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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the Chinese style of imperialism in the early 21st century  
 
through China’s self-justifying rationalization and strategic thought. It develops a theory called  
 
Cultural Subjectivism to explore the PRC’s preferred world order. Specifically, it analyzes the  
 
characteristics of Chinese subjectivity and how Beijing shapes the roles of the self and others  
  
through the othering and altercating processes in order to justify the country’s overseas  
 
expansion. The international order that Beijing espouses reflects a realistic assessment of world  
 
politics. This realpolitik, however, is denied in the narratives for public consumption. Several  
 
idealistic principles that China claims are guiding its foreign policy (and devoid of strategic  
 
calculations) create a false impression that Beijing is an altruistic actor occupying the moral high  
 
ground. Anchoring Chinese behavior to the inherent benevolence of the PRC underpins an  
 
unfalsifiable self-justifying logic that, regardless of shifts in policies, Beijing’s behavior is  
 
always defensive, peaceful, non-expansionist and non-hegemonic.  
 
In accord with Beijing’s assessments of the post-Cold War peace, its narratives have 
grown more inclusive in that the opposing roles (the othering) between the self and others 
becomes less salient while the role congruence (the altercasting) that indicates shared interests 
gets more prevalent. This is tailored to meet China’s strategic needs of the attainment of material 
strength and international status in the era of post-Cold War globalization through engagement 
with countries around the world. Paralleling the increasing usage of inclusive rhetoric to 
rationalize Beijing’s overseas expansion is the growing discursive assertiveness of a China-
espoused world order in which Chinese institutions and Chinese culture are said, due to their 
innate benevolence compared to hegemonic capitalism, to bring the world peace and prosperity. 
After all, the inclusive narratives and the role (re)construction spin around the concept of 
  
Chinese socialism, an embodiment of the PRC’s self-centeredness, and how it is good for both 
domestic development and international community. 
Beijing’s role construction operates within a quasi-world-like “Asia Pacific” that includes 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Eurasian continent. Within this expansive geographical 
scope, China adopts the grand strategy of “winning without fighting” which consists of the 
strategies of “cooperation” and limited provocations. The purpose is to amass resources through 
the land to cope with the challenges from the sea. As the strategic logic of winning without 
fighting dictates, the PRC intends to achieve its political goals during peacetime while, through 
disarming enemies and strengthening itself in its overseas expansion, preparing for a possible 
future war if non-war solutions prove impossible for obtaining its goals. Accordingly, “active 
defense” needs to be understood as a strategic guideline that directs the generation of resources 
and abilities for both non-war and war solutions. From a Chinese perspective, regardless of the 
means adopted, China’s behavior is always defensive and for the sake of peace wherever the 
activities occur. This unfalsifiable rationalization that relies on the benevolent nature of the self, 
rather than an admission of realistic calculations, to explain its own behavior functions on a 
global level and characterizes active defense.  
From the perspective of discursive rationalization, China exhibits the height of 
imperialism. Compared to Japan and the US, Beijing shows an unprecedented degree and scale 
in claiming itself moral in that it is altruistic and inclusive, while firmly believing in its own 
claims. It is the gulf between complicated realities and the extent of the PRC’s willingness to 
systematically deny such or cover up what happens on the ground and a lower degree of 
transparency in its strategic calculations for self-interests that make Chinese imperialism 
different from others.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
                                     
                                     According to Lenin, the highest stage of capitalism is imperialism. 
What is the height of imperialism then? 
 
China has had a vision of the inclusion of peoples and their diverse institutions which 
never gets realized. The future in China’s politics receives a predominant weight to a degree that 
the past and the present can be1 systematically rewritten to preserve one’s beliefs that are biased 
toward everything good about what one hopes for the country and one’s convictions about the 
capabilities of the Communist Party and the morality of certain Party members for their sinicized 
socialist orthodoxy. Like layers of an onion, each logical thread of the Chinese narratives that 
defends the past and provides hopes for the future is further strengthened by an outer layer that is 
added later in response to another case of failed governance. A fully-grown onion is well shaped 
by the cohesiveness of the outer layers. The stories told by the CCP dazzle the minds of many, at 
home and abroad, in a way that numerous horrific incidents of anti-humanity seem unreal or still 
within the bounds of acceptability. As much as the PRC believes in its uniqueness, China’s 
inclusive greatness never gets realized. And yet, the country remains in a constant state of such 
pursuit while, buying into its own account of historical inclusion, convinced that the self already 
has it. The past once was the future. Before it gets rewritten, it used to be the focal point of the 
hopes for the realization of a given political goal. The way the past is no longer the future is to 
become romanticized aspirations for another future. Thus, the Chinese narratives are constructed 
 
1 Lucian Pye had noted a Chinese emphasis on the future instead of the present and how this has consequences 
on things happening at the present. See Lucian W. Pye, “Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture: The 
Escalation of Confrontation from Moralizing to Revenge,” Asian Survey, vol. 30, no. 4, 1990, pp. 331-347, 
specifically p. 332. 
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in a way to preserve and to continue the supply of the (false) consciousness filled with 
convictions and little substance. Such is the primary characteristic of the Chinese polity.  
That multiethnic nationals are living cordially on the vast territories that are called China 
today is said to be a historical fact since the dynastic eras, except for changes in regime. The 
narratives continue that great misfortune however arrived when western imperialist powers came 
to exploit the country. Trials and tribulations would then prove that the Chinese Communist 
Party selflessly saved the country. To show how individuals are committed to the Party’s causes 
with patriotism, heroic stories are constructed. According to Beijing’s narratives, the PRC 
continues the heritage of governing the vast lands with multiple ethnic groups and shoulders the 
responsibility of restoring the past glory. So, this task of restoring Chinese greatness continues to 
today. This type of discourse sends a message that it is inclusiveness and altruism that 
characterize the Chinese polity. From Beijing’s perspective, the CCP equates to the PRC and 
China; the Party also represents multiple ethnic groups. Through such equation and 
representation, every constructed positive characteristic is morphed into the multifarious 
morality of the CCP.   
The PRC since Mao’s period has harbored the ambition of developing global influence, 
first through revolutionary agendas and then economic nationalism in the post-Deng decades to 
today. When nationalism, i.e., reviving Chinese greatness, requires the development and 
consolidation of overseas influence, it has few differentiations from imperialism. The PRC now 
has claimed that its altruism and inclusion also apply to its global governance for diverse 
populations living with various institutions. 
 
3 
Imperialism is generally characterized by a discrepancy between idealistic rhetoric and 
complicated realities. Major powers’ foreign policies are driven by realism, strategic and serving 
self-interests, but they tend to find justifications to make it sound like they are promoters of 
peace and justice. On this baseline, the nature of the narratives varies according to the 
composers’ local contexts. From the perspective of discursive rationalization, systematic and 
multi-faceted construction along with a maintenance and revisions for refinement characterize 
China’s imperialism. The presence of two factors---an authoritarian government with a single 
ruling party and the tradition of utilizing philosophies turned political ideologies to legitimize its 
rule---make possible consistent and persistent efforts to keep certain narratives alive. It is the 
institutionalization of a certain political culture that generates and supports Chinese discourse.  
The main characteristic of the Chinese narratives, pre-modern and modern, is about a 
selfless monarch or polity-enabled governance of inclusion. Imperial grace emanated to each 
corner and cranny of the diverse world that the Chinese state knew of. Different peoples were all 
the people of the emperor. In the modern era, China had obligations to help lesser states, its 
revolutionary and non-revolutionary brothers, against the imperial capitalist US. More recently, 
the world has been plagued by diseases, poverty, environmental issues, etc., and China is willing 
to shoulder responsibilities to apply its domestic model of inclusive governance to international 
society. Needless to say, decades of suppression and ethnic cleansing of the non-Chinese 
population in Central Asian territories points to the disparity between involuntary sinicization 
and the rhetoric of multiethnic unity. Incidents of racism also constantly challenge the claim of 
non-discrimination. Numerous protests over the years belie the emphasis on harmony. Dam 
construction drains the Mekong River which many Southeast Asian countries rely on for their 
livelihood. It offers a counter example for Beijing’s favorite term, win-win cooperation. Military 
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and quasi-military bases in Djibouti and the South China Sea respectively also challenge the 
PRC’s claims that its activities are devoid of military purposes and for the sake of peace only. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese discourse of altruistic inclusiveness has been well-maintained and 
grows more sophisticated. Built upon the constant of discrepancies between words and deeds, it 
is the entrenched belief in the inclusive morality of the self with a blind eye to the governing 
failures that makes Chinese imperialism different. Such conviction is not merely conviction. It is 
an embodiment of a long-term political culture. The height of Chinese imperialism lies exactly in 
the profound degree of its conviction that, however horrendous the anti-humanity enterprise the 
government is engaged in, however blatant the lies it tells, it is always convinced of its moral 
authority.  
It seems that the more (percieved) disorder, disconformity and discord occur on the 
ground, the more likely the PRC is to refine the narratives and make them more closely woven. 
The increasing gulf testifies to the belief that the self is always morally right; whatever it does, 
even when it does things contrary to its claims, the motives are selfless. There is nothing wrong 
to use excuses to shrug off one’s accountability. It is the conviction of moral authoritativeness 
stemming from the claimed altruism that characterizes Chinese imperialism. 
Operating from a Chinese way of thinking, the realization of inclusion depends on 
acceptance of and obeisance to the authority; because the authority is morally good whatever it 
does, as long as its wishes are fulfilled, there will be peace and prosperity. The high morality that 
China believes it has is the type of authoritarian inclusiveness. In the plain words, the Chinese 
way of altruism is, do as I say and you will get what you want, but whether you get what you 
need is not up to you to decide. Such a style of inclusion appears in the pre-modern interactions 
between non-Chinese and Chinese polities and in the contemporary narratives. The differences 
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are that, to be in line with the contemporary rhetorical norm, however hypocritical it is, that 
states are equal, Beijing’s post-Cold War narratives have created an impression that equality 
regardless of the sizes of states guides its foreign policy. And yet, situated in the middle of 
producing webs of idealism, China believes itself to be what its narratives describe. 
On the issue of the South China Sea, the PRC denies any involvement of strategic 
calculations for self-interest, while framing the issue as safeguarding regional peace and simply 
protecting its territories; from Beijing’s view, its behavior in the Sea does not exemplify outward 
expansion. While China is militarizing the Sea, it remains adamant in defending its behavior as 
non-provocative, cooperative and for everyone’s good. It is within the parallel contexts of a low 
degree of strategic transparency and the prevalent idealistic rhetoric that China’s ultra-
defensiveness stands out. 
Policies are made according to changing strategic conditions. The US makes this clear 
when it comes to the Western Hemisphere, but China does not when it comes to South China Sea 
and military bases. The American Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary are examples in that 
both presidents publicly evaluated the world balance of power and came up with the US foreign 
policies accordingly. Monroe clearly mentioned that if conditions shifted, Washington’s policies 
would alter as well. The non-intervention principle laid out by Monroe is self-justified, but it is 
not unfalsifiable, because he already indicated that this principle would no longer guide behavior 
when situations in the future changed in a way that they negatively affected Washington’s 
interests. China’s self-justifying logic, on the contrary, is unfalsifiable. It does not specify the 
realistic conditions for its remaking of polices as the US did. Instead, it argues that its policies 
epitomize and follow various idealistic principles, such as equality, mutual respect, peaceful 
coexistence, etc. These principles in Beijing’s discourse are perennially held and followed. In 
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China’s public narratives, there is a denial that its policies reflect strategic intentions; these 
narratives do not create an impression that China strategically calculates situations to design 
policies for self-interest. In these texts, with the absence of realism, what is left and indeed the 
main body of the texts is idealistic rhetoric and claims about how peaceful the Chinese nation 
and polity have historically been. The question remains, what guides Beijing’s policies? The 
answer is the innate good nature of China. This goodness is genetic as its narratives plainly state. 
Because it is inherently good, however policies change, Beijing’s decisions and behavior always 
follow the above stated idealistic principles, and thus cannot be morally wrong. This type of self-
justification that relies on a believed biological explanation is not falsifiable. The conviction 
behind such rationalization is that China’s moral authority based on altruism---we never 
strategically gauge situations for our sole self-interest---can’t be challenged whatever it does. 
Furthermore, the very fact that the texts are composed predominantly of idealistic narratives that 
aim to highlight the morality of the self, even though they are empty statements and lacking 
substance, can itself be evidence of what the PRC believes it is.  
The deep-rooted conviction of the moral authoritativeness of the self takes place in the 
context where a single political party and China’s political traditions provide conditions for 
persistent and conscious efforts to develop a discourse of inclusion, blended with Confucian 
terms and sinicized Marxist ideology. This is not a coincidence as the current narratives, 
Confucianism and Chinese Marxism all emphasize the selflessness of the Chinese polity. This 
historical consistency in utilizing similar reasoning to sanction one’s rule and the growing 
tightness of connections among different logical threads in the discourse even highlight the 
PRC’s entrenched belief of itself occupying a moral high ground. Chinese imperialism manifests 
the institutionalized culture of unfalsifiable self-justification.  
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Such imperialism that is characterized by ultra-defensiveness and morality politics unfolds 
on a global level. Chinese essays indicate that the world fans outward with the PRC at the center. 
The geostrategic center of gravity is the Eurasian continent. Bordering seas in the east and lands 
in the west and south, China aspires to possess both land power and sea power. By making the 
Eurasian continent its own strategic hinterland, it wishes to muster resources from the land to 
deal with challenges from the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, Beijing’s intention to 
become a sea power cannot be underestimated. Chinese writings dissert that both Taiwan and the 
South China Sea concern China’s domestic development and overseas expansion. The 
militarization of the South China Sea is not merely about the obtainment of that sea but also is 
designed to prepare for warfare, with Taiwan being a target. The narratives clearly indicate that 
once China can control the first island chain, it will have unprecedented freedom in the Pacific 
and the Indian Ocean. The scheme of becoming a land and a sea power on this scale is 
unprecedented in the world history. It is within this vast geographical scope that morality politics 
exerts influence. 
Beijing’s narratives cannot be understood at their face value. Analysts need to take a 
critical view and assess how and to what extent the Chinese discourse reflects the PRC’s beliefs. 
To that effect, three layers of analysis are required. The first layer is the patterns in the narratives 
for public consumption and what they say, do not say and explicitly deny. The second one is the 
patterns in the writings that do not target a broad audience base. The final layer is to compare the 
first two and to take both together to understand how China’s belief system functions. The 
analysis reveals multifold interesting phenomena. Narratives for the public audiences that are 
highly idealistic and moral can be designed according to what one perceives to be the needs of 
others, for instance, toning down the rhetoric of hierarchy and emphasizing equality. There is, 
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however, more to it than strategic deception. Discursive construction on a consistent and 
constant base reveals a belief in function that, despite some subterfuge, such maneuvers will not 
tarnish China’s morality; its policies are still for the good of others, and to avoid or deny any 
strategic calculations is to avoid misunderstanding out of good will. The conviction that one is 
morally good is also indicated in the writings that are not for public consumption. These 
publications that have narrower audience bases spill ink on realpolitik and geostrategy. At the 
same time, they incorporate into the same texts similar inclusive narratives to defend their policy 
suggestions or uphold the current policies. The PRC does not appear to be strategically clueless 
as some may argue. It may also have a grand strategy. It is worth pondering whether a western 
perspective is relied on in evaluating whether China has a grand strategy. The issue areas which 
the PRC focuses on may not be the same as western countries do. If the beautified rhetoric is not 
believed in, why would it be included as a part of arguments in the essays that do not need to 
attract public attention? These writings overall reveal a logic that, however strategic one is in 
working for self-interest, the ultimate result is beneficial for many because, as Beijing reasons, it 
is innately good and thus will not accept blame regardless of what it does. Despite an 
involvement in ghastly violence, China has been building formidable fortresses to defend its high 
morality. It laments though: can an absolute obeisance prove so difficult that others refuse to 
accept my own benevolence? 
************* 
 
This research approaches the Chinese style of imperialism from China’s own strategic 
thought and self-justifying reasonings. The analysis is about how the PRC rationalizes its 
overseas expansion through role conceptions to define interactions, in a way that is materialized 
9 
in the grand strategy of winning without fighting and the strategies of “cooperation” and limited 
provocation, for the realization of strategic and political interests within a quasi-world-like 
“Asia-Pacific.” Andrew Scobell, in examining China’s use of force, coins the term, “Cult of 
Defense,” to describe the entrenched belief among Chinese political and military leaders that 
China’s strategic culture from the aspect of use of force is always defensive and for just reasons.2 
This study expands the term’s application to the PRC’s foreign policy in the pre-war stage. It 
shows that how China’s images shaping the self and others through the altercasting and othering 
processes highlight itself to be on the right side. China’s subjectivity functions on a global level 
in that wherever its activities take place, it will always defend them as peaceful, non-expansionist 
and non-hegemonic. 
The PRC has aspired to be at the central position of world politics since its founding. With 
the exception of the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), its perception of world 
politics, its preferred world order and the orders built by other powers (as viewed from Beijing’s 
perspective) have all been materially based. Increased relative material strength can bolster this 
self-centeredness, but decreased material capabilities may not inversely affect it. Over time, the 
PRC strategically reshapes its own role and that of others to be in accord with the changing 
times. Generally speaking, it has framed its interactions with other countries in more inclusive 
terms, which is especially salient from the 1990s onward. This is tailored for Chinese 
engagement with the world, potential enemies and non-enemies alike. Paralleling the growing 
 
2 Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Long March and the Great Wall. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003; Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell & Larry M. Wortzel, “Introduction: the 
Lessons Learned by China’s Soldiers,” in The Lessons of History: the Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75, 
eds. Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell & Larry M. Wortzel, Charlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, 
pp. 3-14. Regarding the second book, especially see pages 6 to 8. The authors have an evaluation of the 
Chinese style of use of force that stands the test of changing times. 
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intensity of inclusive narratives is the increasing discursive assertiveness in implementing the 
PRC’s preferred world order.  
In Beijing’s narratives, Chinese socialism and Chinese culture, both of which are 
associated in that traditional culture has come to be percieved as the foundation of Chinese 
socialism and sinicized socialism (or Chinese Marxism) has become part of the Chinese culture, 
are conducive to world peace and contain wisdom to reshape international order. Unlike the 
Soviet style of setting up clone regimes in Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communist Party argues 
that sinicized socialism is good because it has an inherently peaceful nature compared to 
aggressive capitalism. The growing discursive assertiveness in this regard is in sharp contrast 
with the fact that China’s elite class, the Chinese families in the political circle at the provincial 
and event county level above, is actively involved in the capitalist world market to accumulate 
money.  
Chinese justification takes place in a quasi-world-like “Asia Pacific.” According to the 
PRC’s geopolitical location, Chinese narratives set out geographical scopes which are deemed 
crucial for the realization of the PRC’s interests. They also provide strategic logic for how the 
resources put into the development of land power and sea power can work together to fulfill 
China’s political goals of gaining international status and influence through obtainment of 
economic, maritime and territorial interests. It seems that the PRC aims to obtain both land 
power and sea power with the (foreign) land serving as buffer zones and China will amass 
needed resources from the land to cope with the challenges from the sea.  
China’s overseas military and non-military activities bear military purposes of peacetime 
deterrence and use of force. The current literature that discusses “active defense”, the strategic 
guideline of the People’s Liberation Army, usually focuses on Chinese use of force. This 
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research will address the dimensions which have not been examined. It applies the strategic 
guideline to peacetime activities and argues that the self-justifying logic of active defense 
functions on a global level. In other words, as the Chinese narratives indicate, wherever the 
PRC’s military activities (including but not limited to use of force) take place, they are always 
defensive and for the sake of peace. The strategic guideline is not merely about use of force. It is 
a concept that encompasses peacetime military and non-military preparations and their strategic 
logic in war deterrence and war preparations as well as the rationalization of one’s own behavior 
in allocating resources for military use to achieve the set political goals. Active defense applies 
to both border regions and regions away from the East Asian subcontinent. This is seen in the 
PLA’s activities in the first island chain, the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. These 
peacetime maneuvers and the infrastructure projects of the Belt and Road Initiative are 
preparations for war 
The PRC’s trajectory to become a great power so far has taken a different route than other 
major powers in the history. Compared to the cases of Japan and the US, the Chinese narratives 
and empirical evidence on the ground show that Beijing has not followed the logic of 
consolidating its regional status first and then expanding outward, but rather is using the outer 
circle to obtain its goals in the inner circle, like a catch-all fishing net spreading as expansively 
as it can before closing, while simultaneously working on both outer and inner circles of strategic 
belts that it identifies. Chinese imperialism also differs from the American and Japanese versions 
in that it is highly coated with the pretension of inclusiveness. This is done systematically in 
public speeches by denying China’s strategic intentions and its realpolitik understanding of 
world politics, and by advancing narratives that try to deliver the message that China not only 
takes the world’s problems to heart but also has the capability to solve them.  
12 
Another difference between China and the US is that, on the issues of a long-term concern, 
the former adopts an unfalsifiable self-justifying logic for its changing behavior whereas the 
American rationalization can be falsified. China wants others to see itself as a carrier of idealism 
who, with the interests of mankind in mind, can make the world a better place, which is revealed 
in its own narratives with an emphasis on morality (such as five principles of peaceful 
coexistence, and a just and fair world order), instead of an actor who is constantly aware of the 
world balance of power and crafts policies accordingly. Beijing does not specify the conditions 
for the functioning of those idealistic terms, and they work more like eternal principles. As the 
result, the PRC self-justifies changing policies through discursive reconstructions so that it will 
never violate these principles. The US, on the contrary, was explicit about its perception of the 
world from a realistic point of view and made it clear how its interests were different from the 
Old World. The behavioral guideline that it adhered to could be overridden as circumstances 
changed, and Washington made it clear in the narratives that its behavior would change once 
situations changed.  
Contributions to the Current Literature 
The “rise” of China has led to many academic discussions and writings. From the 
perspective of international relations and world politics, the literature written in English can be 
generalized into two categories: those who argue for a future China as a benign and peaceful 
dominant power and those who argue that it will be an aggressive and expansionist global player. 
For the former, the literature that incorporates Chinese rhetoric often takes leaders’ words at their 
face value. These works are too quick to give the PRC credit for what it says in its foreign 
policy. There are also cases in which scholars use traditional Chinese philosophies to imply or 
indicate that China will be an inclusive actor and will treat others well. The gaps between 
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idealistic philosophies and operational political ideologies that in essence are realpolitik are not 
addressed. For the latter category, predicting Chinese behavior according to the existing theories 
of international relations--such as power transition, offensive realism, defensive realism, and 
liberal institutionalism, and many other secondary theories that aim to find (negative or positive) 
correlations and are not the previous stated grand theories--is not informative as to the way the 
PRC acts differently from other major powers, mostly western countries whose historical 
experience is the foundation for the IR theories. In fact, it is the differences that matter in 
explaining China’s trajectory to become a great power. 
Both categories have used traditional political philosophies as theoretical sources to build 
their arguments. However, a given philosophy, for instance, Confucianism, is often understood 
partially and is not examined by considering all aspects of it. It is modified to fit the current IR 
theoretical framework of causal relations, or correlations, and therefore the main gist of 
Confucianism as a self-justifying political ideology is lost. Another issue across the two 
categories is that the current treatments in both empirical evidence and in theory do not capture 
nuances and details that explain the Chinese perspective. 
This study takes a different approach in using Chinese statements and Chinese 
philosophies (or philosophies-turned political ideologies) to analyze China’s expansion. Instead 
of taking them partially, this research examines them systematically. Chinese political 
philosophies are theoretical in nature and remain sources for the PRC’s statements and 
narratives. The borrowing of Marxism and its sinicization again reflect a cultural need of using 
some theoretical ideology to sanction Chinese rule. Chinese classics, military and non-military 
alike, dealing with strategic and grand strategic logics also are systematic and theoretical in 
nature. Therefore, in understanding the PRC’s statements, narratives, reasonings and behavior, 
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they are the first theoretical sources to turn to as they are informative of the Chinese worldview 
including how the world runs, the role of the self and its relationships with others, a preferred 
world order and what constitutes that preferred order. 
In general, the current literature has not looked into how the PRC strategically sees its 
geopolitical position, how it defines the world from its own perspective, and how it translates its 
perceptions of world politics and its position therein into foreign policy. It also has not examined 
the above aspects by applying and developing theories that are grounded in the Chinese 
experience. This research addresses these gaps.  
The focus of this study is the analysis of official views. What it does not do is examine 
public opinion, debates or disagreements. The endeavor to explore the popular base of the 
Chinese ideology and what the debates are over the foreign policies will require further research. 
However, the public’s views of the matter in general do not depart from the leadership’s views. 
Michael H. Hunt has a nuanced argument about public rhetoric. It can be used to suggest the 
existence of a broad base of popular support for Beijing’s official ideology. His words deserve to 
be quoted at length: 
“Public rhetoric may seem peculiarly suspect as evidence to be taken at face 
value. The cynical would contend that carefully staged public appeals are 
occasions not for frank and nuanced expression but for cant intended to fool the 
gullible and mask true intentions. One may argue that rhetoric is a form of 
persuasion, that to treat it instead as confession would be profoundly mistaken.  
But such a skeptical view may be too clever by half. Public rhetoric is not 
simply a screen, tool or ornament. It is also, perhaps even primarily, a form of 
communication, rich in symbols and mythology and closely constrained by 
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certain rules. To be effective, public rhetoric must draw on values and concerns 
widely shared and easily understood by its audience. A rhetoric that ignores or 
eschews the language of common discourse on the central problems of the day 
closes itself off as a matter of course from any sizable audience, limiting its own 
influence. If a rhetoric fails to reflect the speaker’s genuine views on fundamental 
issues, it runs the risks over time of creating false public expectations and lays the 
basis for politically dangerous misunderstanding. If it indulges in blatant 
inconsistency, it eventually pays the price of diminished force and credibility.”3 
This research develops a theory, called cultural subjectivism. It is built based on the 
current Chinese narratives and Confucianism and sinicized Marxism. It is a theory that explains 
how the PRC self-justifies its own behavior. Both sinicized Marxism and Confucianism provide 
idealistic blueprints. They depict an inclusive world where political leaders are altruistic and do 
not differentiate. These characteristics sanction the authoritativeness of the political leaders. 
While Confucianism does not explicitly advocate for the pursuit of material strength, its 
envisioned harmonious world requires material foundation. Beijing’s pursuit of material 
capabilities is legitimized by sinicized Marxism that condones materialism and is further justified 
by the Confucian rhetoric of building a harmonious world. Since the purpose of this research is 
to understand Chinese behavior and thinking, cultural subjectivism is based on the Chinese 
experience and is not meant for generalization. 
 
 
 
3 Michael H. Hunt. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009, p. 15. via 
Ebook Central Academic Complete. 
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China’s Cultural Subjectivism 
The Chinese style of cultural subjectivism is defined by high idealism and a claim to a 
moral high ground, both of which are closely associated with the claimed inclusiveness toward 
multiethnic populations and different political and socio-economic institutions at home and 
abroad. There are two criteria to measure this ultra-idealism: 1) a widening gap between 
fragmented/complicated realities and the degree of willingness to systematically deny such or 
cover up what happens on the ground, and 2) a low degree of transparency in one’s strategic 
calculations for the fulfillment of one’s self-interests despite the utilization of lofty rhetoric of 
peace and working for all. Although it is relatively constant across major states to practice 
realism and to entice others to do one’s bidding with beautified narratives, the PRC demonstrates 
a greater extent in publicly deny that it engages in such behavior and in stressing its capabilities 
in making true the rosy pictures it depicts for domestic and international audiences. Both denial 
and emphasis go beyond rhetorical and enter the realm of belief. The extent of this conviction 
about the moral authority of the self can be measured in cases where China uses inclusiveness-
based idealistic and moral rhetoric, and where strategic assessments and intentions are 
intentionally omitted or denied. 
On the basis of the universal phenomenon that states are self-centered and tend to defend 
their own deeds, the ways and the degrees this situation is manifested vary in different cultural 
contexts. In rationalizing foreign policies on the way to becoming a great power, the Chinese 
narratives for public consumption are made to be devoid of the impression that Beijing’s foreign 
policies are based on realpolitik. In these narratives, aside from idealistic rhetoric (such as 
equity, fairness, mutual benefits, cooperation and non-zero sum relationships), China explicitly 
denies any intention for strategic competition with other major states. In other words, the PRC 
17 
colors its narratives with altruism and claims to occupy a moral high ground. This absence of 
strategic calculations paralleling the rhetoric of inclusiveness that is consciously constructed in 
the Chinese narratives characterizes Beijing’s ultra-idealism and its conviction that it has higher 
morality than others. On its way to become a great power, the US, however, showed a different 
example. While defending its behavior, Washington did not intentionally hide its strategic 
calculations based on self-interest and did not conceal the fact that it tailored its policies 
according to its understanding of the world balance of power. Compared with the US, the 
realpolitik basis of Chinese decisions is not readily detected. One needs to look into sources 
which do not target a wider spectrum of audiences. In addition, while the PRC puts on a 
pretention of inclusiveness, the US recognized the differences among peoples but went too far in 
constructing a discourse of racism to justify its behavior. The gist of the matter in the comparison 
between the two countries is the degree of transparency in their realistic intentions and the 
degree of rhetorical cover-up as well as conviction in their constructed idealistic narratives. The 
combined differences explain the Chinese style of cultural subjectivism that is characterized by 
unrealistic idealism and self-proclaimed higher morality, both of which the PRC firmly believes 
in.  
The Chinese emphasis on inclusiveness bears similarities to the Japanese case of Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity. However, there are differences in degrees. In arguing that its 
inclusiveness applies to both domestic and international governance, the Chinese claim occurs in 
the context where there is a gulf between the narratives of multiethnic solidarity and forced 
assimilation and ethnic cleansing. Japan, however, has a higher degree of cultural, ethnical and 
political cohesion at home. The PRC demonstrates a more extreme case in that it believes there is 
nothing wrong in constructing an idealistic discourse that does not faithfully describe or is 
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opposite to what happened. In addition, compared to Japan, the Chinese polity also has a longer 
history, dated to dynastic periods, of building an inclusive discourse toward groups with different 
ethnic and cultural backgrounds. This may speak to an institutionalized tendency to believe in 
and build narratives that sound as if the self is the only one qualified to occupy the moral high 
ground.  
The high idealism of the PRC cannot be dismissed as merely rhetorical. This does not 
mean that its narratives are genuine, but rather from Beijing’s perspective, it believes in what it 
says and/or believes that discursive manipulations are merely minor cosmetic modifications and 
not major concealments. Since depicting a rosy picture for the people to look forward to is the 
norm in Chinese politics, what is the problem with that? Major policy and governing disasters 
may usher in different opinions and power struggles within the Party, but they do not alter 
fundamental convictions in the capabilities and authoritativeness of the CCP itself to make the 
country and the world better in the way it imagines. This dissertation relies on four examples to 
prove that this belief is on a relatively constant basis. First, the evocation of altruistic and 
idealistic rhetoric whose origins can be traced to Maoist Marxism and Confucianism but is 
nevertheless tailored to what China perceives as the needs of countries during the post-Cold War 
decades demonstrates the continuity of using philosophies turned political ideologies to shore up 
China’s mentality of the self occupying the moral high ground. Chinese narratives indicate that 
the CCP’s authoritativeness is derived from the claimed high morality. The second example is 
about the re-interpretations of Chinese socialism from Mao’s period to the post-Deng decades 
and today (chapter 3). Revised socialism 1.0 and 2.0 as the result of major historical ruptures still 
confirm the ruling status of the CCP. The third case shows the increasingly sophisticated foreign 
policy discourse (chapter 4) that aims to persuade domestic and international audiences that “the 
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rise” of China will bring the world peace and solve many thorny issues. Here, the Chinese 
narratives trace the qualifications of the CCP to the innate goodness of Chinese institutions and 
culture. The last example is Beijing’s re-construction of the Wuhan coronavirus narratives 
(epilogue). It shows how the Communist Party reconstructs the event to cope with domestic and 
international pressures while maintaining itself to be on a moral high ground. However terms are 
defined and redefined, events are interpreted and re-interpreted, a belief in the authoritativeness 
of the CCP and the prospects that it will bring equality and harmony to human beings does not 
waver.  
Based on the above discussion, China’s morality politics is characterized by a denial and a 
conviction in that its foreign policies are not based on realpolitik. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
politics of inclusiveness needs to be understood in the context of a constant self-belief that only 
the CCP is able to reshape the country and the world with its own selfless blueprints, despite the 
fact that the historical evidence of Chinese governance will undermine such confidence. On the 
basis that major states practice realpolitik (including China, as chapters 3, 5 and 6 show), the 
PRC denies that it is conducting such deeds and believes itself to behave with altruistic and 
inclusive principles. A large part of this dissertation studies how Beijing practices realism but 
denies it, while buying into its own denial. To put it another way, this study is mainly about how 
China intends to create an impression, with itself buying into the self-created discourse for 
domestic and international audiences, that it is a carrier and practitioner of idealism and morality, 
while its policies reflect the essence of realism. This ultra-defensiveness is not merely 
characterized by the prevalent inclusive rhetoric in a wide spectrum of the texts (public speeches, 
essays from think tanks and newspapers) whose audience bases vary, but also the belief that the 
self is inclusive and its behavior reflects this. The US, on the contrary, on its way to become a 
20 
great power, despite some lofty rhetoric in some cases, had made clear its strategic evaluation of  
world politics and how such assessments were affecting its foreign policies.   
Lucian Pye, a sinologist who conducted in-depth and nuanced research on Chinese 
politics, accurately observed that even power struggle in the PRC is a competition for the moral 
high ground.4 This is not about actors competing to do the right things, but rather actors 
competing to employ moral language to justify their deeds which are really for self-interest (or 
actors employing moral language to justify their competitive deeds which are really for self-
interest) with a conviction that their causes are right because these causes are selfless. One 
example used in this dissertation is Mao’s competition with Moscow for leadership of the 
socialist camp. Mao accused Khrushchev of being a “revisionist” and defended his own 
competitive act as an adherence to orthodox Marxism-Leninism. From Mao’s view, China was a 
true altruistic and inclusive revolutionary who took the revolutionary welfare of other lesser 
states to heart. Another example is China’s swearing that, unlike the American power politics 
and hegemonic behavior, it will never (a word it uses) seek hegemony and expansion. Whether 
one is aggressive and expansive, from Beijing’s view, is defined by the possession of military 
bases. The matter here is not whether the PRC practices realpolitik—it does (just like other major 
states) and uses rhetoric to cover its deeds (many other major states do so as well)—but rather it 
intends to use such narratives, in both military and non-military writings, to emphasize its own 
morality and to stress that only a major country like the PRC can show such moral high ground. 
This persistent conviction is reflected in how China has been doing things which it accuses 
others of immorally conducting and nevertheless still claim itself being moral. The examples are 
 
4 Lucian W. Pye, “Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture: The Escalation of Confrontation from Moralizing 
to Revenge,” Asian Survey, vol. 30, no. 4, 1990, pp. 331-347. 
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the military base in Djibouti and the quasi-military bases in the South China Sea. Despite the 
presence of these facilities, the PRC in the 2019 defense white paper still states that it will never 
seek hegemony and expansion. China does not recognize these facilities as military bases. It calls 
the base in Djibouti a logical support base purely for economic reasons. Accordingly, regardless 
of what Beijing does, even when it does things that it strongly condemns others doing, its moral 
authoritativeness cannot be questioned. Washington, however, did not show such a saint-like 
image in that whatever it does, it cannot be morally wrong. And if the US did, it is questionable 
that such a situation persisted throughout different administrations.  
The Chinese style of cultural subjectivism is characterized by a self-believed inclusive way 
of doing things, and such belief is on a constant basis, which differs markedly from the cases of 
the US and Japan. On its way to be a great power, it was racism-informed exclusion that 
characterized the US in both western expansion and outward expansion. Washington did not use 
inclusive rhetoric to persuade other ethnicities into submitting to its authority. It is also 
questionable whether this sense of authority existed on a constant basis. Since the US at the time 
was not a state with a single political party, its foreign policies and rhetoric were not always 
consistent. As many similarities as there are between China and Japan, in terms of imagining 
oneself to be a selfless authority caring about different peoples, China exceeds Japan in degree. 
In a plain explanation, if seeing major states’ imperialism as an embodiment of an empire 
of systematic lies which espousers do not see major problems with, on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 
being the slightest, China is on 5. When the time demands it, narratives that govern the day can 
be overridden by a new discourse to shore up the legitimacy of the CCP. And the new discourse 
will be constructed in a way to delegitimize any attempt at using previous narratives to attack the 
Party. The past and the presence can always be rewritten and reconstructed to give hope to the 
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targeted audiences that the future will be better, while preserving the lofty status of the CCP. In 
Pye’s words, “It is a politics of becoming, not of being.”5 This also explains why systematic 
discursive manipulation is not an issue; the focus is on the future, and if manipulation of the past 
and the present can provide collective motives to work for a future goal, there is nothing wrong 
with it. That the past disasters are simply mistakes and a thorough examination into 
accountability and institutional flaws is not necessary is the assumption based on which the 
Chinese narratives are constructed to inform the domestic population and international society of 
a great future ahead. Although Maoist socialism did not work, despite the failures of the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, from Beijing’s view, Mao was still 70% right and he 
remains a great revolutionary and the founding father of Chinese socialism. Based on this 
positivity, the redefined socialism 2.0 laid out during Deng’s period will continue to carry the 
people into a bright future by setting forth certain economic goals. Mounting social issues, 
numerous protests, a deteriorating ecological environment and corruption then give rise to the 
rhetoric of harmony since the mid-2000s. With1.4 billion people under its control on territories 
the size of Europe, the PRC is unable to develop a sound economy. The solution is to excite 
another wave of nationalism to support outward expansion and to instill a hope in the 
international society that a future with a strong China will be better. On the recipient side, a great 
many Chinese citizens have been brought up to accept such a political culture and Beijing also 
finds a receptive international audience, including those who are willing to co-opted.  
The fact that the PRC does not see issues with systematic lies is also manifested in its 
confidence in consistently claiming a moral high ground. China’s cultural subjectivism in which 
it sees itself as right in whatever it does is shown through the gulf between 
 
5 Ibid., p. 332.  
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fragmented/complicated realities and its willingness to interweave webs of fabricated or partial 
facts to create the impression that Chinese inclusiveness is a historical continuity and will be so 
in the future, at home and abroad. The PRC consolidates its legitimacy by stringing together the 
alleged 5000-years continuously great Chinese civilization and the claimed continuity in that, in 
the past thousands of years, multiple ethnic groups on the East Asian continent have worked in 
solidarity to build a country called China. Furthermore, Beijing believes that it will be able to 
reshape the world for the better by presenting “evidence” of such historical inclusiveness. Unlike 
the PRC, the US did not claim to be an inclusive country that was based on multiple ethncities 
and the willingness to tolerate different political and social institutions at home and abroad. The 
multiethnic inclusiveness that is seen today is the result of the civil rights movements in the 
1960s, education, and institutional reforms. Neither does the US nor Japan claim its domestic 
and world legitimacy derived from the historical continuity of its own inclusive civilization. 
Washington pales beside Beijing’s ultra-idealism. To put it in a non-academic manner, if this is a 
contest to see who the winner is in telling systematic lies of altruistic inclusion while firmly 
buying into them constantly, the US is not going to win, which also explains Chinese “Cult of 
Defense.” 
Methods, Primary Sources and Spellings 
This research utilizes publicly available resources found in Chinese official documents, 
such as the reports produced for the Party Congresses, and publications from think tanks and 
research centers affiliated with the government and the People’s Liberation Army. Publications 
of the Chinese Communist Party such as Qiushi are systematically analyzed to identify trends 
and logical connections in China’s preferred world order. Speeches of Chinese leaders and 
officials available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and articles found on the websites 
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associated with other government agencies will be utilized as well. Digital archives from the 
Wilson Center are also helpful in providing supporting textual evidence. Through qualitative and 
quantitative textual analysis of the above sources, this study identifies the Chinese perspective, 
strategic logic, and diplomatic rhetoric. It employs within-case historical comparison to identify 
patterns and changes on the issues of the PRC’s worldview, its preferred world order and its way 
of constructing the roles of the self and others. Furthermore, it relies on a cross-case study to 
highlight the differences between China’s imperialism and other variants.  
Generally speaking, Chinese texts are differentiated into four categories: public speeches 
for international audiences, official Party documents, articles from think tanks and research 
centers, and official newspapers/websites. Public speeches aim for diplomacy and thus narratives 
are highly idealistic. They depict Beijing’s visions of an ideal economic and political world order 
by laying out a list of principles which it claims to follow in its foreign policies permanently. 
These texts have two characteristics. First, the proposed agendas and policies within them reflect 
Chinese interests but are shaped as the shared interests of mankind or many other countries. 
Second, they utilize phrases and terms that other countries have used to cast their wishes 
regarding what the PRC can do more positively, for instance, “a major responsible power,” to 
argue that China is doing everything right. 
While English scholarly works and the English writings by China experts have analyzed 
the Party and official documents, a comprehensive and more systematic examination through 
comparison over many years, instead of just two or three years, has been lacking. A larger 
perspective will not be attained unless this approach is taken. In studying the PRC’s trajectory to 
great power status, it is necessary to adopt this approach. Neither does the current literature 
explore the evolution of the Chinese worldview through these texts from a strategic perspective, 
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bringing together the shaping of the images of the self and others, the assessments of 
international climate, corresponding policies, and which actors are newly included and which are 
dropped from the list, etc. Together with the Qiushi journal and newspapers and websites, these 
texts can be propaganda and polemics, but they also contain the beliefs of the Chinese 
Communist Party. The making of propaganda is based on the understanding of the self and 
others and from that point, projects a picture--by interweaving together different pieces of 
information out of their contexts and which can also be fabricated or exaggerated, and partial 
facts as well as information that is believed to accord with the interests of the target audience--to 
create the reality in order to affect the perceptions of the target audience. The underpinning logic 
that supports an article therefore can be informative of the Chinese thinking.  
While also containing the idealistic and defensive narratives, writings from the 
government-affiliated research institutions often provide strategic rationales which are not found 
in public speeches and receive very limited treatment in official papers. The relations between 
the input of research centers and official policies can be two-way influence. These essays follow 
the general official lines and also contribute to the reasonings behind Beijing’s policies. Another 
source for strategic rationale or more substantial thinking can come from official newspapers and 
websites. These two sources can be useful beyond propaganda and the fundamental tenets of the 
Chinese worldview.  
The study relies on a large quantity of texts written in Chinese. In the cases where Chinese 
characters are attached, traditional Chinese characters will be used when it comes to classical 
texts since simplified Chinese did not exist until changes made by the PRC. For materials 
produced by the PRC, simplified Chinese characters will be attached. In a few cases, sources 
from Taiwan will be drawn upon for arguments that do not aim to address the Chinese 
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perspective and China’s strategic logic. Sources from Taiwan will use traditional characters. 
Regarding the spellings, sources from China will use the Romanized pinyin system as this is its 
official usage. Titles of publications, locations, and people’s names from Chinese classics will 
follow the Wade-Giles system. Sources from Taiwan will use the Wade-Giles system without the 
tone marks. The Taiwanese learn the spelling of traditional Chinese characters through a 
different system composed of 37 symbols that does not use the Roman alphabet. The use of 
romanization in Taiwan is diverse and, reflecting Taiwan’s history, mixed with the influences 
from the Taiwanese aboriginal languages, Taiwanese Hoklo and Hakka, Japanese, and Western 
romanization. In transcribing names into the Roman alphabet, the Taiwanese are free to choose 
their spellings. Since the Wade-Giles system without the tone marks is relatively popular, this 
system will be used in citing sources from Taiwan.  
The Organization of This Dissertation  
Chapter 1 is a background essay discussing how the PRC discursively builds a 
contemporary version of imagined community, domestically and internationally. It presents the 
gulf between historical realities and the history rewritten by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). It downplays the war-torn realities and deep-rooted antagonism of the past of the East 
Asian subcontinent as trivial family feuds among different ethnic groups. This sets the tone for 
the type of impression that the official narratives are intended to create, that is, leaning toward 
cordial relationships and moving away from irreconcilable hostile interactions. The purpose is to 
rewrite history to fit the Party’s needs of ruling various ethnic groups on the vast territories it 
controls. In a nutshell, in its national discourse, China, the Chinese nation, and Chinese culture 
are synonyms to one another in that the territories under the PRC’s control have been called 
“China” since antiquity and different groups of peoples with their distinct cultures have worked 
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through a prolonged centripetal process to build a common Chinese culture and the shared 
community of a unified Chinse nation. Thus, in the CCP’s view, the fact that it now rules a 
heterogenous population inhabiting vast territories is a product of the natural and voluntary 
processes of human beings’ interactions.   
Fabricated historical cohesion on the subcontinent blurs the lines between domestic and 
foreign; without differentiations, different groups had a common goal of building a shared 
community. The chapter will then discuss how the official narratives further carry this sense of 
inclusiveness that, according to the PRC’s claims, is enjoyed by the domestic population to the 
CCP’s proposed way of international governance. On the basis that Chinese regimes occupying 
China Proper historically and contemporarily aspire to take the central role in international 
politics, the chapter concludes with a comparison between the dynastic world order and the 
version Beijing espouses today. The analysis will be conducted along the following aspects: 
geographical scope, economic incentives, the nature of external challenges, and the presentation 
and rationalization of preferred world order. 
Chapter 2 builds a new theory that I call “cultural subjectivism,” based on the ideas 
advanced by Chinese leaders to rationalize the PRC’s overseas activities. The roots of these ideas 
are to be found in the historical experience of how Chinese regimes, dynastic and contemporary, 
used Confucianism and Sinicized Marxism as political ideologies to justify their rule. In 
discussing these two ideologies, the chapter focuses on how they were employed in practice, 
instead of what they are as pure philosophies. The analysis is about preferred power relations. 
China has historically opted for a central position in international politics. The underlying 
qualities used to portray the self remain the same, including authoritative, selfless and idealistic. 
In other words, the authority is altruistic and can provide public goods for all, for it knows well 
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what others need. The interaction from the side of the self is an altercasting process and an 
othering process. In some cases, interactions with a certain target can involve both processes 
simultaneously, with the aim to “persuade” the other to take a role in line with the self-desired 
outcomes, sometimes with coercion. 
The process of interaction is to be described and rhetorically presented differently as 
applied Confucianism and Sinicized Marxism are products of different times. The former is more 
explicit than the latter in characterizing relations as hierarchical. The latter, however, is more 
explicit than the former in condoning material pursuits. Their differences work complementarily 
to support the PRC’s rationalization. Because historical backgrounds are different, conditions 
that allow interactions to be described and justified in a certain way also change. As the result, 
the building of cultural subjectivism as a new theory to explain how China rationalizes its 
overseas behavior, aside from the above self attributes and working mechanism (altercasting and 
othering) of interactions, also considers how the changing times affect the current Chinese 
rhetoric whose roots can be traced back to applied Confucianism and Sinicized Marxism. 
Chapter 3 will then provide empirical evidence to the theory of cultural subjectivism laid 
out in chapter 2. By tracing the historical development of Chinese understanding of world 
politics after the founding of the PRC, it analyzes the role conceptions and power relations of the 
world order which the PRC has imagined. Specifically, this chapter discusses two types of 
Chinese worldview. One gives rise to the world order that the PRC favors. The other reflects its 
assessments of world politics while it was using this knowledge to formulate its preferred order. 
To explain the role conceptions of the Chinese self and its projected other(s) in the Chinese 
narratives, this chapter provides evidence of the altercasting and othering process laid out in 
chapter 2 as the mechanisms that the Chinese self evokes in interactions with others (including 
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countries from a wide range on the power spectrum) or in its perceptions of world politics. The 
task will be conducted along with China’s evolving worldview, from vast zone (or intermediate 
zone), two intermediate zones, to three worlds and multipolarity, all of which are Chinese 
conceptions of world politics and inform or are in correspondence with the PRC’s preferred 
order.  
The analysis reveals a relatively consistent pattern in which, during Mao’s period, the 
Chinese inclination for a central position was not hampered by relatively weak material strength 
and during the decades following Deng’s reforms was further bolstered by increasing economic 
growth. Again, the economic downturn from 2010 onward has not affected Chinese discursive 
confidence in taking a leading position. The findings are consistent with theoretical stipulations 
of cultural subjectivism. 
The chapter presents China’s preferred world order in the form of a pyramid, a belief 
triangle, that explains how Chinese discourse links sinicized socialism to domestic development 
and world prospect. The pyramid over time evolved to have complete and reciprocal logical 
connections because of China’s growing economic strength and with that foundation the desire 
to at least maintain the growth, through overseas expansion, if further dramatic increase in GDP 
proves impossible. This finding fits with the theoretical tenet of cultural subjectivism that a 
Chinese world order is supported by a material base. Chinese narratives set the pyramid against 
other orders which, according to Beijing’s discursive construct, were/are espoused by the Soviet 
Union and the US. My analysis in this regard will only focus on the U.S. 
With quantitative discursive evidence from both the Chinese and English versions of the 
journal Qiushi, chapter 4 measures the PRC’s assertiveness in its intention to reshape the 
international order from the four categories: international order, Chinese institutions, Chinese 
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culture and a general group. Chinese institutions and Chinese culture are identified as vehicles 
that, according to Beijing, play conducive roles for world peace and prosperity. Aside from 
statistical results, this chapter will qualitatively present how the narratives are constructed. By so 
doing, it substantiates the othering and altercasting processes that the PRC evokes to shape its 
world order. Furthermore, mostly in the Chinese data, Chinese authors cite alleged statements 
from foreign ruling elites and intellectuals to prove that the PRC’s political appeals and various 
proposals are persuasive.  
The textual analysis of the Chinese data, spanning from 2005 to 2018, shows that there is a 
general upward trend across the four categories with some obvious fluctuations from 2011 
onward. The general group that aims to capture the overall meanings of Chinese texts displays a 
a smooth upward trend. The other three categories, which are more context specific, show a drop 
to various degrees, for one or two years. Regardless, the findings of Chinese discursive 
assertiveness are relatively robust, especially for the years of 2017 and 2018, based on the 
comparison across the four categories. The findings of the English texts in general are similar to 
the Chinese texts. They have a greater degree of fluctuations. The four groups have a drop in 
2018. Nevertheless, in comparing the findings from 2015 to 2018 to those from 2009 to 2014, it 
is obvious that the trend shows increasing Chinese assertiveness. 
Chapter 5 discusses the PRC’s strategies and grand strategy. It first defines geographical 
scopes and regions which the Chinese writings of foreign policy and military affairs believe are 
crucial for the PRC’s survival and outward expansion from a strategic perspective. The evidence 
of the Chinese discourse shows that the border regions have strategic values which the PRC’s 
development and overseas expansion depend on, contrary to the conventional wisdom that these 
regions are peripheries with little strategic importance.  
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With the re-conception of “Asia-Pacific” as a quasi-world in Chinese eyes explained, the 
chapter moves on to analyze the grand strategy of winning without fighting. In order to spread 
Chinese influence across the expansive Eurasian landmass, oceans and seas, the PRC’s overall 
policy reflects the strategic thinking of disarming (potential) enemies before war, if war is still to 
be seen as necessary. Through the discussion of winning without fighting based on François 
Jullien’s theses about “situation” and its “potential,”6 it argues that China’s strategic culture is 
neither defensive nor offensive as argued over in the current literature, but rather about what the 
goals are to be and how they can be achieved. The post-Cold War peace is conducive to (or even 
dictates) accumulating one’s capabilities and influence through economic measures and non-war 
solutions. Chinese foreign policy has followed this line and where there are potential armed 
conflicts such as flashpoints in the first island chain, Beijing has not opted for a war solution. 
Both strategies of competition through “cooperation” with major powers and “cooperation” with 
lesser states within the spheres of influence of these major powers and limited provocation 
(militarization of the South China Sea) constitute the mainstay of China’s winning without 
fighting.  
The PRC’s globetrotting activities in the peaceful age of globalization are not purely for 
economic purposes. They are informed by the strategic logic of weighting land power and sea 
power equally. The notion is implemented in the idea of consolidating its west (land) to meet the 
challenges from the east (sea). This point is illustrated with discursive evidence and the chapter 
 
6 François Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China. New York: Zone Books, 
1995; François Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking. Honolulu: University 
of Hawai`i Press, 2004. 
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concludes with this larger geostrategic perspective. It is within this view that the grand strategy 
of winning without fighting and strategies of “cooperation” and “limited provocation” function. 
Based on the geographical scopes and the strategic logics analyzed in the chapter 5, 
chapter 6 sets forth to discuss the military component of China’s foreign policy, specifically the 
PLA’s strategic guideline of “active defense.” Active defense is a multifaceted concept and goes 
beyond the use of force to incorporate peacetime deterrence and peacetime preparations for war. 
Chinese defense white papers and military journals (specifically, Chinese Military Science) 
indicate that economic, diplomatic and cultural activities lend force to military capabilities that 
can be used to achieve peacetime deterrence and to fight a war. The author provides a cognitive 
mapping to map out, according to the Chinese narratives, how the PRC has been developing and 
using military capacity to realize the political goal of gaining international influence and status 
through the mediation of the fulfillment of economic, territorial and maritime interests. The 
relationships between military and non-military interests are symbiotic as the former can be used 
to protect the latter and the latter can be converted to combat capabilities for both peacetime 
deterrence and war-fighting purposes. 
This chapter further substantiates the argument laid out in the chapter 5 that, from a 
Chinese perspective, the resources put into the land and sea directions can work together to 
achieve the PRC’s political goals. It dissects Chinese strategic logics into the sea direction and 
the land direction before connecting them together. The analysis starts with the strategic value of 
the first island chain, especially Taiwan and the South China Sea (SCS). Chinese narratives 
indicate that Taiwan and the SCS concern the PRC’s own survival and outward expansion in that 
they hold the keys to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, with the militarization of the latter designed 
for the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. The chapter argues that the PLA’s military exercises in 
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the Western Pacific outside the island chain, militarization of the SCS, and peacekeeping 
missions in the Indian Ocean have been and may be designed to have accumulative effects on 
combat capabilities for warfare in the Pacific direction and possibly, pending further 
developments, in the Indian Ocean, with the political target located in the first island chain. In 
the land direction, overseas infrastructure projects that link China’s inland provinces to the 
Indian Ocean and the SCS through Southeast Asian and South Asian countries provide 
peacetime energy supplies and locations for the PLA Navy’s port calls. They will also provide 
wartime logistical support. From the military writings and the defense law of the PRC, Chinese 
overseas activities are concerted maneuvers to obtain both land power and sea power. 
This chapter also examines the working of the self-justifying logic of active defense for 
China’s peacetime military activities. It argues that wherever Chinese military activities are, the 
PRC will always rationalize them as defensive, non-expansionist, non-hegemonic and for the 
sake of    peace. These four mutually associated characteristics from the Chinese view, when put 
into the perspective of geostrategic scopes of a quasi-world-like “Asia-Pacific,” exemplify the 
extreme degree of the Chinese “Cult of Defense.” 
Chapter 7 compares the discursive constructs of three major powers, the US, Japan, and 
China, during their respective power transition periods. Comparison in this way is to minimize 
factors that cannot be compared and cannot be controlled due to different historical backgrounds 
and developmental stages. Along the line of imperialism are three aspects for comparison: 
differentiation versus inclusiveness, domestic-foreign linkage of governance, and falsifiable 
versus unfalsifiable logics.   
Since this research emphasizes the special character of Chinese imperialism by focusing 
on a major pattern and China’s persistent practice of building an inclusive discourse, to highlight 
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how different this is compared to the cases of other states, the study uses China’s experience as 
reference points and to find out whether the major courses of historical practices of other 
countries reflect a similar vein. Japan and China are most similar cases. Through their 
comparison, the factor of a tradition, out of a need to compete with other powerful polities of 
different ethnicities, of relying on inclusion-based political ideology is identified to explain the 
differences in the degree and scale of self-believed morality. The US and the PRC however are 
different cases by nature. Regardless, the conditions that give rise to the factor that explains the 
differences between Japan and China also explain why Washington and Beijing developed 
entirely opposite narratives, with the former being about racist differentiation and the latter a 
pretension of unprecedented inclusion. The American racism, although a prevalent theme, was 
not necessarily related to overseas expansion. This indicates that Washington’s discourse for 
outward influence had not been consistent. A different sort of polity, democracy versus 
autocracy, explains the American inconsistency and the Chinese consistency.    
The chapter first discusses and applies John Mearsheimer’s theory about the relationship 
between attainment of the status of a regional hegemon and that of a global hegemon.7 
Mearsheimer’s theory is important in two aspects. First, the dynamics of competition that he lays 
out between/among major powers on a regional level bears the characteristic of power transition 
which this chapter takes as a common parameter for comparison. Therefore, the summaries of 
the trajectories of overseas expansion of the US and Japan and their discursive constructs will 
conform to the time frame where each aspired to become regional hegemon before obtaining 
global influence, if they succeeded. Second, the case of the PRC fits Mearsheimer’s theory that a 
 
7 John Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.  New York: W. W. Norton & Company; Updated 
edition, 2014.  
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major power will use global resources to obtain regional goals, but unlike the past experience of 
other countries upon which Mearsheimer’s theory is built, China may be more able to throw its 
weight around in some remote and less developed countries than among its immediate neighbors, 
since they are either major powers or states that have strong governments. 
In comparing foreign policy discourse, the Chinese narratives share similarities with 
Japanese narratives in that they both emphasize inclusiveness and stress their abilities to bring 
peace and prosperity to all in the geostrategic space they define. Japan, however, clearly 
differentiated the white race as the Other and outgroup from the Asian ingroup. Despite the 
public political appeal of equality among Asians, Tokyo followed a racial logic to assess the 
abilities of different Asian races in the assignment of the role of political leadership and what 
industry to develop in each country, just as the US used racial logic to judge peoples’ capabilities 
and accordingly decided whether to incorporate foreign territories into the union as federal states. 
China has tried to avoid racial language in its public narratives but certain events have shown 
that it is disguising its own racism. On the basis that people are different, Washington was honest 
in stating what it believed telling what it thought but went too far in using race to justify the 
power relations that it preferred; Japan was less honest, occupying an intermediate position 
between the US and China; Beijing however has coated its realpolitik with layers and layers of 
rhetoric to “persuade” others that it can be trusted and has the ability to address the most pressing 
issues that humanity is faced with. 
Like the US which extended its domestic racial logic to foreign policy, China also applies 
politically constructed domestic harmony to argue that it will follow the same inclusive 
principles in treating others. However, if domestic inclusiveness is fabricated, can the appeal on 
the international level be true? Washington and Beijing have one major difference in how they 
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want others to know how they perceive and react to international politics. On the same footing of 
a lesser power working its way to become a great power, according to its strategic perception of 
world politics, the US specified conditions for its behavior and the rationalization for the stated 
principles could be falsified once situations changed and US behavior changed as well. On the 
contrary, the PRC wants others to have the impression that it does not assess situations 
strategically and does not act strategically. The idealistic principles that Beijing proposes are 
perennial and therefore are empty slogans without conditions specified. Ostensibly as behavioral 
guides, those principles are unfalsifiable because they are not subject to any conditions. Whether 
certain behavior is in accord with its own principles depends on its definitions and 
interpretations. The pattern is that the PRC self justifies its changing deeds so that they never 
violate the eternal principles. The contrasting examples of the American Monroe Doctrine and 
the Roosevelt Corollary and Chinese militarization of the SCS and establishment of a military 
base in Djibouti will be provided for illustration. They are chosen on the same footing that the 
Western Hemisphere had been the US concern and the SCS and military base are China’s long-
term issues.  
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Chapter 1 
Continental History and China’s Search for Greatness 
 
“Now, everyone is discussing Chinese Dream……I believe that by 
the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, the goal of 
achieving a moderately prosperous society in an all-around way will 
certainly come true. At the time of 100th anniversary of New China 
[People’s Republic of China]……the great national rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation will certainly be realized.”---During a visit to the 
exhibition of “Road to Rejuvenation”, 2012. 
“To realize Chinese Dream requires socialist path of Chinese 
characteristics.” ---First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress, 
2013 
“We will forever walk on the path of peaceful development and 
adopt the strategy of opening and mutual benefits. Not only are we 
devoted to the development of China, but also to our duties to the world 
and the contributions we can make to the world. [We] bring prosperity to 
both Chinese people and the people of the world.” ---Joint Interview with 
Three Latin American Countries, 2013.  
           “The dream of the Chinese people is closely related to those of the 
people in other countries……” ---The 19th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, 2017. 
 
The above is a chronological list of Xi Jinping’s words at different occasions to either 
domestic or international audiences. It is not presented for propaganda purpose as the editors of 
the article where these entries are compiled intends.8 These statements, taken together however, 
 
8 CPC News, “Xi Jinping Elaborates Chinese Dream This Way in the Past Five Years,” [五年来，习近平这样多次
阐述中国夢], Nov. 29, 2017, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n1/2017/1129/c385474-29673705-2.html > accessed 
Dec. 22, 2017. 
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tell their audiences the goal of China, the means to get there, and the beneficiaries. A place to 
note is the PRC’s emphasis on the congruence of interests between the Chinese people and the 
people of the world. China is creating an imagined community that blurs the lines between 
domestic and international politics. The above statements reveal the existence of a certain 
ideology whereby Beijing hopes to invite as many as possible to get onboard for its desired 
destination.  
Over the years after Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening, China has grown to be an active 
global player, seeing its domestic and foreign interests intertwined. At the time of writing this 
research, Beijing already is in the 2020 target date, that is, the 100th anniversary of the founding 
of the CCP, when “a moderately prosperous society in comprehensive aspects” will be achieved. 
As early as 2002, the PRC has sent its Navy on cruises outside of East Asian waters for military 
diplomacy. The long sought-for national rejuvenation by the CCP, a corollary to “Chinese 
Dream” that has been publicized officially under Xi, is meant to transform the Chinese state from 
a weakened regional hegemon to a global leading power. 
Beijing’s growing relative strength accompanied with economic development has opened 
opportunities for different interests to be addressed that would be less salient if the country were 
weaker. The belief that domestic prosperity relies on continuous opening and foreign markets 
drives China to expand outward. Investments in maritime power, while justified on economic 
grounds, are also driven by a belief that a blue-water navy serves the country’s strategic interests 
in the Pacific and, equally important, to build Chinese reputation, an old cultural practice of 
drawing awe from the world. Bureaucratic interests cannot be ruled out in the calculation process 
either. Thus, the discourse of Chinese rejuvenation needs to capture the intersected dynamics of 
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domestic and international interests. To achieve this, Beijing falls back to Confucian-Taoist (C-
T) rhetoric and reconstructs history to serve current political needs. 
The discursive issue here is inclusiveness. The PRC unambiguously draws a parallel in 
the principles that govern the running of state affairs and foreign policies; domestic tolerance and 
diversity will also guide the world order that China prefers. Idealistic words such as harmony, 
peace, and coexistence of differences have discursive support of historical continuities in terms 
of people and territory. Behind this mask of idealism, however, is realpolitik. For instance, when 
policies result from the cold calculation of interests, they are rationalized as primarily serving the 
moral purposes. In the spirit of critical analysis, throughout this chapter are examples that 
highlight the gulf between construed idealism and historical realities. They also show the gaps 
between aspired greatness and historical facts. This chapter will also compare conditions for 
dynastic world order, for instance, Ming (1368-1644), and the contemporary version. The 
following is the layout of discussion. 
This chapter is a background essay about basic parameters whereby the PRC builds a 
contemporary version of imagined community.9 After providing a history of continental politics, 
it explains how Beijing constructs a modern Chinese state based on myths by manipulating 
history to create a sense of historical continuities inherited by the PRC. The attention will then 
turn to the rationalization logic that is employed consistently for domestic and international 
affairs; the inclusive idealism in the propagated worldview has no borders. The last section of the 
chapter argues that different modes of economy and the modern nation-state system have 
 
9 A term originates with Benedict Anderson. See, Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on 
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised ed. London; New York: Verso, 2006. via Ebook Central 
Academic Complete.  
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complicated the presentation and rationalization of the currently envisioned future Chinese world 
order, compared to the imperial version. 
A Unified and Peaceful Continent? 
The East Asia subcontinent historically can be differentiated into four geographical 
regions: China proper (combined areas of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers), the northeast, 
northern steppe, and Inner Asia in the west. The agricultural sedentary China proper where 
Chinese civilization originates differs from the rest in language, culture, socio-economic 
structure, and political system. It is not a historical anomaly that the Chinese dynasties 
historically were either threatened or conquered by tribal nomads from the steppe or semi-
nomads from the northeast. They also had very limited influence over Inner Asia (approximately 
today’s Xinjiang and Tibet). Aside from small-scale political organizations, the other three 
regions had seen the rise of empire or some kind of confederacy. Non-Chinese peoples in the 
north and northeast had taken over either Northern China (the Yellow River area) or the entire 
China proper. It had been under non-Chinese empires that dynasties had greater influence over 
Inner Asia while the natives of today’s Xinjiang and Tibet kept their cultural and political 
institutions. 
On the continent, territorial contraction and expansion can be irregular and drastic. One 
way to analyze territorial changes is to assess how successfully dynasties were able to control 
Northern China, especially the strategic “within the passes” (in today’s Shaanxi) and the Yellow 
River region, and how successfully they could expand outward from Northern China, further to 
the northern steppe, the south, and the west. The Chinese dynasties, Eastern Jin and Song, were 
relocated to the South while nomadic and semi-nomadic people controlled Central Plain, in the 
north of China proper. Not only did Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing conquer the Central Plain, 
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they were also able to expand territory south of the Yangtze River and project influence to the 
west including Xinjiang and Tibet. Under Chinese regimes, Han and Tang had substantial 
control over Inner Asia, especially Xinjiang. However, during Song and Ming, the control of 
Inner Asia, the northeast, and the northern steppe was either none or limited over certain areas. 
The sizes of territories shifted according to relative military capabilities, including both land 
force and naval power.  
War and violence made their frequent presence on the continent. When the land was a 
multi-state system with no obvious hegemon, such as the relations between Song and 
neighboring states and that between the warring states which mostly clustered in the north of the 
China proper, armed conflicts are ordinary. The formation of empires and great dynasties that 
ruled the north and the south and in the cases of Yuan and Qing projected forces to Inner Asia 
however did not bring violence to the end. Internal chaos, civil wars and revolts plagued the 
empires. Ruling houses also dispatched troops to borders for punishing, intervening, invading, 
and conquering other regimes (see Table 1.0). 
Although dynastic attention had been devoted to the continent as it is where power 
competition grew most intense, the use of force was not unusual (albeit less frequent) in the outer 
periphery, in areas such as the Korean Peninsula, Japanese islands, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Sui 
and Tang were in constant armed conflicts with Koguryo on the northern Korean Peninsula. 
Eventually, Tang allied with Silla in the southeast of the peninsula to annihilate Koguryo. The 
continental history also saw military interventions. One example is Ming’s troops in Korea 
against the Japanese invasion in the 1590s. Another example is Qing’s intervention under Korean 
king’s request to help quell a rebellion. Both Ming and Qing also intervened in Vietnam. While 
far-sea navigation sanctioned by dynastic imperium was not a tradition from a broader historical 
42 
perspective, Zheng He’s seven-times naval expeditions commissioned by Ming’s Yongle 
Emperor that reached as far as East Africa is a vivid example. During the third voyage, Zheng 
He overthrew the ruling regime in Ceylon (today’s Sri Lanka).  
Table 1.0 lists war and violence on the continent and between continental dynasties and 
non-continental powers. The modern system of sovereign states and national identities does not 
affect inclusion and exclusion of cases. Wars between dynasties and other regimes on the 
continent that no longer exist should be considered as well because such treatment places events 
in their historical contexts. The current PRC that covers territories of more than 9 million square 
kilometers, similar to but smaller than that of the Qing Empire, is the size of the European 
countries from Portugal to the eastern part of Russia. The political divisions on the European 
landmass make it easier to record conflicts, which lends to the thesis that Europe historically is 
not peaceful. Had the proposed geographical scope of Europe had been unified under a single 
authority, these international conflicts would all have become domestic unrest. Similar logic 
applies to the East Asian continent. Supposing the territory that an imperial power dominated 
had been divided, domestic rebellions would have become international conflicts. Neither of the 
hypotheses is true historically. But the point here is that the definition of peace should not be 
limited to international conflicts. To better address whether the continent was historically 
peaceful as the PRC claims—a claim Beijing propagates to bolster its current foreign policies, it 
is necessary to consider both external and internal events.  
Based on the aforementioned, the tables have three purposes, presenting interactions 
between or among different regimes in a multi-state system and conflictual relations between 
ruling houses and subjects within the empire. Regarding the latter, it includes armed rebellions 
initiated by princes of the royal lineage and those by commoners. The third purpose is more 
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nuanced. It is about relations between political entities which were independent, but at the same 
time a certain political entity would lay the claim of superiority in a way that it hoped to define 
the inter-state relations to its favor. This is the case in the interactions between Tibet and Qing.  
Table 1.0 spans from the mid-14th century to the 19th century to include Chinese Ming and 
Manchu Qing with the latter more of an empire than the former. Dynasties on the continent, 
especially those with large holdings of territories did not stop outward expansion after their 
founding. One of examples is Qing. Even after the Manchus entered the Shanhai pass 
(Shanhaiguan) and captured Beijing in 1644, they spent the next one hundred years to eliminate 
the hostile influence, including Mongols and Ming loyalists, before their territory exponentially 
expanded. The wars between Qing and other regimes which were later subdued will be 
considered as they determined territorial size at the height of imperial power.  
The list is not exhaustive. And due to limited space, it is impossible to list every event, 
expeditions and armed clashes that occurred in the same place or involved the same parties when 
they should be treated separately and independently. The solution is to group them together in 
one column with year range, plural term and explanations in parenthesis. The list only includes 
events that occurred on the continent without considering overseas military activities. Since the 
Korean Peninsula and south(east) Asian countries are geographically directly connected to 
China, military ventures into these places will be considered.  
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Table 1.0 
Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644 AD) 
Red Turban Rebellions (1351 to 1368): military campaigns in different parts of China 
that eventually overthrew Mongol Yuan dynasty 
Year Event Year Event 
1371 Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of 
Ming, conquered Xia in Sichuan 
1449 Tumu Crisis (about 20,000 
mongols under the lead of Esen 
attacked Ming's 500,000 troops 
and ended with Zhengton Emperor 
captured (this come from Wang’s 
book) 
1388 Battle of the Kerulen River, 
Ming invaded Mongolia 
1460s 
and 
1470s  
Miao Uprisings 
1399-
1402 
Ming Civil War over succession 1550 Altan-khan's raid into the 
suburban areas of Beijing 
 
1407 Ming's military intervention-
turned conquest of Annam 
(present day Vietnam) 
1408-
1411 
Ming’s Naval Expedition 
Invaded the Kotte Kingdom in 
Ceylon (today’s Sri Lanka) and 
installed regime favorable to 
China 
1510 Rebellion of Prince Anhua (armed 
conflicts took place; aborted 
attempt to usurp the throne) 
1410-
1424 
Ming’s punitive expeditions into 
Outer Mongolia, preventing a 
unified Mongol power (there are 
six campaigns and emperor 
Chengzu (Yongle emperor) 
himself led five invasions into 
Mongolia, in 1410, 1414, 1422, 
1423, and 1424) 
1519 Rebellion of Prince Ning (armed 
conflicts took place; aborted 
attempt to usurp the throne)  
1427 Ming lost Annam in a revolt 1592-
1598 
Ming militarily intervened in 
Korea during Japanese invasion. 
1438-
1465 
Chinese intervention in and 
invasion of Burma 
1631-
1644 
Rebellions led by Li Zicheng and 
the capture of Ming capital city, 
Beijing 
Qing Dynasty (1644 to 1912 AD) 
Li Zicheng’s attempt to overthrow Ming culminated in his conflicts with Wu Sangui. 
Wu decided to open the northeast pass for the Manchus. The Manchus established Qing 
in China proper and Li was defeated. 
Year Event Year Event 
1644-
1662 
The Manchus continued to fight 
against Ming loyalists in many 
southern provinces. At times, 
1788-
1789 
Border war with Annam 
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there are two capitals, one 
headed by Ming loyalist in 
Nanjing and the other by the 
Manchus in Beijing 
1673-
1681 
Three Fudatories Revolt (Wu 
Sangui and other two Ming 
generals) 
1790-
1792 
Two campaigns against Nepalese 
invasion of Tibet 
1696- 
1759 
Qing’s several major clashes 
with the Dzunghar Mongols and 
brought Xinjiang under control 
(the defeat of Dzunghar in 
northwest Xinjiang from 1755-
57, and the defeat of Turkic 
Muslism in southern Xinjiang 
from 1758-59) 
1795-
1797 
Revolt in Hunan and Kweichow 
 
1720s Manchu defeated Dzungars and 
extended influence to Tibet  
1796-
1804 
White Lotus Rebellion (took place 
in central China) 
1730s 
and 
1740s 
Manchus also had several 
campaigns along Tibetan 
frontiers against Dzunghars, 
1729-1735, 1747-1749 
1850-
1864 
Taiping Rebellion (spread from 
southern province Guangxi to 
Nanjing, posed a major threat to 
Manchu Qing) 
1755-
1757 
Qing suppressed Mongolian 
revolt in the Ili Valley 
1851-
1868 
Nian Uprising 
1747-
1749 
The Jinchuan Wars, subdue non-
Chinese self-ruled regions in 
western Sichuan 
1854- 
1873 
Miao Rebellion in Guizhou 
1765-
1769 
The Burma War 1855-
1873 
Hui Muslims Revolt 
1770-
1776 
The Jinchuan Wars 1862 Revolts of Muslims in Shanxi, 
Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and 
Xinjiang 
1781 
and 
1784 
Revolt in Gansu 1900 Boxer Rebellion 
Sources: David Graff & Robin Higham (eds.), A Military History of China. Lexington: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 2012; David M. Robinson, “Princes in the Polity: the Anhua Prince’s Uprising of 
1510,” Ming Studies, vol (65), 2012:13-56; Denis Crispin Twitchett & John King Fairbank. The 
Cambridge History of China: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644. Vol. 7, Part 1. Cambridge University Press, 
1988, pp. 380-381; Edward L. Dreyer. Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 
1405-1433. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007; F.W. Mote, Imperial China:900-1800. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999, pp.583-597, 607-612, 824-840, 844-848, 901-902, 936-937; Feng Zhang, 
Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asia History. CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2015; Sechin Jagchid & Van Jay Symons, Peace, War, and Trade Along the Great 
Wall: Nomadic-Chinese Interaction through Two Millennia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1989, p77; John W. Dardess, Ming China, 1368-1644: A Concise History of A Resilient Empire. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012; Richard Ernest Dupuy & Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia 
of Military History: From 3500 BC to the Present. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 4th edition, 
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1993, pp.480-481, 484, 558-559, 648-650, 715-717, 767, 769-770; Wang Yuan-Kang, Harmony and 
War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 
114, 119-121; Xiaobing Li (editor), China at war: An Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 
LLC, 2012. 
 
The territories under the PRC’s control today cover the China proper, the northeast, the 
west and part of the north. Altogether, they are called China and the term appears frequently in 
Beijing’s discourse. This “China” and its corresponding geographical delimitation did not come 
close to a dynastic territorial boundary until Qing, the last empire on the continent. However, 
Beijing’s narratives have sounded as if they can be further pushed back to previous dynastic 
reigns. In reality, the continent had seen coexistence of multiple regimes with different cultural 
and political institutions. At times, they were subordinate to a supreme imperial authority. 
During other times, they were equal powers. The element of independence from China and being 
non-Chinese in the fact that non-Han peoples enjoyed political independence and were (and still 
are) culturally different from the Hans received insignificant treatments in the historical accounts 
constructed by the CCP. In contemporary interpretations, non-Hans and Hans are all Chinese 
living under a territory called China since antiquity. In creating a false impression of multi-ethnic 
harmony and territorial unity, Beijing tries to popularize the idea that “China since ancient times 
is a peace-loving country.” The issue with the PRC’s rhetoric is twofold. First, it denies 
differences-correlated conflicts between different political entities that prevail in the history of 
the continent. These conflicts hardly validate the claim of continental peace. Second, it attempts 
to downplay political independence of non-Chinese by stressing the superior political status of 
dynasties. The example of Tibet-Tang relations will demonstrate the above points.  
From the early 7th century to the end of the 9th century, the East Asia continent was by no 
means dominated by a single power throughout. Several players were active in competing for 
regional supremacy, including the Eastern Turkish Kaghanate, the Western Turkish Kaghanate, 
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the Chinese Tang dynasty, Tibetan Empire, the Second Turkish Kaghanate, and the Uyghur 
Empire. Tibet and Tang for a prolonged period, about 120 years, were in power parity. Not only 
did Tibet find itself in frequent conflicts with Tang for bordering territories to its northeast and 
southeast such as Gansu and Yunnan, it was also expanding northward and northwestward into 
today’s Xinjiang. In general, the territories to the north and northeast of Tibet that passes from 
southern Gansu to Qinghai and into Xinjiang was much contested between Tibet and Tang for 
both had the same incentives to control transcontinental trade. Conflicts with Tang occurred over 
Kashgaria during the years from 665 to 678, 689, 692 to 694, 717 to 736, and 789 to 791; 
competition for the control over Yunnan from 688 to 694 and 751 to 754. Both sides had lost and 
regained contested territories. A caution here is that Yunnan, now a province of China in the 
southwest, was then an independent kingdom called Nanzhao, and conflicts from 751 to 754 
were between Tang and allied Tibet and Nanzhao. Therefore, Tibet did not actually annex 
Yunnan but rather placed the kingdom under its influence for the next four decades. Tibet would 
also recover Tang-occupied Tibetan territories in 757 and had the Gansu corridor from 758 to 
771.10 During the An Lushan rebellion (755 to 763 AD), Tibetans even captured the dynasty’s 
western capital, but decided to withdraw.  
Generally speaking, for nearly three decades after 756, Tibet was a major threat to Tang in 
two ways. First, many Tang-controlled territories including those inhabited by the ethnic Chinese 
in the China proper were occupied by Tibet. Second, the Tibetan empire was able to 
reconsolidate its influence in Central Asia. This means that Tang not only had difficulties in 
 
10 David Wilkinson, “Power Polarity in the Far Eastern World System 1025 BC-AD1850: Narrative and 25-
Year Interval Data,” Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol V, 3, 1999, pp. 501-617 (specifically, pp. 555-
562); Denis Twitchett, “Tibet in Tang’s Grand Strategy,” in Warfare in Chinese History, edited by Hans van 
de Ven (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 106-179 (specifically, pp. 120-121, 126-127, 132-133). 
48 
defending itself but also lost control over the trade routes. Under these situations, the Chinese 
dynasty had to seek alliances with Arabs and Uyghurs to check Tibetan power. The rise of the 
Uyghur Kaghnanate in Mongolia provided Tang an opportunity to form joint forces to defeat 
Tibet in the early 790s. Due to frequent warfare with Uyghurs, Arabs, the Chinese, and Nanzhao, 
with mixed success and defeat, as well as internal conflicts, the Tibetan empire collapsed during 
the period of the early 840s to 851.11 The extent of the imperial reach at its zenith, including 
territories that it can demand tribute from is nearly half of the territories now under the PRC’s 
control. Tibet was a powerful opponent that China’s dynasty had to reckon with and yet 
contemporary Chinese histories dealing with the Tang period efface the war-fraught relations and 
ignore the power dynamics that put China at an inferior position.  
A 2010 Chinese account of Tibet-Tang relations specifies that the two parties were in wars 
for 192 times, both major and small scales. However, it goes on to characterize the essence of 
these conflicts as nothing more than family quarrels. “Tang-Fan wars are inevitable brotherly 
quarrels during the historical evolution of a unified multi-ethnic Chinese nation state (emphasis 
original).”12 According to the author, these conflicts resulted in “the alliance of peace” and 
“eventually…… a unified and harmonious family.” 13 International wars thus are distorted and 
trivialized as “domestic inter-ethnic wars (国内民族战争).”  
 
 
11 Christopher Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for Great Power 
Among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese During the Early Middle Ages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1987, pp.143 to 172.  
12 “Fan” is a pejorative Chinese word referring to Tibet. It means uncivilized. 
13 Ma Chao [马超], “The History of Tibet cannot be Rewritten,” [西藏的历史不容篡改], Tibetan Academy of 
Social Science, TAR, Feb. 02, 2010, <www.xzass.org/newsinfo.php?id=878&pn=2> accessed July 27, 2019. 
(original text: 唐蕃战争的性质问题，具有中国统一的多民族国家历史演进中的国内民族战争的性质。
唐蕃战争是中国统一的多民族国家历史演进中难以避免的“兄弟阋墙”。它导致的结果是“唐蕃和盟”，
最终“社稷如一”“和同为一家”). 
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Idealistic family-friendship relations in the PRC’s narratives is also used to downplay the 
realistic calculations of costs and benefits in bilateral diplomacy. Take the inter-marriage 
between Chinese princesses and Tibetan kings, especially the marriage of Wencheng and 
Songtsen Gampo as an example.14 The 1992 White Paper describes bilateral relations as 
“solidarity bound with family ties” (团结友好的亲谊关系).Similar rhetoric also appears in 
other writings about Tibetan history. In generalizing Tang Taizong’s intermarriage policy toward 
different non-Hans, the authors of the Biography of Tang Taizong, in the 2002 version published 
by   concludes that it “reduced ethnic barriers, enhanced ethnic solidarity, and facilitated ethnic 
amalgamation (民族融合).”15 However, historically, intermarriages signified political equity and 
usually came when non-Chinese powers proved formidable enough that Chinese dynasties could 
not afford to wage military campaigns. In the case of Songtsen Gampo and Wencheng, the 
marriage was the result of bilateral armed conflicts. 
Idealistic rhetoric is not just used to conceal realpolitik but also to create a false impression 
of Tang having superiority over Tibet. The Biography of Tang Taizong provides an example that 
contemporary Chinese histories describe ancient China as a benevolent power capable of 
subduing others and winning their loyalty through imperial morality. It argues that inter-marriage 
is evidence of the relatively open-minded and inclusive governance of the first Tang emperor 
(Tang Gaozu) because this policy applies to families that contributed to the founding of Tang 
regardless of their ethnic origins and foreign political entities. It goes on to say that inter-
 
14 The 1992 White Paper is one of the documents that cite the inter-marriage example. The 1992 White Paper,  
“Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation,” [西藏的主权归属与人权状况], English version 
<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/tibet/> and Chinese version 
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/1992/Document/308015/308015.htm>. 
15  Zhao keyao & Xudaoxun [赵克尧&许道勋]. The Biography of Tang Taizong [唐太宗傳] Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 2002, pp. 258-260. 
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marriage aims to ensure the wealth and the status of generations of Han and non-Han peoples.16 
Consider another example that discusses Tang’s policies toward “frontier ethnicities”, it writes 
that based on the principle of si hui fu he(思惠抚和), the policy of intermarriage with different 
ethnic groups such as Tibetans, Turks and others does not result from the military threats they 
posed but rather is an act of Tang’s loose rein and huai rou (怀柔) for the purpose of good 
relations among different ethnicities.17 Fu he and huai rou means using political, cultural, and 
economic tools to solicit submission from an opponent one perceives to be inferior. The words 
carry a condescending tone and the connotation of “softness,” with the latter indicating that 
whoever gives something (sending princesses and granting titles to minorities’ leaders) is 
generous and kind. By using these vocabularies, China sees itself as a benevolent authority over 
actors that it deems as belonging to its dominions. In reality, however, China had to face the fact 
of power equity and foreign demands in the times of defeat.  
Another example is different views regarding the Tibet-Tang peace treaty of 823. The PRC 
uses this treaty to rationalize its control over Tibet based on the claimed historical amity. 
However, in reality the treaty is one between equals and was concluded to put to rest years of 
armed conflicts over territories. As the following text will show, the Tibetans may even have 
believed that they were the ones who were superior. The signing of the treaty occurred against 
the background of the alliance between Uyghurs and China and Tibetans’ raid against one of 
China’s forts.18 Tang did not have an upper hand in this triangle power dynamics.  
 
16 Ibid., p. 260. Original text: (世代保辅，长享富贵) 
17 Wang Shu-hui [王树晖], “An Outline for Basic Characteristics of Frontier Policies from Qin, Han to Qing 
Dynasties,” [秦汉至清朝的历代中央王朝治边政策梳理及基本特点概括],  Xinjiang Philosophy Social 
Sciences Website [新疆哲学社会科学网], <www.xjass.cn/dyzx/content/2012-12/27/content_258512.htm> 
July 27, 2019. 
18 Beckwith, pp. 166-167. 
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The PRC’s interpretation can be found in the 1992 White Paper about the ownership of 
Tibet. The Paper praises the solidarity between Tibet and Tang through political marriages and 
finalizes the paragraph with a sentence, from a part of the Treaty inscribed on a stone pillar in 
front of the Jokhang Temple in 823 AD: “the two sovereigns, uncle and nephew, having come to 
agreement that their territories be united as one, have signed this alliance of great peace to last 
for eternity! May God and humanity bear witness thereto so that it may be praised from 
generation to generation.”19 This English translation is directly provided by the PRC for the 
English version of the white paper. Compare this with the translation based on Tibetan 
inscriptions from H. E. Richardson, “The great king of Tibet, the Divine Manifestation, the 
bTsan-po and the great king of China, the Chinese ruler Hwang Te, Nephew and Uncle, having 
consulted about the alliance of their dominions have made a great treaty and ratified the 
agreement. In order that it may never be changed, all gods and men have been made aware of it 
and taken as witnesses; and so that it may be celebrated in every age and in every generation the 
terms of the agreement have been inscribed on a stone pillar.”20  
Two places stand out. First, while both the PRC’s English version and Richardson’s 
translation all specify the relations between Tibet and Tang as those between nephew and uncle, 
Tibet did not readily accept the connotation that as a nephew it was in a lower rank. Even though 
“nephew and uncle” frequently appears in the text, the narrative construction of the Tibetan 
inscriptions as a whole makes it insignificant. Elsewhere in the inscriptions, calling Tang “the 
 
19 The 1992 White Paper,  “Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation,” the State Council, 
<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/tibet/> accessed, July 29, 2019. English translation original.  
20 H.E. Richardson, “The Sino-Tibetan Treaty Inscription of A.D. 821/823 at Lhasa,” The Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, No. 2, 1978, pp. 137-162, (specifically, pp. 153). 
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country of Great China” and itself “the country of Great Tibet” also provides evidence to Tibet’s 
self-affirmation of its independence and equality with the eastern power.21 But there is more. The 
deification of Tibetan kings and their achievements in handling foreign relations signify the self-
perceived central position and a superior status relative to Tang.  
In calling the kings from both sides, Tibetan texts name Tibetan kings as “the Divine 
Manifestation” and when addressing China’s rulers, it uses kings with the Chinese titles. What is 
noteworthy is the effort to elaborate “the Divine Manifestation”: “…he [the king] came from 
being a god in heaven to be lord of men. By great wisdom and method he established a lasting 
dominion. By excellent religious laws he set right the ways of men. By loving benevolence he 
brought harmony to the affairs of the interior. Subduing external enemies through knowledge of 
the arts of war, he increased the extent of his dominion. Through the ever-increasing might of his 
helmet his wise order was immutable. He was great king of the Eternal Swastika of unsullied 
glory.” The Tibetan texts continue to name surrounding great kingdoms and writes “every 
inhabited region without exception” who came to “revere the mighty helmet and excellent 
customs” of Tibetan kings.22 On the contrary, there is no explanation for the titles of Chinese 
rulers. This contrast clearly indicates a central status of Tibet derived from the king’s divine 
presence in the bilateral relations. 
The centrality of Tibetan king can be further highlighted by the description of the 
achievements of the king’s father, the Divine Manifestation, Khri lde-srong-brtsan: “…having 
taken a firm resolve in strict accordance with the relationship of Nephew and Uncle, knowing 
through the great profundity of his mind everything that pertained to religious law and 
 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., p.145. 
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government, and by the grace of his conspicuous loving-kindness embracing the eight directions 
without distinction of inner and outer, came to agreement and made treaties with all the kings of 
the four frontiers (emphasis added).” Without the omission of China, the text mentions that 
“Nephew and Uncle being agreed in their thoughts, one with the other, he conferred about a 
treaty with the Chinese king, Zheng Shin B’un B'u Hwang Te. The old animosity was purged 
and cleared away.” From the Tibetan perspective, it was Tibet who “conferred” the treaty with 
Tang China, instead of the other way around.23   
The other place that deserves attention in the PRC’s English translation is “their territories 
(Tibet and Tang) be united as one.” In Fang-Kuei Li’s translation of Tibetan inscriptions, it 
reads, “their government be as one.”24 In Richardson’s translation, it reads, “the alliance of their 
dominions.” Elsewhere in Richardson’s version, the text mentions that “kingdoms be united.” 
The Chinese version is embedded in the context (the 1992 white paper) in which the PRC 
propagates the idea that Tibet belongs to China historically. However, a closer look into the 
Tibetan text indicates that such usage of history does not conform to historical fact. Consider this 
passage: “…the Divine Manifestation, the bTsan-po, Khri Gtsug-lde-brtsan himself, whose 
knowledge springs from supernatural inspiration, whose acts are in conformity with the ways of 
the gods, who with great kindness treats outer and inner alike, whose helmet is mighty and 
whose commands are strict, he together with Chinese king, B’un B’u He’u Tig Huang Te, 
Nephew and Uncle, agreed in their inspired thoughts; and, the kingdoms being united in 
prosperity, a great treaty was made to bring happiness to both Tibet and China for ten thousand 
 
23 Ibid., pp.145-46.  
24 Fang-Kuei Li, “Inscription of the Sino-Tibetan Treaty of 821-822,” T’oung Pao, Second Series, Vol. 44, 
Livr. 1/3, 1956, pp. 1-99, (specifically pp. 55, 62-63). 
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generations.”25 Given that Tibetan king was placed in such a high regard and the Chinese king 
received diminutive descriptive treatment,26 it is unconceivable that Tibet would yield its 
independence and would think it should not be the one who directed bilateral affairs.   
The Tibetan Empire and Tang were in power parity for an accumulated long period. The 
former also showed strong political and cultural consciousness. And yet, contemporary Chinese 
histories dealing with Tang claim Tibetans as well as other non-Hans to be “minorities,” a term 
that denotes marginality, backwardness, dependence and powerlessness. Consider the following 
narratives. In the Military History of Tang, the authors argue that through the silk road, 
“Tuyuhun and Tufan regimes on the Tibetan Plateau had absorbed large amount of culture from 
China proper, which greatly facilitated the feudalization of these regions where minorities 
resided.”27 Another book that studies military thought of “the minorities in ancient China” 
unambiguously places Tibetans and Turks in the category of “minorities”, indicated by a 
subheading in chapter 3, “the main themes of military thought of the minorities during the 
periods of Sui and Tang.”28 Even the chronology here reveals sino-centrism. From the 
perspectives of Tibetans and Turks, they would not use Chinese historical periodization to 
describe their reign. 
 
 
 
25 H. E. Richardson, p. 146. 
26 Fang-Kuei Li’s translations also match with Richardson’s in that, throughout the two main texts on the East 
and West faces of the stone pillar, Tibetan Kings are the ones whose holiness receives elaboration aside from 
the mentioning of the title, while Chinese emperor is respected simply by mentioning his title. See Fang-Kuei 
Li, 1956.  
27 Yang Xiyi and Yu Rubo [杨希义 于汝波]. The Military History of Tang [唐代軍事史] (vol. 10 of 
General Military History of China 中國軍事通史). Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1998, p. 240. 
28 Tong Lijun [同利军]. The Analysis of Military Thought of Minorities in Ancient China. [中国古代少数民
族军事思想研究] Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2013, pp. 126-136.  
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For the PRC, It Is 
Sentences like “China since ancient times is a peace-loving country” or “Zhonghua minzu 
(the Chinese nation) since ancient times are peace-loving” permeate Beijing’s diplomacy, the 
official rhetoric, and the PRC textbooks. The expressions are not simply for propaganda but also 
convey the entrenched belief of Chinese political and military leaders and arguably a substantial 
number of both intellectuals and ordinary people. More than some catching sentence, the 
statement has the discursive support that justifies the PRC’s control over a multi-ethnic 
population in the vast territory, particularly its hold on the Central Asian Xinjiang and Tibet. The 
key point here is that, to reshape political and cultural consciousness, the CCP uses the 
contemporary territorial boundaries and a modern conception of Zhonghua minzu (the Chinese 
nation) to build a discourse of shared experience that according to the CCP’s framing is to be 
found in the past, the present, and the future; China, the Chinese nation, and the territories under 
the PRC’s control are synonyms to one another throughout history. The following analysis will 
focus on how this is done discursively.  
The 1999 white paper about the PRC’s policies toward minorities released by the State 
Council states that “China since ancient times is a unified multi-ethnic country.” “Unification” as 
defined by the Party refers to centralized governance that was established by dynasties of Qin 
and Han and later became a political norm that lasts for thousands of years. The document gives 
the idea of China’s territorial boundary as it continues to trace the imperial administrative control 
over Xinjiang and Tibet. The territory of Xinjiang is dated to the Han dynasty. Tibet is included 
when the white paper gives the account of Mongol Yuan’s dispatch of a Pacification 
Commissioner. It comments that because of Yuan’s rule, “Tibet has ever since become an 
inseparable part of the territory of China.” The CCP reasons that even though the history of 
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China was separated by territorial divisions at times under more than one regime, unification has 
always been a mainstream. And such political unity has led to solidarity in other aspects: 
“Through a long-term process of great unification, economic and cultural exchanges closely knit 
together each ethnicity of China……[and] create and develop Chinese civilization……The 
mutual interdependence of each ethnicity in terms of political, economic and cultural 
connections leads to shared destiny and common interests in the long-term historical 
development.”29 
The reason for the PRC’s emphasis on the trend of unity is to justify its hold on Inner 
Asian territories. Despite the fact that the great expansionary powers of Mongol Yuan and 
Manchu Qing which incorporated both Xinjiang and Tibet are not Chinese regimes, in the PRC’s 
narratives, they are. Yet both Mongols and Manchus retained their cultural and political 
identities, especially the former, when ruling diverse lands. In addition, “unification” historically 
does not equate to the current territorial size under communist control. Only Qing comes close. 
The Song and the Ming certainly had little influence over the west. On top of these variations, 
Uyghurs and Tibetans once built their own empires and when they recognized the supreme 
authority that ruled China proper (areas of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers) in the form of 
suzerainty, not sovereignty, especially in the case that they needed the eastern support to defeat 
their nomadic or non-Han opponents from the steppe and Central Asia, they kept their socio-
economic and political systems.  
 
 
 
29 “The 1999 White Paper: China’s Policies Toward Minorities and Implementation” [中国的少数民族政策
及其实践], State Council, Sept. 27, 1999, 
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/1999/Document/307953/307953.htm>. 
57 
The Meaning of China  
“China” (Zhongguo 中國) refers to lands ruled by Beijing today. In the official narratives, 
the contemporary political meaning and territorial boundary of “China” also carry validity in the 
dynastic periods. In reality, the term first refers to the Central Plain in the north where Zhou 
ruled. Later on, it becomes associated with China proper as Chinese dynasties mostly did not rule 
beyond this territorial boundary. Take the History of Ming as an example.30 The chapters 320 to 
328 specify the titles as “Foreign Countries” (wai guo 外國). Japan, Korea, Ryukyu Islands, 
Taiwan, Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Mongolia among others fall into 
this category. Chapters 329 to 332 detail Ming’s relations with Western Regions, that is, Central 
Asia. Although the Central Asia chapters do not carry “Foreign Countries” in their titles, their 
context (in 330, 331 and 332) which sees a juxtaposition between “China” (Zhongguo 中國) and 
places of western regions in the descriptions of bilateral political and economic affairs does not 
differ from the chapters that bear the designation of “Foreign Countries.” The following presents 
evidence from the History of Ming.  
The chapter (323) about the islands in today’s first island chain of the Pacific details the 
regional dynamics between Ming China, the Ryukyu kingdoms, and Japan. Chinese historians 
described the visits by the kingdoms’ envoys as “paying tribute.” The record uses “three 
countries” (三國) to describe the kingdoms and identifies Shangbei of the Ryukyu Kingdoms as 
the weakest one. In the late 16th century, Japanese daimyo domain of Satsuma invaded the 
 
30 The History of Ming (明史)has 332 chapters, recording the histories of emperors, princes, geographies, 
rituals and ceremonies, carriages and clothing, selected officials, economy, finance, rivers and canals, military, 
punishment and law, literature, dignitaries, Ming’s relations with foreign countries, etc. Dynastic historians 
were to write, edit, and compile histories. The practice that historians were commissioned to compile the 
history of the previous dynasty by the current court was not uncommon. In the example of the history of Ming, 
the Han official Zhang Tingyu was the lead editor in the Manchu court. The texts can be found: 
<http://chinesenotes.com/mingshi.html>. 
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Ryukyus in 1609. Ryukyu would then become the vassal of both the daimyo of Satsuma and 
Ming. A paragraph describing domestic and regional dynamics substitutes Ming with China and 
clearly indicates that Ryukyus and China are different political units. In response to one of 
Islands kings’ request of bestowing title, the Chinese official of proprieties expressed: “Ryukyus 
traditionally paid tribute once every two years. It then changed to once every ten years after the 
invasion of woko (Japanese pirates, 倭寇). Now the country (guo 國) had recovered a bit, the 
temporary plan for tribute is once every five years. This suspends further changes, till after a title 
is conferred to the new king.” Following this quotation from propriety official, the historians 
continued to write that Ryukyus would pay tribute in the fifth year and again in the sixth year, 
but because “China was in the middle of many events,” the conferring matter was put off. 
Another example is Korea. Regarding the Korean official request to have Ming recognize Yi 
Seong Gye as the Korean King, the Korean chapter (320) recorded the positive answers from 
Ming with a logic directly from the emperor that “Korea is located in the secluded eastern corner 
and is not governed by Zhongguo.” Another event recorded in the volume is the interaction 
between Yi’s son and the Ming court. After Yi Bang-won, now the king of Korea, expressed his 
gratitude for the rare medical ingredients obtained from China to treat his father and requested 
for Chinese royal items, the record wrote that because Yi “expresses his admiration for the 
proprieties and etiquettes of China (Zhongguo Li, 中國禮) ”, Emperor Yongle granted him many 
precious items including seal, jades and clothing. In the Western Regions, there are also similar 
political and cultural differentiations between China and other countries.   
In chapter 331 (biographies of kings and leaders in Central Asia), the dynastic historians 
recorded the Hongwu Emperor as saying that “nowadays the tianxia (天下 the world) is unified, 
thousands of states (wan guo 萬國) from the four directions all come to pay tribute” but only 
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Timur (or Tamerlane) “does not submit to China.” Chapter 332 again shows the Chinese 
recognition of political units in Western regions as countries, for instance, “Yutian is a major 
country (da guo 大國) since ancient times,” while stressing the superiority of Ming under the 
Yongle Emperor, “thousands of states submitted to Chengzu’s (Yongle) aspirations and there 
were non-stop visits by envoys from the Western Regions” for trade. Here,  “China” is also 
identified as Zhonghua (中華). The Hongwu Emperor equated the undisturbed trade relations 
between China and Western Regions to “Zhonghua greatly bestowing benefits to the countries of 
Western Regions.” Hua ren (華人) as a term to describe the people from Ming China landing in 
foreign territories, that is, the overseas Chinese, also makes its appearance in chapter 323 under 
the category of Foreign Countries when describing dynastic relations with Luzon (in today’s 
Philippines). 
Based on the above discussion, in the History of Ming, “China” is not merely a 
geographical term, but also contains political, cultural, and territorial meanings. These four 
aspects together separate Ming from neighboring political entities. Furthermore, whether  
“country” or “state” (guo 國) is used to describe places outside of Ming China does not bear 
exclusive association with either of the two categories; in both Foreign Countries and Western 
Regions volumes, guo is applied to political entities beyond the Chinese territory. Accordingly, 
the equation of Ming to “China” (Zhongguo 中國) at this period still corresponded to the 
geographical delimitation of China proper. Not until Manchu Qing did the imperial power extend 
geographical and political definitions to Inner Asia and other non-Han territories. “Tibet since 
Yuan is an integral part of the territory of China” conveniently skips Sino-Tibetan relations 
under Ming and creates an imagined truth that Chinese territory covered the land that is out of 
the boundary delimitation of China. 
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Chinese scholars have argued that Qing also identified itself with China. For instance, 
based on the treaties, with Russia for instance, and court records of Chinese and Manchu origins, 
Gang Zhao shows that the successive Manchu emperors had identified the territories of Qing 
with the geographical scope of “China” and actually used the term Zhongguo interchangeably 
with or in equivalent to the Qing empire. Zhao however also argues that such equation was the 
product of political needs as it was not the case before the Manchus ruled China Proper and 
further expanded its influence to Central Asia.31 Assuming that non-Chinese scholars looking 
into primary sources also have the same conclusion and we accept Zhao’s findings, the meaning 
of China for Qing differs from that for the PRC. The “China” that the PRC refers to is the one 
which the Chinese (the Han) dominate politically and is the one the PRC uses to justify its 
contemporary rule over a heterogeneous population in the vast territory. The “China” that Qing 
refers to is ruled by the Manchus and the Chinese were targets of co-optation and the ruled. The 
differences are about power relations among ethnic groups as the case of Qing in Xinjiang below 
shows. Using the example of Qing to argue that Xinjiang belongs to China in the context of the 
PRC’s narratives is problematic. 
Qing’s Relations with Xinjiang and Tibet  
The Manchus basically set up a military government in Xinjiang, following their tradition 
of banner hierarchy system. This practice set apart the region from China proper where 
administrative structures were characterized by prefectures and counties governed by magistrates 
and made Xinjiang belong to the same group with Manchuria and Mongolia where the 
populations mostly are not Chinese (the Han people). The military governor had authority over 
 
31 Gang Zhao, “Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity 
in the Early Twentieth Century,” Modern China, Vol.32(1), 2006, pp. 3-30. 
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the entire region and reported to the emperor and the Grand Council of the court. Below the 
governor, there were councilors and superintendents responsible for important sub-regions and 
cities respectively. These officials were dominantly Manchus and Mongols with a very few 
exceptions of Uyghurs and Manchuised Han.32 This ethnic composition in high offices lasted 
until the 1880s. Locally, there are three bureaucratic structures: jasak system, beg system and 
Chinese-style system. The former two are the products of co-optation between the Manchu and 
nomads and between the Manchu and Uyghurs respectively. The local leadership positions were 
occupied by the Mongol and Uyghur allies of the court as the rewards for their aid in the Qing’s 
conquest. Chinese bureaucracies that imitate the administrative style of China proper applied to 
the colonies where Chinese farmers and merchants resided. Again, these areas were 
predominantly in the charge of Manchu and Mongol magistrates. Unlike Tibet, the stationing of 
Qing’s troops in Xinjiang was on a permanent basis with more soldiers. The number of troops 
even increased from 40,000 to 50,000 by the mid-19th century.33  
Based on the above analysis, the political relations between Xinjiang and Qing had been 
mostly those between Uyghurs and resettled Mongols and Manchu and Mongol officials from 
the court. The Chinese ascent to the ruling class in the region did not occur until the 1870s when 
the Manchu banner military was unable to put down empire-wide unrest and gave way to 
regionalism characterized by the Han generals and the domains where they wielded power. 
Following Zuo Zongtang’s (a Chinese general) reconquest of Xinjiang in rebellion, the court 
after a debate about the value of the region made it into a province in 1884. Zuo’s administration 
 
32 The Manchu can be an artificially created political identity formed from people of various ethnicities. From 
the perspective, a Han choosing to become Manchu was as much a Manchu as any other Manchu. See, William 
Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard 
University Press, 2012. 
33 James. A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009, pp. 97-102. 
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would start a sinicization process.34 Thus, not until the last two to three decades of the declining 
Manchu empire did the Chinese political-military presence start to gain a foothold in Xinjiang. 
Xinjiang was part of the Qing empire in which the Manchus ruled and the Chinese were 
subjugates. There were differentiations in the ruling class but the PRC’s narratives makes it 
sound like a unified whole. 
Using the Manchu example to affirm that Tibet belongs to China in the context of the 
PRC’s narratives is even more questionable, given that the Manchu reign on the Plateau from the 
administrative perspective, by itself and also compared to Qing in Xinjiang, does not quite 
substantiate the claim that Tibet is part of the Qing as it does for Xinjiang.   
Qing’s reach to Tibet was unfolding against the background of regional competition for 
supremacy; the bilateral relations did not evolve in isolation and other actors played influential 
roles. Continental politics in the late 17th century and the early 18th century basically was a 
contest for power under an (informal) alliance system. Internally, Tibet suffered divisions and 
had to deal with Mongols who took the seat of Tibetan King after their response to calls for help 
in the Tibetan sectarian power struggle turned into throne usurpation. To expel the influence of 
Qoshot Mongols, Tibet under Sanye Gyatso encouraged the Dzungars to unify all of the 
Mongols. The defeat of Eastern Mongols prompted the tribe to seek for the alliance with the 
Qing. The Dzungars however then lost to the Manchus in Inner Mongolia. But the defeat was not 
total and they still wielded influence in Tibet. Allies can become enemies in the eyes of those 
who sought for help if the strong act at their will unchecked. Following Qoshot’s practice, now 
 
34David Christian. A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia. Volume II, Inner Eurasia from the Mongol 
Empire to Today, 1260-2000. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell 2018, pp. 300-301. via ProQuest Ebook Central; 
Dillon, Michael. Xinjiang: China's Muslim Far Northwest. London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004, pp. 
19. via Ebook Central Academic Complete; James. A. Millward, Eurasian crossroads: a history of Xinjiang. 
Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 125-132. 
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the Dzungars appropriated the role of Tibetan King for themselves. Tibet thus was in a constant 
state of fighting the enemies that it invited first as allies to crack down on opposition forces. The 
Manchu emperor believed that the dynasty had a stake in the west, mainly to check the Mongol 
forces and prevent them from gaining power from religious relations with Tibet. Thus, the 
Manchus dispatched troops twice to intervene and succeeded in expelling Dzungars on the 
second occasion.35  
Since 1720s, Qing had at different times intervened on the issue of the governing structure 
and who would be actual rulers wielding the administrative power, either ministers or the Dalai 
Lama. It also sent troops twice to quell the civil wars in fear of a third party taking advantage of 
domestic chaos. However, the court was only willing to go so far to assuage its own concern 
about Dzungar Mongols’ influence among Tibetan officials. Tibetans remained the people who 
made administrative decisions. Even after ambans (Qing’s resident officials) were made to hold 
an equal political position to the Dalai Lama after a Nepalese invasion in 1788, the Manchu did 
not see it in its interests to make Tibet a province directly under Qing’s control. Manchu 
influence however diminished especially after 1840 since Beijing was busy with the western 
powers and also suffered internal decay. The political consultation with ambans and imperial 
approval of official appointments became non-substantial. On the Tibet side, it made successful 
moves to secure Qing’s agreements to withdraw and reduce its military presence on the Plateau 
after intervening in Tibetan civil wars. To advance Tibetan interests, Gyurme Namgye, after the 
death of his father (Pholhanas) in 1747 who was more tolerant with some presence of the Qing, 
had tried to muster strength by creating an army and sought overtures to Mongols to 
 
35 Melvyn C Goldstein. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999, pp. 10-14. Via Ebsco eBooks, EPUB version.  
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counterbalance the Manchus.36 Thus, the official view that Tibet is part of China, now equated to 
Qing and the peoples of Qing are the people of China, is unilateral. Tibet intended to preserve its 
political independence from the Manchu interference whenever it could. In addition, there are 
gaps between the PRC’s claim and the administrative realities that reveal the Manchu motives. 
Beijing’s influence functioned within an empire system that saw the frontiers with ambiguities; it 
is a pity to let the territory go but not important enough to warrant full attention. The current 
official construct is an exaggeration.  
The PRC’s view of Chinese space expands to where its political interests lie, 
regardless of the historical contexts of the territories concerned. This is shown in the 
conscious molding of continental politics that focuses on the periods where dynastic 
authority reached to the lands that currently are parts of the PRC. The periods when those 
territories were outside of dynastic reign is recognized at times but nonetheless regarded as 
anomalous. Their meanings are downplayed to create the impression of temporal continuity. 
Even when imperial power is projected to remote areas, in the case of Manchu Qing for 
instance, there are questions about the nature of control, the size of the lands under control, 
the presence of native governments, and relations between native authority and imperial 
court. Continuity in territorial possession is one of the myths that the CCP relies on to rule a 
heterogeneous population.  
Chinese Nation and Chinese Culture 
One of the characteristics in China’s discursive creation of national unity is that the 
narratives are comprehensive and hardly focus on a single aspect. Aside from territorial issues, 
the 1999 white paper also mentions the term, the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu). Zhonghua 
 
36 Ibid., pp. 14-18. 
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minzu is only used when narrating aggregate experience of western aggression.37 When 
mentioning non-Han groups as this document is primarily concerned with, the phrase is “ the 
various ethnic groups of China” (中国各民族) and  “minority groups”（shaoshu minzu 少数民
族）, instead of the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu). Zhonghua minzu is meant to be 
comprehensive, standing for 56 ethnicities including the majority Han and the 55 officially 
recognized minorities. However, “nation” as a singular reveals that although subset ethnic 
identities, in theory, can exist, they cannot replace the overarching Chinese ethnicity and the 
Chinese national identity which happen to be most associated with the Han people. The fact that 
Chinese documents and propaganda publications constantly remind their audience about non-
Han areas being integral parts of Chinese territory and CCP’s policy success toward non-Han 
groups indicates that minorities remain the “Other” in Beijing’s narratives, paradoxically, in 
parallel to the rhetoric of inclusiveness.  
Another historical exaggeration is shared “Chinese culture” (Zhonghua wenhua) among all 
ethnicities. The term is not mentioned in the 1999 document but prevalent in the articles from 
Qiushi, People’s Daily and other official sources. The closest term in the white paper is “Chinese 
civilization” (Zhonghua wenming). Imagined historical community is again evoked to remind 
readers of unbreakable ties between Han and non-Han. “Through the course of intimate contact 
over several thousand years, China’s 56 ethnic groups were drawn together by their common 
lands, common goals and common cultural traditions. The integration of various nationalities 
culminated in the birth of the Chinese nation, a family of nationalities characterized by diversity 
 
37 While China tries to make it sound like all peoples suffered the same fate, as demonstrated in the Dalai 
Lama’s plea letter to London, Tibet may not see the Chinese invasion led by Zhang Erfeng in a different light 
from British aggression. See Melvyn C. Goldstein, 1999, p. 20. 
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in unity.”38 The concept of inseparable parts constituting a whole that is seen in the definition of 
the Chinese nation also is reflected in the composition of Chinese culture. The logic goes that if 
all ethnicities live happily together, they also produce a shared culture. “Chinese culture itself is 
the common creation of many nationalities……and an amalgam of diverse cultural elements, 
including not only the culture of the Han ethnic group, but also the cultures of dozens of other 
ethnic minority groups in the country.”39  
As much as the CCP stresses shared Chinese culture since antiquity, dynastic historians 
provide evidence to the contrary. The educated elites (the shi class) such as court officials 
denigrated non-Han cultures. Dynastic historians also labelled non-Han peoples as barbarians. 
Man (蠻), yi (夷), and fan (番) refer to those who did not submit to Chinese civilization. Chapter 
332 of the History of Ming writes that “those who do not honor China’s institutions are foreign 
barbarians (wai fan 外番).” (should honor be replaced by follow according to the context? 
double check this translation) In chapter 331, several examples contrast civilized China and 
troublemaking barbarians. Peoples from Central Asia were depicted as “ignorant,” “foolish” (yu 
愚), “stubborn” (wan 頑) and “unrefined” (su 俗).Two four-characters phrases go that “the nature 
of barbarians is not of certainty. They are pacified during the day and revolt at night” (番性無
常，朝撫夕叛). Dynastic historians further drew a causal linkage between these racial traits and 
the invasions of the Chinese frontiers. In a stroke to depict Ming emperors’ benevolence, 
historians rationalized the granting of state preceptors to the western Buddhist monks as an act of 
transforming their uncivilized nature. “In the beginning, Taizu (the Hongwu emperor) solicited 
 
38 Ma Qizhi, “The Pluralistic Unity of the Chinese Nation and China’s Ethnic Policy,” English Qiushi, vol. 3, 
no. 2, 2011.  
39 Yun Shan, “Cultural Awareness, Cultural Confidence, Cultural Strength,” English Qiushi, vol. 3, no.1, 2011. 
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fan monks (番僧) and conferred state preceptor and great state preceptor to about four to five 
people in the hope that this will transform their ignorance and stubbornness and thus cease 
frontier troubles.” Another sentence stated that at the time of Chengzu, titles were also bestowed 
to the monks to “transform their disposition and provide them guidance so that they will 
altogether defer to China” (轉相化導，以共尊中國). It continues that, in so doing, western 
frontiers are free of barbarian troubles (以故西陲宴然，終明世無番寇之患).  
An event during the reign of Emperor Zhengde reveals court officials’ contempt toward 
non-Chinese people and entities. Zhengde intended to meet monks from Wusizang (today’s 
Tibet, 烏斯藏) who were known as living buddhas and even sent envoys to deliver banners with 
transportation of horses and ships loaded with salt and tea. Before the journey, Ming’s ministers 
and officials admonished the emperor and expressed their opposition. In their reasoning, “the 
past practice of sending envoys by previous emperors is not an act of respect based on beliefs in 
the religion,” but rather a need to pacify [the region and the people] by transforming and guiding 
them out of ignorance and stubbornness.” In the eyes of the officials, “the religion of western fan 
is demonic and presumptuous as well as devoid of canonical laws” (西番之教，邪妄不經) and 
this placating act through non-use of force is necessary because the world order was just 
established with the founding of the Ming (蓋因天下出定). They continued, as the dynastic 
reign entered the period of prosperity and peace, the court granted foreign envoys gifts but did 
not send our people to foreign lands. The minister expressed shock upon hearing Emperor 
Zhengde’s decision. Considering bandits may once again become active in Shu (today’s Sichuan 
province, 蜀) and safety was a grave concern in the years-long journey on the roads outside the 
dynastic realm that did not have Ming’s posts, the court officials deemed it impermissible for 
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“China to take insults from foreign barbarians” (虧中國之體，納外番之侮).40 The 
differentiation between the Chinese and non-Chinese casts a sharp contrast to the PRC’s 
accentuation of a historical sense of community. In addition to the educated elites’ contempt 
toward non-Chinese cultures and peoples, the historical trajectory of non-Hans to affiliate 
themselves with non-Han cultures also rebuffs the CCP’s claim of commonalities. 
Voluntary assimilation occurred over time but not to the degree that the political and 
cultural independence of non-Han actors can be sidelined. History records that the attraction of 
Chinese civilization to non-Han peoples is limited. It has been a constant pattern of continental 
history that people to the north, the northwest and the west of China proper (areas of the Yellow 
and the Yangtze Rivers) have developed their own socio-economic and political systems that are 
different from Chinese institutions. Mongol Yuan tried to replace the Chinese writing system 
with the Mongolian writing scripts. Even during the last dynasty of Qing and in the era of the 
nation-state, Xinjiang and Tibet remained distinct from China proper. Tibet unquestionably has 
its own civilization. Given that Qing had more control over the region compared to Tibet and 
historically it had frequent contacts with eastern dynasties, Xinjiang presents an interesting case 
in which the ethno-cultural traditions sustained throughout the Manchu rule have continued into 
the PRC period. 
 
 
40 Original texts: (正德元年來貢。十年復來貢。時帝惑近習言，謂烏斯藏僧有能知三生者，國人稱之為
活佛，欣然欲見之。考永、宣間陳誠、侯顯入番故事，命中官劉允乘傳往迎。閣臣梁儲等言：「西番
之教，邪妄不經。我祖宗朝雖嘗遣使，蓋因天下初定，藉以化導愚頑，鎮撫荒服，非信其教而崇奉之
也。承平之後，累朝列聖止因其來朝而賞賚之，未嘗輕辱命使，遠涉其地。今忽遣近侍往送幢幡，朝
野聞之，莫不駭愕。而允奏乞鹽引至數萬，動撥馬船至百艘，又許其便宜處置錢物，勢必攜帶私鹽，
騷擾郵傳，為官民患。今蜀中大盜初平，瘡痍未起。在官已無余積，必至苛斂軍民，鋌而走險，盜將
復發。況自天全六番出境，涉數萬之程，曆數歲之久，道途絕無郵置，人馬安從供頓？脫中途遇寇，
何以御之？虧中國之體，納外番之侮，無一可者。所齎敕書，臣等不敢撰擬。」帝不聽。禮部尚書毛
紀、六科給事中葉相、十三道御史周倫等並切諫，亦不聽。) 
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Tang is one of the three dynasties (the other two being Han and the Manchu Qing) that had 
more extensive influence over Xinjiang, including some short-lived military garrisons41 and 
military settlements and administrative communications in the east. However, the dynasty was 
not the only actor interacting with the region. In general, Tibetan empire from the south and the 
emergence and reemergence of the Turkic states in the north constantly challenged Tang’s 
holdings in Xinjiang. The establishment, abandonment, and reestablishment of Tang’s four 
garrisons and Anxi Protectorate-General witnessed the area under changed hands.42 In addition 
to the angle of political relations, the people and their activities were primarily non-Chinese in 
origin.  
From the 7th century to the 16th century, the Turko-Mongolian origins in population and 
linguistics gradually replaced Indo-European and Iranian origins and eventually became the 
dominant force in Xinjiang. During this period, despite contacts with Chinese dynasties, non-
Chinese cultures dominated the region. When Tang reigned in the east, the major political, 
linguistic, and genetical influence in Xinjiang came from the Turks migration. Turkic and 
Mongolian states/empire that controlled Xinjiang also chose non-Chinese ruling systems. For 
instance, the Uyghur Kaghanate (744-840 AD) with its capital in Mongolia adopted Soghdian 
administrative model, Soghdian scripts and Manichaeism religion. When Xinjiang under the 
Qocho Uyghur state came to recognize the suzerainty of the Mongol empire, it not only 
preserved its cultural identity but also provided Mongols the Uyghur writing system and Uyghur 
officials to run imperial affairs.43 Chinese influence from the angle of people and culture was 
 
41 From 649 to 670, the “Four Garrisons” were Kashgar, Khotan, Kucha, and Karashahr. After 693, garrisons 
were reestablished at Kucha, Khotan and Kashgar (and a new one set up at Tokmak. More secure bases to the 
east were Karakhoja, Tingzhou, and Hami. (Note that Tokmak is now in Kyrgyzstan, not China.) 
42 James. A. Millward, 2009, pp. 30-39. 
43 Ibid., p. 47. 
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relatively limited even in the case of Chinese dynasties which held greatest sway in Xinjiang. For 
instance, Tang’s armies in the region were mostly Turkic soldiers commanded by non-Chinese 
officers.44 Even though the empire in the east usually is categorized as a Chinese regime, the 
extent of its non-Chineseness, including the imperial lineage and ethnic composition in the 
troops, may warrant an analysis in its own terms.45  
Similar to Tang, the Manchu Qing before 1878 also left Xinjiang relatively undisturbed in 
terms of culture. The rising Chinese influence in the region and the ensuing provincialization 
however would begin sinicization. The high-ranking positions now would be filled by Zuo 
Zongtang’s Hunan Army and people from Hunan province, instead of the Manchus. 
Bureaucracies would imitate the Chinese administration implemented in the China proper and 
the staff would be Chinese. This means that local Uyghur elites lost their prestigious status and 
became subservient to the Chinese officials.46 Another major break with Qing’s rule before 
Zuo’s reconquest is sinicized assimilation, first through Confucian education and then “modern” 
education. Ideally, the latter departed from Confucian style under the Manchu reforms, but lack 
of instructors who specialized in subjects other than traditional curriculum call this “modernity” 
into question. Neither attempt was successful and there was strong local opposition to Chinese 
education. Islamic education however was embraced in terms of subjects and educational 
settings.47  
 
 
44 Ibid., p. 37. 
45 Chen Sanping. Multicultural China in the Early Middle Ages. 1st ed. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2012, pp. 4-38. via Ebook Central Academic Complete. 
46 James. A. Millward, 2007, pp. 139-142. 
47 Ibid, pp. 142-148. 
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The context of cultural disparities may provide explanations as to why identification with 
Chinese culture has particular appeals in CCP’s narratives. Shared Chinese culture is part of the 
propaganda fabricated to create the reality. A common origin is described as the fundamental 
root for multi-ethnic solidarity and harmony as it connected hearts and minds by shared values; 
“insofar as the cultural identification is attained, identifications with the great motherland, with 
the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu), and with the CCP-led socialist path of Chinese 
characteristics will be consolidated .”48 In other words, a person regardless of ethnic background 
will ultimately identify himself or herself as a member of Zhonghua minzu, inherit the traditions 
of Chinese culture, carry the identity of being a Chinese and align the self with socialism of 
Chinese characteristics led by the CCP. For instance, one can practice, in theory, Muslim 
customs and speak Uygur language but such ethnic identification cannot override the Chinese 
identity which is, from the CCP’s perspective, deeply wed into the narrative of national 
unification of a multi-ethnic territory whereby Beijing promises that revived national glory will 
come.  
Despite the gulf between realities and the discourse of historical territorial continuity and 
cohesion among peoples, the PRC sees its version of history as the correct interpretation. The 
Chinese phrase cuan gai (篡改) is often used to accuse others of committing grave moral sins in 
rewriting the history in a way that differs from the Chinese Communist Party’s views. Cuan gai 
carries a stronger tone than the English word, rewrite, which is similar to Chinese gai xie (改寫). 
Cuan means usurpation of the throne. Thus, it denotes the meaning as strong as something that is 
orthodox and gets overthrown. Cuan in this context thus means the orthodox account of history 
 
48Hao Shiyuan [郝时远] “Consolidating the Correct View about the Chinese Nation” [牢固树立正确民族观], 
Qiushi, issue 18, 2015. 
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is unduly and unjustly overridden. Simply put, cuan gai (篡改) means usurping the right to write 
history. Beijing is appropriating the right-associated sense of righteousness to crown its historical 
view. 49 
Patriotism  
The PRC does not miss opportunities to frame the consciousness of a community with the 
appeal to patriotism. Chinese patriotism, another example of imagined historical continuity, is 
built upon the belief that different ethnicities and different cultures have been an integrated 
whole far before the modern conception of Zhonghua minzu and re-definition of Chinese culture 
and before the presence of fixed territorial boundaries under the nation-state system. “The 
Chinese nation has glorious tradition of patriotism……Over the long course of our 
history……patriotism is the source for development and progress of Chinese civilization in the 
past thousands of years.”50 Sometimes the narrative does not explicitly emphasize the far past, 
but the phrase “profound” （深厚）or “long” （悠久）tradition seems to indicate such.51 After 
opening with the tradition of the Chinese people’s love for the country, the official narratives 
turn to modern-day nationalist experience from the mid-19th century onward. It is argued by the 
CCP that the establishment of the PRC in 1949 further transforms patriotism from “striving for 
the independence and liberation of [Zhonghua] minzu to realizing national rejuvenation and 
making the state strong and wealthy.”52  
 
49 “Fan” is a pejorative Chinese word referring to Tibet. It means uncivilized. See Ma Chao, 2010.  
50 The CCP Committee of Beijing University, “Promoting the Spirit of May Fourth Movement” [弘扬五四爱
国主义精神推进中华民族伟大复兴], Qiushi, issue 09, 2009.  
51 Ministry of Education, “Patriotism is a Strong Force for the Realization of A Rejuvenation of the Chinese 
Nation” [爱国主义实现民族复兴的强大精神动力] Qiushi, issue 01, 2009; Qiu Shi, “The Current Theme of 
Patriotism: the Great Enterprise of Promoting Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” [爱国主义的当代主
题：推进中国特色社会主义伟大事业], Qiushi, issue 01, 2010.  
52 Qiu shi, 2010. 
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The official account of patriotic acts before 1949 includes dynasty-led reform and revolts 
within the Qing empire such as the Taiping and Boxer rebellions. Beijing’s definition of 
patriotism apparently is very loose and it explicitly admits so in sinicized Marxist verbiage: 
“when the old regime and social institutions become impediments for the progress of the 
motherland, it is patriots’ responsibility to struggle against such institutions. Patriotism in 
modern China’s foreign policy is manifested in anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism while 
striving for national independence. Domestically, it is to fight against feudalism and bureaucratic 
capitalism to achieve the liberation of the people.”53 Accordingly, domestic events that occurred 
from the mid-19th century to WWII, the period of Qing’s decline followed by internal power 
competition among parties with and without clear ideas of modern governing institutions 
(regionalism in the late Qing and the warlord period), are understood to be nationalist.  
Rebellion as the result of imperial decline, part of a regular pattern of dynastic cycle, 
having more to do with local deprived conditions and inability of dynastic reign, nonetheless is 
interpreted as patriotism. As the official logic goes, the Hundred-Day Reform of 1898 that 
attempted to modify Qing’s political system with no success also reflects the effort to save the 
country and people. It is doubtful that rebels had a clear idea of the nation-state. How far beyond 
saving the throne the dynastic reform was meant to go also challenges the interpretation. Last but 
not least, Beijing misuses “feudalism” that had long ceased before Qing to describe imperial 
socio-political institutions which in the CCP’s view the rebellions and reforms were targeted 
against.  
 
 
53Ministry of Education, 2009. 
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The relaxed definition of patriotism and categorization of events into “isms” serve a larger 
purpose of highlighting the progressiveness of Chinese socialism under communist leadership 
and also affirming Maoist thought which survives the 1981 resolution54 and remains guiding 
principles for the CCP. After recounting a series of failed endeavors, the argument then goes that 
the turning point for patriotism to take on a form of making the country great again is the 
adoption of Chinese socialism. The narratives interweave the choice of the people and the 
Party’s efforts to defend socialism under the CCP’s leadership as the only path to national 
rejuvenation. But, they mostly are to justify Beijing’s governance and to propagate the idea that 
patriotism should be exclusively identified with love for socialism defined by the Party. This is 
also proved by increasing assertion, as chapter 4 demonstrates, that Chinese socialism is better 
than western institutions. “Patriotism is to love socialist motherland and to embrace the 
communist party’s leadership.” Beijing makes no pretense of hiding the demand of political 
loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party and its ideological banner.55  
The Chinese nation, Chinese culture, territorial boundaries, Chinese civilization, and 
patriotism have close associations. Through the PRC’s reconstructing of history, they seem to 
gain temporal immortality. Discursive emphasis on the unified diverse lands under centralized 
government in the past makes the communist rule over the vast territory a continuous normality. 
The key element in sustaining this imagined community is the experience of western aggression. 
The created memory of ancient greatness contrasts sharply with officially exaggerated 
humiliation in the beginning of the modern era. This comparison provides the impetus to move 
 
54 The resolution concludes the Maoist period. While recognizing mistakes Mao had made, it generally 
reaffirms his contribution to the Chinese revolution. See chapter 2 for detailed discussion.  
55 for the absolute loyalty to socialism defined by the CCP and to the communist leadership, see chapter 2 
in this research and discursive evidence in chapter 4.  
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the country forward to a revived glory in the future. And Beijing’s blueprint for this goal is the 
demand of loyalty to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” crafted by the CCP. The discursive 
logic described above underlines Xi Jinping’s speech at the closing of the Party’s 19th National 
Congress in October 2017: 
“The establishment of the People’s Republic of China has been 68 years. Reforms 
and Opening has entered the 39th year. Our Party has led the Chinese people and 
the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu) out of miserable poverty and weaknesses, 
and thoroughly changed wretched conditions of the Old China since the Opium 
War. Today, more than 1.3 billion Chinese people are high-spirited and walk with 
pride. Our 9.6 million square-kilometers motherland is vibrant and vigorous. Our 
five-thousands-years Chinese culture is splendid and forever charming. Chinese 
people and Chinese nation has a promising future……We have full confidence 
and meanwhile feel heavy shoulders……The Chinese communists take 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation to their hearts and……will stride toward the 
grand objective of national revival with persistent and unprecedented efforts.”56 
From Domestic to International Politics 
The PRC also brands this imagined community with the permanent quality of non-
conflictual propensity. Harmony, inclusiveness, and peace are concepts taken from 
Confucianism and Taoism to describe the nature and/or the pursuit of China and the Chinese 
nation for more than two millenniums. The stress on the culture of non-confrontation aims to 
serve a larger purpose of persuading other countries of the peaceful benefits of Beijing’s outward 
 
56 See “Xi Jinping Gave a Speech at the Closing of the 19th Party Congress” [中国共产党第十九次全国代表
大会在京闭幕 习近平主持大会并发表重要讲话], Oct. 24, 2017, <http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-
10/24/content_5234120.htm>. 
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expansion. There is a growing trend in official rhetoric and academic writings by Chinese 
scholars to emphasize or infer the cooperativeness and inclusiveness of Beijing’s external 
behavior and governance from the perspective of C-T ideology. In other words, the lines between 
internal and external affairs are blurred when the PRC stresses that non-conflict and common 
interests govern its state and foreign policies. It is rationalizing its behavior according to the 
same logic.  
Domestic governing plans frequently contain Confucian phrases. Since 1996, Xiaokang or 
xiaokang society (小康社会), meaning a “moderately prosperous society”, has appeared either as 
a current developmental situation or a nationwide goal in the documents of the Party’s Central 
Committee, the Party’s National Congress, and the National People’s Congress. The phrase 
continues beyond Jiang Zemin’s era into Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. In an attempt to cope with 
mounting domestic problems and demands, a 2006 “Resolutions” declares the goal of 
constructing a “harmonious society” (和谐社会).57 Underpinning the domestic blueprint is the 
emphasis that the upholding of the Party’s leadership in all undertakings is the key to national 
success. Beijing’s diplomacy similarly suggests that the CCP at the helm of China can be a 
modern undertaker of the Confucian mission in creating a peaceful world.  
In a 2006 Qiushi article about China’s international influence, penned by the head of 
China Institute of International Studies, a research institute of PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the author wrote: “Historically, the Chinese nation has been peace-loving and the Chinese culture 
consistently pursues peace. Desire for peace and the pursuit of harmony have always been the 
 
57 The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, “Resolutions of the CPC Central Committee on 
Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society” [中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐
社会若干重大问题的决定], Oct. 11, 2006, 
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/72347/6347991.html>. 
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spirit of the Chinese people.” The non-violent tendency is argued to be evident in traditional 
philosophies. “Dialectically treating relations between people and society and between human 
beings and nature, and fully respecting ethics and lives are the fine thought of Chinese 
civilization.”58 The article does not explicitly mention Confucianism, but it is no doubt the 
source of the relations and ethics in the text. The author continues to state that the fine thought 
“provides important inspirations for solving many issues in today’s world.”  
The applicability of ancient philosophical wisdom to international affairs stated here is not 
randomly opined by the author. Hu Jintao’s 2005 UN speech that stressed building a peaceful 
and harmonious world is mentioned in the article and praised as a combination of Chinese 
traditional ideals and current development trends. Beijing’s adoption of phrases echoing Chinese 
philosophies seems to start from Hu’s first term. After his UN speech, analysis of related 
concepts in relations to traditional thought obtains growing space in official writings. 
If the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao administrations mostly utilized Confucianism for 
domestic purposes, then Xi Jinping’s period expands the scope of its function by associating the 
philosophy with international affairs. Xi’s 2014 speech at an international conference 
commemorating the 2656th anniversary of Confucius’ birth reflects similar logic to that laid out 
in the Qiushi article, but expands more in depth. According to Xi, the fundamental contributing 
factors to the pacific tendency of the country are the inclusiveness of Confucianism, its peaceful 
co-existence with other schools of thought in Chinese history, and the idea of “the world as one 
shared community with great unity” (天下为公、大同世界). Xi then applied domestic Chinese 
inclusiveness to the world affairs by emphasizing the principle of harmony with diversity, as he 
 
58 Ma Zhengan [马振岗] “Understand China’s International Influence with Rationality” [理性看待中国的国
际影响力 求是], Qiushi, issue 5, 2006.  
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states: “Differences between the civilization of one’s own country and that of others should be 
handled rationally, with the awareness that every civilization is unique. We must seek common 
ground while reserving differences……Don’t feel displeased or try to transform, assimilate or 
even replace other civilization when they are different from your own.” Regarding how the 
philosophy is relevant to governance, he continued that “some people of insight believe that the 
fine traditional culture of China, Confucianism included, contains important inspirations for 
solving the troubles facing us today.”59 Accordingly, Confucian values hold the keys to the 
solutions of poverty and war because of their tolerance toward differences and altruistic motive 
to make the world a better place. The following year at the U.N., Xi Jinping noted that many of 
U.N. principles have not come true including justice, development, and peace, and cited a 
Confucian adage, “the greatest ideal is to create a world truly shared by all” (大道之行 天下为
公) as the goal for global governance. He then proposed several guidelines for global issues and 
called for joint effort to realize a world that respects differences and enjoys co-prosperity.60 Non-
exclusion that is said to be practice in domestic affairs, according to Beijing’s narratives, also 
applies to the way that the PRC claims to follow in its foreign policies. China is providing an 
international version of imagined community and recommending itself as a preferred leader. 
 
 
59 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the International Conference in Commemoration of 
the 2,565th Anniversary of Confucius' Birth and the fifth Congress of the International Confucian 
Association” (在纪念孔子诞辰2565周年国际学术研讨会上的讲话), Sept. 24, 2014 
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60 Xi’s UN speech, see “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperation and Create a 
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近平在第七十届联合国大会一般性辩论时的讲话], < http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-
09/29/c_1116703645.htm>. 
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Xi’s understanding of Confucianism which tolerates diversity does not fit historical 
realities that the Chinese elites looked down upon other cultures. The PRC re-interprets the 
political philosophy for its contemporary needs. Xi’s emphasis on the coexistence of diversity 
without attempts of subjecting one to another originates in China’s refutation of the democracy 
and human rights which it accuses the US of trying to impose on China in its own image. 
Chinese scholars will not concur with Xi’s interpretations, however, despite their association of 
Confucianism with inclusiveness. Scholarly understanding, in presenting Confucianism as it is, 
draws an unfortunate conclusion of civilizing mission which the author of the article to be 
discussed may or may not realize.  
In a 2015 English article, “Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History”, 
published by The Chinese Journal of International Politics staffed with renowned Chinese and 
American scholars on the editorial board, Feng Zhang’s argument reveals that inclusiveness in 
Confucianism is a synonym of cultural homogeneity.61 He differentiates Confucian 
exclusiveness affiliated with neo-Confucianism from Confucian inclusiveness in Classical 
Confucianism. Contrary to the exclusion thought which rejects the innate ability of barbarians to 
be transformed for the better, the inclusiveness school proposed that non-Chinese can become 
Chinese through cultural assimilation, specifically through “education and transformation” (教
化) of barbarians. Zhang argues that as China’s strength grows, there is higher likelihood of 
Confucian inclusiveness. Two paragraphs of his prove such. “Song neo-Confucians were 
extremely reluctant to acknowledge the transformative potential of the yi (barbarians). 
Furthermore, given the equality and even superiority the semi-nomadic regimes of the Liao and 
 
61 Zhang, Feng. “Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History.” The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, vol. 8, no. 2, 2015, pp. 197-218 (for quotations, see pp. 206, 207-209). 
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Jin were able to maintain vis-a`-vis the Song, they could not but recognize the difficulty of such 
transformation.” Another short paragraph goes, “Yet it was when the Mongols turned defiant and 
started raiding Ming frontiers that the emperors began to describe them as heartless beasts that 
must be punished. Thus, the early Ming also exhibited its particular cultural exclusivism. It, 
however, was never pronounced or enduring, because Chinese strength enabled the emperors to 
launch successful military expeditions against the Mongols……This is why Chinese material 
strength is an enhancing condition of inclusivism (emphasis added).” This indicates that, to 
achieve Confucian inclusiveness, it is acceptable to use coercive measures to ensure compliance. 
The last section of this article is the suggestion for China’s current foreign policies with some 
key points from one of Xi Jinping’s speeches that borrows Confucian concepts of moral values. 
Judging from the overall context, the article implies that having foreigners become Chinese by 
enculturing them with Confucian values as the country’s national strength grows--and it indeed 
has become more capable than before—is recommended as the pathway for Beijing’s foreign 
policy. 
Zhang’s argument amounts to cultural hegemony and favors cultural homogeneity. 
Although he praises non-existence of the Self-Other dichotomy in the inclusive conception of 
Confucianism (since others can be assimilated and become culturally Chinese as well), his 
argument remains sino-centric for the identity of the Other spins around “the Chinese” and 
depends upon whether it accepts Chinese view. When Zhang states that the idea that the Chinese 
are “more culturally advanced and trustworthy” is outdated,62 his emphasis on Confucian 
moralities such as humanness, mutual benefits, and trust as the pathway to harmonious foreign 
relations ironically retains the idea of sino-culture superiority, because these moralities function 
 
62 Ibid., p. 212.  
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within Confucian cultural bounds. In other words, the requirement for this harmonious world to 
work is that others act in China’s cultural terms or behave in a way that China interprets to its 
liking while others may attach different meanings. While Zhang tries to downplay the possibility 
of sino-centrism as a factor in informing Beijing’s policies today and recognizes the self-
rationalization of the court officials, it does not lessen the fact that the superiority of the Chinese 
culture governs the idea of Confucian inclusiveness. In fact, Zhang’s writings contain an 
irreconcilable contradiction. The main bodies of his arguments contend that cultural superiority 
and utilitarianism underpin the Confucian world order but the conclusions evade these upholding 
columns of a Confucian community and simply stress a non-utilitarian idealistic vision.   
Both official and scholarly interpretations of Confucian inclusiveness are equally 
problematic. The official version is not faithful to history as the elite often despised non-Chinese 
cultures; respect for diversity was lacking. Whether “barbarians” can be converted to Chinese in 
the Confucian literature during different dynastic periods is beside the point because the 
fundamental logic does not change; the Chinese way of doing things reigns above others. 
Benevolence, morality, and peace are present only when one acts according to Chinese terms. 
Is History the Present and the Future? 
The CCP has been building its modern version of Chinese uniqueness as shown in 
“Socialism with Chinese characteristics” blended with revived Chinese traditions and sinicized 
Marxism. It is as systemic as the Confucian ideology employed by the imperial court and 
similarly carries fundamental characteristics of Chinese political culture such as authoritarianism 
and the appeal to morality. As with imperial ideology, the theory appeals to domestic and 
international audiences that acceptance of the Chinese way promises benefits. The dynastic 
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world order however differs from Beijing’s contemporary version as the modern economic mode 
and nation-state system add complications. 
Industrialized China has a broader worldview in terms of space to which it can project 
influence than agricultural dynasties in which mobility of sedentary population is limited and 
security concerns mostly come from immediate neighbors. Beijing’s demands for overseas 
markets and resources depart from imperial practice. Agrarian China proper attracted pastoral 
nomads and semi-nomads for its material wealth and to varying degrees sedentary Koreans and 
Japanese for its cultural inheritance. China was self-contained and, in some cases, others came. 
Now it has to rely on other countries as well in the quest for natural resources and in solving 
problems of domestic over-production and unemployment. Therefore, China’s national interests 
in the era of globalization have extended to different parts of the world where activities 
sanctioned by the imperial court were rare. Economic interests thus play a weighted role in 
advocating for a Chinese order and providing additional reasons such as protecting commerce by 
building a blue-water navy. This differs from the imperial pattern that a Chinese order was 
mainly based on a relatively self-sufficient base. 
Beijing’s developmental needs coupled with the nation-state system complicate 
presentation and rationalization of a Chinese world order. The PRC is by no means a power on 
par with the US and not even a regional hegemon, but its official discourse speaks as if it is, 
especially in the sense that it will bring public goods of prosperity to the world. Blatant claims of 
sanction from Heaven and wordings directly conveying hierarchical relationships in addressing 
foreign states are absent in contemporary writings. They are replaced by professions of equality 
and mutual respect for sovereignty. As the chapter 4 about Chinese worldview will show, 
contemporary narratives make salient equity rhetoric but the idea of China taking a 
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regional/global leadership is not difficult to discern. The discursive presentation of hierarchy 
heavily shrouded with idealism to some extent parallels the hypocrisy of the modern state system 
in which it is said that each country enjoys sovereign equality, but it is not difficult to observe 
the governing position of material capabilities in the modern-day international hierarchy. China’s 
idealist proposals remain instrumental to the end it desires.  
The intersection of the imperial legacy of sino-centrism, nationalism and the contemporary 
nation-state system, and shifts in the mode of economy necessary to make a given country more 
powerful than others creates an interesting phenomenon that unlike the confident reaffirmation of 
resurrection of Chinese civilizational superiority over “the barbarians” in the aftermath of Ming’s 
overthrow of Mongol Yuan,63 the PRC has been working for decades for a revived national 
glory, intermittently in the form of economic nationalism. Mao’s version of Marxism-Leninism 
intending to surpass all other advanced economies, including the USSR, the U.S. and Britain, 
proved a fiasco after the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) created famine on a large scale. The 
The World Development Indicators (WDI) records -27. 27 percent and -5.58 percent for annual 
growth rate in 1961 and 1962 respectively. Not until Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and opening was 
China able to develop for a longer run. According to WDI, the average growth rate per year from 
1980 to 2018 is 9.46 percent.64 The association between nationalism and Beijing’s material 
capabilities thus has increasingly gained momentum since the 1990s and become inseparable 
synonyms in the early twenty-first century, in comparison to Mao’s era. 
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Such nationalism in the two different periods is not merely for a country to return to its 
own “normalcy”, but also to demonstrate to the world that the Chinese state which used to be 
humiliated by western powers and Japan now is more powerful than or as powerful as they are, 
and that the Chinese system is superior to capitalist democracy and Moscow’s deviant socialism. 
Reaffirmation of self-worth requires comparison to an othered inferior party. Imperial Confucian 
scholar-officials wrote that because of the lack of virtue (te) and sole reliance on the use of force, 
the Mongols eventually lost the territory to Ming and retreated to the northern steppe.65 Ming’s 
civilizational superiority has its modern-day analogy. As the analysis of the narratives in later 
chapters will show, underlying Beijing’s pursuit of economic growth is the motive to reclaim 
institutional and material superiority over the countries, especially the U.S., that have loomed 
large as threats in its modern national discourse.  
In the dynastic history, it is believed that there was barely a rival to Chinese civilization. 
Chinese institutions and bureaucracies were exported to neighboring countries, especially the 
Korean Peninsula. The legitimacy of Son of Heaven claimed by the imperial house may not have 
been accepted by tribal groups from the north and northeast, but Mongols and Manchus used it to 
their advantage when they ruled the China proper. On the contrary, in the contemporary era, the 
U.S. poses great challenges to the PRC in material strength and in governing values. More 
specifically, the CCP may fear Western-inspired and orchestrated subversion in the form of 
“peaceful evolution.” This is self-evident in the CCP discourse that often criticizes the western 
system of democracy and human rights and long featured “American aggressive hegemonism”, 
while defending Chinese socialism and increasingly positioning it as an alternative. In the PRC’s 
narratives, western institutions are the root cause of international conflict whereas the inherent 
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inclusiveness of Chinese socialism guides China’s foreign policy toward peace. As chapter 4 
demonstrates, the relationship between Chinese socialism and world peace is more about the 
restraints that socialism puts on the PRC, preventing it from aggression, and about the good 
impact brought by the innate good nature of China. It is less about creating peace by cloning 
Chinese institutions to other countries as Stalin installed the soviet regimes in Eastern Europe.   
Unlike ancient times when whoever occupied the entire China proper could claim to be a 
regional hegemon, other powerful actors, especially the U.S., now complicate Beijing’s 
aspirations. The Indo-Pacific where the PRC has become active economically and militarily is by 
no means a power vacuum for an easy fit-in. The countries on the Pacific Rim such as Japan and 
Taiwan have long had uneasy relations with Beijing. Australia has publicly voiced alarms about 
China’s military development in 2009 if not earlier. India does not sit idle when the sailing of 
Chinese navy grows frequent in the Indian Ocean and Beijing’s political and economic clout 
reaches deeply into South Asian states that traditionally have belonged to the Indian sphere of 
influence. In addition, China has to deal with the continuing presence of American power.  
China attempts to and is expanding outward through routes that are either hostile to the 
country, or have diverse populations, or traditionally fall into other major powers’ spheres of 
influence. In other words, residing hegemons do not deter Beijing from probing their bottom 
lines and building up its influence. The outward expansion is driven by domestic needs of 
economic growth, pursuit of international influence and prestige, and the desire to have the 
western Pacific and possibly the Indian Ocean as well cleared of other powers when China 
intentionally shapes and preserves a vivid memory of aggression from the sea. The mixed 
motives of ambition and insecurity coupled with the Chinese ultra-conviction of righteousness in 
claiming contested territorial interests and the sanction of Marxist materialism sweetened with 
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revised Confucian-Taoist (C-T) ideology of a world community set in motion the train of making 
a modern version of Chinese world order. The realities will certainly complicate China’s design, 
but if that design is rooted in widely held beliefs, there is reason to expect that China is willing to 
challenge the (global) status quo.  
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Chapter 2 
Cultural Subjectivism 
Chinese newspapers, military writings, speeches, and publicly available texts in other 
forms have frequently evoked the image of Zheng He’s naval expeditions in the 15th century that 
cruised from Southeast Asia to the Red Sea and Eastern Africa when celebrating the growing 
close ties between the PRC and the countries along the route. The script reads the same: the West 
enslaved and colonized Africa while Ming China did not, and the PRC inherits the good 
traditions of Zheng He’s voyages in that the Sino-African cooperation is built on friendship and 
goodwill. The narratives built upon the myth are not intended to be rhetorical.  
Among China’s networks of infrastructure in Africa is the 300-mile long Standard Gauge 
Railway that links Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi to the coastal city of Mombasa. The construction 
took about three and half a years before the service was launched in 2017. As with many other 
projects on the continent and elsewhere in the world, it was constructed by China (in this case 
China Road and Bridge Corporation) with imported materials from that country and financed by 
Export-Import Bank of China. According to the information available at the time of writing, the 
PRC also operates the railroad and reportedly will hand operation over to Kenyans after 
personnel training is completed.66  
 
 
66 Jevans Nyabiage, “Kenya’s Chinese-built Railway is a hit with travelers, but is this safari line a massive 
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<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3019603/kenyas-chinese-built-railway-hit-travellers-
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Another ‘Lunatic Express,’”  New York Times, June 8, 2017, 
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May 31, 2017< https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40092600>, accessed Oct. 5, 2019. 
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Aside from physical presence, the Chinese also decided to leave their cultural mark. At 
Mombasa terminal is a statue of Zheng He with a plaque stating: “Zheng’s fleet paid four visits 
to Mombasa, enhancing mutual understanding between China and Kenya, and strengthening 
Kenya-China friendly exchanges.”67 An article published in the Chinese version of the People’s 
Daily praises Zheng He for the seeds of friendship, and the railway as the symbol of the revived 
prosperous trade and exchanges of the old Silk Road.68  
The Standard Gauge Railway serves a larger purpose for the Chinese by bridging Mombasa 
and, via other planned rail lines, connecting to inland countries to the west, northeast and east of 
Kenya (such as Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo).69 The PRC 
already invests in Mombasa port, one of dozens of PRC-sponsored African ports with 
commercial and/or possibly military value.70 Tanzania and Senegal are other coastal states, east 
and west respectively, where China invests in infrastructure to streamline transportation from 
inland states to the Indian and Atlantic Oceans.71  
Aside from being one of the focused countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Kenya 
also becomes the center of the PRC’s soft power in Africa. Since 2005, the country has hosted 
four Confucius Institutes, one Broadcast Confucius classroom, and several Chinese classrooms. 
In addition, the capital Nairobi is home for the headquarters of Chinese media on the continent, 
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including China Central Television, Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International, and China 
Daily.72 
The PRC’s approaches to individual countries vary but on the aggregate level are  
strategically comprehensive, ranging from economic and military to diplomatic and cultural. All 
of these are tied into the objective of so-called “national revival.” The globetrotting is made 
possible by the possession of material strength that reaches to a certain level and propelled by the 
expectation of more gains to come. The slogan of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” 
has not always seen economic growth upward since its debut under Jiang Zemin. The Chinese 
economy already reached its height in 2007 when annual GDP growth rated 14.23%. By using 
ten years as a measuring unit, the average growth rate from 2010 to 2018 is 7.79%, compared to 
10.35% from 2000 to 2009, and even lower than the decade of 1990s. From 2010 to 2018, there 
was a decline in growth from 10.63% to 6.6% (see graph 2.0).73 “Chinese Dream”, the latest 
term embodying the slogan, took its form in 2013 during the economic downswing and continues 
to be propagated in state-controlled media. As chapter 4 shows, Chinese narratives become more 
articulated regarding how the PRC intends to reshape international order from 2012 onward, 
except for 2013. It was during the economic downturn that Belt and Road and supporting AIIB 
were proposed. The coupling of discursive confidence and policy initiatives may signal the 
determination and the belief that foreign markets and resources may provide opportunities for 
further economic growth or at least sustain a certain level of material capabilities.  
 
 
72 Embassy of the PRC in Kenya, “Chinese Ambassador to Kenya H.E. Amb. Sun Baohong’s Article Themed 
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Graph 2.0 
 
Overseas construction projects in Africa and elsewhere in the world benefit China in 
various ways. They provide employment opportunities for the Chinese and mitigate the problem 
of overproduction in steel. The PRC is using the global market to support its industries that 
otherwise might not exist because of limited domestic demand. In addition, China also expects to 
gain from repayment of loans with interest or in forms of other assets if default occurs. 
Despite economic downturn, the PRC may still have enough material foundation by 
possessing access to international markets and resources for the foreseeable future to support 
cultural programs, finance military and technological development, and to build reputation and 
fame. Regarding the last item, trains, railways, ports and buildings constructed and sponsored by 
China are materials for propagating the greatness and generosity of the Chinese nation in helping 
the developing states. Visits by the PLA Naval escort fleet and hospital ship also serve the 
narratives of Chinese altruism and peace. Zheng He in statue and in text at the Mombasa train 
station symbolizes these messages. The evocation of the admiral’s image mythologizes the 
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nature of bilateral interactions and rationalizes the PRC’s pursuit of tangible and intangible self-
interests. 
The Nairobi-Mombasa Railway is one among a great many investment projects that the 
PRC has in Africa. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2020 
and has since held several conferences and summits to facilitate economic, cultural and political 
ties. The latest one was in 2018. Xi’s speech (in English version) at the opening ceremony in 
Beijing provides an example of China’s diplomatic narratives that are grounded in high idealism. 
It also showcases how the PRC constructs relations between itself and others.74 The speech first 
focuses on the amicable and cooperative China-Africa relations by identifying their 
commonalities in the past and what they have in the future. “[W]ith similar fate in the past and a 
common mission, China and Africa have extended sympathy to and helped each other 
throughout all the years. Together, we have embarked on a distinctive path of win-win 
cooperation.” Beijing claims that it “values sincerity, friendship, and equality in pursuing 
cooperation” and states that China and Africa “have worked in unity and forging ahead.” To 
detail the spring of Chinese “good faith” toward the continent, Xi continued, “We respect Africa, 
love Africa and support Africa. We follow a ‘five-no’ approach in our relations with Africa: no 
interference in African countries’ pursuit of development paths that fit their national conditions; 
no interference in African countries' internal affairs; no imposition of our will on African 
countries; no attachment of political strings to assistance to Africa; and no seeking of selfish 
political gains in investment and financing cooperation with Africa.” Xi proceeded to say that 
other non-African countries should also apply these principles in dealing with Africa. 
 
74 “Full text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at opening ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit,” 
Xinhua, Sept. 3, 2018, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_129946189.htm>. 
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While making China-Africa relations the primary focus of his speech, there is a third party 
in the background that Xi insinuated. Beijing has long perceived that western countries have 
intended to remold China in a way that will undermine the legitimacy of the CCP, hence the 
Party constructs narratives that reflect its own perception of how others have been treating it 
“unfairly” and how it wishes that others do not impose their own institutions on China (which the 
Party equates itself to). The first three “non-interferences” reflects the CCP’s perception that 
others have “interfered” in affairs that it claims to be internal. Meanwhile, there has been 
growing criticism toward the Chinese practice of development and business in the developing 
countries. Questions have been raised about neo-colonialism, loan traps, destruction of 
ecological environment, reinforcement of authoritarian rule and dislocation of population. 
China’s idealistic narratives can be seen as its responses to the criticism. To reassure that 
Beijing’s agenda will proceed unhampered, Xi accentuated that, “No one could undermine the 
great unity between the Chinese people and the African people” and “[n]o one could hold back 
the Chinese people or the African people as we march toward rejuvenation.” 
To show the PRC’s selfless motivation toward the countries of the continent, Xi addressed 
them as “our African brothers” and emphasized, “China follows the principle of giving more and 
taking less, giving before taking and giving without asking for return. With open arms, we 
welcome African countries aboard the express train of China's development.” 
“Shared” appears 15 times in the speech including the speech title, “common” 9 times, 
“friendship” 6 times and “cooperation,” 56 times. By speaking to the African audiences about the 
shared interests regardless of changing times, as aforementioned, “with similar fate in the past 
and a common mission,” Beijing’s purpose is to promote the Belt and Road Initiative as Xi 
expressed, “We need to see to it that the Belt and Road Initiative and the AU Agenda 
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2063[African Union Agenda 2063], the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 
development programs of African countries better complement each other.” 
The speech depicts a better future that waits for China and Africa and the world in general, 
if certain security challenges are overcome. According to Xi, the world “is undergoing profound 
changes unseen in a century,” as there is a “surging trend toward multi-polarity, economic 
globalization……accelerated transformation of the global governance system and international 
order, rapid rise of emerging markets and developing countries, and greater balance in global 
power configuration.” Beijing intends to deliver a message that the world is experiencing a 
phenomenon unprecedented in the past 100 years and this phenomenon in fact creates 
opportunities for many countries to develop. To make China’s Belt and Road proposal sound 
legitimate and serve common goods at this historical juncture, Xi said, “[t]o respond to the call 
of the times, China takes it its mission to make new and even greater contribution to mankind”; 
“[t]o respond to the call of the times, China is ready to jointly promote the Belt and Road 
Initiative with international partners.” These Chinese efforts are to be seen in the context of Xi’s 
criticism about the current running of international affairs. According to him, “[h]egemony and 
power politics persist; protectionism and unilateralism are mounting; war, conflicts, terrorism, 
famine and epidemics continue to plague us.” While no specific countries were named, as 
evidenced in the narratives of other texts as well, it is clear that the PRC perceives that the 
current international politics dominated by the US manifests hegemony and power politics. 
Protectionism and unilateralism are also used to describe Washington’s attitudes toward trade 
and global governance. To frame the PRC as a positive contributor, Xi stated, China will “stay 
committed to the vision of consultation, cooperation and benefit for all……” 
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Beijing’s role/identity depends on how it perceives its relations with others. Its role 
construction usually requires a party whose interests, from China’s perspective, are in accord 
with the PRC’s and another party who goes against its agendas. By creating a perception to the 
international audience that globalization and interdependence is the unprecedented trend of the 
time, Chinese narratives that stress a convergence between the PRC’s policies/principles and 
what the world needs marginalize the role and influence of other major powers, such as the US, 
whose policies are not beneficial to the PRC. In other words, the narratives indicate that China 
and the developing countries are riding with the tide of the history whereas hegemonic 
Washington is doing what contradicts to the wishes of many.  
Based on the altruism indicated by the narratives, the CCP posits itself as a better 
candidate to bring the world peace and prosperity as opposed to other major powers. In the 
attempt to shape power relations to its favor, instead of an outright statement that conveys 
superior-inferior relationships, China utilizes the rhetoric of “equality”, “consultation,” “unity” 
and “cooperation” to persuade others into believing that its overseas activities do not aim for 
subjugation. By stressing the trend of the time, it tries to convince the international audience that 
its global initiatives mean nothing but answering the wishes of the world.  
The PRC’s efforts in shaping itself as the natural leader of the time were already evidenced 
in an English news report of a joint statement that wrapped up a high-level meeting between the 
CCP and political parties from around the world. The four-day event was held after the 19th Party 
Congress in 2017 and the joint statement it produced was dubbed by the Chinese media as “the 
Beijing Initiative.” The official Chinese media was trying to create an impression that the world 
has echoed China’s various initiatives. According to the English version, more than 120 
countries express in the joint statement that “[China’s] Belt and Road Initiative serves the 
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interests of people of all countries and provides a platform for building a community with a 
shared future for mankind.” To realize such a community, the participants called on “countries to 
stay away from isolationism and exclusionism and support a multilateral trade system.” They 
further agreed that “a new form of international relations” that is, “mutual respect, fairness, 
justice, and win-win cooperation,” has to be erected to build such a community. The participants 
had a leader in mind as they “hailed the CPC’s historical contribution and expect China’s further 
navigating role.” The report also cited the president of the Senate of the Republic of Congo as 
saying, “China fulfills its duties efficiently, promotes unity, friendship and safety among people 
in the world and works for enabling everyone to benefit from development. The Belt and Road is 
one of the best examples.” A correlation between Beijing’s economic power and a world leading 
status is clearly indicated by foreigners’ views mediated through a Chinese reporter.75 What is 
intriguing is the concerted opinion about what an international order should look like. By 
forming a perception of wide approval for Beijing’s position and policy, the narratives create a 
climate that there is nothing opposing China’s global activities. Such narratives aim to foster an 
expected bandwagon effect in that other countries will also believe in the beneficial outcomes of 
deepening engagements with the PRC.  
To justify its outward expansion, Beijing framed its overseas policies as answers to the 
needs of the time and with the endorsements from foreign dignitaries. The narratives shape the 
dynamic of interaction in a way as if China’s ongoing ascendance to a central position is a 
natural outcome due to the demand of the time. Diplomatically, it shapes the relations between 
the PRC and other countries in a way as if these are not power relations; instead, revealed by the 
 
75 Zhang Yunbi, “Shared Future Concept Embraced,” People’s Daily, Dec. 04, 2017, 
<http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/1204/c90000-9299937.html>. 
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narratives, Beijing is selflessly doing the right thing at the right time and is willing to consult 
with others to find common ground. It claims to rely on a “democratic” way for global 
governance.76 By the appeal to morality, the CCP criticizes others’ policies that go against its 
interests as selfish and in contradiction to the trend of the world. Regarding the source of China’s 
benevolence, the narratives trace it to the genetic goodness of the Chinese polity and the Chinese 
nation.77 Such rationalization that attributes one’s deeds to the self’s permanent good nature is 
unfalsifiable.   
China’s self-justification is characterized by ultra-defensiveness and unfalsifiable logic. It 
is informed by a Chinese worldview which defines the world, the relations between the self and 
others, and the issues and their solutions. In other words, Chinese rationalization is 
systematically built and is a manifestation of cultural subjectivism. Cultural subjectivism has its 
roots in Confucianism and Chinese Marxism, both of which show that China has the tradition of 
utilizing political philosophies-turned ideologies to endorse governance. Meanwhile, cultural 
subjectivism also carries its own characteristics corresponding to the changing times and China’s 
 
76 Many Chinese articles use the term “democratization of international relations” (国际关系民主化) or 
relevant expressions to describe that the PRC is committed to the democracy of international relations. For 
instance see, Zhang Zhijun [张志军], “China’s Peaceful Development and International Society” [中国的和平
发展与国际社会], Qiushi, issue 6, 2006; Wang Yi [王 毅], “The Year of A Comprehensive Promotion of 
Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics”[中国特色大国外交全面拓展之年], Qiushi, issue 1, 2016. 
77The quoted examples appear in English speeches and written interviews. See, Wang Yi, “Toward Peace and 
Development for All”, Sept 21, 2017, At the General Debate of The 72nd Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1496244.shtml> 
accessed Jan. 5, 2019; Xi Jinping, “Written Interview Given by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Major Media 
Agencies of Four Latin American and Caribbean Countries, July 15, 2014, 
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1185623.shtml> accessed Jan. 08, 2019; Liu 
Zengmin, “China Remains Committed to Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the South China Sea through 
Negotiations and Consultations,” March 25, 2016, 
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1350776.shtml> accessed Jan. 05, 2019. 
Narratives in Chinese version also contain genetic explanations. See, Chen Shuguang [陈曙光], 
“Understanding the Methodology of the ‘China Model’” [理解“中国模式”的方法论原则], Qiushi, issue 12, 
2014; “Resolutely Adhering to Peaceful Development” [坚定不移走和平发展道路], Qiushi, issue 18, 2014. 
97 
contemporary needs. This chapter explains this term. It first lays down the basic definitions and 
analyzes the role of Confucianism in the current scholarship. The in-depth discussion of the two 
philosophies and comparison will then follow. The analysis presents how the two thought 
systems are institutionalized power relations and their combined use create another form of 
power relations. 
Defining Cultural Subjectivism 
This study uses cultural subjectivism to analyze how the PRC self-justifies peacetime 
overseas expansion from a critical perspective. It is an theory that explains how China 
rationalizes the power relations that it prefers. There are two questions to be addressed when 
tracing the theoretical origins to Confucianism and Chinese Marxism: why focus on the two 
philosophies and what are their similar and complementary attributes?  
Culture in “cultural subjectivism” mainly refers to descriptive features, such as the 
attributes of rhetorical rationalization that this research focuses on. The study will rely on 
Confucianism-Taoism (C-T) and Marxism-Leninism (M-L) political philosophies-turned 
ideologies to explain the characteristics. Confucian ideology is usually associated with the 
tributary system and dominated in the pre-modern era when the concept of sovereignty was 
absent. M-L has lost its appeal among the Chinese populace after Mao’s disastrous rule. In this 
vein, their application in the late 20th century and beyond seems anachronistic. Two reasons 
however make the theoretical choices ideal. First, since 1990s, official rhetoric has increasingly 
relied on Confucian terms to appeal to the domestic population and to shape a positive image for 
the international audience. While no public Party documents use the word “Confucianism” as 
Marxism-Leninism still reigns to this day, Chinese leaders in public speeches and Chinese 
scholars in academic writings as demonstrated in chapter 1 have drawn on Confucianism to 
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expound the discourse of non-conflict and inclusive unity in a PRC-envisioned community. 
Detailed breakdown of narrative construction in later chapters will provide more evidence that 
both are alive and well in Beijing’s narratives and the authority also tries to revive them in the 
public mind. Second, the way Beijing justifies its behavior reveals a holistic Chinese worldview. 
Such a worldview informs the understanding of the world, the power relationships between self 
and others, what the world should look like, techniques to deal with problems, and the methods 
and pathways toward the realization of an ideal world. These are systematically formulated in 
Marxism-Leninism and Confucianism. As the PRC simultaneously employs both ideologies, it is 
their combined use, instead of individual, that explains the systematic characteristics of Chinese 
rationalization. The issue now is what cultural attributes they can explain. 
A theory consists of different propositions and assumptions that show individual cultural 
traits and altogether they point to something larger. For instance, both M-L and C-T assume the 
altruistic nature of the authority. Both propose that the authority has legitimate rights to exert 
violence for the sake of peace. Both also assume the feasibility of a utopian world and make it as 
an appeal to the public. When connecting three propositions together, the logic goes that the 
selfless authority as it knows best the interests of the masses and identifies its own with others’ 
will lead people to a peaceful and prosperous world, and anyone who acts to impede the process 
will risk deserved punishment for disturbing peace. At the unit level, the cultural traits are 
authoritarianism, altruism and idealism as each proposition shows. At the aggregate macro level, 
China’s strategic culture is unfalsifiable justification and ultra-defensiveness with the latter the 
evidence for the former, as reflected in the idea that violence for the sake of peace, from the 
authority’s viewpoint, cannot be taken as non-peaceful and unjust. In other words, what the 
authority does is always right and violence does not violate the claim of its peaceful nature.   
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Since both “isms” reveal a central role of the self in the interaction with others, it is 
necessary to bring into discussion subjectivity. Using one’s perspective to rationalize the 
behavior of the self as being right and for the good of others is “subjectivism.” Subjectivism 
involves the process of altercasting and othering. Altercasting, according to Eugene A. Weinstein 
and Paul Deutschberger, “is defined as projecting an identity, to be assumed by other(s) with 
whom one is in interaction, which is congruent with one’s own goals.”78 It is about persuading 
other(s), by assigning them a role that from the self’s view may be reflective of their wishes and 
thinking, to act in a desired way so that one’s goal can be achieved. This process produces role 
congruence in which the other acts in accord with the interests of the self. In the othering 
process, the identity of the self is defined with reference to the existence of the Other and the 
self-worth is measured against the worth of the Other. This process produces opposing roles 
between the self and the other.79 The subjectivity is reflected in the self-assumed cultural 
superiority. When the mentality of cultural superiority interacts with material capabilities, it 
produces different conditioned and rationalized behavior. There can be positive correlations 
between material strength and behavioral assertiveness.80 However, when one is relatively weak, 
one still can justify concessions as granting benefit to others.  
 
 
78 Eugene A. Weinstein and Paul Deutschberger, “Some dimensions of Altercasting,” Sociometry, vol. 26, no. 
4, Dec. 1963, pp. 454-466. 
79 Both altercasting and othering are parts of role theory. For literature that applies role theory to Chinese 
foreign policies, see Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick & Jörn-Carsten Gottwald, eds., China’s 
International Roles: Challenging or Supporting International Order? London and New York: Routledge, 
2015. The book is a compilation of articles by various authors about the PRC’s foreign relations. My study 
differs from the book in content and in perspective. My research sees more efforts to coherently and 
systematically explain variations in Chinese behavior. Another difference is that my study analyzes how these 
behaviors are rationalized.  
80 Chinese behavior discussed here is not dichotomously differentiated along the line of use of force versus 
non-use of force or war versus non-war. It considers a wide range of behavior and thus behavioral 
assertiveness can refer to the non-use-of-force type of coercion.  
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At the unit level, M-L and C-T also differ in several ways. After all, C-T and M-L are the 
products of different times when different economic modes (agrarian and capitalist) govern the 
development on the subcontinent. Marxism explicitly sanctions materialism whereas C-T does 
not make it salient. C-T allows more behavioral options than M-L which primarily condones 
violence. While hierarchy is explicitly expressed in C-T, M-L uses the rhetoric of equity. Where 
they differ does not necessarily weaken either of the ideological appeals. Instead, they work 
complementarily in the Chinese narratives in the current international environment.  
The two “isms” are characterized by self-justifying logic. Both also systematically define 
power relations and how they function. In this light, self-rationalization is a manifestation of 
political culture and this political culture is structural as it intends to institutionalize a preferred 
hierarchical interaction pattern. The way China justifies its overseas behavior has the intention to 
institutionalize the power relations that it prefers.  
Literature Review and Critique 
Table 2.0 presents a list of current literature using Confucianism to explain China’s foreign 
policies. Many more from history and political science/IR disciplines are excluded, because they 
either receive cursory mention or have little to do with foreign policies. In general, regardless of 
how Confucianism is defined, the current scholarship has found that China has a parabellum 
culture. Three out of four in the table have associated Confucianism with pacifism or pacifist 
tendency and describe it as a defensive strategic culture. Three of them aim to establish causal 
relations and demonstrate that strategic cultures in their hypotheses have support of empirical 
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evidence.81 This research does not challenge the idea that use of force is prevalent in China’s 
history. It however questions the definition of Confucianism and how it is applied.  
Table 2.0 
Author does Confucianism 
sanction use of 
force? 
peacetime 
behavior as 
dependent 
variable 
use of 
force as 
dependent 
variable 
strategic 
culture 
Confucianism as 
a thought system 
for self-
justification in 
both cases of 
non-use of force 
and use of force 
Johnston  no       none          yes defensive       none 
Wang yes but only as 
passive, defensive 
last resort; 
antimilitarism is 
dominant Confucian 
culture 
      none         yes defensive       none 
Feng yes but only for 
“righteous reasons”   
       yes          yes defensive 
and 
peaceful 
      none 
Zhang       yes       none         none Confucian 
pacifism is 
a myth 
      none 
 
 
 
 
 
81 Feng draws the defensive self-image of Chinese leaders who opt for accommodation and cooperation during 
peacetime as evidence of Confucian defensiveness. Johnston and Wang conclude that Confucian defensiveness 
has little empirical support. In general, regardless of how Confucianism is defined, the current literature has 
found that China has a parabellum culture. Instead of having use of force as dependent variable, Zhang 
differentiates the types of Confucianism-informed bilateral relations between dynastic China and neighboring 
countries. He finds exit relations in the case of Mongols as they usually rejected Confucian world order, 
instrumental relations in the case of Japan because Confucian interactions were often based on interests calculi, 
and cultural affiliations in the case of Korea because the peninsula accepted Confucian order based on its 
cultural identification with the Chinese. Alastair I Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand 
Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1995); Wang Yuan-Kang, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power 
Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Feng Huiyun, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War. New York: Routledge, 2007; Feng Zhang. 
“Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 
2, 2015, pp. 197-218. 
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Scholars have used C-M (Confucian-Mencian philosophy, C-T) as a theory to hypothesize 
an accommodation policy when the dependent variable is use of force regardless of whether they 
recognize that C-M does not exclude use of force. The hypothesis itself has issues of definition. 
This research argues that Confucianism is better understood as a continuum that covers the pre-
war stage and the decision to use force. However, the primary function of the ideology lies in the 
pre-war phase even though it also sees use of force as a viable and legitimate solution. In other 
words, Confucianism is ideal for explanation of peacetime behavior and there are more options 
available under Confucian auspices aside from accommodation. The means provided by C-M is 
wide ranging, from non-use of force to use of force. Non-use of force does not equate to 
accommodation; conciliation is only one of the options in the category. Economic, political, and 
diplomatic means can be employed for coercion that does not need to involve military means. 
Even when military tools are utilized, it does not have to be use of force. Show of force is often 
designed to intimidate the opponent. These non-war and non-use of force venues are by no 
means compromising and peaceful. They are options falling into C-M theoretical parameters. So 
is the use of force and war. A country does not have to solely rely on the military to be offensive 
and assertive.  
Another issue with the theoretical application of Confucianism in the current literature is 
the equation of the philosophical ideology to defensive strategic culture. The key point with 
Confucian strategic culture is not its being defensive or offensive, but rather the logical 
sequences of justification within the Confucian thought system, as the Mongol-Ming case shows 
below, creates the impression that Confucian decision makers are defensive. Ming’s reasoning 
on non-force measures and use of force will demonstrate how the justification is framed to shape 
the image of Ming as a defensive actor acting on just grounds. In other words, Confucianism has 
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a built-in cultural bias. This bias is twofold. First, the narratives of this type, while used for 
rationalization, also reflect an ingrained belief among Chinese leaders that their actions are 
always for defensive purpose on the strategic level. In using defensive rhetoric, it can be difficult 
to distinguish between its cover (and utilitarian) purpose and a genuine belief in it. Second, to 
associate Confucianism with defensive strategic culture is to take the Chinese perspective. The 
research needs to go beyond understanding the Chinese view and take a critical analysis of it. In 
modeling the political philosophy into a theory/hypothesis of political science and IR fashion—
considering the first part of the hypothesis: according to Confucian pacifist tendency, China will 
refrain from use of force—the current literature does not apply Confucianism according to its 
nature as a theory or thought system about self-justification. 
The binary distinction between defensive and offensive may also become less important, 
given that the nature of means in each category, non-use of force and use of force, depends on 
the subjectivity of actors (see table 2.1). Coercive non-use of force solutions is offensive from 
the views of others but may be rationalized as defensive from the perspective of the coercion 
initiator. Similar logic applies to use of force; the parties involved may see each other’s moves as 
offensive while justifying theirs as defensive. 
                                 Table 2.1 
 non-use of 
force options 
use of force  
 
offensive      v       v 
 
defensive     v       v 
 
 
Despite much emphasis on ethics, rituals and humanness to develop socio-political 
stability, in examining historical records carefully, Confucius himself did not see use of force as 
104 
a passive last resort. When disciple Tzu-lu asked his master who he would bring to wage war, 
Confucius replied that he needed people who were strategic minded and acting with discretion 
and he did not need those with bravery but strategically clueless.82 Upon knowing that Chen 
Heng murdered his prince, the Duke of Ch’i, Confucius recommended to his ruler, the Duke of 
Lu, to dispatch troops and punish Chen on the ground that the proper relations between a 
superior and a subordinate had been violated.83 From the conversation between the Duke of Lu 
and Confucius, the pretext of restoring proprieties belies the realpolitik motive of elevating the 
status of Lu which had suffered internal weakness and not been a comparable rival of Ch’i. 
Confucius fasted three days and proceeded to petition Duke of Lu to send troops.84 The Duke 
replied to Confucius that since Lu has been weakened by Chi’, what did you propose to do? 
Confucius said: “there are one half of the people of Ch’i who do not agree with Chen Heng in his 
murder of his ruler. If with all the force of Lu we attack one half of that of Ch’i, we shall conquer 
it.”85 It is unlikely that Confucius was not aware of the relative strength between Lu and Ch’i, 
considering his attentiveness to state affairs and aspiration for a public position to implement his 
governing blueprint. In his calculation, since a substantial amount of people of Ch’i were 
displeased with Chen’s treachery, they would concur with Lu’s punishing expedition or at least 
not rise against it. In other words, Ch’i temporary weakness brought by Chen was an opportunity 
for Lu to shift balance of power to its favor. The use of force in this case is not passive. Neither 
 
82 In the Analects of Confucius, Book VII. See, Arthur Waley, trans. The Analects of Confucius. New York: 
Random House, 1938, pp. 124-125. 
83 Ibid., Book XIV, p.186. 
84 Tso Chuan describes the ritual that Confucius had before petitioning to Duke of Lu as qi (齊), which some 
scholars translates into “fast.” See Tso Chuan, the chapter of Duke of Ai, the text is on  
<http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/saxon/servlet/SaxonServlet?source=xwomen/texts/chunqiu.xml&style=xwome
n/xsl/dynaxml.xsl&chunk.id=d2.18&toc.depth=1&toc.id=0&doc.lang=bilingual>. In the Analects, the ritual is 
recorded as taking a shower (沐浴), or wash head and limbs in Arthur Waley’s translation, p. 186. 
85 In Tso Chuan, the chapter of Duke of Ai, the 14th year.  
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is it a last resort. It is a calculated move that fits the then domestic and international conditions as 
perceived by Confucius.  
According to A Table of Major Events in the Annals of Spring and Autumn,86 the version 
written by a Qing scholar official, Ku Tung-kao, the suggested expedition was a strategic move 
that would have brought Lu’s reputation above others if the Duke of Lu had decisively given a 
greenlight to Confucius’ petition. According to its reasoning, because Lu acted with a righteous 
cause of punishing thief Chen, neighboring princes and states would echo and bandwagon (倒
戈)with it. If the troops had been sent, the state’s awesomeness (guo wei 國威) would have been 
revived thereafter. In the paragraph describing the event, a word such as thief (賊) is used to 
name Chen Heng; verbs of punishing such as tao (討) and zhu (誅) are used to describe action 
initiated by Lu and its possible allies to punish Chen and his followers. These words denote the 
roles of Chen Heng and Lu, with the former committing grave immoral crimes and the latter 
righteously restoring the moral order. 87 
The ethical norms seen in the classical texts serve a utilitarian purpose of changing the 
weak status of Lu. They were evoked when Confucius judged that the conditions were right for 
action; the hearts and minds of the people in Ch’i created a favorable trend that Lu could utilize 
 
86 In the Chinese political culture, spring and autumn usually mean war, conflict, vicissitudes of international 
politics. They reflect realism and are by no means light-mood descriptions of events or books of weather. 
87 A Table of Major Events in the Annals of Spring and Autumn (春秋大事表), Chapter 45. Original text: 孔子
之志宜奈何曰魯之兵權在三子而三子之兵權在家臣觀陽貨弗擾且能以其衆畔而冉求季路獨不可出其兵
以仗義討賊乎孔子能使由求墮費墮郈而三子靡然聽從豈孔子當日奉魯君之命命家臣出其卒而三子敢或
梗令乎誠得哀公一言聽許委夫子以兵權空魯國之甲使家臣將之此時子路雖仕衛而冉有自在也加以樊遲
有若皆勇銳之士移檄逺近聲罪致討吾知四鄰諸侯必有聞風響應而齊之甲士且倒戈來迎縱不能梟陳恒之
首亦當誅當日之推刃于齊君者而更定齊嗣如此則國威可振周道可興夫豈空言而不可見諸實事者哉宋之
儒者以力為諱而但執正誼不謀利之說謂事苐當揆于義不論其力之能不能如此則書所謂同力度徳孔子好
謀而成非矣孔明之成敗利鈍非所逆睹葢謂其謀出萬全至事之萬有一失則聽之天耳夫豈僥倖以嘗試者哉
余向惡夫世之詆訾宋儒者至先生此論心竊疑其有未然故備論之 (the text is to be located on: 
https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=982481). 
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and other states could not find moral faults with Lu as a pretext for invasion. What Confucius 
proposed was a military intervention that would shift the winning tide toward Lu in the 
international politics. He did so with a strategic initiative of seizing the window of opportunity. 
Idealistic rhetoric in the Analects conceals realpolitik incentives that Tso Chuan and the Annals 
do not hesitate to disclose. Although the Analects tends to keep precepts out of contexts, which 
creates the impression of Confucian idealism, a utilitarian explanation in line with the then 
strategic environment is validated by Confucius’ words that he acts cautiously and strategically 
with war. 
There is another angle to question the equation of Confucianism with defensive strategic 
culture and accommodating policies. Civilian and military leaders in different states have 
cooperative and bellicose propensities. One does not need to receive Confucian education to be 
peace-minded. This leads to the question of what it is that makes Confucianism so unique that it 
has to be brought in for discussion. It is the structured cultural perspective of the philosophy that 
matters. This research argues that Confucianism is more about self-justification in a systematized 
way that gives the impression of defensiveness which others may have doubts about but 
Confucian followers or subscribers may genuinely believe in,88 and less about itself being peace 
and defensive-oriented in nature. In the context of this research, for the philosophy to be 
meaningfully employed, a similar question needs to be answered. What is it that makes 
Confucianism unique that the PRC’s leaders have publicly used the term or borrow phrases to 
 
88 One example of Confucian subscribers is seen in Feng Huiyun’s argument. In defending China as a country 
with peaceful strategic culture, she writes, “…my reading of China’s history indicates that in over 2,000 years 
of feudal rule the feudal empires of China seldom displayed aggressive intentions toward other countries nor 
made any attempts at expansion despite the capability to do so.” She continues to cite the Great Wall and 
scholarly works to show that there is consensus on the pacific and defensive tendency of China’s strategic 
culture. While she admits that Confucianism allows use of force, she defends that it is on the righteous 
grounds. See Feng Huiyun, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, 
Leadership and W/ar. London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 26-27. 
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appeal to the public? It is the appeal of self-rationalization and its accompanying belief that 
China has been peace-loving and defensive, even though coercion is used. The PRC hopes to 
structurally frame the consciousness of the public in a way that supplied information will be 
processed in conformity with the desired result that it favors.  
Confucianism is a theory that considers both the pre-use of force stage and the decision to 
use force. As the classic texts and historical records demonstrate below, the main function of 
Confucianism lies in the pre-use of force stage; therefore, this study argues that the theory should 
be applied where it belongs, to explain peacetime behavior. There is a paucity of academic 
endeavors to examine Confucianism as a thought system and to apply the theory to peacetime 
policies. Feng’s study of non-wartime behavior is one limited effort and this contribution still 
follows the conventional wisdom of Confucian defensiveness. This research fills the gap. In 
forging a new theory of cultural subjectivism, Confucian ideology will lend the constitutive 
element of self-justification for peacetime policies.  
Confucianism and Historical Experience  
This section has several goals to achieve. First, it lays out the basic tenets of Confucianism 
and explains why it is an institution of power relations. Second, the historical examples will 
demonstrate how a Confucian world order functions at the pre-war phase.  
The upholding tenet of the Confucian worldview is moralities-guided hierarchical human 
associations. Chapters 3 to 9 of the Analects, a collection of conversations between Confucius 
and his disciples,89 are devoted to moral cultivation of individuals and relationships between 
individuals and between monarch and subjects. Each person plays multiple roles depending on 
whom they interact with. Children show filial piety toward parents. Father shows paternal love 
 
89 Arthur Waley, 1938. 
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toward son. Individuals’ obligations toward each other are specified and reciprocal. One can be 
inferior to some in his networks but superior to others. The inter-personal relationships follow 
differentiated moral principles guided by a hierarchical order. A father treats his son differently 
from his wife. A son does not treat his siblings the same way as he treats his father. The elder is 
always respected and obeyed.  
The running of imperial affairs does not depart from moralities-based human 
relationships.90 The analogy applies to state and international levels. In the Confucian hierarchy, 
the emperor (the Son of Heaven) is the patriarch and people in and outside of the dynastic state 
are his family. His authority comes from the Mandate of Heaven. As emperors’ brothers and 
children, people in the dynastic state (mostly referring to Han people) and ethnic tribal groups 
from the North and Northwest, and the southern states such as Vietnam had to express their 
submission. In return, the monarch provides his people with material abundance and cultural 
enrichment. The reciprocal behavior is differentiated according to the type of relationship 
between emperor and subjects. Within a dynasty, officials show loyalty toward monarch. 
Monarch has trust in officials. A neighboring tribal leader who was defined by emperor as his 
younger brother or a relative of a lower rank would have a different exchange from that between 
emperor and peasants.  
With the basic tenets of human relations laid out, the question now is how the inter-
personal network gets enforced. It depends on punishment and reward. In foreign relations, the 
emperor can declare war by the mandate of heaven to restore peace and order. When foreign 
envoys come to the court to pay tribute, the emperor showers gifts and answers the call for trade 
 
90 Xiaotong Fei. From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992.  
109 
as a reward for their submission. Accordingly, a Confucian order requires solid material 
foundation to show imperial generosity and to inflict pain. With behavioral codes specified and 
an enforcement mechanism in place, if everyone acts according to the dictates of their positions, 
peace and order can be obtained. In this light, Confucianism is an institutionalized form of power 
relations. 
Since not all events undergo the continuous process of negotiation and war and many of 
them stop at the pre-use of force stage, in theory and in practice, Confucianism is better seen to 
be capable of explaining both the peacetime phase and the decision to use force, with a focus on 
the former. Specifically, Confucian superiority rationalizes both peacetime behavior and use of 
force. Mediated by material conditions, Confucian logic serves different instrumental purposes. 
When China was relatively strong or when there was power parity, it came up with various 
means to entice, intimidate and force others into accepting Chinese world order. The justifying 
logic of applied Confucianism embodies both role altercasting and othering. The following cases 
show a wide spectrum of means sanctioned by Confucianism. They also illustrate how the roles 
of the self and others are shaped.  
The overthrow of the Yuan dynasty by the Chinese did not sound the death knell for the 
Mongols’ activeness. Bilateral relations were characterized by unstable dynamics of trade, war, 
and tribute. The competition between Eastern Mongols who produced legitimist Khans and 
Western Mongols (Oirats) for hegemony on the steppe had disturbed Ming’s frontiers. 
Mongolian refusal to recognize Ming’s reign was another concern for the dynasty. In response, 
the Yongle emperor sent envoys to urge the nomads to settle their disputes on peaceful terms and 
pay tribute to Ming in exchange for trade on the frontier. In the emperor’s words, “the Way of 
Heaven” is the peace brought about by Mongolian submission to Ming in return for titles, gifts 
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and trade. The emperor’s love is “like the bright sun” but whoever does not obey will suffer the 
consequences.91  
The Oirats paid tribute to the court and their leader, Mahmud, was granted the title of 
Shun-ning Wang (prince of obedience and peace). Bunyashiri Khan of the Eastern Mongols 
however killed the Chinese envoys. Seeing this as outright disobedience, Ming fortified the 
frontier, prepared for war and allied with the Oirats to counter the Eastern Mongols. After the 
defeat in the 1410 campaign led by the Yongle Emperor, Arughtai, one of the leaders of the 
Eastern Mongols, sent tributary horses to the court as an act of submission. While it seemed that 
calmness eventually came to the frontiers, the killing of Bunyashiri Khan by Mahmud in 1412 
that proved to Ming the worth of alliance ironically led the Oirats to demand more from the 
dynasty, from goods such as gold, silk and weapons, to control over the Eastern Mongols. 
Mahmud’s increasing assertiveness did not escape Chinese sensitivity to any slight toward 
imperial authority. Two years after Bunyashiri’s death, in perceiving a growing threat from 
Mahmud, Yongle decided to ally with Arughtai to punish the Oirats.92 
The Ming emperor rationalized military action, echoed by the court ministers, on moral 
grounds: “I inherited the Mandate of Heaven to nurture and govern the Chinese and the non-
Chinese alike, only wish to ensure peace……having depended on our court for rest, [the Oirats] 
reassembled a horde and immediately became arrogant and wanton, betraying [my] moral 
excellence and failing [my] grace, violating trust and appropriateness……They have left me no 
choice but to lead the Six Armies to punish them [emphasis added].”93 
 
91 See Feng Zhang’s translation of Yongle’s rescript. Feng Zhang, 2015, pp.130-131. 
92 Sechin Jagchid & Van Jay Symons. Peace, War, and Trade along the Great Wall. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989, pp. 135-137; Zhang Feng, 2015, pp. 133-134; Thomas J. Barfield. The Perilous 
Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989, pp. 236-37.  
93 Zhang Feng, p. 135, adapted from the quotation originally used and translated by Zhang. 
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While the Oirats suffered defeat, Arughtai grew ambitious and aimed to expand influence 
into parts Mongolia just as the Oirats tried to do before. Yongle himself led three punitive 
expeditions against Arughtai.94 After one of them, the emperor stated: “I respectfully inherited 
the Mandate of Heaven to become emperor and rule the Chinese and non-Chinese alike……with 
no other purpose but to let the lives and souls of the world have their proper places……Pursued 
by the Oirats and unable to protect his wife, he led his tribe to come to submit. Considering his 
anxiety and loss of dependence. I especially treated him with favorable care, granting him noble 
titles and allowing him to return to his own land to live in peace and happiness. But this 
caitiff……has become willful and arrogant, breach the [Way of] Heaven, betrayed [my] moral 
excellence, failed [my] grace, violated [my] orders……For the purpose of ensuring security and 
protecting people, I led the Six Armies to punish him.”95  
Relations between Mongols and Ming demonstrates that China’s peacetime policies and 
decisions to use force as well as rationalizations were informed by Confucianism. Interactions 
with both Eastern and Western Mongols evolved from conferring titles and bestowing gifts to the 
use of force. Granting titles and bestowing gifts were part of Ming’s strategy to check either the 
Eastern Mongols or Western Mongols so that they would not ally with or be absorbed by the 
other in a way that posed a greater threat to Ming. However, these policies serving self-interests 
were rationalized as manifestations of imperial grace and generosity, with the language and logic 
couched in the Confucian rhetoric. The title of Shun-ning Wang granted to Mahmud symbolizes 
his obedience to the emperor as the word Shun (順) indicates, and the emperor’s grace toward 
him. So long as the hierarchical relations are maintained and everyone behaves according to their 
 
94 Sechin Jagchid & Van Jay Symons, 1989, p. 77; Zhang Feng, p. 136. 
95 Quotation directly comes from Zhang Feng, p.136, with deletion of original Chinese phrases and redundant 
sentences and words that convey the meaning repetitively.   
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positions, as ning (寧) denotes, peace will prevail “Under Heaven.” There is much expectation 
on the behavior of subjects defined by the Chinese that it must be moral faults of theirs, that is, 
the subjects’, when relationships cannot be sustained. When it comes to use of force, Yongle 
similarly relied on the Confucian logic of restoring peace in that Mongols were the ones at fault 
because they violated heavenly grace embodied in the emperor. Ming’s policies tried to establish 
power relations that it preferred through rewards and punishments under conditions that it saw 
fit. 
The Mongols-Ming case also demonstrates that the altercasting and othering process was 
in place. Knowing the economic needs of the nomads, Ming projected upon them an identity of 
subservient Mongols obeying the imperial wish that the Mongols would not invade and stay 
where they were in exchange for trade and gifts from tribute. The underlying reasoning that 
supports this type of interaction is a Confucian family system where the emperor would take care 
of his Mongolian younger brothers and sons. Another example is the relationship between 
Yongle and Arughtai. Yongle himself altercasted a miserable role to Arughtai who in Yongle’s 
view was in a desperate situation to get help. Yongle’s words, quoted above, indicated that since 
the Ming emperor answered Arughtai’s call as, again following Confucian worldview, father 
answered the needs of his son, and Arughtai was provided for, he should have stayed where he 
was in accord with Ming emperor’s wish.  
The evidence of an othering process lies in Ming’s justification of use of force. The 
emperor casted an opposite role to the Mongols, ungracious Mongols versus emperor’s 
generosity and kindness. In Ming’s logic, lack of role congruence between itself and Mongols 
would severely challenge its own superiority if no measure was taken to address this issue, and 
thus to bring about role congruence, it was justified to use force. Contrary to altercasting in 
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which role congruence exists and a complied role will reinforce the identity of the self, role 
opposition in the othering process indicates the possibilities that the authority of the self can be 
undermined.  
Other examples in which the self-assumed superiority is translated into action include 
intimidation and compromise in Chinese terms in the relations between Han dynasty and Hsiung-
nu. Hsiung-nu proved to be a substantial threat that the Han court repeatedly answered to its calls 
for intermarriage and opening of markets. However, when Emperor Wu (Wu-ti) succeeded to the 
throne, he decided to change the terms of interaction by showing the nomads who was stronger. 
War waged against Hsiung-nu, although forcing them eventually to propose intermarriage to sue 
for peace, damaged Han financially and militarily as well. Shih Chi records that Han lost 
hundreds of thousands of horses on the battlefield. At the moment when both sides were 
exhausted, in response to the intermarriage proposal, Han court suggested to Hsiung-nu that they 
become a foreign subordinate (wai chen 外臣) to Han before peace would be possible. The  
Hsiung-nu rejected this and took the Han envoy as a hostage.96 When both sides were in power 
parity, Confucian superiority still was vividly seen. War lasted for about two decades 
intermittently. After Wu-ti conquered Minyue and Nanyue, he led 180 thousands strong army to 
show Hsiung-nu, now retreating to the north of Gobi desert, Han’s military awesomeness. The 
envoy sent the message to the Shan-yu.97 that “the head of Nanyue king is hanging above the 
northern gate of the Han imperial palace. The Son of Heaven is waiting at the frontier if you 
 
96 See The Book of Han, written by Pan Ku, a Han court official. <https://ctext.org/han-shu/xiong-nu-
zhuan/zh>. Original text: 初，漢兩將大出圍單于，所殺虜八九萬，而漢士物故者亦萬數，漢馬死者
十餘萬匹。匈奴雖病，遠去，而漢馬亦少，無以復往。單于用趙信計，遣使好辭請和親。天子下
其議，或言和親，或言遂臣之。丞相長史任敞曰：「匈奴新困，宜使為外臣，朝請於邊。」漢使
敞使於單于。單于聞敞計，大怒，留之不遣。先是漢亦有所降匈奴使者，單于亦輒留漢使相當。 
97 The Shan-yü.is the leader of the Hsiung-nu confederacy.  
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desire a war. If you cannot fight, then turn to the south and bow to Han. Why do you flee to this 
bitterly cold place where there is no water and grass?” The envoy hoped to solicit submission 
from the Shan-yü through intimidation and to shatter his defiance by pointing out the miserable 
environment surrounding him. The Shan-yü was outraged and again took the envoy as hostage. 98 
By showing (ostensible) sympathy to the Shan-yü’s situation in which he and his people 
could not prosper in the barren land, Wu-ti altercasted a role to the Shan-yü in hope that the 
Hsiung-nu would come to submit. This type of “persuasion” however came with the coercive 
power of an army 180,000 strong. It is an example of “coercive persuasion” that displays the 
parallel of altercasting and an othering process in one maneuver. While Wu-ti’s rhetoric showed 
an expectation of role congruence in which the Shan-yü would comply and thus reinforces Wu-
ti’s imperial authority, given that the previous hostile interactions, Wu-ti also alienated himself 
from the Shan-yü because military intimidation showed a dichotomous differentiation of roles 
between the heavenly sanctioned Wu-ti and the troublemaker the Shan-yü.  
The above examples of interactions between Chinese regimes and non-Chinese political 
entities demonstrate Confucian rationalization across a wide range of behavioral variations. 
Cultural superiority was a relatively constant factor in the cases examined, although relative 
material strength might affect behavioral assertiveness. Whichever options Chinese regimes 
opted for, enticement, use of force, intimidation or compromise, the justifying logic highlights 
the superiority of the self even though relative strength was not in its favor.  
 
 
98
 See The Book of Han.  Original text:是時，天子巡邊，親至朔方，勒兵十八萬騎以見武節，而使郭
吉風告單于。既至匈奴，匈奴主客問所使，郭吉卑體好言曰：「吾見單于而口言。」單于見吉，
吉曰：「南越王頭已縣於漢北闕下。今單于即能前與漢戰，天子自將兵待邊；即不能，亟南面而
臣於漢。何但遠走，亡匿於幕北寒苦無水草之地為？」語卒，單于大怒，立斬主客見者，而留郭
吉不歸，遷辱之北海上。 
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Marxism-Leninism 
Sinicized Marxism-Leninism shares many features with Confucianism, in terms of a 
predilection toward authoritarianism, emphasis on altruistic motives, and a utopian vision of an 
egalitarian world where rulers and the ruled have common interests. Furthermore, as with 
Confucianism, it demonstrates another form of institutionalized power relations. While the two 
differ in the role of material strength, the differences work complementarily to justify China’s 
foreign policy. 
Lenin revised Marxism in several ways. For Karl Marx, communism will be obtained only 
when a state’s development follows the stages of agriculture, industrialization, and advanced 
capitalism. Lenin, however, believed that with revolutionary enthusiasm, a state of communism 
can be reached within a much shorter time span, even though a country is still largely agrarian. 
Lenin internationalized this idea on a world scale. For him, the success of a communist 
revolution depends on the success of the world revolution. If only one country succeeded, the 
achievements may not last. It takes the revolutionary success in other countries to sustain the 
movement and to thoroughly eradicate the capitalist institutions so that the lingering capitalism 
will not chip away the already obtained success. Lenin’s ultimate goal is a world revolution, 
corresponding to his view that capitalism is a world system. Stalin would again revise Lenin’s 
view in that he made Russia the primary country in the world revolution whereas Lenin was open 
to any country that had better chances in making a start.99 Sinicized Marxism-Leninism would 
then incorporate both Lenin’s and Stalin’s ideas, but during Mao’s era it put forward the PRC as 
a leader in the socialist camp.    
 
99 Rob Sewell “Lenin and Internationalism,” In Defense of Marxism, May 28, 2019, 
<https://www.marxist.com/lenin-and-internationalism.htm>. 
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 The materialist view of M-L is characterized by class struggle rooted in unequal 
distribution of resources. The economic structure of capitalism empowers the bourgeoisie and 
weakens the leverage of the working class by reducing the latter’s abilities to accumulate capital 
and to control the means of production. According to M-L, the productive forces released by 
modern industry will eventually grow to the extent that it incorporates an unprecedented large 
mass of population into the capitalist system. Although there are different classes within the 
mass, modern machinery effaces all distinctions; they (artisans, shop owners, and trade people) 
all become the proletariat. In the Marxist view, machinery, while increasing productivity, strips 
workers of freedom and individuality and reduces them to merely a tool for accumulation of 
capital that ultimately benefits a few, the bourgeoisie. The wages of laborers only reflect the cost 
of production rather than the value, skills and characters of men and women. Based on the 
assumption that hostility between the capitalist and the working class will grow irreconcilable, 
M-L predicts the eventual overthrow of capitalism and the erection of communism led by the 
working class.100 
In a Marxist-Leninist view, to avoid the historical pattern that the previously oppressed 
class becomes the oppressor in the new society, in other words, to break the cycle of power 
relations,101 the erection of a communist leadership representing the proletariat provides the 
remedy as they will unselfishly distribute resources to the proletariat. In order to transform a 
 
100 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, “The Manifesto of the Communist Party”, in The Marx-Engels Reader. Ed. 
Robert C. Tucker, 2d ed. New York: Norton, 1978, pp. 469-500. 
101 Ibid., first chapter, pp. 473-483. In the Marxist worldview, economic activities explain history and show a 
consistent pattern of exploitation. Productive forces change social relations and propel the revolution of 
society. For instance, when the feudal society with its economic and social capacity cannot accommodate more 
progressive productivity, it dissolves and gives away to new social structure. However, in each new society, 
previously oppressed class had become the new oppressor. Class antagonism prevails throughout history 
between the oppressed producers and the oppressors who appropriate products of collective labor 
disproportionately for private gains and enlargement of personal power in social relations. 
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society where only the capitalist class has privileges to a society where everyone has equal 
treatment socially, economically, and politically, it is necessary to undergo the process of “the 
dictatorship of the proletariat.” The “dictatorship of the proletariat” refers to a type of political 
system that centralizes the means of production in the hands of state, including credit, property, 
lands, factories, and means of communication and transport. According to Lenin, within the 
Party, decisions regarding allocation of resources will be made through “democratic centralism”, 
a political process that allows freedom in discussion within the party before conclusions are 
reached and requires absolute unity and conformity in action.102 The underlying logic behind the 
state control is to ensure an equal distribution of resources. The feasibility of this blueprint, 
however, is based on questionable assumptions: identical interests between ruler and the ruled 
and inherently good human nature.  
The first assumption deals with the issue of representation. The proletariat here refers to all 
classes of the population that belong to wage labor. Hence, it represents a majority of the 
population and their interests on a scale which previous classes never did. As Marx and Engels 
wrote: “All the preceding classes that got the upper hand sought to fortify their already acquired 
status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation…… All previous 
historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The 
proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in 
 
102 Lenin, “Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P: A Letter to the St. Petersburg 
Workers,”Marxists.org, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/rucong/viii.htm>. 
In the letter, when Lenin mentioned “democratic centralism” and pushed for more discussions about the Party 
lines in the Russian Social-Democratic Party, he already had the agenda of promoting the Left wing by 
ideologically struggling out the Right wing. However, he framed his motives in a way that fit the communist 
cause and that can attract more “true revolutionaries”. Democratic centralism as ideal as it may sound is a tool 
for power struggle and authoritarianism. For more details, see the discussion of Mao’s Cultural Revolution in 
the final part of this section.  
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the interest of the immense majority.” 103 The second assumption speaks of the altruism of a 
communist party as the spokesman of the working class. Here, although Marx and Engels 
differed from Lenin regarding what a party is and how it works, they all assumed a selfless 
nature of the party. For the proletariat engaged in the revolutionary enterprise, Marx and Engels 
describe them as selfless because “they have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their 
mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.”104 
As to how the proletariat can change the fundamental conditions that privilege one class at 
the others’ expense, Marx and Engels made no secret that to eradicate the exploiting institutions 
which support bourgeois production and property, revolutionary means (as opposed to 
conservative or incremental measures), mainly by “despotic inroads,” are necessary to change 
thoroughly the political, social, and economic orders.105 They wrote: “The proletarians cannot 
become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous 
mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation…… The 
proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without 
the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air (emphasis 
added).”106  
In practice, the concentration of power and resources in the hands of a few inevitably 
entails authoritarianism in which the interests of the ruling class are first served. To make things 
worse, the leadership privileges which Lenin appropriated to communist parties so that the 
 
103 Ed. Robert C. Tucker, 1978, pp. 473-483. See the first chapter of the communist manifesto, “Bourgeois and 
Proletarians.”. 
104 Ibid., p. 482. 
105 Ibid., see chapter 2, “Proletarians and Communists,” pp. 483-491. 
106 Ibid., pp. 482.  
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communists have means to create public goods have become avenues for ideological 
radicalization and tools for legitimization of perennial rule.   
Following the M-L logic is the first type of institutionalized power relations in terms of 
economic exploiter and exploited. Marxist structuralism in the International Politics field adopts 
this logic and applies it to unequal interactions between developed and developing countries. 
According to this school, the structure of global economy is set as such that developed states are 
privileged to control technological know-how and have greater access to resources and markets.  
In the world system, these states are core states with capital-intensive industries whereas 
developing countries are the periphery who are relegated to labor-intensive economy providing 
resources for and importing manufactured products from developed countries.107 In the case of 
China, the empirical evidence proves that the first type does not have close relevance to the 
Chinese experience during Mao’s period. As chapter 3 shows, Mao Zedong used the ideology in 
strategic terms in China’s foreign policies. This does not mean that Mao simply used M-L for 
cover purposes and did not genuinely believe in it. Mao believed in it in a Chinese way through 
his re-interpretation, just like Lenin re-interpreted Marxism to suit Russian needs defined by him. 
As chapter 3 will demonstrate, although the gist of M-L is unequal distribution of power from an 
economic viewpoint, the Chinese version morphed it into international politics in which 
economy is a factor among others in the overall strategic calculations that aim to obtain national 
security and international status. When it comes to economy, the exploitation is more of a result 
of internal issues than foreign factors.  
 
 
107 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979; Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Middle East in the World Hierarchy: 
Imperialism and Resistance”, Journal of International Relations and Development, 2011, 14, pp. 213–246. 
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China under Mao’s planned economy, ostensibly conducted in the name of egalitarian 
Marxism-Leninism, ironically was a highly exploitative development mode. The period from 
1952 to 1978 saw an increasing savings rate. From 1970 to 1979, the rate climbed up to the range 
between 29.7% and 33.2%. This is either comparable or better than its East Asian neighbors who 
also had high savings. Most of savings went to the state, however. In 1978, state savings 
accounted for 78% of aggregate savings, a combination of state, enterprises, and households. As 
income and state purchase of agricultural surplus were controlled to be at a low rate and in 
disproportion to individuals’ labor, citizens’ savings were pitiful. From 1952 to 1978, the rate 
was only 2.9%. Nearly all profits went to the Ministry of Finance.108 The state was far better off 
than its citizens and was more willing to invest in heavy industries than light industries that 
produce daily necessities. And this shows the influence of Stalin’s legacy.  
If the first type aims to criticize the capitalist system, the second one questions M-L itself 
as an institution of power relations. The class struggle stipulated and advocated by M-L 
structures human interactions in a way that people are expected to follow certain behavior. The 
approach that groups every wage earner into the category of the proletariat assumes that each and 
every one of them has the same interests and these interests are identical with those of the 
communist party that waves the banner of overthrowing imperial capitalism. The effacement of 
differences in this regard and the dichotomous class labels of capitalists and the proletariat lay 
down the structure within which conformity in action and thought on the side of the working 
class is expected and will bring rewards; disconformity however can be seen as an immoral act 
 
108 Chang Jung-Feng (張榮豐), “The Evolution of China’s Strategy for Economic Development During the 
Periods of Deng and Jiang,”[鄧、江時期中國大陸經濟發展策略之演變], in Chang Jung-Feng, Yuan Lei 
&Wu Ming-Tse eds. (張榮豐、原磊、吳明澤著), The Planning for the 12th Five Year and the Evolution of 
China’s Strategy for Economic Development [十二五規劃與中國經濟發展策略演變].Chung-Hua Institute 
Economic Research, Taiwan, 2013, p. 117. 
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of capitalism and incur punishments. According to the theoretical dictates, the working class who 
truly aspire to communism should not side with capitalists, make compromises with them, and 
endorse actions short of annihilating capitalism.109 Those who are deemed as non-pure 
communists can become objects against whom the alleged true communists conduct their 
struggle until the ideological line is rectified. 
The ideological construct can easily become a self-serving instrument in practice while the 
belief side may not entirely disappear. After all, human beings’ motives are complicated. 
Ideology can be a tool for pursuing power. Internationally, Mao used Chinese Marxism to 
compete with Moscow for leadership in the socialist camp from the second half of the 1950s to 
1960.110 Domestically, who were the true socialists and who were capitalists disguised as 
socialists was used for political purges within and without the Party. The purge of Liu Shaoqi, 
Deng Xiaoping and others had roots in power reconfiguration after Mao retreated from the 
political center following the disaster of the 1958 Great Leap Forward of his own design. His 
reemergence to power in 1962 again set the course that would collide with other leaders’ 
developmental visions. Mao’s version would prevail and during implementation, he sent those 
whose opinions differed from him to prisons and labor camps based on the accusation that they 
 
109 Marx made clear this sense of absoluteness in his thesis. In criticizing “petty-bourgeois socialism”, he 
commented that “this form of socialism aspires either to restoring the old means of production and of 
exchange, and with them the old property relations, and the old society, or to cramping the modern means of 
production and exchange within the framework of the old property relations that have been, and were bound to 
be, exploded by those means. In either case, it is both reactionary and Utopian.” In Marx’s view, petty-
bourgeois socialism is not true socialism because it does not take a revolutionary stance of eliminating all 
capitalist institutions. Another example that shows Marx’s adherence to ideological purity is his criticism 
toward “Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism.” In his view, this school of thought and its followers, 
despite the initial revolutionary objective, had tried to reconcile class struggle, instead of taking advantage of 
class antagonism for the true revolution. He labeled these people “reactionary.” See Ed. Robert C. Tucker, 
1978, pp. 491-499, for the chapter 3 of the Manifesto of the Communist Party.  
110 Lorenz M. Lüthi. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008. via Ebook Central Academic Complete. 
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were “capitalist roaders” because they were seen by Mao as “revisionists” pushing a policy line 
that would eventually lead to the revival of class society and the restoration of capitalism.111  
China then was an autocracy that encouraged a leadership cult. Once Mao released the 
force of ideological fervor on a national level through mass mobilization, different groups 
utilized his version of socialism for power struggle. This characterized the Cultural Revolution 
that ostensibly aimed to overhaul the society into a socialist one. Red guards raided people’s 
houses and scrutinized books and belongings to find any traces of “capitalist” thought. Those 
who were labeled as “counter-revolutionaries” or “capitalist roaders” by either interpersonal 
associations with someone already bearing such name or personal behavior that was intentionally 
defamed by others could end up with public humiliation. They received trials in the meeting halls 
where their “crimes” were numbered and made a showing of repentance by reading out scripts 
that admitted their own faults and stated their beliefs in and upholding of Maoist thought as part 
of the process to “redeem” their counter-revolutionary sin. Many would be dragged to the street 
for a public parade with a placard hanging in front of their chests reading “counter-revolutionary 
revisionists.” The most devoted followers of Mao were not exempted from political persecution 
either.112 A substantial number of people would be publicly executed by their fellow countrymen 
on the same ideological accusations. The exact death toll is unknown and scholarly estimates 
vary widely. By using a “conservative statistical procedure,” Andrew Walder estimates 
somewhere between 1.1 and 1.6 million dead for the period 1966-1971 based on data compiled 
 
111 For a nuanced assessment of changes in political institutions and power struggle, and their interrelations in 
the PRC, see Lucian W. Pye. The Dynamics of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & 
Hain, 1981. Despites changing times, the book captures the subtleties that matter in the changing dynamics of 
Chinese politics and how these changes affected policy outcomes. 
112 Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro. Son of the Revolution. New York: Vintage, 1984.  
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from local histories.113 In that socio-political milieu, political labeling determined one’s life. 
People with and without the Party affiliations were punished once they were seen as betraying 
socialist causes. For people who managed to choose the right side that happened to win, they 
received rewards of honor for they would claim to be true revolutionaries following Mao’s 
footsteps. Such “irrationality” is the product of structuralized power relations in which people are 
incentivized to conform through fear or eager to prove oneself to be in the right camp.  
The altercasted role of the Chinese population under Mao’s rule was to comply with the 
idea that one needed to act like a “socialist” and could not behave like a “capitalist, reactionary, 
or revisionist.” If one failed to conform, he or she was to be labelled as an enemy and received 
the fate of defamation. Mao as a populist leader casted his agenda of maintaining revolutionary 
momentum to what the Chinese people would carry out in the next twenty years following the 
founding of the PRC. Popular excitement was aroused, the evidence of conformity, and 
resentment toward what occurred on the ground was also present. The irony is that just when 
people believed they were true followers of Maoist ideology, they were accused of wearing a 
different ideological badge, and were purged or punished. They were othered. In that volatile 
political environment, it seems that othering was more predominant in securing one’s survival.  
Comparing C-M (C-T) and M-L 
Both C-M and M-L sanction authoritarianism. They all place power in the hands of a few. 
From the standpoint of the two ideologies and the messages that the CCP intends to deliver, 
Chinese authoritarianism carries the characteristics of morality, altruism, and ruling based on 
social contract. The linkage between authoritarianism and its defining features is puzzling but the 
 
113 Andrew G. Walder. China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2015, p. 334. 
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theory makes it possible, by laying down conditions, in the case of Confucianism, for the ruled to 
accept and dwelling on unrealistic assumptions (such as those in power are selfless and the 
interests and identities of the people are the same), in the example of Marxism-Leninism, and is 
embraced by the communist regime. The belief in the virtues of an authoritarian political system 
is more evident in that the CCP rarely uses the word “authoritarianism” and instead describes its 
governance as “socialist democracy.” The PRC claims itself to be a democracy.  
In Confucian ideology, the emperor has selfless affection toward his people by governing 
in the interests of the people. The underlying message is that as long as one accepts defined rules 
that govern human relationships, the monarch’s heavenly grace will bestow benefits upon the 
people and make them prosper. Offense against the Son of Heaven deserves punishment as it 
challenges social order, destabilizes society, and hampers the delivery of the common goods. In 
Confucian logic, rewards and punishments aim to ensure the system that allows imperial 
generosity to manifest. Altruism in Confucianism is what rulers make it appear to be. After all, 
“altruism” is not without conditions and when conditions are attached, it is not altruism.  
Similar to C-M, moralities in M-L develop from the logic of positioning the CCP Politburo 
at the center of governance. Contrary to Confucianism in which selflessness is related to ethics 
that maintains human relations and thus the role of monarch, in M-L, altruism has more to do 
with identification of the interests of the rulers with those of masses and ethics is used to 
differentiate ingroup (the working class) and outgroup (capitalists) by dichotomous roles of good 
and evil. The M-L egalitarian principle, however, removes Confucian hierarchy in the state’s 
representation of people’s interests; the communist party and the masses share the same identity 
and common interests as well. Nevertheless, the Party has privileges to allocate resources just as 
a Confucian monarch does. The use of morality is less about creating a permanent orderly 
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society as Confucianism dictates than about justification for violence. To erect a just society for 
the proletariat (the good victims), exploitative imperial capitalists (the evil doers) and their 
institutions at home and abroad must be, as the above quotation from Marx and Engels suggests, 
overthrown by whatever means possible.  
Another similarity is about the perception of self superiority. Both condone a central 
position that China assumed. In M-L, the communists’ coming to power corrects capitalist power 
relations domestically and internationally. In the PRC’s narratives, the textual pattern usually 
reads as follows: before the communist party came to power and expelled and eradicated 
imperialists and capitalists, the country was deprived and exploited by them; the image of the 
country is shaped to be weak and hopeless and the communist party is framed to be the savior. In 
September 1949 when Mao addressed the Political Consultative Conference after victory over 
“the American imperialism-supported reactionary KMT government”, he announced that “the 
Chinese who constitute one fourth of the world population have stood up.”114 In the post-1950 
Party Congress (NCCPC) reports (when the government was functioning) and even in today’s 
narratives, the texts continue to emphasize an oppressive hegemonic force (the U.S.) attempting 
to subdue other peoples and countries while China remains steadfastly unyielding and charts its 
own path for its socialist institutions that are superior to capitalism. Despite relative material 
weaknesses, the PRC has not perceived itself to be a political inferior. 
Both thought systems espouse a utopian world and see violence as a legitimate means to 
that end. However, Confucianism sees more options other than violence as possible. Aside from 
enticement, coercive measures short of use of force and war, accommodation policies such as 
 
114 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up” [中国人民站起来了], Marxists.org, Sept. 21, 1949, 
<https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19490921.htm>.  
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inter-marriages and frontier markets can be rationalized in a way as if they were out of imperial 
benevolence while they actually resulted from a comparison of relative strength.115 In the pursuit 
and maintenance of power, C-M is more flexible in terms of means and thus able to address a 
variety of situations. 
Marxism and Confucianism have some important differences that work in compatible and 
complementary ways to address Beijing’s interests. One example is material capabilities. 
Confucianism conceals their importance whereas Marxism emphatically places material strength 
at the center to explain the trajectory of history. However, it is important to note that even though 
morality is salient in Confucian ruling ideology, a realized Confucian governance requires a 
strong material base for the long term. The following paragraphs will explain the importance of 
material growth for contemporary China and point out complementary advantages of the two 
ideologies that are seen in how the PRC utilizes them to justify material pursuits with different 
audiences in mind.  
Historical China was a self-sufficient agricultural economy with a sense of the world 
generally confined to bordering neighbors in Asia. The legitimacy of imperial rule did not come 
from economic growth as much as it did from Confucian rituals such as formalities and 
ceremonies that prevailed in inter-personal relationships, in the interaction between the emperor 
and his court members, and in the relationship between the emperor and the society. The 
contemporary era witnesses a different development. China has other major powers and 
superpowers to compare itself with, and it is impossible to increase productivity to the level of 
advanced economies through agricultural means only. As material achievements become primary 
 
115 See the case about Altan Khan of Mongols and Ming in the final section of this chapter, Forging a New 
Theory.  
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measurements for national revival, the PRC uses Marxism to endorse its pursuit of economic 
interests. Although the material base supports a Confucian world order, the philosophy does not 
explicitly sanction material pursuit.   
In addition, considering the needs of supply and demand created by the massive 
population, the continuing rule of the communist party depends on expansion of material power 
internally and externally. The augmentation of material strength as the source of regime 
legitimacy may alarm other states. To assuage concerns and justify such pursuit, Beijing has to 
make it part of greater shared good. Even though Marxism has the self-justifying logic of 
altruistic motive as Confucianism does, the international bankruptcy of M-L promises following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union does not allow the possibility of using it to persuade a broader 
audience, or at least not using it as the sole political appeal.116 It may not even have a great 
appeal to domestic constituents. While the CCP rationalizes material pursuits through Sinicized 
M-L in the Chinese texts, when the main audience is a non-Chinese population, it relies more on 
Confucian rhetoric of harmony to impart the image of co-prosperity and a non-conflictual 
international society that China’s rise can bring.  
Another complementary difference is the presentation of relations between states. C-M 
sanctions hierarchy and explicitly states so. L-M advocates equality but contains an escape 
clause that the communist party has monopolized authority. Today’s world is more receptive to 
equity rhetoric than frankly stated unequal relations. To win the hearts of others, China’s 
 
116 Chapter 4 in this dissertation shows that the English texts of the Qiushi journal translated many articles 
about Chinese Marxism when they discuss why Chinese socialism and Chinese institutions are not just good 
for domestic governance, but also the running of international affairs. In this sense, the PRC does not shy 
away from affirming its claimed advantages of sinicized Marxism to international audiences.  
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narratives have stressed equal relations with other countries in its imagined new international 
order.  
Forging a New Theory: Cultural Subjectivism 
The above discussion of similarities and differences provides the foundation for a new 
theory, a theory that reflects the ideology advanced by political actors in order to gain practical 
advantages. This version removes from C-M (or C-T) and M-L the unpleasant theoretical 
constructs, such as explicit endorsement of hierarchy and class struggle, that the PRC does not 
find appealing to contemporary audiences. The new theory broadens the means to the end by 
retaining from Confucianism non-use of force options (enticement, accommodation, and 
intimation), aside from violence which both C-M and M-L condone. The reconfigured theory 
further keeps the shared traits of authoritarianism, self-described altruism, and the self-assigned 
leadership position. Despite the discursive effort to obscure hierarchy, the utilitarian purpose of 
moderated rhetoric of equity for public consumption remains.  
To account for China’s peacetime behavior and how the PRC rationalizes it, the new 
theory also considers two factors: dynamic process and material capabilities. The purpose of 
considering dynamic process is to capture the strategic calculations during the period of power 
transition between the U.S. and China. The strategic calculations informed by an awareness of a 
relatively peaceful international environment and of external accusations of China threat produce 
the result of moderate rhetoric compared to original C-T and M-L which sanction explicit 
hierarchy and class struggle respectively. It is conceivable that, based on strategic reasons, the 
PRC will act with caution, such as being discursively moderate, to persuade international 
audiences into accepting policies whereby it alters the international order gradually.  
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Material capabilities can have positive correlations with the mentality of superiority or the 
aspiration for a central position in the world, both of which cannot be separated and, as empirical 
evidence shows, the latter also can be present without the condition of material strength. In other 
words, material strength is not a necessary condition for superior mentality, but it can have 
contributing effects to the behavior that reflects a self-assumed central position. To elaborate 
their relations, it is necessary to first bring in the subjectivity of actors into discussion. 
Actors’ subjectivity needs to be considered, including how biases can affect interpretations 
of bilateral relations. The mentality of political superiority/leadership can come from two 
sources: material strength and culture. Culture is here defined as political culture, namely the 
preferred way of doing things in politics and the political reasoning that one believes is just 
(though others may not concur). Consider the following two scenarios: the party perceives itself 
as possessing cultural superiority while being materially weaker in a comparative term and the 
party perceives itself as possessing both cultural and material strength compared to the other 
actor. Note that culture can be a source of bias. The Chinese elite and the non-Chinese may see 
each other as the Other projected by the image of the self. Therefore, this study uses the word, 
assume. China assumes a superior position. This is to emphasize the subjectivity in the Chinese 
worldview, and meanwhile to raise the awareness that realities are more complicated as China 
may pretend to be superior, as the case of Han- Hsiung-nu relations shows, while relative 
material conditions do not allow so or others may not see themselves inferior, in conformity to 
the image projected by China which self-assigns a powerful role.  
The mentality of superiority is relatively constant and may be reinforced by material 
strength. The case of Ming-Mongol relations, especially Yongle’s punitive campaigns, 
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demonstrates a mentality of superiority informed by both culture and material capabilities.117 A 
more recent example is Mao Zedong’s China from 1956 to 1960. Lenin’s internationalization of 
communism in that developing states of the world can unite under a single central leadership 
across national boundaries moved Marxism out of its original orbit. The unfortunate adoption of 
this notion by Mao, as it fueled unrealistic revolutionary fervor to bring about disaster, or merely 
a coincidence with his revolutionary zeal, demonstrates China’s historical aspiration for a top 
status. Within the socialist camp, Mao was competing with the Soviet leader Khrushchev for 
ideological leadership. While the CCP had followed Moscow’s ideological tutelage when Stalin 
was alive, the death of Stalin, the growing pace of China’s economy in the 1950s under the First-
Five Year Plan (FFYP, 1953-1957), and Mao’s ideological radicalization in the second half of 
the 1950s contributed to the Chairman’s confidence in publicly challenging Moscow’s 
interpretations of Marxism-Leninism.  
Riding the initial economic success of the FFYP, Mao intended to accelerate the growth. 
His goal was to surpass Britain, the USSR, and the US in 15 years. The Great Leap Forward, 
starting from 1958, was designed as one step to that effect. However, Beijing and Moscow 
diverged on the methods with the latter seeing the plan as unrealistic and infeasible. The 
disagreement would only aggravate the discord whose seeds were sown in Mao’s criticism of 
Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization. For the matter of de-Stalinization, the Chairman had started to 
call the Soviets “revisionists,” meaning those who did not follow the orthodox M-L doctrines as 
defined by Mao himself. The disputes over the second five-year plan sent bilateral relations into 
a further downward spiral. Before both countries had a major military confrontation in 1969, 
 
117 Wang Yuan-Kang shows in statistics the positive correlation between grain production and military 
campaigns during the Yongle period. From the number of horses he provides annually from 1403 to 1423, they 
are also positively correlated with Yongle’s military expeditions. Wang Yuan-Kang, pp. 109-112. 
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ideological disputes had already ended the alliance in 1960 when Moscow pulled out its advisors 
and economic-military support. China’s public bid for the socialist leadership has positive 
correlations with its aspiration for economic growth. 
When China was materially weaker or when parties reached power parity, it might still 
believe itself to be culturally superior. During the mid-16th century when Ming’s military power 
was in decline, Altan Khan of the Right Wing Mongols repeatedly raided Ming frontiers to 
request trade and tribute, the venues where nomads obtained grain, silk, luxuries, cotton fabrics 
and other goods. The “barbarian” insult proved too much to bear for Confucian officials who 
believed that Ming was the “head” and the barbarian was the “feet.” For the head to listen to the 
feet was against the nature of things. Some officials even suggested an expedition to punish the 
Mongols. The emperor eventually did not concur because of limited military strength. Ming also 
limited compromises to the opening of markets. The Mongol’s request for tribute was left 
answered. Even the markets deal would be cancelled months later after initial agreement. Altan 
Khan would continue to raid and Ming would also cross the border to fight. It was not until 
twenty years later in 1571 that both sides made peace and Ming agreed to the Mongols’ requests. 
The timing of peace is positively correlated with further decline of Ming in terms of its financial 
and military capabilities, but Altan Khan’s grandson as Ming’s hostage may be the reason why 
the dynasty finally opted for accommodation in 1571. A Ming governor-general rationalized 
conciliation in the following way: making peace was for the benefit of the people as years of war 
had burdened Ming’s garrisons and the Mongols’ needs were economic; granting titles to 
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Mongols and answering their needs would show the Emperor’s heavenly grace and the 
barbarians would become civilized.118  
Despite further decline of their power, if it had not been for the hostage issue, Ming might 
not have agreed on compromises. Altan Khan’s grandson in the hands of Ming increased the 
latter’s leverage. The hostage was a card for Ming to play, to ensure political equity, if not 
superiority for its side during negotiations. The Confucian justification from the governor-
general that evoked imperial heavenly grace toward its people and the enculturing power of the 
heavenly Kingdom toward the less civilized were words to save face. Ming was materially 
inferior but was not willing to relinquish its cultural superiority. 
Material strength in the context of peacetime expansion however matters in a different 
manner. It is the prospect to gain and the buttressing confidence in economic success in post-
Deng reforms that propels a discursive assertiveness today. As chapter 4 shows, Chinese 
narratives are more articulated regarding how the PRC intends to reshape international order 
from 2012 onward, except for 2013. This discursive confidence overlaps with more materialized 
Chinese global footprints. China’s confidence in this regard may reflect the decision to broaden 
its access to international markets and resources for continuing development during the 
economic downturn of the past few years. Even though economic growth slowed down during 
 
118 The course of events and the Confucian view of the self and others comes from: Wang Yuan-Kang, pp. 
131-142. Wang’s interpretations differ from mine. He argues that Confucian superiority prevented Ming from 
making concessions during the 1550s and not until twenty years later when material conditions further 
deteriorated did the court finalize accommodation policy. Wang’s overall argument remains that relative 
strength and the declining power of Ming is more crucial for conciliation. He is more concerned with the 
causal relations between material strength and use of force/compromise. My research however is interested in 
how dynasties used Confucian logic to rationalize their policies, be it war, coercion, intimidation or 
compromise, regardless of material conditions. In other words, whatever the policy outcomes are, they can be 
justified in a manner to serve superior mentality and to make the authority feel better. While Wang identifies 
declining material strength as the factor for conciliation, I argue that despite that fact, the real reason for both 
sides to reach agreement may be that Ming now had the hostage. 
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the 2010s, the PRC has a more solid foundation to be internationally active than was possible 
during Mao’s period. Arresting the receding tide of economic growth, however, is not the only 
motive for globe trotting. Reputation and fame which affirm self-values are similarly important 
commodities that China expects to obtain during the process of building technological, cultural, 
economic and military capabilities through overseas expansion. 
Cultural subjectivism is a theory of structuralized power relations with self-justification 
mechanism built in. In other words, it explains the unfalsifiable logic in Chinese reasoning. 
Before getting to how such logic works in the contemporary Chinese narratives, it is necessary to 
first introduce the discursive construct. As chapter 3 demonstrates, in the PRC’s narratives, 
China and the developing countries which account for two thirds of the states in the world belong 
to the same camp that suffered from imperialism and has struggled for a just international order. 
This shared history and shared future is informed by sinicized Marxist universalism in which the 
PRC will lead the changes and create a better future for all. As chapter 4 shows, Chinese 
narratives examined from 2005 to 2018 still carry such logic, albeit without the revolutionary 
tone seen during Mao’s period. The discursive construct frequently stresses equal relations in 
parallel with the indication of an assumed Chinese leadership. Equality mainly means that the 
PRC will not treat other countries in an imperial way as past powers did. Chinese discourse is 
shaping domestic consciousness and is trying to persuade international audiences that getting on 
board the Chinese train will deliver benefits and China will not exploit and suppress others. The 
message is tied back to the greatness of the Chinese nation in that “aggression is never in the 
genes of the Chinese.”119Since the authority is selfless and inherently good, treats everyone 
 
119 Wang Yi, “Toward Peace and Development for All,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Sept. 21, 
2017, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1496244.shtml> accessed Jan. 05, 
2019. 
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equally and sees others’ interests as its own, there is barely a reason to fault it and no reason to 
challenge what it does because what it does is always right.  
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 Chapter 3 
 Chinese Worldview and A Projected Chinese World Order 
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze the role conceptions and power relations of 
the world order which the PRC has imagined. Specifically, this chapter discusses two types of 
Chinese worldview. One gives rise to the world order that the PRC favors. The other reflects its 
assessments of world politics while it was using this knowledge to formulate its preferred order. 
To explain the role conceptions of the Chinese self and its projected other(s) in the PRC’s 
narratives, this chapter provides the evidence for the altercasting and othering process laid out in 
chapter 2 as the mechanisms that the Chinese self evokes in interactions with others or in its 
perceptions of world politics. The task will be conducted along with Beijing’s evolving 
worldview, as chart 3.0 shows, from vast zone (or intermediate zone), to two intermediate zones, 
to three worlds and multipolarity, all of which are Chinese conceptions of world politics and 
either inform or correspond with the PRC’s preferred order.  
Chart 3.0 
 
The four worldviews are better understood through a longer timeframe, instead of specific 
time points. The timespan will include the duration they took to formulate and to transform into a 
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new version. During the period of intermediate zone, the PRC saw itself as following the Soviet 
lead, but gradually shifted to divide the world such that it would lead one of the three camps. 
Multipolarity would then sustain the leading role conceptualized at the stage of the three worlds. 
Thus, it was only for a short time, less than a decade following the founding of the PRC, that the 
country did not see itself in a leadership position. The role of the US had/has been the Other, 
with different degrees of salience at different historical points, against which the PRC formulated 
its preferred order. The four worldviews reflect three things from the Chinese perspective: the 
PRC’s conceptions of world politics, the world orders which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. laid the 
foundation for, and where the PRC saw/sees itself and the order that it led/will lead. Another 
noteworthy trait of the four worldviews is the underpinning of relative material strength that 
came to differentiate camps and poles. Views projected to understand the running of things may 
also reflect the self or what one deems important to the self. In other worlds, a preferred order 
that China projects also is informed by material capabilities. 
Discursive evidence, from the reports of the National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (NCCPC reports) and other historical documents, shows that a projected Chinese order has 
sinicized socialism situated at the top of the pyramid that describes the PRC’s conceptions of 
itself and its relations with other countries. This is in consistency with the stipulation of cultural 
subjectivism in chapter 2 that China assumes a superior central status and the world order it 
prefers is a hierarchical one supported by the material base. However, the material pursuit is not 
always constant, as seen in the rupture of the Cultural Revolution. Economic strength alone does 
not support a hierarchy. It is one facet of national greatness that the PRC intends to prove and 
thus needs to be understood in strategic terms. In the Chinese narratives, the material capabilities 
of the west are correlated with conflicts whereas a materially strong China contributes to world 
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peace. This difference, from the PRC’s viewpoint, lies in domestic institutions which preside 
over both internal and external affairs. As the CCP considers itself the architect of sinicized 
socialism, claimed success resulting from socialism is the success of the CCP. The PRC’s 
ultimate objective is the recognized and unchallenged legitimacy and power of the Party in the 
running of the state. Regarding the international affairs, on the issues that it finds it has a stake 
in, it frames them in a way as if they are the common concerns/interests of countries around the 
world and claims that it upholds idealistic principles, unlike some major powers, in conducting 
foreign policies in these issue areas. In so doing, it highlights its superiority and as the discursive 
presentation in chapter 4 will shows, Beijing wants others to recognize its uniqueness and to pay 
it deference. 
In the Chinese writings, a favored world order is discursively constructed in parallel with 
and in comparison to the order that the U.S. lays down the foundation for. In other words, the 
PRC’s preferred version is a long-term pursuit and material accumulation in the post-Deng 
period has made it more possible than during Mao’s time. This chapter traces this dynamic 
process and analyzes how it contributes to the gradual formation of a more complete pyramid 
which exhibits the power relations that China favors while denying its inequity. The discussion 
of the pyramid is against the background of an existing order that through a Chinese perspective 
is oppressive and unfair. The following will compare the roles of the self and others and their 
relations with the world constructed in the Chinese narratives at two different periods: Mao and 
post-Deng. 
China’s arguments presented here should not be taken as statements of fact. They are for 
propaganda and thought education aimed at Party members, the domestic population, and 
increasingly an international audience. In analyzing Chinese narratives, there are two goals to be 
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achieved. This chapter breaks down the techniques used in creating the narratives and explores 
the underlying ideas/beliefs. 
Unless stated otherwise, the reports mentioned here are speeches given by Chinese leaders 
in the NCCPC (Party Congress) meetings that, since 1977, have been held at regular five-year 
intervals. There are 12 documents under examination as listed in Chart 3.1, 4 produced in Mao’s 
period and 8 after Mao’s death until today. These reports summarize domestic development and 
provide observations about international politics from a Chinese perspective in the past five 
years, lay out domestic objectives for the next five years, and project future international security 
trends. Therefore, they provide an authoritative guide into the PRC’s worldview. Other historical 
documents will be drawn upon when needed.  
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Chart 3.1 
 
From 1953 to 1977 
Actors and Their Relations with the PRC in the Chinese Worldview  
This section explores China’s evolving conceptions of world politics in which it defines 
the roles of itself and others. The ideology-charged Cold War climate did not dictate 
differentiation of political camps, except in the first few years after the PRC’s founding. While 
the intermediate zone is characterized by two ideological camps, the two intermediate zones and 
three worlds are divided by material standards and were formed as the primary enemy shifted 
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from the U.S. to the USSR. Unlike its initial acceptance of being a junior partner, from two 
intermediate zones to three worlds the PRC rejected an inferior position to the Soviet Union and 
assumed a separate identity which eventually saw itself as the leader of the Third World. The 
third characteristic which ran through the period with consistency is the United Front strategy 
that supported the engagement with countries regardless of differences in ideologies and 
domestic institutions in a way favorable to the PRC for its larger move against the primary 
enemy. The fourth characteristic is related to the second and the third in that throughout the 
entire period, from 1953 to 1977, Chinese narratives formed a role congruence between the PRC 
and many (not all) developing countries on a relatively constant base and more ambiguous 
relationships with lesser capitalist states. Overall, China’s view of international politics was more 
materially than ideologically based and its approach was strategic.  
Three years after the end of the Korean War, the PRC was making economic progress out 
of the First Five-Year Plan. Against this background, the 1956 report made by Liu Shaoqi for the 
Eighth NCCPC (or the 8th Party Congress) criticizes American post WWII “expansionist 
activities” in Asia and Africa and deems military alliances and military bases as creating tension 
and preparing for war; the goal of the US was to “oppress the American people and control and 
intervene by all possible efforts in the intermediate zone between the socialist countries and the 
US.” The report makes a role contrast: “American imperialism defends these activities as 
preventing communist aggression. However,…socialism and aggression are entirely 
incompatible......The people around the world see it very clearly: the Soviet Union, China, and 
other socialist countries actively seek for peaceful coexistence, development of East-West 
economic and cultural relations, and take the lead in downsizing armed forces and military 
spending.” To depict the US as a belligerent destroying world peace as opposed to what China 
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was doing is not enough. The narrative adds “the people around the world” to increase the 
credibility of Chinese perspective. 
The view that the U.S. intended to suppress countries around the world in the intermediate 
zone corresponded to Mao’s interview with Anna Louise Strong, an American journalist, in 
1946. When asked about the possibility of a war between the US and the USSR, Mao responded:  
“The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which 
includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and 
Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack 
on the Soviet Union is out of the question. The U.S. reactionaries say that the 
military bases they have set up and are preparing to set up all over the world are 
aimed against the Soviet Union. True, these military bases are directed against the 
Soviet Union. At present, however, it is not the Soviet Union but the countries in 
which these military bases are located that are the first to suffer U.S. aggression 
(emphasis added).”120 
The juxtaposition of evil Americans and good Soviets plus the people around the world is 
a role shaping process that links back to where the PRC stood at the time. In the 1956 report, 
opposition to Washington’s aggressiveness is the claimed (expected) result of aggregate efforts 
of promoting world peace formed by the USSR, the PRC and other socialist countries. Parallel 
with the othering of Washington’s role is the altercasted shared identity among Moscow, Beijing, 
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and many lesser states. Since the PRC’s primary enemy at this time was the US, it projected to 
the identities of others its wishes of weakening American influence by describing the 
relationships among socialist countries (including the PRC) headed by the Soviet Union as 
“brotherly friendship and mutual help.” In other words, it is saying that American imperialist 
influence is gradually offset by socialist power that advocates peace. “After the October 
Revolution, there was no second socialist country except for the one that the Soviets were 
building. However, the situation changed fundamentally when our people undertook socialist 
endeavors. After WWII,……new socialist countries emerged in Europe and Asia. 
Now,……people in the socialist countries account for 900 millions, one third of human 
population.” 
In the report, former colonies who were nationalists and were struggling for their 
independence also are altercasted as the PRC’s allies “in weakening imperialist power.” Beijing 
also satisfied its desire to be seen in a positive light by describing these countries as the 
recipients of Chinese assistance in their effort of national liberation.121 “The existence of socialist 
countries and the sympathy and support from the socialist countries will greatly expedite the 
development and victory of national independence movements.” Aside from these nationalist 
lesser states, in Beijing’s worldview, capitalist economies other than the U.S. often became 
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candidates with which the PRC could cooperate in politics and in economy. But their role is 
ambiguous. 
Although economic ties with socialist countries was a priority in the early years of the 
Cold War, trade with capitalist countries was not discouraged. This is especially true in the case 
of Japan, with which the PRC was eager to maintain relations even though in propaganda it 
presented Japan as an unforgivable oppressor during WWII.122 In China’s plan, Britain and 
France were the other two ideal candidates to do business with as well, despite limited results 
due to the U.S. embargo.123 In the 1956 NCCPC report, capitalist states except the U.S. were 
both a negative Other because they, such as Britain and France, had lingering imperial interests 
in Egypt on the issue of the Suez Canal and an altercasted potential role cooperator because they, 
in the Chinese view, had deepening contradictions with the US. Nevertheless, on a continuum 
with othering and altercasting positioned at the two ends, it seems that in the Chinese view lesser 
capitalist countries leaned toward altercasting.  
Despite the stated Chinese allegiance to Moscow, the frictions between communist China 
and the Soviet Union would soon begin and competition for socialist leadership then followed. 
Beijing opposed Moscow’s de-Stalinization and the policy of peaceful coexistence with the U.S. 
The Soviet opposition to the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and to the Taiwan Strait Crisis 
(1958) which Mao initiated to mobilize the Chinese people for the Great Leap also sowed the 
seeds of the discord between the two countries. Moscow further was disturbed by Mao’s 
contempt of nuclear weapons and became less willing to transfer relevant technologies. 
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Khrushchev’s visit to the U.S. in 1959 did not sit well with the PRC either as the latter perceived 
Washington as its primary enemy and the Soviet overture as “revisionist.” Mao then turned his 
discontent into an ideological battle with the USSR. In the eyes of the Chairman, sinicized 
Marxism-Leninism was the orthodox way to communism whereas the Soviet practice was 
revisionist. At the end of 1959, he decided that Moscow was more a competitor for the PRC’s 
leadership position in the socialist camp than an ideological mentor that would guide and 
materially assist China.124  
While Beijing had growing tension with Moscow, it did not play down the American 
threat. In addition, in the early years of the Cold War, Mao already did not hold sanguine views 
about solidarity within both the socialist and capitalist camps. He long believed that solidarity 
within the capitalist camp would eventually collapse due to American dominance.125 When 
meeting with Kikunami Katsumi, a Politburo member of the Japanese Communist Party, in 
January 1964, Mao mentioned that although the PRC and the Soviet Union are in the socialist 
camp and bound by diplomatic relations, the bilateral relations are not “as good as those between 
China and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party or China and the Ikeda faction.” In Mao’s 
view, the contradictions did not only exist between Beijing and Moscow; they also applied to 
relations between the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe. In explaining the odd 
phenomenon that China had better relations with capitalist Japan which in theory belonged to the 
imperialist bloc, Mao said to Kikunami that the reason is because “the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
both have nuclear weapons and want to dominate the world.”126 By 1964, Mao already began to 
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place the USSR in the same category where the U.S. was because both had material capabilities 
and imperialist ambitions. The Chairman’s theory of “two intermediate zones” maturing from 
1963 to 1964 thus reflected the evolution of events in previous years, including Beijing’s 
deteriorating relations with Moscow, Mao’s observations about eroding cohesion within the two 
blocs, and his belief regarding how world situations would evolve. 
Against the above backgrounds, in the conversation with Kikunami, Mao continued to 
spell out what he meant by “two intermediate zones.” “The vast economically backward 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the first. Imperialist and advanced 
capitalist countries represented by Europe constitute the second. Both are opposed to American 
control. Countries in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, are against control by the Soviet Union. 
This trend is quite obvious.”127 Unlike Mao’s 1946 interview and the intermediate zone in the 
1956 NCCPC report, both of which are similar, by 1963-64, Mao further divided the world by 
the standard of material strength in two ways. First, the seeds of disputes and discord among both 
socialist and capitalist camps were sowed by the major states’ ambitions aided by unequal 
distribution of material capabilities. Second, the differentiation between capitalist countries other 
than the U.S. and developing countries was based on relative strength.  
Chinese perception of the Soviets would become worse. First, Beijing came to believe that 
Moscow’s military supplies to Hanoi during the Vietnam War posed a security threat to Chinese 
territory.128 Second, the border skirmishes between the PRC and the USSR over the years 
eventually culminated in the 1969 border clash. By 1973, Beijing already saw the Soviets as the 
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PRC’s primary enemy. In addition, the views articulated during 1970s indicate that material 
capabilities became more salient as a grouping standard in the Chinese worldview. The self-role 
conception shifted from a country in the socialist camp to a socialist country belonging to the 
Third World whose collective identity is that of “developing countries” regardless of their 
ideologies.129  
The new addition of Moscow to the evil camp perceived by the Chinese in which the US 
had once been the sole member theoretically accentuated the role of the Third World in the 
PRC’s foreign relations. Zhou Enlai in the 1973 NCCPC report addressed the competition 
between Washington and Moscow for world domination with increasing emphasis on the Soviet 
expansionist threat, and China’s role in the race. “Internationally, our Party upholds proletariat 
internationalism……enhances solidarity among the proletariat around the world and oppressed 
peoples and nations, strengthens solidarity among countries that suffer from imperialist 
aggression, sabotage, intervention, control and bullying. [The goal] is to form the most expansive 
United Front against imperialism and new and old colonialism, especially the hegemonism of 
two superpowers, the US and the USSR (emphasis added).” Zhou was projecting Chinese 
loathing of both Washington and Moscow to the views of those opposing the US and the USSR 
in order to show that Beijing had allies against two imperialist powers. The split with the Soviets 
had led the PRC to readjust its allegiance, from both the USSR and economically backward 
countries to an emphasis on political alliance with the developing countries.  
The PRC’s relations with the Third World, the two superpowers, and other developed 
capitalist states had its final formulation two years before Mao’s death. The Chairman’s 
worldview remained materially informed and this time it left no confusion between developing 
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countries and lesser capitalist powers. In a 1974 conversation with Zambia’s president Kenneth 
Kaunda, Mao threw out questions about who belongs to the First and Second Worlds after both 
agreed with the expectation of solidarity among Third World countries. Kaunda replied that the 
exploiters and imperialists belong to the First world and the revisionists (such as the Soviets) to 
the Second world. His answers were ideology-based, but Mao’s own answers differentiated 
countries based on the quality and number of atomic bombs. “The U.S. and the Soviet Union 
have a lot of atomic bombs, and they are richer. Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada, of the 
Second World, do not possess so many atomic bombs and are not so rich as the First World, but 
richer than the Third World.”130 The alliance with developing countries no doubt has its material 
foundation, at least in theory. The “Three Worlds” theory has strategic implications for the 
PRC’s foreign relations.  
The NCCPC report of 1977 specifies how the Three Worlds can guide China’s 
international struggle. The Third World countries (including the PRC) are the main revolutionary 
forces against capitalist and socialist imperialist enemies, namely the US and the Soviet Union. 
The countries of the Second World who are both oppressors of the developing countries and 
oppressed by the two superpowers can be potential candidates for the PRC to form a United 
Front with in the struggle against the First World. Beijing affirmed its role, as the document 
states: “China is a developing socialist country of the Third World. We unswervingly stand 
together with developing countries of Asia, Africa, Latin American and other regions. And we 
resolutely support their just struggle” in maintaining national independence and economic 
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development. The PRC’s self identification could not exist without imagining that others were 
willing to identify their goals with that of Beijing. 
The evolving worldview has implications for what informed China’s strategic calculations 
and Chinese perception of the self. Regarding the former, ideological alliance did not stand the 
test of sino-centrism and security interests. The Sino-Soviet split is the evidence to both reasons, 
and rapprochement with the U.S. resulted from the latter. Furthermore, the PRC was flexible in 
cooperating with others regardless of their ideological affiliations so long as it did not perceive 
them to be the main security menace. As early as in 1950s, the PRC already expressed that 
regardless of social systems and ideologies, it would work with others. There was a brief period 
in which Zhou Enlai was implementing such a strategy through diplomatic and economic 
venues.131 In fact, the United Front strategy articulated in 1977 resembles the strategy of co-
optation between the periphery and the semi-peripheral capitalist stated in Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s World-Systems theory.132 Compared to domestic policies,133 in foreign relations, 
the PRC was no less strategic than ideological, if not more strategic than ideological. But the 
question remains: did ideology matter? If so, in what way? After all, despite shifting alliances, 
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the PRC had insisted that it was a socialist country,134 and there were reasons why it adhered to a 
socialist identity. 
Whether the other party that it associates with is a socialist state from a Chinese 
perspective is irrelevant to the PRC’s socialist identity. The core constitution of China’s socialist 
identity rests on how it rationalizes its own policies as being socialist and how it over time re-
interprets Marxism-Leninism and makes it the spring of sinicized socialism. It also rests in 
Chinese leaders’ belief in the ideology as they define it. Therefore, the use of socialism is both 
instrumental and results from belief. At the fundamentals, the repeated appearance of the term 
delivers a message that it wants others to recognize the difference and uniqueness of China and 
that such uniqueness is related to the expressed superiority of Chinese socialism in the PRC’s 
narratives. The demand of deference to the CCP/PRC in domestic and foreign affairs underlies 
the usage of socialism however it is defined. This will bring the discussion to the second 
implication, the PRC’s definition of the self.  
Conception of the Self and A Projected New Order 
While perceiving itself as a target of aggression, the PRC’s self-perception was not of 
powerlessness at the inferior end of the oppressor-oppressed relations. In the pre-1982 narratives, 
it discursively rejected conformity to the hierarchy which it claimed was the design of imperialist 
powers. Instead, the PRC affirmed its self-worth and believed that time would show socialist 
institutions are superior to capitalism. From the Chinese perspective, institutional advantages 
would be manifested in economic development and in the values carried to build national 
infrastructure and conduct foreign policies, such as the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In 
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the 1950s, the PRC already associated sinicized socialism with both domestic development and 
world peace. However, the interrelations and the causal mechanisms among the three of them 
had not received detailed treatments as they would in the late 2000s. The pyramid below that 
describes their relations reflects how Chinese superiority functions in practice. Within this 
framework, the following paragraphs also address two issues about the development of material 
capabilities.  
The first one is about the salience of material pursuit in a highly ideological context. 
Ideological radicalization in Mao’s China was an instrument to many goals. This is the case in 
both domestic and foreign policies. Using ideological zeal to achieve material objectives was 
especially salient before the Cultural Revolution when the country was able to focus on its 
foreign relations and pay more attention to international politics. This can be seen in that the 
highlighting of material development took place in the discursive context of competition with 
capitalist countries. Material strength factored in China’s perception of the self when it came to 
its status in world politics, even though during the 1950s, the PRC mainly divided the world in 
line with ideological fault lines (intermediate zone). The Chinese leaders understood the 
importance of material capabilities and they believed that these were indispensable if the 
superiority of Chinese socialism was going to be fully manifested. This was the case before the 
end of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 
China’s less than suboptimal economic development during Mao’s era had more to do 
with policy decisions and how those decisions were made in the echo chamber at the expense of 
field expertise and bureaucratic suggestions than with the belief, if such belief was ever the case, 
that the country did not need a material base to be strong. Second, the PRC was aware of its 
material weaknesses, but this did not affect its perception of the self as a superior actor versus the 
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US and the USSR. This awareness further contributed to more investment into heavy industry 
when it was the agricultural and light industries that required more attention. The prospect that 
things would get better motivated the Chinese assertion that it was ideologically superior to other 
major powers. The discussion of material factors is important because it mediates the relations in 
the pyramid between domestic development and world peace which would not come into full 
play in the Chinese discourse until the late 2000s. A comparison of the NCCPC documents in 
1956, 1973, and 1977 along with other supplements will illustrate the above points.  
China’s finalization of the First Five-Year Plan (FFYP1953-1957) occurred 
simultaneously when the new economic programs were already implemented after the Korean 
War. Domestic official discussions surrounded a necessity to make the PRC politically 
influential with a strong material base. The CCP understood the rationale that the economy is the 
basis for political, military, and cultural strength. In addressing the work meeting of the CCP’s 
National Organization in 1953, Zhou Enlai connected the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) to a 
greater strategic goal. “We have many tasks in our plate. Why do we take the economy as our 
main working line and main task? Because it is the foundation. Chairman Mao said, the economy 
is the foundation; politics is the reflection of economy in concentration; military struggle is the 
highest level of political struggle in its most extreme form. Therefore, political, military, and 
cultural work all depend on the economy. Without it, we cannot have the foundation for 
socialism.”135 The economy Zhou had in mind undisputedly is industrialization. 
Among different sectors, Zhou placed developmental emphasis on heavy industry. In a 
1953 meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, he reasoned that “if the 
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industry is underdeveloped, an independent country can become a satellite state (or dominions?) 
of others. Can we depend on socialist countries? For instance, the Soviet Union develops heavy 
industry and we will specialize in the light industry. I do not think so. If China does not strive for 
developing industry, especially heavy industry, it cannot stand tall in the world (emphasis 
added).”136 The primary concern for Beijing is the country’s relative status to others, and a 
developed heavy industry becomes the very symbol of that goal being achieved. The light 
industry that produces consumer goods will not help China leap upward on the power ladder 
because it does not modernize the military.  
The military purpose is clearly indicated later in the same year when Zhou said to the 
attendees of the CCP’s National Organization, “military modernization is possible only with 
heavy industry.”137 He continued to explain the necessity of being able to produce modern 
equipment. “You once saw a car at an industrial exhibition. The car is made by others. We 
assembled the parts. We did not make it. Since we cannot make a tank, an airplane, an advanced 
cannon, and a car, we do not have powerful defense capabilities.”138 Defense industry no doubt 
had a significant share in overall investment in heavy industry. In his report to the CCP’s Central 
Committee in 1954, Chen Yun noted that “defense industry receives most attention, oil industry 
is lagging behind, and coal and electricity is under supply strains. There is no way to improve 
this situation.”139 His conclusion was to execute the plan that had already been designed. The 
language in the final version of FFYP that came out in 1955 does not specifically single out 
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defense industry in comparison to others, but it does not leave any ambiguity regarding its 
importance in China’s overall strategic goal either.140 
The realpolitik thinking behind heavy industry first is further colored by the reasoning of 
“a shared wish of developing the economy together.” In Zhou’s view, if China concentrates 
resources on light industry, it will increase the burden for the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries. Focusing on heavy industry which also was suggested by Moscow, however, would 
make possible “developing the economy together, and creating solidarity and consolidating [the 
socialist camp].”141 
Zhou’s rhetoric shows a blend of plain admission of the country’s world aspirations and 
pretentious humbleness and inclusiveness. Even though a focus on light industry is more realistic 
according to the domestic conditions at the time, for the Chinese leaders, to increase material 
capabilities of the country within a short time span in a global context outweighed other 
considerations. According to Zhou’s logic, not to develop light industry first is to avoid 
burdening Moscow. This thought serves as a cover for the real motive of “standing tall in the 
world” which Zhou did not try to hide anyway. The expressed intention to contribute to 
international public goods and to develop the economy together no doubt is to justify the pursuit 
of heavy industry. The message goes that only when China gets to develop heavy industry, 
which it sees as a gateway to become one of major powers, can the goal of “developing the 
economy together” be realized. In other words, things need to go in the Chinese way so that 
public goods defined by the PRC can be provided.  
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The relative success of the FFYP and a future prospect of continuous growth conditioned 
Beijing’s perception of itself. This is evidenced in the 1956 NCCPC report. Meanwhile, despite 
the economic documents linked China’s domestic development to the world in that the success of 
the former would contribute to the later, the 1956 report and other NCCPC reports throughout 
Mao’s era do not have the discursive connections between the two.  
In the 1956 NCCPC report, the PRC believes that its “international status has been 
elevated” because of the country’s participation in the peaceful socialist camp headed by the 
USSR and its victory over the American aggression in the Korean War. It is the juxtaposition of 
a peace promoter who won the war versus an imperialist evil doer who lost the war that underlies 
China’s self-perception of a higher status that it now enjoys compared to the years before 1949. 
In the Chinese narratives, the time before was a period of imperialist humiliation. Liu Shaoqi’s 
1956 report thus is a continuation of Mao’s line.  
Liu further stated Chinese self-affirmation from the angle of governing and developmental 
institutions. “The institutions of our country show a combination of a greater degree of 
democracy and a greater degree of concentration (高度的民主和高度的集中的結合). This 
institution has displayed its superiority in the past years.” In the text, the PRC did not claim that 
the national development already demonstrates the “superior qualities of socialism” (社会主义
的优越性), but it believed that it was taking the right path toward that objective. This resulted 
from initial economic success in the past years, as Liu stated that “the first five-year plan (1953-
1957) has obtained gigantic achievements which even our enemy cannot deny,” though he also 
recognized that there was much to be done in the upcoming second five-year plan.  
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In discussing international relations, Liu’s report compared socialist and capitalist 
institutions to highlight the advantages of the former to create a better world. The report shows a 
confidence in winning the competition between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp. It 
observes that imperialist expansion after WWII in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America did not win the minds and hearts of the people. Because of the receding influence of the 
US, Britain and France, the possibility of “permanent peace in the world” starts to emerge. It is 
in the context where China and the socialist camp headed by the USSR are said to be peace 
makers, specifically referring to the adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and 
the aggressionist West is believed to be on the losing side that Liu stated in the same section, 
“we believe in the superiority of socialist institutions, and are not afraid of peacefully competing 
with capitalist countries.” Accordingly, “superior qualities of socialism” in the PRC’s rhetoric 
are not just good for domestic development but also good for world peace.  
Pertinent to the above analysis is how material strength adds to the equation of Chinese 
institutional superiority in international politics. Specifically, what are the connections between 
domestic development and world peace, if there are any? The 1956 report characterized the 
relations between the PRC and the world through economic development in comparative and 
competitive lights. It indicates a belief in industrialization through “socialist institutions” to solve 
the problem of its “economic and cultural backwardness compared to the advanced development 
of the world.” In other words, through state ownership, eventual eradication of private enterprise 
and planned economy, the PRC would be able to develop its material base and compete with 
other major powers. At this point, the narratives were more concerned about proving the country 
as a materially equal and competitive peer to its capitalist counterparts than claiming that a 
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strong socialist country with material wealth can make the world better compared to what 
capitalist states can do. Such an assertion would not take place until the late 2000s. 
Pyramid 3.0 cognitively presents the relationships among concepts based on the NCCPC 
reports. The arrows mean positive contributing effects of socialist institutions, which is to be 
understood in a comparative light with the effect of capitalism. The contributing effect of B to D 
is mediated by C. However, since the PRC was building an economic foundation during the 
1950s and remained so in the 70s, the distance between C and D was not addressed in the 
narratives and thus is presented by the dash line. Placing A on the top of pyramid reflects its 
primary and foremost central position in the Chinese discourse. Economic, military, social, 
political, cultural and ethnical narratives all develop out of this ideology. 
Pyramid 3.0 
 
 
 
Chinese confidence at the time only went so far as stating that the comparative superiority 
of socialism in international politics would be demonstrated by the incoming economic success. 
It fell short of saying such institutional advantages would eventually translate to world peace 
through national material capabilities.  
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The Great Leap Forward launched in 1958 epitomized leaders’ ambitions to prove that the 
PRC would be materially superior to the world powers. It aimed to promote the country to the 
third place in the world and, with further effort, to surpass the two superpowers by 1964. At the 
September 1958 meeting of the Supreme State Council, Mao said: 
“We should strive to produce eleven million tons of steel, doubling last year’s 
output…….Three years of hard efforts, fifty million tons of steel. At that time, we 
will occupy third place in the world, next only to the Soviet Union and the United 
States…….by 1962, it is possible [for us to produce] eighty to a hundred million 
tons [of steel], approaching the level of the United States…… [At the end of] the 
second five-year plan, we will approach or even surpass America. In another two 
years, in seven years, [we may] produce a hundred fifty million tons of steel, and 
surpass America to become the number one in the world.”142 
Mao’s statement displayed his earnestness to develop the country into a socialist state with 
a strong material base within an unrealistic time span. The Chairman at this moment still divided 
the world according to ideological fault lines. However, when it came to the status of the PRC, 
the judging criteria also included material conditions. During the Great Leap Forward, to meet 
the production goal under the situation of resources scarcity, the PRC relied on ideology to 
mobilize the masses.  
 
 
142 “Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council (excerpt),” September 
08, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Selected 
Works of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy (Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan ) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian 
chubanshe, 1994), pp. 348-352, via Wilson Center Digital Archive.  
158 
Strategically staking out heavy industry as a primary sector for development did not make 
the task easier and the objective more achievable. The country lacked material foundation and 
professionalism. Normally, agricultural surplus can be used to invest in and develop industrial 
sectors. In the case of China, it would go to the payment of imports of machinery, equipment and 
plants from the USSR. Since the PRC remained largely an agricultural state and lacked the 
ability to develop heavy industry on its own, imports and reliance on the Soviet technicians and 
advisors were the shortcuts to the goal. The country was even willing to invest more on heavy 
industry than agriculture. When the latter did not receive sufficient investment and in the 
meantime had to support heavy industry, the country was faced with the problem of resources 
scarcity. It then turned to rely on the will power of the people. By staging a crisis in the Taiwan 
Strait to create a sense of immediate danger, the PRC mobilized the population to participate in 
agricultural collectivization and production of steel by backyard furnaces. The productivity fell 
short of expected goals, which would translate into the reduction of citizens’ daily rations. A 
vicious cycle then formed. Without the material rewards, people were less incentivized to work. 
Ideology was used to achieve material ends, but its positive effect was short term.143  
The Great Leap ended with disaster immediately just one year after the experiment began, 
but Mao insisted on continuing the policy into 1960 despite bad results that were already clear in 
1959. The temporary economic revival between 1960 and 1962 would then be overshadowed by 
Mao’s return to the political center and his ideological radicalization as well as the domestic 
power struggle. The coming Cultural Revolution would further retard the growth of the 
economy. The goal of surpassing the superpowers by 1964 never got realized.  
 
143 Alexander Eckstein. China’s Economic Development: The Interplay of Scarcity and Ideology. Ann Arbor: 
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Beijing’s self-assertion would continue to be correlated with a positive prospect of future 
gains, despite the apparent gaps between its capabilities and other major powers. One example 
came in the early 1960s after the GLF fiasco. Despites the abruption of the Great Leap, China’s 
preoccupations with industrialization and its relative status in the world economy did not recede. 
On December 24 1959, when speaking to the party members who also held the titles of 
provincial bureaucrats at Heilongjiang, Zhou compared China’s situations with the Soviet Union 
and voiced again the possibility that China would be able to speedily build an independent 
economic system to cope with a future war. “Our current conditions, ten years after the founding 
of the nation, are much better than the Soviet Union in 1927. Our production index, basic 
infrastructure, and science show that we have more advantages than the Soviets……If we can 
build an independent economic system with speed by 1972 (during the Fourth FFYP), it will be 
beneficial for the socialist camp and for the anti-imperialism struggle. Such a strong country will 
be able to handle war because we have an independent economic system.”144 In the aftermath of 
obvious failure of the GLF, Zhou was saying that China’s economy was still doing better than 
that of the USSR after the latter’s founding and there were still hopes for the PRC to do better in 
the future. 
Mao’s re-emergence at the political center in the second half of 1962 also meant the 
resumption of the Sino-Soviet polemics after a respite in 1961. This time, the Chairman found 
fault with Moscow over its seeking a relationship with “revisionist” Yugoslavia. A proposal 
drafted by the PRC that stated its positions regarding the principles of the international 
communist movement eventually led to a bilateral meeting at Moscow in July 1963. The 
proposal opposed a Soviet rapprochement with the U.S. and submitted Chinese views regarding 
 
144 Zhou Enlai, 1998, p. 404. 
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how true Marxism-Leninism should be implemented; instead of seeking a reconciliation with the 
Americans through nuclear disarmament, according to the Chinese, the Soviets must uphold a 
revolutionary agenda and communist states’ support for national liberation of the oppressed 
people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America should come as a priority in foreign relations. The 
PRC was accusing Moscow of abandoning true communism. In its view, “resolute revolutionary 
struggle” by uniting socialist countries and the international proletariat was the way to create 
world peace. Seeking peaceful coexistence with the U.S. would foster imperialism. The 
document in the beginning stressed that “the general line of the international communist 
movement” must adhere to Marxism-Leninism. Beijing’s definition of M-L was based on its 
understanding of the Moscow documents of 1957 and 1960. It was legitimizing the 
authoritativeness of its interpretation of M-L by stating a continuity between its current position 
and what had been agreed in the documents. When the Proposal stressed in the beginning that the 
general line of the international communist movement must adhere to M-L, it meant that the 
PRC’s position, rather than the Soviets’, as orthodox interpretations, should be the guiding 
principle. Beijing’s intention to compete with Moscow for the socialist leadership was 
apparent.145 This mentality of Chinese superiority was channeled through ideological 
competition. 
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In the PRC’s original plan, by 1967, the end of the Third Five-Year Plan, the country will 
meet the basic requirement of industrialization and set the stage for expansion of production and 
economic upgrading. Domestic production of machinery and consumer goods will then be made 
possible. In Zhou’s words, a complete industrial system is especially important because “from 
the perspective of domestic demands, we need to quickly change the situation of economic 
backwardness; internationally, our strong industry can promote the economic growth of all 
socialist countries and enhance the force that safeguards world peace.”146 Beijing’s economic 
deadline was not fulfilled due to the disruptions of the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution. 
Following interruptions, changes were made to the deadlines when the set economic targets are 
to be met. The final three years of the second FFYP (1958-1962) ended up with handling the 
consequences of mismanaging the economy in the aftermath of the Great Leap. The succeeding 
Cultural Revolution would then postpone the third FFYP to 1967, and the year of 1980 would 
become the new official deadline to build an independent economy after at least twice 
consideration of some certain year during the 1970s.147 During the re-planning period, Zhou 
repeatedly expressed the hope and possibilities for the PRC to leap forward. For instance, a 
succesful development of “an independent national economic system” “will contribute more to 
the revolutionary movement in the world,” so did Zhou say when he spoke with the party 
members about the issues concerning industrial development.148  The Chinese leaders believed 
that, since they had “knocked down the basis of seemingly powerful imperialism, feudalism, and 
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capitalism at home” and had detonated an atomic bomb, such leapfrog advance is entirely 
possible.149 
Although economic documents frequently connected China’s future economic success to 
the world peace and prosperity, probably because the performance had been lackluster, the 
linkage continued to be absent in the NCCPC reports (the Party Congress reports). The Chinese 
leaders’ linking the country’s material development to a full display of socialist advantages 
internationally would not occur until the late 2000s. Meanwhile, to understand Beijing’s 
expectations of gains and what to gain, an analysis of the resources devoted to heavy industry 
and other sectors can be more informative than the statistics of average GDP growth. The 
Chinese way of developing the economy under Mao was different. Instead of fostering a solid 
economic foundation that would first support the basic necessities and the overall wealth of the 
country, the CCP hoped to develop heavy industry first and thereby lift the overall economy of 
the country.  
Despite the economic plunge during the Cultural Revolution, the priority of the Third 
Five-Year Plan (1965-1970), originally designed to meet the requirement of daily subsistence by 
focusing on agriculture, was shifted to heavy industry, represented by the Third Line policy (三
线建设). This was due to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations rooted in the border clashes 
during the first four years of the Cultural Revolution. To meet the goal of “active preparation for 
war”, the third FFYP focuses on production facilities, such as local steel factories, small-scale 
chemical factories, and warehouses, and materials for the making of weapons and military 
equipment.150 The Fourth FFYP continued to carry out the goal of the third FFYP and not until 
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150 National Development and Reform Commission documents, 
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1973, after China completed another round of power struggle, did agriculture become a 
priority.151 Starting from 1965 and probably even earlier, producer goods had surpassed 
consumer goods in terms of production. By the constant 1952 prices, when setting total industrial 
production as 100, producer goods made up a 35 percent whereas consumer goods had 65 in 
1952. By 1965, producer goods accounted for 53 and consumer goods dwindled down to 47 out 
of 100. In 1974, producer goods claimed 62 out of 100.152 Accordingly, during the Cultural 
Revolution, it was the prospect of future gains in heavy industry, measured against what one had 
at the moment, that drove the sense of one’s superiority. 
By 1973, the great hope of surpassing advanced countries in 15 years (from 1949 to 1964) 
had long been dashed since the disastrous Great Leap Forward. From the Chinese perspective, 
the external environment had not changed for the better. Despite the rapprochement, the US 
remained a threat, but China’s nemesis now shifted to the USSR. Under these conditions, the 
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PRC continued to hold the view that Washington and Moscow would not win the game and time 
remained on China’s side.  
In the 1973 NCCPC report, according to Zhou Enlai, “the ambition of the US and the 
USSR is one thing. Whether [their ambition] can be realized is another. [They] want to swallow 
China but do not have teeth for it. They do not have teeth for Europe and Japan as well, let alone 
the vast Third World. American imperialism has walked down the hill since the failure in a war 
of invading Korea. It publicly admits that it has grown weaker gradually and thus has to 
withdraw from Vietnam. The revisionist Soviet ruling clique, in the past twenty years from 
Khrushchev to Brezhnev, has transformed the socialist country into a socialist imperialist 
one……The more bad things and scandals it does, the quicker it will be sent to historical 
museum by the Soviet people and the people of the world.” Zhou continued to emphasize a need 
for China to unite with countries oppressed by imperialism and “make greater contributions to 
mankind by building the country into a strong socialist one.” He recognized that China remains 
“a poor and developing country.” After Mao’s death, the PRC reaffirmed its ideological 
superiority. While directly stating that “China and the US have fundamental differences in social 
institutions and ideology,” the 1977 NCCPC report focuses on the USSR. “The Soviet ruling 
clique betrays Marxism-Leninism…we insist on confrontational struggle with its hegemonism.” 
During Mao’s period, the U.S. and the USSR were imperialists (or, in the latter case, 
socialist imperialists) that exerted destructive power on world peace, whereas the PRC which 
was a true inheritor of Marxism-Leninism revolutionary doctrines brought peace to the world by 
struggling against imperialist powers and aided the Third World, which collectively was a victim 
of imperialism in its struggle for national liberation. The positive self-image of the PRC built 
upon the negativity of the aggressive roles of the US and the USSR through an othering process. 
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It also relied on what it could contribute to the world by bringing the Third World and some 
capitalist countries into the equation of amassed forces against China’s enemies, as shown in the 
United Front strategy in the 1977 NCCPC report. Through an altercasting process, Beijing 
imagined that developing countries were in need of its help in obtaining national independence 
and, in the process of fostering a world peace, they were also the PRC’s allies against 
Washington and Moscow who, from Beijing’s view, were declining powers anyway and would 
not win the contest with the rising Third World of which the PRC claimed to be a member. It 
was casting its wish to developing countries to form a discursive role congruence to increase 
narrative credibility.  
From the post-Mao period until today there would be a lesser degree of negativity in the 
shaping of opponents’ images and a greater emphasis on as well as a more sophisticated 
construction of China’s positive role in world politics. These changes occur within the 
framework laid out in Pyramid 3.0. China still requires a negative Other to affirm its self-value, 
albeit with a toned-down rhetoric that reflects a less intense rivalry. Chinese superiority still 
manifests itself through institutional comparisons with western capitalism, in both domestic and 
international domains. In the narratives, the country continues to emphasize relationships with 
developing countries and sees an informal political alliance with them. Entering into the mid-
2000s, the relations between B and D would turn to a solid line mediated by material strength. 
China’s gains in material foundation after Deng’s reforms and its need of continuous material 
pursuit to maintain the country at a certain level of capabilities supply the confidence behind a 
more elaborated causal effect of A to D. The developing countries as well as developed 
economies provide venues to secure material ends. However, material pursuit does not come 
from pure economic motives. As shown in Pyramid 3.0 that cognitively connects B, C and D 
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back to A, it is tied to a larger purpose of proving the superiority of Chinese socialism over the 
liberal, capitalist model championed by Western countries, which will place the PRC at the 
center of the world. The United Front strategy that had developing and capitalist countries as 
potential allies in the 1977 document also was to serve the Chinese purpose of struggling against 
the enemy that it identified. It also was about proving Chinese superiority, in the confrontation 
with Moscow. The strategy would continue to manifest in the post-Deng period and with more 
success as the result of changes in domestic politics and the end of the Cold War.  
From 1982 to 2017 
In conceptualizing the identity of the country (including the mentioning of important 
revolutionary figures), national development, the country’s relations with the world, and the 
international environment, “struggle” and “revolution” prevail in the texts from 1956 to 1977 
(see graph 3.0).153 Because the 1977 report concludes national development and foreign policies 
under Mao, there is a drastic spike in the count of revolution and struggle.154 Following Mao’s 
death, ideological zeal was attenuated and the two words make fewer appearances from 1982 to 
2017, compared to the previous decades. The question is how these changes are informative of 
China’s identity. Because the concept of multipolarity would not be incorporated into official 
documents until 1992, as the result of the end of the Cold War, and due to shifts in domestic 
political dynamics, the redefinition of sinicized socialism already took place before changes in 
international politics; therefore this section will first discuss the Chinese self before elaborating 
actors and their relations with the PRC in its post-Cold War role conceptions. 
 
 
153 Graph created and data collected by the author. Revolution not in the sense of Chinese socialism does not 
count. Words such as “technological revolution” will be excluded. 
154 The report blames certain people in the Communist Party for policy catastrophes and praised Mao in his 
overall leadership. 
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Graph 3.0 
 
 
 
Redefining the Self  
Definitions of identity may vary according to the issues and time frames under 
examination. It could be argued that the PRC’s identity changed as it became less revolutionary 
and ideological. It could also be argued that the embrace of capitalism changed the country’s 
socialist identity. This research poses the question in this way. Will the definition follow the line 
about ideology, or changing (economic) means to the end, or the end itself? Which of these 
explanations best fits the observed changes? From a strategic standpoint that addresses the long 
trajectory of the rise of a major power and from a Chinese perspective indicated in the narratives 
as well, this research argues that the identity is based on the CCP’s governing position and its 
symbiotic aspiration to become a modernized country which is both externally and internally 
strong. Both have stayed relatively constant except that the Cultural Revolution evolved against 
the second goal. Various means are to serve both ends. Changes in the means and methods, for 
instance re-interpreted socialism and the adoption of capitalist measures, do not affect the end, 
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that is, a Chinese identity, as defined by the CCP, that only the Communist Party has the 
capability and the right (with the “right” stemming from its claimed past success of its 
revolutionary struggle) to lead the country to national greatness as it adopts “socialist” doctrines, 
however defined, which it considers most suitable for China.  
The re-consolidation of the CCP’s ruling position and economic re-interpretation of M-L 
in the post-Mao period eventually led to the coining of the term, “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics (SWCC).” In politics, SWCC means single-party “democratic” rule and 
governance through consensus and cooperation, instead of competition, with multiple non-
communist parties but with the CCP remaining the only ruling party.155 In economy, it is a 
combination of public ownership in the main and private ownership as auxiliary that releases and 
develops productivity. And most importantly, as seen in the narratives of stability, the overall 
national development cannot happen without the leadership of the CCP; political guidance from 
the Party is indispensable at present and in the future to create a stable environment for economic 
development. It is not difficult to conclude that the core of Beijing’s national discourse is about 
the CCP.  
 
155 The 2005 white paper about democracy in China states that “Chinese democracy is people’s democracy 
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Without the CCP……there is no people’s 
democracy……The development and perfection of Chinese democratic institutions is undertaken under the 
leadership of the CCP. The CCP’s stewardship fundamentally guarantees that the Chinese people is the master 
of their country.” The relationship between the CCP and other political parties is described as partnership with 
the former being a ruling party and actively consulting with the latter regarding the making and 
implementation of major policies. From Beijing’s perspective, such institution allows a democratic process of 
political participation and check and balance while one-party rule ensures stability and order, a prerequisite for 
long-term development. The white paper writes, “the leadership and governance of the CCP guarantees 
political stability. Because China is a populous vast territory……maintaining political stability is particularly 
important. Only when stability is attained can concentration on development become possible.” See, “White 
Paper on Political Democracy” [中国的民主政治建设白皮书], Oct. 19, 2005,  < http://www.gov.cn/2005-
10/19/content_79553.htm>. 
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The Communist Party justifies its historical and continuing ruling position from three 
aspects. First, by affirming Mao’s “achievements” and neglecting his mistakes, the CCP does not 
dissociate itself from the revolutionary past. It intends to keep that identity, even though it 
necessitates the downplaying of past disasters. Second, by re-interpreting Chinese Marxism in 
the economic realm, the CCP provides new ideological impetus for national development. This 
will be a new stage in which the Party again sets forth objectives in its self-described centenary 
mission, which continues the unfinished business of building a materially strong country from 
Mao’s era, and lays out a prospect for people to look forward to. Related to the second point, the 
narrative of stability pivots upon the role of the CCP as an irreplaceable vehicle to carry out the 
mission of national revival. If Mao’s period was redefined socialism 1.0 (RS 1.0), the 1980s and 
the early 1990s was the transitional period from RS 1.0 to RS 2.0. The following paragraphs will 
illustrate changes and continuities in the practice and definition of sinicized socialism through 
the 1981 Resolution and the 1987 NCCPC document.  
The 1981 Resolution is a watershed document that assesses Mao Zedong’s historical status 
and the Party’s governance in the first 30 years of the PRC.156 It is important to note that the 
evaluation is conducted in the context of affirming the pre-PRC revolutionary success of the 
Party in line with Marxism-Leninism and stressing that, during the twenty-eight years of struggle 
from 1921 to 1949, the CCP is “the vanguard of the proletariat, wholeheartedly serving the 
people without seeking its own interests.” The confirmation of the CCP’s status at the very 
 
156 English translations of the resolution in this research are the author’s. For the English version of the entire 
resolution, see, “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the 
People’s Republic of China,” June 27, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Translation 
from Beijing Review 24, no. 27, 1981, pp. 10-39. 
＜http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121344＞; for the Chinese version, see [关于建国以来党的
若干历史问题的决议], Xinhua,   
<https://web.archive.org/web/20151123222207/http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-
03/04/content_2543544.htm >. 
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beginning of the document, the recounting of the nation’s fundamental makeover to be in line 
with socialist economic and social structures after entering a “socialist society” as the Party 
claims following the communist victory of the civil war, the listing of statistics showing 
economic growth, and the reassurance of Mao’s overall contributions, which is not to be negated 
due to some mistakes, altogether set the tone and parameters for correct political thought in the 
post-Mao decades.  
First, based on the historical success and the correctness of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist 
fundamental guidelines in building a “modernized and strong socialist country”, the CCP will 
remain the only governing political party and is capable of realizing “the historical mission of 
communism.”  “The Party’s leadership will inevitably make mistakes……no one is allowed to 
use past mistakes to weaken, get rid of, and even sabotage the leadership of the Party……[To do 
so] will incur severe catastrophe……As long as we insist on and constantly improve Party’s 
governing abilities, our Party can better undertake the great historical responsibility.” Second, 
based on the lesson of the derailment of socialist democracy and neglect of productivity during 
the Cultural Revolution and the unrealistic economic plan of the Great Leap Forward, the Party 
will now reform itself in line with “democratic centralism” to prevent power concentration in the 
hands of a single man and to undertake the correct path of “developing productivity” while 
remembering the Great Leap Forward lesson that economic development has to consider Chinese 
conditions under which policies take place, “step by step realizing modernization at different 
stages.” In other words, according to the document, the principle of political guidance to 
overhaul the society and economy---in reality, it is conducted by force---has overall been correct. 
The only times that the country swerved away from Marxism-Leninism and the actual conditions 
of China was during the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward. The belief in the 
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Party’s capabilities and the reason for its continuous governing is further strengthened by the 
idea that it is aware of its own mistakes and now with experience it knows better how to govern. 
“Through the success and failures in the past thirty-two years after the founding of the PRC, via 
repeated comparison of correctness and mistakes, our party’s understanding of socialist 
revolution and the building of a socialist country exceeds any period after the founding of the 
nation.” The document continues to stress that setbacks are temporary and after trial and error, 
“our socialist enterprise has a great promising future.” Despite a revision from single-man rule to 
collective leadership, Chinese discourse continues to operate in the framework of 
authoritarianism while appropriating M-L language to endorse the governance.  
The economic focus of the 1981 document is further developed in Zhao Ziyang’s 1987 
report to the 13th Party Congress. Zhao’s report reflects notable changes in the economic 
narratives of Chinese Marxism in the post-Mao era. The assessment of future national 
development becomes more realistic. In the past blueprint, the country would undergo a 
transitional period to build the foundation for socialism after 1952, then move on to continuous 
development of socialism and finally communism. The transitional period would include, first 
the transformation of economic and social structures—agricultural collectivization and state-
owned enterprises--and increasing heavy industrial and agricultural production. The plan was to 
spend about 15 years at this stage.157  However, the 1958 Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution that lasted from 1965 to the mid-1970s severely hindered the projected goals of 
production. To make up for the lost years would have to wait until Deng’s reforms; in Zhao’s 
report, the developmental stages are revised to include a particularly long period of “primary 
stage of socialism” (社会主义初级阶段) between the transitional period, which is now redefined 
 
157 See the 1956 NCCPC report, < http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64560/65452/4526551.html>. 
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to simply include the completion of transformed production relations, i.e. from private to state-
owned economy, and the modernized stage of socialism(社会主义现代化). In other words, it 
was originally believed that socialism would be attainable during Mao’s period, but it turned out 
to be a more arduous task that required a prolonged period. This newly defined primary stage 
that will take one hundred years from 1950 onward, according to Zhao’s evaluation, contains 
theoretical foundations for the means and pace to develop productivity. 
The primary stage addressed mistakes from Mao’s era and set the guidelines for post-Mao 
economic development. According to the report, the Cultural Revolution that placed productivity 
as secondary was based on the mistaken assumption that China could “go through the primary 
stage of socialism without greatly developing productivity.”158 Although the GLF recognized the 
importance of productivity, the policy was the result of blindly and rashly pursuing high 
productivity through mass mobilization without considering that China was still in need of 
capitalist development. The key issue here is ownership. The report concludes that maximization 
of commune, that is, township and village enterprises, and state-owned enterprise does not help 
in releasing productivity. The GLF failed because it carried the wrong idea that a full 
development of capitalism is not necessary before reaching socialism. Here, in setting forth a 
future plan, Zhao put China’s situation in a comparative perspective: because China’s 
“productivity lags far behind developed capitalist countries, we need to undergo a prolonged 
primary stage to realize industrialization and commercialization, socialization, and 
modernization of production.” The proposed solution to release and develop productivity is to 
adopt multiple types of ownership (including private) while collective or public ownership 
 
158 See the 1987 NCCPC report, < http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64566/65447/4526368.html>. 
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remains the main institution. This will facilitate socialization of production and develop the 
commodity economy and domestic market.  
The economic and political narratives of sinicized Marxist socialism set forth in the 1981 
and 1987 documents still have validity today. In the official rhetoric, China is developing a 
“socialist market economy”, combining both planned economy and capitalist market economy 
with the latter serving as a means to socialist ends.159 Regarding political institutions, socialist 
democracy develops around the idea that the CCP remains the only ruling party. China is 
reversing the order of developing socialism. In theory, one will have an advanced economy 
followed by political revolution. The PRC’s experience is to nominally create the political 
conditions first and then play the game of economic catching up.160 This reverse order leads to a 
problem that the country claims to follow a Marxist socialist line without the required economic 
foundation. Thus, an interesting phenomenon emerges that the CCP is trying to substantiate the 
economic precondition while arguing that it adheres to socialist political institutions that simply 
do not have economic grounds.   
The CCP recognizes this problem but justifies itself on the grounds that this is “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics”, not Marx’s Marxism or Lenin’s Leninism. Zhao’s report states: 
“the situation that we are faced with is not building socialism based on highly developed 
capitalist economy as the founder of Marxism designed to be. Nor is our situation the same as 
other socialist countries. It will not work either if we do things according to books or by 
transplanting foreign models.……[We] have to combine the basic principles of Marxism and the 
 
159 For instance, the 1992 NCCPC report describes the economy as a socialist market economy 
160 This was not a new problem in the history of world communism. The Bolsheviks confronted the same 
problem after their seizure of power in Russia, and Stalin’s forced-draft industrialization (emulated in China in 
the 1950s) was the solution. 
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realities in China. Through practice and implementation, [we] will chart a path that is socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.”  
Reinterpreted M-L after Mao’s death is used to rationalize the Party’s ruling position and 
policies. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that ideologies only serve as instrumental endorsement. 
Philosophical systems can be loose or complex enough for different interpretations and re-
interpretations; the act of selecting certain parts of the theory for justification may not contradict 
the belief of the CCP that it is a genuine follower of M-L, however the Party defines it. The use 
of political philosophy can change but it still serves the end of affirming Chinese uniqueness and 
the Party’s way of doing things.  
The official publications in the early twenty-first century that propagate correct political 
thought also argue that only under the combination of single-party “democratic” governance and 
the utilization of a capitalist market economy can the economy develop in China and the country 
see today’s national success. To be precise, the regime attributes decades-long economic growth 
to the advantage of China’s socialist political system over its capitalist counterpart in that the 
former “provides maximum possibility of releasing productive forces.”161 It is a recurring theme 
in the official rhetoric to emphasize that economic success does not come without the country’s 
unique political institutions. In forming continuous needs of economic reform for future growth, 
emphasis also is put on the prerequisite of political reform. And Beijing makes clear the premises 
for reform of political institutions: “political reforms should serve to strengthen and improve the 
leadership of the Party, and should never be allowed to undermine or remove its 
leadership……Without the Communist Party of China and socialism, China would be thrown 
 
161 Chen Hongtai [陈红太], “Effective Governance and Orderly Participation : the Characteristics of China’s 
Political Reforms” [有效执政与有序参与：中国政治体制改革的特色], Red Flag Manuscript, issue 23, 
2009. 
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into turmoil and chaos.”162 In other words, political stability, order and the CCP’s rule are 
priorities before anything else. The narratives especially weave together stability with the fate of 
the CCP and its symbiotic socialism.   
Following Deng’s reforms there was a relaxed political climate in which various social and 
political demands flourished in China. The protests that started with a commemoration of Hu 
Yaobang’s death eventually culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.163 Deng had 
consistently expressed the view that thought education was needed to harness the population. In 
March 1989, months before the Tiananmen massacre, he talked to comrades about the methods 
of controlling political situations in a way to stabilize society for foreign investment and the Four 
Modernizations. He saw the need to restrict “establishment of organizations, parades, 
demonstrations, journalism, and publishing” and that “violators need to be punished.” Despite 
Deng’s framing the issue with economic motives, his main concern was the correctness of 
thought that cushioned the CCP’s governing legitimacy with conformity. He said, “…in the past 
ten years, education is our biggest mistake. Education on political thought among the youth is 
insufficient.”164  
 
 
162 Wen Ping, “Great Economic Success Testifies to China’s Political Success,” English Qiushi, vol. 3, no. 2, 
2011, <http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201102/201109/t20110920_111481.htm>. 
163 Hu was the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party from 1982 to 1987. He was trying to 
conduct economic and political reforms during the 1980s. However, there were strong waves of opposition 
within the Party and eventually he was forced to resign. Hu passed away in April 1989. A commemoration of 
Hu was later on followed by a large-scale demonstration in front of the Tiananmen Square that included 
students, intellectuals and workers who demanded reforms. The event in the following weeks culminated with 
the crackdown by the People’s Liberation Army under Deng Xiaoping’s order.  
164 Deng Xiaoping,  “It is not allowed to have disorder in China” [中国不允许乱], in Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping (Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan) [邓小平文选], March 4, 1989, < 
http://www.71.cn/2008/0407/500993.shtml>. 
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From the CCP’s perspective, the pluralist demands of the Chinese people were evidence of 
the infiltration of western ideas and values with which capitalist countries took advantage of the 
transitional period to advance their agenda of remaking China in their own image. This also was 
a sensitive, politically charged time as Beijing already observed the uncertainty surrounding the 
problems created in the USSR by Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika. In 
November after the event, Deng mentioned to the chairman of the Revolutionary Party of 
Tanzania that western countries were waging a third world war of “peaceful revolution” against 
socialism without actual fighting. “[What happened in] Eastern Europe is not surprising. Sooner 
or later it will happen. The problem that Eastern Europe is faced with is mainly internal … 
Western countries treat China in a similar way. They dislike the fact that China insists on the 
socialist path. The turmoil [Tiananmen demonstration] that took place this year in China likewise 
sooner or later will emerge.” The root cause of instability that Deng saw was countries wavering 
on socialism and adopting western democracy and capitalist political institutions. He similarly 
saw the problem of China as internal: “our two general secretaries [Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang] also foundered on the question of capitalist [political] liberalization. If China does 
capitalist liberalization, turbulence is certainly to come. Our set policies……and three-stages 
strategic goals of development go for naught.” Deng did not have any problem believing in the 
monopoly of power by the CCP. In his defense, stability, socialism and the Party are synonyms 
to one another, and thought control serves best to secure their long-term presence.165 
 
 
165 Deng Xiaoping, “Resolutely Adhering to Socialism and Prevent Peaceful Evolution” [坚持社会主义防止
和平演变] in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan) [邓小平文选], Sept. 23, 1989. 
<http://www.71.cn/2012/0423/612905.shtml>. 
177 
For the CCP, if Tiananmen embodies the invasion of western values, the resistance to 
economic reform and opening is another opposition that adds uncertainty to the transitional 
period. Jiang Zemin’s 1992 report to the 14th Party Congress reveals domestic doubts and 
uncertainties, the basis that can brew instability. The report repeats what was laid out in the 1982 
document that emphasizes “planned commodity economy based on socialist public ownership”, a 
combination of planned economy and market economy. It highlights the success of special 
economic zones on the southeast coasts and argues that they are socialist, not capitalist, as these 
zones serve as means to socialist ends. Jiang aims to counter the doubt that a turn to capitalist 
market economy violates the belief in the superiority of socialism.  He continues with the “Two 
Hands Grasp” principle, one hand firmly grasps material civilization, the other firmly grasps 
spiritual civilization, in the context of reflecting on the Tiananmen demonstration.  The purpose 
is to stress the necessity for “a strong guarantee in thought correctness and in politics” while 
developing the economy. 
RS 2.0 lays out theoretical foundations and includes stability to preempt any percieved 
attempt to undermine the CCP’s ruling status and economic policy. The re-interpretation is about 
self-rationalization as well. As the Tiananmen massacre demonstrated, through RS 2.0, the CCP 
punished those who deviated from the revised ideology and yet their forces were released by the 
post-Mao revisions in Chinese socialism. RS 2.0 overthrew RS 1.0 that was characterized by the 
inflexible socialist doctrine of a planned economy and counteracted those who adhered to it. The 
(re)generation of ideological orthodoxy and accompanying justified internal purge characterize 
Chinese politics. The shaping and reshaping of the PRC’s identity is a discourse of 
institutionalized power relations centered on the CCP. At one level, it can be argued that China’s 
identity was changed as it changed economic policy. At a higher level of analysis, its identity 
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persevered because whatever changes came into play, they still aim to reconsolidate the CCP’s 
monopoly of power.  
Actors and Their Relations with the PRC in the Chinese Worldview 
From its founding, the country’s worldview has been global and it has prescribed itself a 
role of making the world a better place. The issue for analysis after 1979 is how engaged China 
“can” and will be with others. Domestic reforms beginning at the end of the 1970s and 
continuing into the 1980s already started the process. Rapprochement with the USSR also began 
in the second half of the 1980s. Therefore, the end of the Cold War did not bring about these 
changes but created a new international climate which facilitates China’s long-term growth and 
interactions with other countries. The PRC describes the post-Cold War politics as multipolarity. 
Under this percieved framework, China readjusted the images of itself and others and put on the 
pretension of inclusiveness in describing the relationships. Discursively reshaping the nature of 
interactions conditions the PRC’s engagements with countries around the world to bolster its 
economy and political influence. Materialization has fulfilled the discursive links between C and 
D. Moreover, further material pursuit has conditioned a two-way causality in the pyramid and 
makes it a self-sustained, mutually reinforced logical cycle. 
The PRC characterizes post-Cold War politics as multipolarity. The 1992 and 1997 reports 
correlated the term with a relatively peaceful environment, i.e., lack of a major war. It is unclear 
whether the debate in IR about what poles can lead to peace informs the Chinese conception.166 
 
166 In the field of international relations, scholars hold different opinions as to which type of world balance of 
power is conducive to war. Some argue for bipolarity whereas others multipolarity. The disputed point is about 
whether uncertainties that multipolarity generates have positive correlations with war. See Mearsheimer, 2014; 
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and David Lalman, “Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of 
International Conflict,” World Politics, vol. 41, no. 1,1988, pp. 1-20 (specifically p. 4); Thomas J. Volgy and 
Lawrence E. Imwalle, “Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World Order,” American Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 39, no. 4,1995, pp. 819-834. 
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Regardless, it is under a relatively peaceful environment that China adjusted role conceptions of 
itself and those who it expected to interact with. Differentiation still exists but has become less 
explicit, especially regarding the role of the US. The rhetoric overall gets the pretension of 
inclusiveness in that now it says peace and development is every country’s wish with which it 
also identifies and can contribute to.  
The NCCPC reports from 1992 onward on the issue of international relations contain three 
types of actors: those who practice “power politics” and “hegemonism”, the vast developing 
countries to which the PRC considers itself belonging, and countries around the world. Since 
1990s, “American imperialism” and “the US” have not appeared in the NCCPC reports. The 
need to have an enemy in order to affirm a positive self-image as a peace promoter is now 
fulfilled by “hegemonism” and “power politics.”  China continues to have the U.S. as the Other 
because the latter’s negative role serves as a contrast to highlight the public goods that the PRC 
says it can provide internationally and to accentuate China’s engagement in world affairs. 
However, the U.S. is now implied between the lines without being singled out by name.  
Developing countries continue to take a role commensurate with the spirit shown in the 
narratives of Mao’s era in that, from a Chinese perspective, their aggregate growing power and 
influence (including that of the PRC) help direct the world balance of power toward peace by 
offsetting unpeaceful forces. The differences are forms of expressions. Wordings in Mao’s 
period were coated with ideological labels whereas NCCPC documents from 1992 onward are 
not. While dropping “Soviet revisionism” and replacing “American imperialism” with 
“hegemonism” and “power politics” as the targets against which a different force will come to 
balance, the 2012 report states, “the aggregate capabilities of the new markets and developing 
countries have increased and international balance of power moves toward the trend that is 
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conducive for maintaining world peace.” In other words, the growing strength of China and other 
lesser states are said to be conducive to peace. Additionally, developing countries will remain the 
targets to which China projects its desire of being seen as a benevolent and generous actor and 
“friend” who provides developmental and economic assistance. “We will continue to strengthen 
the solidarity and cooperation with the vast developing countries, deepening traditional 
friendship……provide assistance within our bounds of abilities, and safeguard the legitimate 
demands and common interests of developing countries.”167  
China’s efforts to build its own image as a non-discriminate and altruistic actor occupying 
a moral high ground reach a climax when the narratives depict a country concerned with world 
affairs and are able to translate the concerns of the world into the principles which China claims 
to follow in its foreign policy in the context of decreased discursive ideological antagonism. The 
1992 report stated, “peace and development remain the two major themes in today’s world. 
Development requires peace and peace is unalienable from development. The existence of 
hegemonism and power politics have always been the major obstacles in solving the issues of 
peace and development……The universal concerns in the current international society is what 
kind of international order to build……We propose an international order that is based on the 
principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, 
mutual non-interference, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. Countries 
should be treated as equal members of international society regardless of their sizes, capabilities, 
and wealth……Building a new international order is a long-term task. The Chinese people will 
make continuous efforts together with people around the world for that goal.” The narratives in 
 
167 See the 2007 NCCPC report. Another example is the 2012 NCCPC report, “China is dedicated to 
minimizing the gaps between the North and the South and supporting the enhancement of the development of 
developing countries on a base of their own self-sufficiency.” 
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the NCCPC reports after 1992 are of the same gist. They repeat the same principles and the 
Chinese vision for the world. 
The attempts to create role congruence are seen in the Chinese projection of its own 
perceptions of what characterizes the world and what the world needs to what other countries 
think and need. The principles proposed accordingly may reflect the PRC’s own anxiety about 
the self-identity in that it does not feel it was treated equally in the past and the CCP regime 
often senses threats of being undermined by external forces, such as “peaceful evolution.”  The 
exaggerated victim mentality168 and regime insecurity parallel with the desire of affirming self-
worth through the prospect that it can change the world together with others on the idealistic 
principles that it proposes. Despite the inclusive rhetoric, after all, it is about the PRC itself.  
The less extreme and less dichotomous role conceptions in a, according to the PRC, peace 
related post-Cold War multipolarity are in line with the Chinese policy of engagement with 
countries around the world. The international climate makes it relatively easy for China to form 
complex and multi-layered relations with other countries with no concerns about the 
consequences of antagonism seen during the Cold War. As indicated in the 1997 NCCPC report, 
multipolarity presents China with opportunities to participate in the international regime.169 
Years later, it also has become active in establishing new institutions such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, Forum of China-Africa Cooperation, Asia Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative. It is important to note that in these organizations 
 
168 The standard practice in the CCP’s historiography is to depict China before the coming to power of the 
CCP as a victim of Western imperialism and Japanese imperialism in order to highlight its claimed capability 
to lift the Chinese people from misery. See Zheng Wang. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical 
Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.  
169 Jiang spoke in the 1997 NCCPC report that “the trend of multipolarity on regional and global levels has 
attained new development in political and economic realms.” He then connected multipolarity to the 
flourishing of regional and continental organizations. It is obvious that participation in the international 
regimes was China’s objective. 
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developing countries are the prime targets which the PRC intends to have the designated tasks 
accomplished in or with.  
Multipolarity is not only about the opportunities for engagement. It is also about 
competition. Multi-poles refers to China, Russia, Japan, India, and the US. While the Chinese 
narratives often stress cooperation and diplomacy with major powers, they also are explicit about 
fundamental divergence in interests, especially in the bilateral relations with Japan and the U.S. 
The PRC’s economic and diplomatic initiatives have entered the traditional spheres of influence 
of other powers. With inclusive rhetoric in the reshaped role conceptions, nevertheless, these 
activities are strategic and their ultimate goals are political in producing a complete and 
reciprocal pyramid.  
A key component that RS 2.0 sanctions is economic development with relaxed state 
control. Thirty years after its founding, the PRC still found itself with a shaky foundation. Its 
situation in 1982 was comparable to 1956 in that the country remained materially weak but there 
was hope for economic growth. After the GLF failure, the NCCPC reports have again featured 
the importance of relative material capabilities since 1982. Hu Yaobang in 1982 had the goal of 
production set to be 2800 billion (RMB) by 2000, more than three times the 1980 figure. He 
further stated that “the realization of this objective will bring China’s national income and 
industrial and agricultural production to the first ranks in the world.” Five years later, Hu argued 
in the NCCPC meeting that if the country could not be competitive enough in terms of 
technology and market share, it would “not gain status in the world.” The PRC was humbled by 
the fallout of its earlier ideology-driven development mode. While it experienced growth by 
1976 with fluctuations, largely boosted by heavy industry, inefficiency and widening inequality 
plagued the nation. Mao’s goal of becoming number one in the world remained a pipe dream. 
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The 1956 rhetoric that indicates a backward state compared to other major powers finds its 
embodiment in different expressions twenty-six years later. During the two decades following 
the beginning of Deng’s economic reforms, however, the PRC would undergo rapid economic 
growth. 
As graph 2.0 shows, even though there was a small jump in China’s economic growth 
rate between 2009 and 2010, the overall growth rate has been in a gradual decline slope between 
2007 and 2018. Four changes in the narratives, appearing in the reports of 1992, 2007 and 2017 
respectively, roughly correspond to the development at two different stages: the initial 
fulfillment of material pursuit and with that foundation the attempts to arrest the receding tide to 
at least maintain material capabilities at a certain level through overseas expansion.170 If the first 
two changes are about developing the material foundation, the last two will be, if not creating 
another growth wave, the attempt to harness more that the country can spend without weakening 
the foundations that it already has.  
First, against the success of economic reforms,171 the 1992 NCCPC report for the first time 
explicitly expressed China’s interest in taking the role of an international norm builder, with an 
emphasis on “a new international economic order”, aside from the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence that had been mentioned in Mao’s time. None of the reports before 1992 had stated 
this economic ambition. Ever since, the NCCPC reports have made explicit China’s intention to 
change the world both politically and economically.  
 
 
170 This assessment is similar to Lenin’s theory that Western imperialism was driven by the need of European 
capitalist economies to extract super-profits overseas to compensate for the declining profitability of domestic 
industries.  
171 According to World Development Indicators, the average growth rate of GDP from 1980 to 1989 is about 
9.74%, higher than 5.47% in the 1970s. 
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By the mid-2000s, China was ready to change its rhetoric to reflect its (inter)dependence 
with the world and newly gained economic status. The 2007 NCCPC report fulfilled the link 
between C and D and has the relations between B and D become a two-way causality. In the 
report, the PRC prides itself with the achievements made under the leadership of the CCP. “Our 
Party implements modernization plan……Our economy……jumped to the fourth largest 
economy in the world and the third rank in combined amount of exports and imports compared 
with other countries……China’s development not only leads its people steadily toward wealth 
and wellness but also makes significant contributions to the world economy and human 
civilization.” The rhetoric in this paragraph shows heightened confidence in Beijing’s ability and 
external influence. On one hand, there is a domestic/international distinction when it comes to 
development. On the other, “human civilization” blurs the line; from the text, the CCP is 
claiming that it makes contribution to the entire human race. What Beijing does not explicitly 
state is that, with its economy wedded to a world capitalist system without its domestic 
institutions being free-market oriented, the PRC is dependent on others for continuous growth. 
The 2007 document writes that “[China] will develop itself through maintaining world peace, 
and maintain world peace through developing itself.” Now, the arrow is not only pointing to D 
from B, but also from D to B, and eventually to A172 (see pyramid 3.1). 
 
172 For further discursive evidence. Jiang Zemin stated in 1992 report that “socialism is an entirely brand-new 
institution in mankind’s history and it will inevitably replace capitalism……The flourishing of socialist 
enterprise with Chinese characteristics will make major contributions to the progress of mankind.” This set the 
pyramid in comparison with the western institutions. See Chapter 4 for more examples of institutional 
comparison. For the mutual influence between B and D, the 2012 report writes, “develop the self through 
seizing and creating the opportunities of a peaceful international environment, maintain and promote world 
peace through self development.” (通过争取和平国际环境发展自己，又以自身发展维护和促进世界和平) 
The 2017 report writes, “…insist on building a shared community for mankind, The dream of the Chinese 
people and the dream of the peoples in different countries are interconnected. The realization of the Chinese 
Dream depends on a peaceful international environment and a stable international order. We must have the 
view that considers both domestic and international chessboards at the same time, forever walk on a path of 
peaceful development and uphold the opening strategy of mutual benefits and win-win……forever be the 
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Pyramid 3.1 
 
 
 
Instead of seeing the 2007 report as a signal that China’s growth rate will continue to 
climb, the expression that links B and D symbiotically together may actually reflect (unstated) 
Chinese needs to depend more on foreign markets; with its economy deeply wedded to a world 
capitalist system without its domestic institutions being free-market oriented, it can only sustain 
the growth through expansion because of saturation in domestic consumption.  
The jump in growth rate between 2009 and 2010 however was not lasting and did not 
change the trend that all growth has been in decline between 2007 and 2018. As the result, the 
 
promoter of world peace. (坚持推动构建人类命运共同体。中国人民的梦想同各国人民的梦想息息相
通，实现中国梦离不开和平的国际环境和稳定的国际秩序。必须统筹国内国际两个大局，始终不渝走
和平发展道路、奉行互利共赢的开放战略……始终做世界和平的建设者、全球发展的贡献者、国际秩
序的维护者。) Accordingly, the mutual influence of B and D are present. The report also exemplifies the 
pyramid 3.1. under the first sub-headline, several paragraphs explain China’s newly gained socialist 
achievements in the past five years, in the areas of economy, diplomacy, thought education, other domestic 
issues, and military. Diplomacy is directly linked to the building of a shared community for mankind and 
world peace. These achievements are said to, as the third section under the sub-headline, “the guidelines for 
socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era,” demonstrates, reflect socialist spirits and follow 
socialist guidelines. Therefore, the links between A and B and A and D are present. In addition, this section 
identifies “the leadership of the CCP” as “the biggest advantage of Chinese socialist institutions.” (中国特色
社会主义制度的最大优势是中国共产党领导). In other words, “a shared community for the mankind” 
embodied by the mutual connections between B and D will be the result of Chinese socialism and the claimed 
ability of the CCP. 
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third discursive change came in 2017. Rarely do the publicly available Party documents convey 
direct connections between Chinese institutions and China’s international influence.  This 
changed in 2017. According to the text, “Chinese socialism has entered into a new era……This 
means that China’s socialist path has continued to develop. So have relevant theory, institutions, 
and culture. [Chinese experience] expands modernization options for developing countries that 
wish for rapid growth…… [Chinese socialism] contributes Chinese wisdom and Chinese 
measures in the solution of mankind’s problem (emphasis added).” The PRC’s political, 
economic, and social institutions have become one of the selling points for the Chinese 
Dream.173 The idea that “socialist institutions” of Chinese style are not just good for China’s 
domestic development but also a mechanism that will help solve many issues human beings now 
face is not entirely new. The 1956 document analyzed above carries a similar point. After 
hibernating for 60 years, the connections between A and D are now reemphasized. The change is 
that the new version goes one step further in narrative sophistication and affirms Chinese 
determination in overseas expansion.  
Another change in 2017 is about means and methods in Xi Jinping’s plan to make the 
country great again, which was also the national objective in previous decades. However, there 
are some noticeable differences in means and methods. As graph 3.0 shows, following Mao’s 
 
173 Building upon “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” that originally appears in 2002, the Chinese 
dream is a new phrase included in the 2017 document. It comprehensively captures every aspect of national 
development including economy, military, and political and social institutions. Its realization is two phased 
with fifteen years in the interval, from a moderately prosperous society in all-around way in 2020, to socialist 
modernization in 2035 and a strong and modernized country characterized by socialism in 2049. The word 
“rejuvenation” indicates a return of assumed past glory that was the aggregate result of both internal and 
external strength. The Chinese Dream thus by no means is inward-looking, as the 2017 text states, “[China] 
will persistently promote a community of a shared future for mankind. The dream of the Chinese people is 
closely related to that of the people in other countries. Realization of the Chinese Dream depends on a peaceful 
international environment and a stable international order……[China] will always be a promoter of world 
peace and a contributor of global development.”  
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death, ideological zeal was attenuated and “revolutionary” and “struggle” make fewer 
appearances from 1982 to 2017, compared to the previous decades. “Peace” saw an upward trend 
from 1982 to 1997 before a drop in 2002. Hu Jintao’s years again witnessed another mild 
increase in use of the word. However, in 2017, “peace” decreases to 20 times, the lowest point 
after 1987 and even lower than the 25 times in 2002. Another phenomenon that makes 2017 
different from previous years is the increased use of “revolution” and “struggle.” What usually 
accompanies these two words are the policies that set major changes in the society, in the polity, 
in the Party, in the economy, and in governance. The implementation of these policies has high 
positive correlations with domestic power struggle. In the post-Deng period, “struggle” in the 
text has often referred to anti-corruption struggle and military struggle. The former already 
appeared in Jiang Zemin’s NCCPC reports and has been used ever since. That “struggle” rises to 
23 instances in 2017 indicates a higher level of power play in the Chinese politics, which was 
heralded by intensified anti-corruption campaigns and various reforms under Xi Jinping. 
Twenty-three times is the highest in the entire period after Mao’s death. Not even the years of 
1982 and 1987 when the country underwent revolutionary economic reforms had such a high 
count. Meanwhile, 3 out of the 23 instances refer to “military struggle.” The term first 
reappeared in 2007, only once. The 2012 document mentions it twice. “Military struggle” is 
about both peacetime deterrence and wartime fighting capabilities beyond the homeland.174 Since 
NCCPC reports summarize development in the past five years and set out basic guidance for the 
next five years, military expansion, including outposts for military uses and activities short of 
war, is predicted to persist. To make the country great again, the PRC under Xi takes a two-
 
174 For detailed explanation, see chapter 6. 
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pronged strategy; one struggles against internal opponents and the other against external enemies 
to spread influence. A drop in the “peace” count is commensurate with strategic offensiveness. 
The above four discursive novelties are related to deeper changes in China’s economic 
structures. The policy of “Bring in, Go global” (引進來，走出去)175 that officially appeared in 
the 2002 report (double check this fact) and was already made public near the end of the 1990s is 
designed to foster domestic industries and encourage them to invest overseas. This policy took 
place after foreign direct investments brought the initial success in economic growth and 
building trade networks in modern-day commerce. Therefore, by 2007 and entering into 2010s, 
despite its slowing economic growth, the PRC already has the dual motors, FDI and domestic 
enterprises that have sizable and growing shares in the world market, to fuel the economy. 
Despite the fluctuations in GDP, China has improved its economic structure in a way that allows 
it to at least sustain material strength at a level that makes possible military modernization and 
technological advancement at a lower cost. Accordingly, the increasing assertiveness in the 
Chinese narratives, from adding the reshaping of world economic order to the agenda to 
specifying the causal relations of economic development to the world and a resurrection of 
Chinese institutional advantages to mankind, has more to do with economic structure, instead of 
GDP growth, that requires global interdependence to sustain the economy, and reflects the 
PRC’s conviction that it will be a global actor unswervingly. The first two changes are related to 
developing material foundation and the last two are, based on the foundation that it already has, 
the attempts to muster more from global resources for the country to utilize.  
As the improved pyramid shows, material strength is only one node, a means, in the belief 
triangle that, in essence, is about the greatness of the Chinese nation and the CCP. Material 
 
175 Many articles in the English Qiushi journal uses the translation of “going global”, instead of “going out.” 
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amalgamation is to serve the desire to have others’ respect. China’s global activities need to be 
understood through the pyramid that is based on the PRC’s discursive construct. As to how they 
are strategic, the reasons for why China’s behavior has not met with greater resistance across the 
globe can be informative. For a country which intends to spread influence, multi-poles in a 
peaceful environment may not pose great challenges as it would in a tension-charged climate. 
Because of the peaceful climate, it may not even require military solutions to obtain markets and 
resources in foreign territories. As cooperation and economic development attract the widest 
spectrum of audience in both developing and developed countries, the PRC is using economic 
means, also a lower cost venue, to stake out shares in different parts of the world. It is not merely 
minimizing the cost but also maximizing gains. Military operations extract finance while 
economic means cost little and may accrue earnings. An imperfect and simplified example will 
do the explanation. If economic deals can add 15 millions to the national savings, a military 
operation that costs 5 millions will incur 20 millions loss because not only will earnings from 
economic deals not come true, but the country also has to pay for what it spends.  
The narratives of the NCCPC reports about international politics from 1992 onward were 
formed with a belief that the world is moving toward multipolarity. In them, multipolarity, 
peaceful international climate, and less extreme role construction are associated, which indicates 
that the advocacy of multipolarity may change depending on changing conditions. The PRC 
emphasis on it stems from Beijing’s view that the term is highly correlated with the post-Cold 
War peace which will help the country develop. That Chinese narratives often state the need to 
seize the strategic opportunities offered by the post-Cold War environment while making efforts 
to prolong such climate indicates that the PRC is highly conscious about the international 
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security dynamics.176 As long as China perceives that situations are changing, it may also change 
the rhetoric and readjust the roles of the self and others to rationalize policy shifts. All these can 
be done through an othering process to produce dichotomous and opposing images of a righteous 
self versus the immoral other; to justify Beijing’s policy shifts, others, in China’s framing, are to 
take the blame for a deterioration of relationship or international cordiality. The PRC had 
indirectly cast a negative role to the US without directly pointing out the US in the post-Cold 
War period. This discursive insinuation has in recent years shifted to a direct labeling. A 
discussion of and a comparison among the 2017 foreign policy white paper (China’s Policies on 
 
176 Discursive evidence is presented as below. “The report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the CPC 
states that China is still undergoing an important period of strategic opportunity for development, and therefore 
needs to accurately judge the changing nature and conditions of this period, seize all available opportunities, 
and respond calmly to challenges. At present, the international situation is generally stable, and the balance of 
power between countries is tilting in a direction that is favorable to the preservation of world peace. This, 
together with China’s increasing national strength and global influence, has placed China in a more favorable 
position to seize and make the most of an important period of strategic opportunity for its development. 
However, we also need to realize that our development is coming up against increasing risks and challenges, 
and that the task of preserving and making good use of a second decade of important strategic opportunity will 
be an arduous one. In order to gain a correct understanding of the changing nature and conditions of this 
period, the key lies in understanding that opportunities and challenges are both mutually complementary and 
mutually interchangeable. Therefore, we need to be adept at finding opportunities amidst complex conditions, 
at seizing opportunities in changing situations, and at creating opportunities in response to risks and challenges 
(emphasis added)”  See, “A New Milestone for the Socialist Diplomatic Theory with Chinese Characteristics,” 
English Qiushi, vol. 5, no. 3, 2013. English translation original; Another Qiushi article writes, “We have 
worked to maintain the important period of strategic opportunities for China’s development by actively 
promoting and managing relations with various parties. We regard the first two decades of the 21st century as 
an important period of strategic opportunity for China’s development. Under this new situation, the 
fundamental task of our diplomatic work must be to secure this period of opportunity.” The author continues to 
laud various Chinese efforts in diffusing regional tension, managing some world issues and facilitating 
international cooperation as contributions to stability and peace. The above views and assessments are laid out 
in the context that the years before had been peaceful and the prospect of peace in the future remains. The 
article writes, “The international situation has remained predominantly peaceful over the past year.” With a 
recognition of challenges ahead, it nevertheless states, “However, on the whole, the opportunities will 
outweigh the challenges. We must adhere to the path of peaceful development, pursue an open strategy of 
mutual benefit, and promote the building of a harmonious world with lasting peace and common prosperity.” 
The author sees the making of a future harmony and peace, when he discusses the prospect of 2012, to be 
interlinked with China’s development that requires deepening ties between the PRC and other countries. See, 
Yang Jiechi, “China’s Diplomacy in 2011,” English Qiushi, vol. 4, no.2, 2012. English translation original; the 
associations between China’s development, strategic opportunity and peace can also be found in many Chinese 
Qiushi articles. For instance, Zhang Yunling[张蕴岭] “ Have A Thorough Understanding of the International 
Environment That Overlaps With Our Period of Strategic Opportunity.” [深刻认识我国战略机遇期面临的国
际环境], Qiushi, issue 24, 2015.  
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Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation), the 2015 defense white paper, and the 2019 defense white 
paper will show how this process takes place when the PRC perceives an environment with 
growing tension without sensing the immediate arrival of a major war even though the climate 
revealed by the narratives tilts a bit toward that direction. The discursive evolution that is about 
to be presented demonstrates the subtleties of a Chinese realpolitik view of world politics. 
The 2017 foreign policy white paper came out against the background of the American 
deployment of THAAD in South Korea and the decision made by the 2016 UN Arbitration 
regarding the South China Sea that favored the appeals of the Philippines, one of the claimants 
on the SCS issue. Paralleling Beijing’s perception of growing regional tension is the view that 
international peace remains the main trend for the future and/or is obtainable. 
The paper expresses direct opposition to the deployment of THAAD and points out the 
U.S. and South Korea are guilty of “severely destroying the regional balance of power.” The 
reading on this part does not contain the slightest possibility about cooperation and compromises. 
The narratives on territorial disputes however are more nuanced. While the PRC states its 
ownership over the Senkakus (the Diaoyu islands) and the SCS, the wording regarding the 
former slides toward dialogues and coordination to reach consensus but regarding the SCS, 
China sees the possibility of conflict.  The prospect that China will be able to create a fait 
accompli in the SCS by island reclamations and the establishment of military facilities due to a 
favorable regional balance of power compared to the East China Sea where it competes with 
Japan may explain the differentiated discursive treatment of these territorial disputes. 
After stating China’s undisputable sovereignty over the SCS, the paper goes on to 
emphasize a peaceful resolution of the disputes, continuous negotiation on the SCS Code of 
Conduct with neighboring countries, and close dialogues with ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
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Asian Nations). “Mutual benefits” and “win-win” do not mark the final note for this issue. The 
tone shifts to address a (possible future) conflictual scenario and China’s reaction to it. Because 
the narratives are typical of Chinese rationalization, it deserves a lengthy quotation: 
“China resolutely opposes certain countries’ provocations of regional disputes for 
their selfish interests. China is forced to make necessary responses to the 
provocative actions which infringe on China’s territorial sovereignty and 
maritime rights and interests, and undermine peace and stability in the South 
China Sea. No effort to internationalize and judicialize the SCS issue will be of 
any avail for its resolution, it will only make it harder to resolve the issue, and 
endanger regional peace and stability.”177  
The PRC assigns to itself the role of an actor which exercises restraint and opts for 
cooperation and conciliation while blaming others for stirring up troubles in a way that 
forces it to react to the event. Through an othering process, China defends its action by 
framing the dispute as a moral issue with itself on the right side. By incorporating the 
latest events, China recognizes the rising tension. Meanwhile, it maintains the discursive 
consistency of peace, either as an assessment of future world politics or as a public good 
that China believes it can deliver. The question is what informs this optimism. To answer 
this question is to analyze how the PRC defines peace. The paper embodies the idea of 
multipolarity and its associated peace connotation. This can be seen in the identification 
of the five poles and an overall cooperative tone that the paper carries. In the Chinese 
narratives, whether the international climate is projected to be peaceful depends on the 
 
177 Original text: 中国坚决反对个别国家为一己私利在本地区挑动是非。对于侵犯中国领土主权和海洋
权益、蓄意挑起事端破坏南海和平稳定的挑衅行动，中国将不得不作出必要反应。任何将南海问题国
际化、司法化的做法都无助于争议的解决，相反只会增加解决问题的难度，危害地区和平与稳定。 
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assessed likelihood of use of force with at least two major powers involved and taking the 
opposite stances. The official documents in the post-Deng period have followed this logic 
in evaluating the foreseeable development of world politics.178 The nature of threats that 
the 2017 white paper identifies is not the possibility that major powers are likely to end 
up with armed conflicts in the course of competition. It is about the wrestling between 
actors whose material capabilities are asymmetrical, for instance, North Korean and 
Iranian nuclear issues, or disputes that involve major powers and whose nature is long-
term.   
The strategic landscape that Chinese documents present is the concurrence of multiple 
poles and peace defined by the lack of armed conflicts between at least two major states in the 
post-Cold War period. The 2017 security paper further clarifies that the geographical center 
where major powers interact is and will be Asia-Pacific.179 Even though such idea is recently 
written down, it predates the paper’s publication. According to the PRC, in this prolonged period 
(post-Cold War decades and first decades of the 21st century), its primary policy is peaceful 
development. Very often, this goes hand in hand with the promise that China will never take an 
expansionist and hegemonic path as the U.S., Japan, and the rest of the colonial powers did 
historically. In the PRC’s definition, so long as the means is not a military solution of aggressive 
and offensive nature which it uses to describe the deeds of the west, its behavior is not 
expansionist and hegemonic and thus is peaceful. Seeing this logic in the discursive context of 
 
178  For instance, the defense white papers explicitly contrast “informationized limited war” against a major 
war or a world war. These white papers indicate a Chinese view that a major war or a world war is not likely to 
occur in the near future. See detailed discussion in chapter 6.  
179 The 2017 paper writes: “To promote peace and seek stability and development is the strategic goal and 
common aspiration of most countries in the region. Political mutual trust among countries has been 
strengthened, and major countries have frequently interacted and cooperated with one another. To address 
differences and disputes through negotiation and consultation is the major policy of countries in the region.” 
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maintaining a peaceful environment for domestic development, China will prefer non-military 
solutions to spread influence but it does not rule out use of force. When the use of force becomes 
an option, it will be rationalized as self-defense and restoration of peace, to avoid the labeling of 
aggression. 
From a Chinese perspective, peace in a multipolar world equates to the lack of war 
between major states. This definition may explain why the 2019 defense white paper adheres to 
the tone that the world is “increasingly multipolar” and “peace, development and win-win 
cooperation remain the irreversible trends of the times”, even though it recognizes the growing 
tension and does not refrain from listing the deeds of other major states for their contributions to 
growing international competition. A comparison between the 2015 and 2019 defense white 
papers highlights this point. 
Both white papers share two similarities in their assessments of the security landscape.180 
First, the Asia-Pacific is becoming “the world economic and strategic center [of gravity]” and is 
where major powers compete for their interests. Second, in describing the world politics, 
hegemonism and power politics are placed in parallel with the rising trend of world peace. 
However, the latter overrides the former and as the 2015 paper writes, “in the foreseeable future, 
a world war is unlikely.” Within this broad framework, the 2019 paper is more detailed and 
organized in terms of threat perceptions and identification of unstable factors. The eventful years 
before the paper’s publication may explain why the sections dealing with international security 
dynamics receive more elaboration. In addition, it reflects a shift in China’s perception of power 
dynamics in that major power competition has kicked off and entered the first stage. In the 2019 
version, security assessments are divided into four parts: “the international strategic landscape”, 
 
180 Quotations used here come from the English version of the two white papers.  
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“the Asia-Pacific security situation,” “China’s security risks,” and “global military competition.” 
In 2015, all of them are grouped under “national security situations.” The difference goes beyond 
a simple formality matter of labeling. 
In the 2019 paper, specific countries and their deeds are identified, instead of generalized 
phrases and statements, to form the narratives suggesting that they are responsible for 
international tension. Aside from the US and Japan which have frequently appeared in the text, 
Russia, NATO, EU, India, Australia, Germany, France, and UK are included as contributors to 
rising competition. Unlike previous white papers, Chinese criticism of the US is straightforward. 
It writes, “The US has adjusted its national security and defense strategies, and adopted unilateral 
policies. It has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly 
increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber 
and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability.” This contrasts with the discursive 
construct that implies the PRC is a cooperative actor. Take the section of “the Asia-Pacific 
Security Situation” as an example.  
The U.S. and Australia are identified as countries who try to enhance military alliance in 
the region with the latter also aiming at a greater role. Japan is included in the same paragraph 
but with more emphasis on its attempts to act with fewer restraints and to become “more 
outward-looking” through “circumvent[ing] the post-war mechanism” that limits the operations 
of its Self-Defense Forces. These trouble-making states are discursively juxtaposed with a 
community that aspires for stability and inclusiveness and in which China plays a role. In the 
beginning paragraph of this section, it writes, “Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly aware that 
they are members of a community with shared destiny.” Following this sentence are the 
cooperative examples of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 
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Informal Meeting and other ASEAN related forums. This paragraph continues, “SCS is generally 
stable and improving as regional countries are properly managing risks and differences,” despite 
the facts to the contrary. Without mentioning the increasing tension in the SCS, the PRC creates 
a false consciousness by indicating that Southeast Asian countries and China are in the same boat 
as they all belong to “a community with shared destiny.”  
China does not directly state that it leads regional cooperative efforts, but it is a major 
player in the aforementioned multilateral platforms and on the SCS issue. Meanwhile, unlike the 
2015 defense paper that frames the SCS as a matter between Chinese sovereignty and 
provocations from neighboring countries who are not specified but apparently refer to Southeast 
Asian states as well external countries’ interference, the opposing images of self-rights protector 
and intruders are removed in the 2019 paper. The main actors, China and Southeast Asian 
countries, both of which however are not specified in the text, but rather implied by “regional 
countries” (except for the U.S. who is “the external country” and is not even considered to be an 
actor on the SCS issue), now become cooperators. The puzzle is why the narratives state what 
entirely contradicts the reality, especially deteriorating relations with the U.S.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The fact that the PRC does not acknowledge the actions and counteractions between itself 
and the U.S. against the unstated and ongoing background of itself being able to create faits 
accomplis without effective countervailing measures from opposing countries in the past years 
creates the momentum for it to exclude the U.S. from the picture and frame the issue as a matter 
that is under the “cooperative” control of regional countries. To refrain from explicitly declaring 
further advancement of its interests in the SCS and to make the issue sound like it has been 
temporarily settled based on coordinated management fit the rhetoric of inclusiveness that China 
has been propagating. Furthermore, it seems that the PRC is framing its interests as the common 
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interests of all. China does not directly state that it leads regional cooperative efforts, but it is a 
major player in the aforementioned multilateral platforms and on the SCS issue. By silencing 
opposing voices and distorting international perceptions of territorial disputes, China provides a 
façade of peace for its expansion and, as an unstated but implied statement, altercates to the role 
of Southeast Asian countries its own wish that these countries will acquiesce to its interests in the 
SCS, as shown in the sentence that countries are aware of themselves belonging to a “community 
with shared destiny,” a phrase that was coined by the CCP. 
What Chinese documents show is an evolving international politics from a Chinese lens 
and the role of the PRC therein. While recognizing that destabilizing factors have gained more 
force, the 2019 defense paper nonetheless states that the force for peace is on the rise as well. 
The result is a temporary equilibrium. The opening sentences of the international strategic 
landscape section state, “As the realignment of international powers accelerates and the strength 
of emerging markets and developing countries keeps growing, the configuration of strategic 
power is becoming more balanced. The pursuit of peace, stability and development has become a 
universal aspiration of the international community with forces for peace predominating over 
elements of war. However, international security system and order are undermined by growing 
hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional conflicts and wars.” Emerging 
markets and developing countries including China are representatives of the international 
community who aspire for peace whereas major states are sources of security challenges. The 
unstated differentiation between the camp of China and developing countries and that of other 
world powers is indicated by this paragraph and the organization seen in the section of “the Asia-
Pacific Security Situation” where the positive Chinese role is implied by the paragraph that 
mostly focuses on the claimed cooperation between the PRC and countries in Central Asia and 
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Southeast Asia versus the collective negative image of the U.S, Japan, and Australia in a separate 
paragraph. This power equilibrium is not seen in the previous defense white papers. More 
importantly, the paper hints that China is leading these “irresistible trends” of peace and 
development with smaller states in the Asia-Pacific. The height of the trade war with the U.S. 
and diplomatic tension with other major powers did not discursively reduce Chinese confidence 
in its abilities to shape the world order to its favor. Despite the assertive rhetoric and deeds, 
China may not see itself involved in conflicts with the US and/or other powers in the coming 
years. Not until it is prepared to use force will the evaluation of continuous peace change and, 
according to its history of image shaping, the PRC most likely will, consistent with its past 
practices, blame its opponents for creating the conditions that make it impossible for it to refrain 
from using force itself. 
The Chinese narratives contain many nuances and the logic is not always straightforward. 
Even though China perceives that there are increasing unstable factors changing the international 
climate, the writings nevertheless emphasize that international peace remains the main trend for 
the future and/or is obtainable. This may indicate less about China’s confidence in the 
continuous peace and a Chinese view that the current disputes in East Asia can be easily solved 
in the foreseeable future than about an attempt to shape international perceptions with the view181 
that the PRC, a representative of the forces for peace, is on the right side and the peaceful force 
that it leads is on the rise because many other countries are siding with it, as shown in how 
Beijing has framed the positions of smaller countries in the region (i.e., a community) in a way 
that opposes the collective aggressive role of the US, Japan, and Australia, as viewed from a 
 
181 These three white papers have their English translations and thus it is safe to argue that Beijing intends to 
convey this message to foreign audiences.  
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Chinese perspective. Meanwhile, a role construction that explicitly, contrary to the post-Cold 
War indirect practice, separates the self and the Other by opposing roles, clearly indicates a 
Chinese perception of a less peaceful international environment. This seeming oxymoron in the 
Chinese perception of world politics when understood in the context of a more solvent Chinese 
economy compared to its Maoist past, however, reflects the PRC’s view that the gap in 
capabilities between Washington and Beijing has narrowed and, from the latter’s official 
standpoint, bilateral relations is about power transition.  
A Chinese article authored by a researcher of the Contemporary World Research Center 
captures the dynamics of absolute and relative increase of Chinese influence and strength. The 
article first briefs the history, from a humiliated state situated “at the margin of the international 
system” to the current success that moves China “to the center of the world stage”. Followed by 
examples of the country “pro-actively shouldering responsibilities of a permanent member of UN 
Security Council” is the Chinese version of world order and the comparative roles of the U.S. 
and China regarding their international influence. The author continues to assess that the U.S., 
albeit still the only superpower, is in decline and this situation parallels with “rising and 
unstoppable voices of constructing a new equal and reasonable international political economic 
order.” Here, the contextual indication is that multipolarity has gained one more step and 
becomes the “irresistible trend of the time” and the Washington-dominated world system will 
become history. To further shore up one’s psychology, the essay argues for Beijing’s rising 
influence and reputation as the Chinese socialist path attracts many developing countries and 
instills “fear in the hegemon” who exports western democracy around the world.182 
 
182  Yu Sui [俞 邃] “The Profound Changes in the Relationships between China and the World” [中国与世界
关系的深刻变化], Qiushi, issue 23, 2015. 
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As much as multipolarity is stressed, caution is required is seeing it as China’s preferred 
world order permanently. In the beginning, the term was a response to the collapse of the USSR, 
based on which China started to project a future of the coexistence of multiple poles. Meanwhile, 
post-Cold War narratives, military and non-military alike, also condemn an order with the US as 
the sole superpower and see Washington in decline.183 Therefore, the advocacy for multipolarity 
aims to free the PRC from the percieved threats from Moscow and Washington. Since the term 
was proposed as the result of Beijing’s evaluations of world politics, multipolarity may be more 
a temporarily preferred balance of power in which the PRC believes that it has more room to 
maneuver in obtaining material strength and spreading political influence.  
The Old Is New, The New Is New 
The pyramid that is seen today is made possible by the initial fulfillment of material 
conditions and the need to continue the pursuit. However, the ideational framework dates to the 
1956 report. Despite the fact that the two triangles were produced at different times, the most 
fundamental logic of power relations did not change. Sinicized socialism that channels the 
mentality of Chinese superiority, which is shown by a discursive comparison with the negative 
effects of capitalism and western democracy on both internal and external affairs, has the 
 
183 Another discursive example that juxtaposes a declining US and a rising China can be found in an English 
Qiushi article. According to this article, the 2008 financial crisis has made “positive changes to the 
international balance of power” by shifting toward multipolarity.” The reason is that the US-led west has 
decreasing grip on global economy whereas China and other newly emerged developing countries continue to 
grow. Although modern capitalism is not “on the brink of collapse”, its golden age already passed. On the 
contrary, the article continues, “socialism with Chinese characteristics has captivated the world with its 
incredible achievements, demonstrating the superiority of the emerging socialist system.” The essay cautions 
that since “the capacity of capitalism to make self-adjustments cannot be underestimated”, “the replacement of 
capitalism by socialism on a global scale will involve a drawn out, bitter, and complicated struggle.” 
Nevertheless, the article carries a raised tone in declaring the verdict of the fates of two systems: “The reality is 
that there are two basic systems in the world at present, one being capitalism, and the other being socialism. 
The conflict between these two systems and two paths constitutes one of the major conflicts in the world at 
present, and the struggle between them will decide the future of the world.” Ru Xin, “Two Paths, Two 
Futures,” English Qiushi, May 28, 2013. < 
http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201302/201305/t20130528_234925.htm>. 
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commanding height however it is interpreted. Changes affect the means to the end, not the end 
itself. The act of re-interpretation of Chinese socialism along with new economic policies aims to 
re-assert the self and re-consolidate the status of the CCP. The ideology in the political realm has 
not changed.  
In the Chinese worldview, there is always some Other to be compared with. In the role 
casted by the PRC, the Other wreaks havoc in the world whereas China is a peace maker and 
promoter of harmony. At the beginning, the enemy was “American imperialism”. It then shifted 
to the Soviet Union during the 1970s after ideological polemics and border clashes. The US 
again become the number one nemesis following the collapse of the USSR. In the post-Mao era, 
however, the Party documents do not explicitly single out the US, but rather use “hegemonism” 
and “power politics” as surrogates. The framing of the PRC as the leader of the developing 
countries continues the line established during Mao’s period. The difference is a greater degree 
of engagement in all aspects that has come as the result of wealth accumulation. Despite an 
attenuation in the negativity of the opponent’s role and an accentuation of the positiveness in the 
self-image in the post-Mao decades, changes occur within the same ideational structure of the 
triangle.  
The sense of cooperativeness revealed in the reimagination of the roles is associated with a 
greater implementation of the United Front strategy in the post-reform decades that originally 
was spelled out in Mao’s years. In the post-Cold War decades, Beijing has altercasted to the 
identity of other countries its own preferences that peace and development are universal 
priorities. In so doing, China hopes to persuade others to adopt policies that play to its advantage 
by framing issues as shared interests, and China’s outward expansion is meant to facilitate that 
end. Through the construction of role congruence, Beijing engages with countries around the 
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world, including advanced economies, developing countries and even its erstwhile enemies as 
well. Cooperation however is not the end. Proving and having others accept the idea that the 
PRC is more capable and more ethical than other powers is as the connections pointing back to A 
demonstrate. Cooperation is a means in the realpolitik of competition. The developing countries 
remain a primary locus of the PRC’s foreign policies. They are the destinations of diplomatic 
visits, homes to Chinese military bases and logistical outposts, and the recipients of Chinese aid 
and investments. 
The triangle shows the beliefs of the CCP which are evidenced by its narratives. The Party 
not only aims to spread its ideas to the domestic population, but also an international audience. 
The second version of the pyramid applies to the English texts as well. Chapter 4 will draw 
evidence from the English textual pool of Qiushi to show that information aimed at non-domestic 
and non-Chinese speaking audiences follows the same ideational structure. In other words, the 
PRC delivers a message that sinicized socialism is good for both China and the world. For the 
latter, it is not about exporting the Chinese institutional model to developing countries in the 
same way that Stalin installed soviet-style regimes in Eastern Europe, but rather the restraining 
effects of the Chinese institutions to prevent the PRC from being aggressive at others’ expense 
and a reflection of the innately good nature of the Chinese nation to bring harmony and 
prosperity to mankind. The ultimate objective is to have both the domestic population and other 
countries pay deference to the PRC and recognize the undisputable top position of the CCP 
domestically and internationally. Socialism is situated at the top of the triangle, as the source of 
material and spiritual goods, and often equated to the CCP and Chinese superiority in a 
comparative light over against the inability and destructiveness of the west, demonstrating this 
political goal. Despite much emphasis on equity and on cooperation instead of confrontation, the 
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fundamentals of the Chinese worldview conveyed through pyramids 3.0 and 3.1 remain the same 
and are further reinforced by expanding material capabilities. The language of equity masks the 
hierarchy that the country prefers. It serves as a better strategy for enticement than outright 
expression of hierarchy.  
In the case of China, the need for domestic development and a global aspiration occur 
simultaneously. Even though domestic issues demand much attention, it does not mean a reduced 
possibility to be outward-looking. On the contrary, not only do the Chinese narratives link the 
fates of both together,184 the main lines revealed in the 2017 report that internal struggle and 
external military struggle will take place simultaneously for the long run also provide another 
confirmation.  
The Chinese narratives are not just for the sake of self-defensive reassurance; they provide 
evidence about the value of proactiveness in strengthening the country and competing with other 
major powers. If the PRC’s goal were purely defensive and its actions passive, linkages between 
A and D, either direct or mediated by B and C, would not exist in a comparative and competitive 
context. In other words, the pyramid would not have come to form. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
184 For instance, in laying out how a revived Chinese nation will come true, it is common to see statements 
like: “We must have the view and the policy to that effect that considers both domestic and international 
chessboards at the same time.” (必须统筹国内国际两个大局). 
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Chapter 4 
Reshaping the International Order: Measuring Assertiveness 
 
The PRC’s identity is defined by the historical mission that the CCP will achieve a 
promised “revived glory” of the Chinese nation. In the realm of foreign policy, the prospect is to 
make the international order run in a way that China advocates. This new order allegedly will be 
more peaceful, just, inclusive, and equitable than the current order. The ensuing questions 
include how to make it happen. The examined narratives suggest three vehicles to deliver the 
outcome. One is through economic ties with China. Another is “the nature” of Chinese socialism. 
The last one is the “inclusiveness” of Chinese civilization (or culture). Since economic 
cooperation has been a constant factor in the texts under analysis and functions more like a self-
evident link, this chapter will focus on the latter two mechanisms. Regardless of actual material 
capabilities, the narratives create an impression that China is ascending while the West is in 
decline. The Chinese discourse displays a perceived narrowing of the gap between the US and 
China. It is at this juncture of perceived power transition that there is a rhetorical assertiveness 
suggested by the “tightness” among different nodes in the belief system.185 To be specific, the 
addition of the three vehicles as transmission agents makes the narrative more sophisticated. In 
measuring discursive assertiveness, the study examines both Chinese and English texts of the 
Qiushi journal. There is no 100 percent overlap between the two versions. The English version 
 
185 The idea of tightness in the belief system comes from sociology literature and originally refers to group 
cohesion. However, it is used differently in this research. Sociologist John Levi Martin defines tightness as 
“the degree to which holding some belief implies holding or not holding other beliefs.” This definition works 
in tandem with the degree of consensus in a certain group. To simply put, higher degree of consensus means 
higher level of tightness in the belief system. Lower degree of consensus means lower level of tightness. John 
Levi Martin, Power, “Authority and the Constraint of Belief Systems,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
107, No. 4 (2002), pp. 861-904.  
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however selects a good amount of articles from its Chinese counterpart while incorporating 
articles from official newspapers and other official journals.  
Qiushi is a journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a 
biweekly magazine that theorizes Chinese socialism and explains national and foreign policies. 
The journal encompasses a wide range of topics, from domestic development (economy, culture, 
military, and governance) and international economy, to world politics and foreign relations. 
Qiushi has advantages when it comes to analyzing the PRC’s national/international discourse 
building and rhetorical sophistication. The main target audiences are the ranking officials of the 
Party and the People’s Liberation Army, the Party members, the leadership groups of enterprises, 
and educators and propagandists who disseminate the CCP’s ideas. The domestic circulation 
varies, with 1.26 million reported for 2010 and 1.8 million reported for each issue in 2018. Since 
October 2009, Qiushi has published articles in English and the official website claims that the 
circulation is in more than 100 countries of different regions. In addition, the PRC has digitalized 
the magazine since 2009 and makes it available at different platforms of social media (weibo and 
wechat for instance) to widen the audience base.186  
The journal provides a relatively ideal corpus of texts for the research purposes in this 
dissertation. As an official organ of literature for thought education, it is theoretical in nature 
across domestic and foreign affairs. Therefore, the treatment of ideas and logic are to various 
degrees systematic. This is line with the theorization of Chinese way of justification laid down in 
the Chapter 2 and with the actuality that Chinese politics always require an endorsement of a 
 
186 “Introduction of Qiushi”  [《求是》简介], Qiushi, August 20, 2018,  
<http://www.qstheory.cn/qssyggw/2018-08/20/c_1111961498.htm>; “About the English Edition of Qiushi 
Journal,” Qiushi, Sept. 19, 2011, 
<http://english.qstheory.cn/about/201109/t20110919_110886.htm>. 
206 
systematic political philosophy-turned ideology. In dealing with internal and external affairs, 
Quishi also has both Chinese and English versions which other theory-oriented publications do 
not have. In other words, to fit the purpose of this dissertation, i.e., how the PRC justifies its 
deeds based on a set of logic(s) that it carries over from its domestic governance to international 
governance,  three elements need to be present in the pool of texts: both domestic issues and 
international relations are dealt with, having both English and Chinese versions, and it is 
theoretical in nature. A survey of the PRC’s publications shows that Qiushi is a relatively ideal 
choice.    
Considering the large volumes of articles publicly available, it is necessary to narrow 
down the scope of the search. Articles are selected based on the inclusion of “international” (国
际) and “order” (秩序). The main theme of an article does not have to be about international 
order itself. Because international order can appear in different contexts, such as domestic 
development, maritime interests, economy, diplomacy, military reform, etc., as long as the two 
words appear in the article separately or jointly with international as adjective, it counts. Not 
every article with the two words is necessarily relevant to international order, however. It 
requires reading through each of them and deleting the irrelevant ones. The methods of 
collection apply to texts in both Chinese and English. Among 593 articles sorted out by CNKI 
with full-text in the search field,187 164 are valid and the rest irrelevant and thus invalid. CNKI 
does not have the years from 2016 to 2018 but they are available on the Qiushi website. 
Accordingly, from 2005 to 2018, there will be 263 valid articles under examination. In the case 
 
187 CNKI refers to China National Knowledge Infrastructure. It is an online database where Chinese 
newspapers, non-academic and academic journals are located.  
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that the same article appears twice in the same issue,188 it will only receive the coding once. The 
English version, however, will only include data from 2009 to 2018 because the English 
publication was not launched until 2009. There are 94 essays included in the English pool.  
In quantifying the textual data, this study differentiates four groups: international order, 
Chinese institutions, Chinese culture, and general group. Altogether, they inform readers of the 
interrelations among different concepts/ideas and the degrees of logical tightness and logical 
assertiveness. Each group contains different labels that code certain phrases and ideas. The 
article will receive the value of 1 if it fits the definition of a given label. Otherwise, it will have 
0. The study incorporates qualitative reading into quantitative coding process and thus it is not 
merely a test of word frequency which counts the times a certain word/phrase appears. For 
example, in the general group, a label will count the frequency of the idea that the impact of 
China’s rise will be more peaceful than other powers. The comparison can appear in different 
forms, in one single or consecutive paragraphs which discuss the negative consequences of other 
powers’ involvement in world affairs and what the PRC can offer. When the article contains such 
comparison, it will have the value of 1 under that label. For the discussion below, following the 
definitions of each group, the study will first present and explain statistic results before 
discursively presenting selected articles from the datasets.  
Chinese Texts 
In the PRC’s narratives, the relations among Chinese institutions (Chinese socialism, 
Chinese Marxism), Chinese culture (traditions, civilization, philosophies), and a better world 
 
188 The situation usually occurs in this way. A given article will reappear in a collection of different articles 
under a new headline. The reason for double appearance is unknown.  
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order can be summarized in this way. Chinese socialism is rooted in Chinese culture/traditions 
and Chinese culture is also influenced by the sinicized Marxist culture. Both Chinese socialism 
and Chinese culture are characterized by their peaceful, inclusive and harmonious nature. 
Because of their innate goodness, according to Beijing’s narratives, Chinese institutions are 
superior to aggressive Western capitalism and democracy. Compared to Western institutions, the 
Chinese way of “democratic” governance and the Chinese way of economic development 
(together called the Chinese path or Chinese model) are said to not only fit the Chinese 
conditions, but also to be good for the world. Both Chinese institutions and Chinese culture are 
said to endow the CCP/the PRC with abilities to solve many issues that human beings have been 
faced with.  
When the PRC’s narratives mention “Chinese/China Proposal”  (中国方案) as a way to 
deal with issues ranging from the world economy, ecology, climate change, international 
relations, war and peace, etc., it is the same justifying rationale, mentioned above, that underlies 
different policies that Beijing proposes to cope with a variety of issues. For instance, the Belt and 
Road Initiative as a Chinese foreign policy is justified by the CCP’s capabilities to make more 
equal and mutually beneficial trade relations; the Chinese way of doing business and investment 
is claimed to be fair and equal. As for the sources of such characteristics, the PRC claims that 
they come from the peaceful and inclusive nature of Chinese institutions and Chinese culture. 
Beijing’s ambition to reshape world order is reflected in the term, “Chinese proposal,” which is 
rationalized and made as a means for the desired result of a new world order by the claimed 
inherent goodness of Chinese institutions and Chinese culture. The following analysis will break 
down each logical node stated above with discursive evidence presented in quantitative and 
qualitative ways.  
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International Order  
China has used different verbs, such as “reshape”, “reform”, and “build,” to express the intention 
of making international order run in a way that it advocates. At times, it wraps such intention in 
the narrative that contains a sense of togetherness, as if a different international order is a 
common wish of many countries with the PRC as their spokesman, and China and others will 
work hand in hand for such a goal. It is also the case that, in some texts, while Chinese intention 
is expressed, the author adds that Beijing does not intend to overhaul the international norms 
(cite 2016 为引领世界和平发展合作共赢贡献中国智慧), but rather to improve them. In other 
words, China does not hide its aspiration, but it consciously and tactically tones down the 
language by which the aspiration is expressed (see graph 4.0).189  
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 X axis is the count of articles and Y axis is year, which applies to the 8 charts in this chapter. The 
definitions of the four labels are as follows.  I): new type/new model of major country relations (新型大国关
系); II): new type/new model of international relations (现代国际关系/新型国际关系); III): words that 
contain the meaning of building, facilitate, promote, reform, rebuild, improve, reshaping international/world 
order. This label is exclusive to I and II, and the statement is not expressed through foreigners’ voices; IV): 
same with III, but indicates togetherness with other countries; V): safeguarding/upholding international order 
or verbs that do not indicate a change of status quo. This label however cannot be understood as the PRC is not 
intending to change the status quo. It needs to be understood in the following context. When Beijing perceives 
that certain policies of other major states contravene its interests, it frames the narratives in a way that shapes 
its role as an actor who upholds the international order and shapes the role of others as a troublemaker who 
intends to change the post-WWII order.  
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Graph 4.0 
 
The new type major-power relations primarily refers to relations between the PRC and the 
U.S. It starts gaining currency since 2012 against the background of relatively cordial bilateral 
relations before the Trump Administration. This historical context allows China to construct 
narratives in a way as if international relations is moving toward the direction it formulates and 
prefers. The policy shift and trade war under Trump remove the contextual premise and thus 
explain the dwindling number and complete disappearance of the term in 2018. However, lack of 
amity may not severely hamper the Chinese belief of itself being on a par with the US as the 
term suggests or how the country intends to continue shaping domestic perception of China 
being a great power since Xi Jinping’s ascendance to the presidency, despite the consequences of 
trade war and mounting internal debt problems preceding the trade issues. 
Reshaping international order experienced a drop in 2018, but closer examination into the 
texts reveals no reduced confidence on the Chinese side. In the context of a growing rift with the 
U.S., the narratives stress that China will safeguard international order which, in the Chinese 
narratives, is under siege due to American hegemonism related to unfair practices on trade 
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issues. Guarding international order is an old rhetorical ploy that China evokes when criticizing 
Japan’s past military expansion and alleged “revived militarism” in recent years.190 It was also 
used in defending China’s position in the 2016 international arbitration case of territorial 
disputes with the Philippines. What appears to be new in the American context is the additional 
emphasis on the declining power of the US and the identification (sometimes insinuated) of 
Washington’s policy as the root cause of deteriorating bilateral relations. The PRC blames what 
other countries are doing as, not explicitly stated in Beijing’s narratives, their policies contradict 
China’s interests. It also tries to create the impression that the country is already in an 
advantageous position to direct international affairs, by protecting international order from these 
troublemakers. Furthermore, 8 out of 14 articles that have a value of 1 in the column of 
“safeguarding international order” also have a value of 1 in the column of “the new type of 
international relations” that China advocates. This means that the PRC still seeks to foster the 
belief that it is a better candidate to reshape world order. In addition, in 2018, the number of 
articles that have values of 1 in both columns of “safeguarding international order” and “new 
type of international relations” that China advocates exceeds the years of 2017 and 2016. By 
aggregate count, the year of 2018 does not see a diminished trend of Chinese confidence, but 
rather a growing tendency.  
Generalization  
The CCP’s determination to reshape the world order can be further measured by certain 
general phrases and ideas. This section aims to capture the overall meanings of the Chinese texts 
from two situations. First, overall Chinese texts or certain terms can express general meanings 
 
190 The PRC perceives the domestic discussion of a relaxation of Article 9 within Japan and the policies that 
relax Japan’s involvement in overseas military operations in recent years as attempts to change the post-WWII 
order which Beijing claims to have helped establish.  
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that are not captured in the measurements in the groups of Chinese institutions and Chinese 
culture. For instance, without specifying explicitly a context for comparison (such as institutions 
or a direct naming of certain countries which the PRC compares the course of its own rising 
trajectory to), many articles convey the meaning that the impact of China’s rise will be peaceful 
compared to other powers. The narratives may also draw upon foreign voices on a variety of 
issues or simply a statement without specification of issues to support its own views that the PRC 
will and needs to undertake a greater leadership role in the world. Second, there are phrases that 
succinctly represent a set of complex and inter-related ideas, such as “Chinese path” (or Chinese 
model)191 and “Chinese proposal”.  
According to the statistical results of the label “international impact of China’s rise,”192 the 
rhetoric that the rise of China will be more peaceful and beneficial to the international 
community compared to other powers already started in 2005. However, it is not until 2012, that 
there is a steady trend in the increasing number of articles that emphasize the international 
benefits that China can bring through comparison (see graph 4.1).193 
 
 
191 For both Chinese and English datasets, even though “Chinese path” and “Chinese model” are synonyms, 
Chinese model is not counted. The label of “Chinese path” receives the value of 1 only when “Chinese path” 
appears.  
192 international impact of China's rise:  a strong and growing China behaves differently from other powers. 
When the narratives mention colonialism, hegemonism, Cold War mentality, and power politics, all of which 
are the symbols of the West and Japan in the Chinese narratives, in comparison to the peace, harmony, 
equality, and economic prosperity that the PRC can bring to the international society. Or when China is shaped 
as a symbol of international peace and the west as source of international conflict. Or when the narratives only 
generally compare the PRC and other past powers and current powers. This label does not consider the 
international implications of domestic political and economic institutions in a comparative light.  
193 The six labels are as follows. I): the international impact of China's rise is different from other powers. The 
behavior of other powers can be current or past; II): foreign assurance 3 (positive comments that encourage or 
expect China’s leadership, while sometimes not specifically saying “leadership”, it expects greater role of 
China). This is NOT an exclusive label to foreign assurance 5; III): foreign assurance 5  (foreign countries 
praise china's regional/international proposal about economy, governance or the international norms or 
foreigners echoes China on all kinds of international issues); IV): Chinese path (中国道路); V): Chinese 
wisdom (中国智慧); VI): Chinese Proposal (中国方案). 
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Graph 4.1 
 
The labels of “Chinese path”, “Chinese wisdom”, and “Chinese proposal” aim to measure 
the PRC’s assertiveness. In a nutshell, these three terms in the examined data pool allegedly are 
conducive to world peace and development. “Chinese path” usually refers to Chinese socialism, 
sinicized Marxism, and Chinese institutions. It sometimes also refers to the peaceful 
development of Beijing’s outward expansion. “Chinese proposal” can be defined as Beijing’s 
proposed policies or measures, in the fields widely ranging across global issues such as 
economy, finance, climate change, environment, and counter-terrorism. Global economy and 
finance are particularly important. For the time span under study, an uninterrupted and dominant 
theme is the PRC’s emphasis on how its economic strength and initiatives, such as bilateral and 
multilateral platforms for economic and developmental cooperation, can fuel global growth and 
provide solutions to the problems in today’s world. “Chinese proposal” does not merely refer to 
policies, but also embodies a set of idealistic principles that are said to characterize Chinese 
socialism and Chinese culture, with the latter, according to the CCP’s redefinition, being 
influenced by sinicized Marxism, and that underpin how Beijing’s proposed policies will be 
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implemented internationally. Those idealistic principles are about inclusiveness, equity, mutual 
benefits and harmony, all of which define “Chinese wisdom” and are said to be rooted in 
Chinese culture and Chinese socialism. Therefore, “Chinese proposal” alone carries three layers 
of meaning: the cultural traits of the Chinese way of doing things as the PRC describes, Chinese 
institutions (or Chinese socialism) that materialize these cultural traits, and the proposed policies. 
In other words, because of all these idealistic benefits reflected in the CCP’s governance, 
Chinese proposals initiated by the CCP will make the world better, just as Chinese socialist 
institutions which embody these idealistic principles have created domestic developmental 
successes. In this sense, “Chinese proposal” can include the meanings of “Chinese path” and 
“Chinese wisdom.” According to Beijing’s discursive construct, as the section on Chinese 
institutions will demonstrate, the “Chinese proposal” will make the world a better place, better 
than that shaped by Western institutions. The PRC’s determination to reshape the world order, as 
the chart of the international order group shows, is also confirmed by the increasing usage of 
“Chinese proposal” in the narratives, along with “Chinese wisdom.” The appearance of the term 
as a catch phrase indicates a growing confidence in the ability of the self and Beijing’s assertive 
intention to play a more active role of leadership.  
The PRC’s needs for overseas markets and resources to maintain material growth along 
with its concerns about border security have spurred various international initiatives. To create 
the impression that the world echoes the Chinese view and supports Chinese plans, the narratives 
have drawn upon foreign assurance more frequently since 2013. A 2017 article shows how the 
author weaves the narrative of foreign assurance together with Chinese culture, Chinese 
proposal, and better behavior from the PRC compared to other powers. 
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Under the subheading of “Chinese Proposal Leading World Changes,” the author claims 
that Chinese wisdom derived from the Chinese cultural idea of “the world as a community” and 
its manifested inclusiveness are embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative. In the same paragraph, 
the author concludes that “the Chinese proposal shows the fundamental directions [for the future] 
in the face of contemporary global challenges. It fits the common wish of the international 
society regarding peace, development and cooperation, and thus has won world acclaim.” The 
narrative again contrasts China’s ethical behavior with the old practice of “zero-sum game” and 
“the old logic that a strong country will inevitably end up becoming a hegemon.” 194 
With the examination of phrases and ideas for the overall directions of the narratives completed, 
the next two sections, Chinese institutions and Chinese culture, discuss in detail how the logical 
nodes are connected together through a presentation of the narratives. 
Chinese Institutions 
To discursively self-assure the superiority of Chinese socialism, the narratives have both 
stand-alone evaluation of Chinese institutions and comparison with western institutions. Chapter 
3 already points out that institutions in the NCCPC reports have internal and external 
significance. Since the effects are both domestic and international, questions about the 
importance of Chinese institutions are asked differently. In a domestic context, the question is 
whether they are good for China. In a global context, the questions are whether they are good for 
the world and whether other countries can learn from the PRC’s experience. Accordingly, in 
breaking down the narratives, the research focuses on the findings of the following four 
combinations: 
 
194 Qiu Yuan [秋 原] “China is the main force that promote stability, development and peace of the world” [中
国是促进世界和平稳定发展的中坚力量 ], Qiushi,  issue 11, 2017. 
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1. domestic context X domestic audience  
2. domestic context X international audience (this will be mentioned but not analyzed in detail 
through English texts) 
3. global context X domestic audience 
4. global context X international audience (this will be studied through the English texts) 
 
The combinations can further increase to eight if adding stand-alone evaluation and 
comparison into each equation. However, the sub-categorization would make the discussion 
trivial. In the first equation, the CCP addresses the domestic population that Chinese institutions 
are good for national development, either by comparing them to western institutions or not.  In 
the fourth equation, the CCP addresses foreign countries that Chinese socialism can solve global 
issues and/or other countries can learn from China’s governing experience. This again can be 
done either by comparison with western institutions or simply through self-affirmation.  
The findings show the following patterns. In assessing the combined result of the first and the 
third equations (without differentiation between domestic context and global context), based on 
the eight labels in the dataset of Chinese Qiushi that traces the discursive treatment of Chinese 
institutions from 2005 to 2018 (see graph 4.2),195 a steady rhetorical assertiveness about the 
advantages of Chinese institutions begins from 2014. The discussion here concerns the results of 
labels 3, 4, and 5. Labels 3 and 5 are exclusive, which means when either of them gets the value 
of 1, the other will be 0. The articles that get the value of 1 under the labels of either 3 or 5 by 
 
195 The eight labels are: I) cinstitution: mentioning “Chinese socialism” or Chinese political, economic 
institutions; II) criticize winstitution: criticizing western institutions including practices of democracy and 
economic system; III) cinstitutions good for the world/other countries: correlations between Chinese 
institutions and world peace, prosperity, harmony, etc.; IV) self-compare institutions: which type of 
institutions fits China, V) self-compare institutions on international level: Chinese institutions can better serve 
the world/other countries compared to western ones. VI) foreign assurance 1: foreign positive comments about 
Chinese socialism; VII) foreign assurance 2: foreign comments about the downside of western institutions; 
VIII) foreign assurance 4: foreign countries see China as a model that they can learn in terms of domestic 
governance and/or development.  
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meeting the label descriptions concentrate in the years from 2014 to 2018. Although the idea that 
Chinese socialism is superior to western capitalism in advancing the interests of the world is not 
new, China under Xi Jinping has further specified Chinese political and economic institutions as 
the transmission agents to that effect. The articles that get the value of 1 under the labels of both 
4 and 5 also concentrate in the same time span. While the annual statistical result shows that the 
CCP has been relatively consistent, and with increasing trend, in re-assuring its institutional 
superiority for domestic governance by comparison, comparing with western institutions in terms 
of which system will do better for the world is more recent and drives the outcome to cluster in 
the years from 2014 to 2018.  
Graph 4.2 
 
The purpose of quantifying data is to obtain word counts, trace evolution over time, and to 
assess the overall associations among keywords and logics. Since quantification may not capture 
the meanings that can only be attained through textual reading based on the assessment of 
sentences, their relations to paragraphs, and their relations to the entire article, to analyze 
nuances and details in the Chinese discourse requires coding by reading through each relevant 
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text. Consider this case: the CCP is using its own voice, not the voices of foreign politicians, 
experts, or scholars, to argue that Chinese institutions (or Chinese socialism) work better than 
western institutions (political and economic) in terms of serving the interests of the world ( such 
as promoting international peace and creating economic benefits). This type of case is labeled as 
“self-comparing institutions on international level” in the codebook. To have a positive value 
(that is, 1) under this label usually requires passing through some thresholds of logical 
sequences. First, positive comments about Chinese institutions and negative comments about 
western ones exist. Second, the impact of institutions, both Chinese and Western, on the world or 
other countries is specified. Since not every relevant article contains a sentence or consecutive 
sentences which directly express that Chinese socialism works better than western democracy 
and capitalism in facilitating world peace and economic prosperity, and because the structure of 
each article varies, the above two thresholds can appear in various ways. Positive impact of 
Chinese institutions and negative impact of western ones can find their direct expressions in one 
sentence, or in the paragraph, or the overall context of the article. Considering the structural 
variations, to judge whether the text meets the two thresholds requires perusing the contents.  
The following examples come from the pool from 2014 to 2018 where self-comparing 
institutions on the international level has the value of 1. The correlation between Chinese 
socialism and world peace and prosperity is not new, but over the years, the connections have 
been further specified and mechanisms laid out. In some articles, the merits of Chinese 
institutions are directly linked to the self-acclaimed abilities of the Chinese Communist Party. 
For instance, a 2014 article penned by a socialism research center at the Central Party School of 
the Chinese Communist Party unequivocally equates the following phrases: the Chinese path, 
socialist institutions, combined economy in terms of types of property ownership, and the 
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leadership of the CCP. To be specific, in the text, the Chinese path is defined by the rest of the 
terms. After criticizing capitalism for failing to help developing countries develop, it offers a 
Chinese solution by stating in an opening sentence that “the Chinese path is a path of peaceful 
development and it can push forward the building of a new world order… The more China gets 
developed, the more opportunities and leverage developing countries will have in breaking down 
the old international political economic order.” In other words, according to the Chinese 
narratives, the stronger the PRC is, the better the world is. In another opening sentence of a 
different paragraph, the author writes, “the Chinese path upholds the leadership of the 
Communist Party…this is the fundamental reason for maintaining China’s political stability 
while conducting fast development.”196 In other words, the CCP leadership makes a strong China 
possible and thus makes world peace possible.  
Another example is a 2018 article. It describes the CCP as a Party capable of realizing the 
wellbeing of the people during the modernization process and a Marxist Party which makes hard 
efforts for the progress of mankind. The same paragraph continues with additional praises about 
what the CCP can do and concludes that “socialist China…has confidence in building a better 
world through the China Proposal.”197 “Socialist China” and, elsewhere in the article, “Chinese 
 
196 Research Center of the Theory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics of the Central Party School [中央
党校中国特色社会主义理论体系研究中心],  “Chinese Path Solves A Series of Difficulties Which 
Developing Countries Are Faced With In Modernization” [中国道路破解了一系列发展中国家现代化
难题], Qiushi, issue 5, 2014.   
197 Zhuo Shuchun [周树春], “Let the World Understand China” [让世界读懂新时代中国], Qiushi, issue 22, 
2018.Orignial text: 在深入解读中国共产党“为中国人民谋幸福”“为中华民族谋复兴”的初心和使命
时，讲清楚全心全意为人民服务，坚持人民主体地位，致力于人的全面发展，与人民同呼吸、共命
运、心连心，把人民对美好生活的向往作为奋斗目标，在领导现代化的历史进程中实现民族复兴和人
民幸福等，正是中国共产党生存发展的根基和宗旨。阐明面向世界、面向未来的胸襟和气度。忠实描
绘始终走在时代前列、为人类进步事业而奋斗的马克思主义政党形象，讲清楚中国共产党是善于借鉴
人类文明有益成果的世界最大的“学习型政党”，是不仅能够带领人民进行伟大社会革命、也能够进
行伟大自我革命的新型政党。讲清楚社会主义中国坚持对外开放，始终把自身发展同世界发展紧密联
系在一起，始终注目于人类发展进步的未来，有信心为建设更美好世界提供中国方案。 
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socialism” thus refers to the self-defined identity of the CCP that characterizes China’s political 
institutions. In a 2017 article that comments on the negative global consequences of western 
capitalism, the author stresses the advantages of the “China Proposal” for the international 
community and traces the “inclusiveness” of the proposal to the governing idea of the CCP that 
allegedly has wholeheartedly worked for the people. The ending sentence of this article writes, 
“in the competition with capitalism, Chinese socialism is showing strong vitality and unique 
institutional superiority.”198 In other words, judging from the context, the alleged Chinese 
capabilities to make the world better originate with socialist institutions that in the Chinese 
narratives are inalienable from the rule of the CCP. According to the PRC discourse, the CCP 
will make the world a better place. 
Chinese institutions can also be defined in economic terms, such as “socialist market 
economy” or “the preliminary stage of socialism”, types of property ownership in China, and 
“release and develop productivity” as well as explanations of how the Chinese economy runs. 
“Release and develop productivity” unmistakably refers to the socialist economy defined by the 
PRC. Regarding western institutions, common phrases in the Chinese narratives are neo-
liberalism, aside from capitalism, and western type of democracy. The prevalent narrative in 
many articles that compares two institutions goes like this. The western style of democracy, 
economic privatization and capitalization create an anarchic world leading to either domestic or 
international chaos as well as widening gaps between haves and have-nots. Chinese political and 
economic institutions however have stabilizing effects, create global economic opportunities, and 
lead to more equal political relations among countries. Under this specified context, articles have 
 
198 Yang Guoliang [杨国亮], “How To Interpret the Current Anti-Globalization Trend” [如何看待当前的
“逆全球化”思潮],Qiushi, issue 10, 2017. 
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asserted that Chinese institutions can contribute positively to the world and other countries, 
mostly developing ones. 
A 2014 article details the drawbacks of western institutions and the implications of the 
advantages of Chinese “democratic politics” for the world.199 The article traces people’s 
discontent to the 2008 global financial crisis and writes that “people’s reflection on the failure of 
western democracy has reached to capitalist institutions. Among disappointments and 
dissatisfaction with contemporary capitalist democracy, international intellectual circles have 
started the shift to and the trend of ‘looking east,’ in search for the eastern wisdom that can help 
the world out of difficulties. The Chinese style of governance and democratic political 
institutions begin to receive more and more attention.” The author further quotes the words of 
some foreign intellectuals to demonstrate the frustration. And, by quoting their words, the 
narratives also try to prove the merits of Chinese socialism. After elaborating China’s 
“democratic system”, the author concludes that “based on its pursuit of democracy in domestic 
affairs and foreign policies, socialist China can provide Chinese wisdom and the China Proposal 
for the world which is now situated in the intersection.”   
A 2017 article penned by a dean at Fudan University concludes that “ the significance of 
China’s rise is not merely about the breadth and depth of the international impact of leading one-
fifth of the world population to wealth, but also about the beneficial experience and invaluable 
wisdom that China’s political, economic, and social systems can provide for building a better 
society for mankind.”200 Consider the beginning paragraph of another article in 2018: 
 
199 Su Changhe [苏长和] “Affirming China’s Position in Democracy”[确立民主政治的中国坐标], Qiushi 
issue 11, 2014.  
200 Zhang Weiwei [张维为], “The Reasons for the Chaos in the West and the Order in China” [西方之乱与中
国之治的制度原因], Qiushi, issue 15, 2017. 
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“…Chinese socialism enters into a new era. This means that the path, the theory, the institutions 
and the culture of Chinese socialism is constantly developing…It provides a brand-new 
alternative to countries and nations who hope to accelerate development while keeping their 
independence. It also offers Chinese wisdom and the Chinese Proposal to solve the issues which 
mankind is faced with.” The article goes one more step to assert the comparative merits of “the 
Chinese path” when it states, “today, China’s political and economic systems are more complete, 
learnable, and sustainable than the American model which dominates the post-WWII 
international order. China’s success has charted a new path for developing countries that account 
for three-fourths of the world population. It is going to have a deep model effect among the vast 
developing countries.”  In a different paragraph, the author writes, “…the great implementation 
and achievement of Chinese socialism declares the end of the hegemonic history of western 
modernization.”201 Aside from the PRC’s developmental model as an alternative to western 
institutions for other countries, in these two articles as well as others in the data pool, the 
connections between domestic institutions and their impact on the world are also tightened by the 
constant mentioning of the “Chinese Proposal.” 
In evaluating the eight labels from 2005 to 2018 as a whole, a discursive assertiveness 
starts from 2012 onward with the exception of 2013. Most of the articles that have values of 1 for 
at least five labels by meeting their definitions are in 2012 and years after. These articles assure 
the advantages and/or superiority of Chinese institutions, including the CCP’s leadership, 
through foreign voices mediated by Chinese writers.  
 
201 Zhou Wen and Fang Qian [周 文 方 茜], “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Widens the Path for 
Developing Countries on Their Way to Modernization” [中国特色社会主义拓展了发展中国家走向现代化
的途径], Qiushi, issue 6, 2018. 
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To support the Chinese thesis, a 2014 article cites Immanuel Wallerstein’s argument about 
the world system as saying, “the creation of capitalism is not a glory but rather a cultural 
humiliation. Capitalism is a dangerous anesthesia. In the entire history, most civilizations, 
especially Chinese civilization, have been stopping its development. The Christian civilization of 
the west, however, succumbs to it at its weakest moment. Thereafter, we have been suffering the 
consequences.”202 A 2012 article presents a good example of how the PRC diversifies foreign 
sources to affirm self-value. The president of Senegal is quoted as saying: “it is not only Africa 
but also the west who need to learn from China.” The author also cites the alleged views of 
western Caucasian scholars, in the US and Britain, who either have reputations in China studies 
or teach in highly renowned academic institutions, to endorse the rule of the CCP. “It is the 
Chinese Communist Party which guides China forward. The CCP is different from the Soviet 
communists. Chinese reforms differ from those of the USSR. China insists on the socialist path 
and the leadership of the CCP, which guarantees the success of opening and reform.” Another 
quotation claimed to come from an American scholar reads as follows, “the political institutions 
of China solve international crisis effortlessly and the Chinese path should be regarded more 
highly than western democracy.” It continues to quote the words from the then ruling political 
party of Ethiopia and the former US ambassador to China to prove that foreign countries and 
dignitaries hold the same view with the PRC’s in that the rise of China is good for world peace. 
Last but not least, according to the author’s claim, a renowned Mexican economist describes 
 
202 Su Changhe [苏长和] “Affirming China’s Position in Democracy” [确立民主政治的中国坐标], Qiushi 
issue 11, 2014. 
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China’s development as “unprecedented” and a “great success” that “should be a learning model 
for Mexico and all of Latin America.”203 
It is important to know that the above examples come from examined data by the selecting 
criteria of two keywords, “international” and “order”, and only from those that have a value of 1 
for at least five labels. There is however a larger body of texts about Chinese institutions when 
the criteria change to “capitalism”, “socialism,” and “democracy.” These use the same 
techniques of discursive structure to argue for the superiority of Chinese institutions. The 
following are examples.  
For the PRC, “the basic ideals and values of socialism do not disappear with drastic 
changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe. They prove successful in China’s reform and 
development.” An article in 2012 states so. Carrying the economic success, the CCP argues that 
it is providing an alternative for “the future of mankind’s civilization”, by “reshaping the world’s 
perceptions toward socialist theory and practice.”204 The Chinese development, from the PRC’s 
viewpoint, has international appeal because “[economic and other] achievements bring attention 
and admiration from many developing countries. They are trying to learn from the experience 
and the laws of the unique ‘China Model’.”205 The International Liaison Department of the CCP 
claims that by November 12, 2012, more than 800 congratulations letters had been received 
regarding the 18th Party Congress. It notes, “foreign parties and politicians highly assess the 
 
203 Kong Genhong [孔根红] “Chinese Path in A Global Perspective” [全球视野中的中国道路] in Chinese 
Path in Global And Comparative Perspectives”[国际比较和全球视野中的中国道路], Qiushi, issue 21, 2012. 
204Zhu Lijia [ 竹立家] “China Provides New Alternative for Mankind’s Civilization” [中国为人类文明提供
新的选择] in China Provides New Alternative for Mankind’s Civilization and Other Five Articles [中国为人
类文明提供新的选”等 6则], Qiushi, issue 3, 2012.  
205 Li Gang and Wang Zaiwen [李刚 王再文] “The International Influence of China Model” [“中国模式”的国
际影响] in Western Political Model Cannot be Copied and Other Five Articles [西方政治模式不可复制等 6
则], Qiushi, issue 22, 2010. 
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historical achievements of the Chinese path and express that the CCP has conducted correct 
political lines at different periods.” The author canvasses statements from foreign politicians to 
support the idea that “China has been successful in building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.”206 Another article penned by a member of the policy planning staff of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains three-and-a-half pages of foreign acclaim of Chinese 
development and institutions that are again tailored to what the regime wants the population to 
believe and/or what it believes.207  
Chinese Culture  
The narratives starting from 2012 also use Chinese culture/Chinese civilization to further 
elaborate why the PRC will do better than other powers. Despite a drop in 2013 and a minor 
decrease in 2016, the overall trend climbs upward (see graph 4.3). It is important to know that 
Chinese culture is mentioned throughout the years under examination, but when it appears in the 
context of reviving Chinese culture or promoting Chinese culture overseas, with no connections 
to how and why the PRC can make the world better, they are not coded in the dataset. This 
research is interested in two functions of Chinese culture. First, the label of culture (I) receives 
the value of 1 when Chinese culture/traditions/civilization is defined as inclusiveness and evoked 
as the principle which the PRC claims to follow in its foreign policy. Second, the label of culture 
(II) receives the value of 1 when Chinese culture/traditions/civilization is defined as the root 
source for Chinese socialism, which in the text is linked to how and why China will make the 
 
206 The International Liaison Department of the CCP [中共中央对外联络部研究室], “The New Realm of 
Chinese Path: Chinese Path in the Eyes of Foreign Dignitaries”  [中国道路新境界—— 外国政党政要眼中的
中国道路], Qiushi, issue 23, 2012.  
207 Zheng Xiwen [郑熙文], “How Do Foreign Dignitaries See China” [外国政要看中国], Qiushi, issue 19, 
2014. 
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world order better. The two labels are mutually exclusive. The following are discursive examples 
taken from the data pool.  
Graph 4.3 shows that historically Chinese culture/civilization is more associated with the 
peace principle that the PRC claims to follow in foreign policies. From 2011 onward, its 
affiliation with Sinicized socialism starts to emerge and reached a record high in 2017 and 2018.  
Graph 4.3 
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politics that refers to the behavior of the west, especially the US.208 Another example is a 2016 
article. In one paragraph, it first defines Chinese socialism from theoretical, institutional and 
cultural aspects. The author then writes, “The Chinese socialist path…is rooted in the heritage of 
the 5000-years long history of the Chinese nation.” The article continues to state that “peaceful 
development is the necessary choice derived from Chinese socialism……This path differs from 
the old logic that a strong country will inevitably end up becoming a hegemon. It avoids the old 
path of building a colonial system, competing for spheres of influence, and expanding outward 
through use of force as capitalist imperialism did.” 209  
A 2018 article traces the two proposals (building a “new type of international relations” 
and building a “shared community for mankind” (人类命运共同体) ) China has for the world to 
the Chinese culture with a claimed 5000-year-long history, specifically the idea of “the world as 
a community.” (天下为公) It further details what this world will look like: open, inclusive, 
cooperative, and just.210 Another 2018 article also uses the term, “the world as a community,” 
along with “harmony without sameness” (合而不同) and “finding common ground within 
differences” (求同存异) to describe the ideas that Chinese culture emits. In the same paragraph, 
the author suggests the need to explore how the ideas of governance and the way to behave in the 
Chinese culture resonate with the needs of today’s world. The author argues that these cultural 
 
208 Qin Yaqing [秦亚青], “The Correct Ideas About Righteousness and Interests: Ideational Innovation and 
Principles for Implementation in China’s Diplomacy in A New Era” [正确义利观：新时期中国外交的理念
创新和实践原则], Qiushi, issue 12, 2014.  
209 Qiu Shi [秋 石],”Continue to Search the New Realm for Governance” [不断开拓治国理政新境界], 
Qiushi, issue 5, 2015.   
210 Wang Yi [王 毅], “Chart A New Realm for Major Country’s Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” [开
辟新时代中国特色大国外交新境界], Qiushi, issue 1, 2018.  
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ideas are conducive to promoting the peaceful and inclusive world that China intends to build, as 
opposed to the way of hegemonism and power politics. 211  
English Texts  
The collection of English essays includes the years 2009 to 2018. Except for 2009 which 
only has the beginning issue, each year has four. As with the Chinese version, the majority of 
English articles are about domestic politics (Chinese “democracy”), economic development, 
social issues, ethnicities and population, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theory, and national defense. 
Articles about foreign relations and/or world politics and economy, although not a dominant 
theme, can be found in the majority of issues. For both internal and external affairs, theorization, 
affirmation of the CCP’s or China’s capabilities, and praise of achievements are prevalent 
frameworks as they are in the Chinese version as well. It is also not strange to find a recognition 
of setbacks and needed improvements as is the case in the Chinese texts, but that the CCP or 
China remains on a good footing with promising prospects and the world can rely on the PRC for 
growth and a more democratic governance set the overall tone for the journal.  
The articles in the English dataset whose texts contain “international” and “order” and the 
texts are in part or in their entirety relevant to international order are 94. The graphs are 
presented below. The colors of each label in the English charts may not be same with those in the 
Chinese charts. Readers can get the definitions through Romanized numerical labels which have 
the same meanings in both the Chinese and English charts. Different from the Chinese texts, the 
English texts do not show a smooth upward trend. The year of 2018 experienced a drop across 
the four groups. The international order group also had a drop in 2017 compared to the statistics 
 
211 Zhang Xiaojun [张晓君],”Respect the Authoritativeness of International Law and Maintain International 
Order” [尊重国际法权威 维护国际秩序], Qiushi, issue 20, 2018. 
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of 2016. Unlike the Chinese texts which show a drop in 2013 except for the international order 
group and the general group, the English dataset only has one apparent drop in the international 
group. Overall, in each given year from 2015 to 2018, the numbers are higher than those before 
2015. Accordingly, it is safe to conclude that in general China was more assertive in the period 
of 2015 to 2018 than that from 2009 to 2014.  
Graph 4.4 
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Graph 4.6 
 
Graph 4.7 
 
A good number of English articles are translations from the Chinese version of Qiushi. 
Sometimes they appear in the same year and sometimes after a one-year lag. Others come from 
Red Flag Manuscript, People’s Daily, Learning Times, Study Times, Xinhua News Agency, and 
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celebrating diversity in one unity. In English Qiushi, foreign relations are grouped under the 
sectional title, “International,” or beginning in 2015 “China’s Peaceful Development,” to 
disseminate Chinese views and defend Chinese positions on the PRC’s preferred world order, 
values, and territorial claims based on its historical interactions with other major and non-major 
countries. The institutional comparison, within and outside the pool of articles that contain both 
“international” and “order”, between the Chinese and the American or western systems also 
appears in the English version in a way that highlights the benefits of “the Chinese model” 
(Chinese socialism, Chinese institutions) for the world. In other words, the PRC is saying to 
audiences at home and abroad that since it can govern well at home, it can do so on the 
international stage as well because of the spill-over effect of the values and Chinese traditions 
that it inherits. Similarly, in the English texts, it is the term “Chinese proposal” which explains 
the interrelations between Chinese socialism and Chinese culture, and how they benefit domestic 
governance and the running of international affairs under a “better” world order that Beijing 
espouses. Since the meanings in the English narratives are the same, this section will not repeat 
the presentation of the narratives that has already been done in the section on the Chinese texts.  
It is important to note that the presented statistics and trend is a sample of a larger pool of 
articles that are not included in this study for analysis, because they do not contain both 
“international” and “order” in a single text. This does not mean that those articles are irrelevant. 
In many cases, the texts use “world order” or “international (financial, economic, trade) system.” 
In some cases, it is clear that the main theme of articles is about the international order, for 
instance, essays about a community of a shared future for mankind or essays that dissert 
Beijing’s approaches and policies for world economy and international politics. This type of 
essay can include keywords such as “global governance” and “Chinese proposal.” Although 
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these articles fit the analytical purpose in this study, they are not included in the dataset because 
they do not contain “international” and “order.” 
Another important thing to take note is that within the dataset, some phrases may be 
expressed in different ways but were left out of the statistics. For instance, in describing the 
Chinese way of doing things or any measures coming from China that are helpful in dealing with 
world issues, aside from “Chinese proposal”, “Chinese wisdom” and “Chinese path”, the essays 
also use “Chinese solution” (a synonym of “Chinese proposal”) and “Chinese/China model” (a 
synonym of “Chinese path”). Those which use “Chinese solution” and “Chinese model” are not 
counted under any labels. 
Another situation is that in some cases phrases do not appear in the text the same way the 
coding labels show but are expressed in a grammatically different form. Take “Chinese 
proposal” and “Chinese wisdom” as an example. It can be written as follows: “Building a 
community of shared future for humanity to unite efforts at creating a peaceful, tranquil, 
prosperous, open, and beautiful world is the great proposal that the CCP and the Chinese people 
have put forward in accordance with historical trends and the demands of contemporary 
development. This proposal thus put the solution and wisdom that China can offer for promoting 
the progress of humanity on display and demonstrate its sense of responsibility in this effort, 
while also serving as a powerful manifestation of China’s confidence in the path and system of 
socialism of Chinese characteristics. ”212 Such cases do not receive the value of 1 for the labels 
of “Chinese proposal” and “Chinese wisdom”. 
 
212 Hu Yuexing and Zhao Cengzhen, “Building A Community of Shared Future for Humanity: the CPC’s 
Grand Mission,” English Qiushi, vol. 10, no. 4, 2018, pp. 134-136, (specifically p. 136). English translation 
original.  
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Another English article of Qiushi also demonstrates that “Chinese path” and “Chinese 
wisdom” are expressed in grammatically different ways and does not receive the value of 1. 
Meanwhile, this essay provides the example showing how Beijing uses othering and altercasting 
to shape the role of itself and others, with a goal of highlighting its own capabilities and altruism. 
After all, it is about itself. The essay criticized the protective measures taken by “some 
developed economies” and continued to add, “this has upset the regular order of international 
trade,……increased the international community’s misgivings about the future of free trade, and 
added a great amount of uncertainty for a global economy that is still in the process of recovery.” 
What follows the criticism is China’s offer to solve such problems. It writes, “The pilot free trade 
zones and free trade port……are China’s main platforms for meeting international high-standard 
trade and investment regulations, and for making active participation in the process of 
globalization an integral component of China’s own reform and opening up. China will thus 
explore a new path and offer its wisdom for the healthy and sustained development of 
globalization.”213 The message that the PRC delivers to the international audiences is that, to put 
it explicitly, “I understand many of you are victims of some countries’ selfish policy and I can 
provide you a solution.” Beijing is projecting onto others of its own interests and perception that 
globalization of its own version is still needed for one’s development, and presents itself as an 
ideal candidate to continue offering such public goods. 
A Myriad of Stars Cluster around the Moon 
Chinese traditions/culture and Chinese socialism are enablers in the PRC’s narratives to 
create a better world order that Beijing imagines. The question then is what the relations between 
 
213 Institute of international economic studies of the Chinese academy of macroeconomic research, “China’s 
Expansion of Opening Up Is Brining Great Opportunities to the World,” English Qiushi vol. 10, no.4, 2018, 
pp. 26-31, (specifically pp. 28-29). English translation original. 
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the PRC and other countries look like, as indicated or implied by the narratives that Chinese 
culture and Chinese socialism are good for the world. What kind of relationship must be in place 
for Chinese institutions and Chinese culture to be good for the world? 
According to the Chinese claim, even though the Chinese experience is “a model” or “an 
alternative” to western institutions for other states, it does not export China’s socialist/Marxist 
institutions to other countries.214 As indicated by the Chinese narratives, what the PRC wants 
other countries to learn from China’s experience is that countries’ development needs to be 
tailored in accord with the local conditions and that there are other ways of development, aside 
from the western model. This is what the narratives mean when they mention that the Chinese 
way of development provides an alternative to the Western model for developing countries. In 
addition, as indicated by “Chinese proposal,” Beijing is proactively pushing through some 
agendas for global governance. Therefore, the type of relationship that describes the interactions 
between China and other countries, as the narratives reveal, needs to consider both inactiveness 
and proactiveness. An unstated but preferred way of interaction is the type of “a myriad of stars 
cluster around the moon” (zhong xing gong yue眾星拱月). The brightening of the moon itself 
attracts numerous stars to appreciate its extraordinariness. This is demonstrated by the discursive 
evidence within and without the dataset examined.215  
 
 
214 For instance, see A 2018 article about forming consensus among political parties around the world. It 
concludes, “China will not import foreign model, nor will it export the Chinese model. It will never demand 
that another country copy Chinese methods.”  Song Tao, “Toward the Common Goal of a Brighter Future:  
Building Consensus among the World’s Political Parties,” English Qiushi, vol. 10, no. 2, 2018, pp. 127-130, 
(specifically p. 130). English translation original.  
215 The following discursive evidence thus will draw upon articles within and outside of the database under 
analysis.  
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According to the Qiushi narratives, the PRC’s logic goes this way: the CCP’s successful 
domestic governance is based on the Chinese path/model that is characterized by the innate good 
and peaceful nature of Chinese institutions (Chinese socialism or Chinese Marxism)216 which has 
high associations with Chinese traditions and Chinese culture. The superior qualities of the 
Chinese model have drawn admiration from and made the Chinese experience an example for 
many outside China, and to share the benefits with others that Chinese Marxism endows to the 
Chinese population, the PRC will altruistically take on the responsibilities of a major power and 
run international affairs the same beneficial way as Chinese socialism and Chinese culture allow 
it to do in the domestic realm. When the narratives mention “Chinese proposal,” it carries the 
following meanings: for various policies proposed in the fields of world economy, environment 
and international politics, they embody the inclusive Chinese way of doing things.  
“[A]s the theoretical fruit borne of the adaptation of Marxism to Chinese conditions, the 
theoretical framework of socialism with Chinese characteristics is deeply rooted in the fertile soil 
of Chinese culture, and is a reflection of the wishes of the Chinese people.”217 In other words, 
sinicized Marxism is compatible with and reflects to the certain degree Chinese 
traditions/culture. While it may seem, under the title, Promoting Chinese Culture with High 
Degree of Confidence, that sinicized Marxism is secondary to the traditional Chinese culture that 
the PRC has been eager to incorporate in the national and foreign policy discourse in recent 
years, the emphasis is really on Chinese Marxism, i.e, Chinese socialist culture that mixes 
 
216 While Beijing’s propaganda about Chinese inclusiveness and harmony strikes a Confucianist tone, the 
narratives for foreign consumption do not shy away from affirming Chinese practices of Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism despite its international bankruptcy. Instead, the writings about the CCP’s governance in English 
Qiushi when translating their Chinese versions also include many that feature the benefits of Chinese Marxism 
to today’s domestic “successes” and to the world. Both domestic development-oriented and foreign policy 
articles contain correlations between the inherent goodness of Chinese Marxism and benefits to the world. 
217 “Promoting Chinese Culture with A High Degree of Confidence”, Qiushi, issue 3, 2015, pp. 109-113, 
(specifically pp. 111). This article is outside of the database under examination. 
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traditional culture and imported Marxism. “In order to give full play to the distinct advantages of 
traditional Chinese culture, we must work to promote cultural transformation and innovation 
under the guidance of Marxism……ensuring that our culture can become an important source of 
nutrition for the cultivation of socialist values.” Chinese culture now is represented by sinicized 
socialism as the article writes, “the theoretical framework of Chinese socialism embodies our 
culture’s rich heritage and ethos.”218 The rest of the article centers on a need to enhance 
governance through thoroughly implementing socialist values.  
Omitting the intentional destruction of Chinese culture during Mao’s years, a practice also 
seen in other articles about relations between sinicized Marxism and Chinese traditions, a 2016 
article titled, How the CCP Views Traditional Chinese Culture, defends, idealizes and rewrites 
the CCP’s history by the argument that the Party “combines revolutionary spirit with scientific 
spirit, attempting to unite the two in its approach to traditional culture.”  In other words, 
Sinicized Marxism absorbs both revolutionary and traditional spirits as the article concludes, 
“the CPC (or CCP) has always been committed to the creation of a Chinese form of Marxism 
through the integration of Marxism and China’s fine traditional culture. By blending the two, it 
has succeeded in developing Chinese theories of Marxism that conform to contemporary 
needs.”219  
In disserting how the CCP will “build a community of shared future for humanity,” a 2018 
essay writes that this idea “succeeds and builds upon Marxist concepts of community……The 
appeal that the CCP has made to humanity on the basis of this concept of shared future not only 
 
218 Ibid. pp. 111-112.  
219 This article is outside of the database under examination. Shi Zhongquan, “How the CCP Views Traditional 
Chinese Culture,” Englsh Qiushi, vol. 8, no. 4, issue 29, 2016, pp. 72-75, (specifically p. 75). English 
translation original.  
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represents an innovative development of Marxist theory, but also a solution for solving the 
contemporary issues that we are now facing (emphasis added).” The author further connects the 
idea of this community to Chinese traditions. “The idea of community of shared future for 
humanity is rooted in China’s rich cultural traditions. Chinese traditional culture advocates 
harmony that spreads to every corner of the world, unites humans and nature, brings peace 
between all nations, and bridges all forms of diversity.”220 
In comparing Chinese socialism and western institutions in the sense that the former fits 
China’s domestic governance better and will benefit the world more,221 another 2018 essay 
writes, “ Chinese socialism inherits traditional Chinese philosophical concepts such as the unity 
of humans and nature and harmonious coexistence, and is guided by Marxist ideas about the full 
and free development of every individual, advocating harmony between people and people, 
between people and society, and between people and nature……making China become an 
important contributor to and leader for global ecological civilization.” It comments that China’s 
“unique, inclusive and fair path of modernization” is not “based on the expansion of territory” 
and “sets an example and provides experience for other developing countries in striking a 
balance between independence and openness and rapidly getting rid of their marginal status in 
global systems (emphasis added)” The PRC is projecting what it perceives of itself and 
 
220 Hu Yuexing and Zhao Cengzhen, “Building A Community of Shared Future for Humanity: the CPC’s 
Grand Mission,” English Qiushi, vol. 10, no. 4, 2018, pp. 134-136. English translation original. 
221 Discursive evidence is as follows. “the historic achievements of Chinese socialism demonstrate China’s 
institutional advantages.” “On the relations between the state and society, Chinese socialism breaks the typical 
western understanding and pattern of thinking characterized by binary opposition and a tradeoff between the 
state and society, creating a novel system and pattern of social governance. On relationships between 
countries, Chinese socialism surpasses the hegemonic ‘winner-takes-all’ logic, and the ‘zero-sum’ Cold War 
mentality, advocating and promoting the establishment of a new model of international relations characterized 
by mutually beneficial cooperation……” See Research Office of the International Department of the CPC 
Central Committee, “International Significance of the Theories and Practice of Chinese Socialism,” English 
Qiushi, 2018, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 129-136, (specifically pp. 131-133). English translation original.  
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corresponding needs to what other countries wish by assuming they all shared similar 
experiences in the past and feel the same as well as want the same thing. 
Chinese Marxism mentioned above is the essence that upholds “the Chinese model”, a 
synonym for “Marxist political economy”222 and the “Chinese path,” that endorses one-party rule 
for China’s national development. A 2015 article, The Chinese Model: Spurring China Forward 
and Benefiting the World, frames Chinese influence as if this is the common wish of many, 
instead of what the PRC needs.223 It presents a Chinese way of development “enlightening 
western countries” and “encouraging more and more developing countries to give up their blind 
faith in the Western model and follow a path that is more suited to their national conditions, with 
the ultimate aim of achieving modernization.” It then goes on saying, after citing alleged praise 
from an Israeli president, how the Chinese model can provide “inspiration and thrust for the 
resolutions of many problems in the Middle East, such as poverty, unemployment, education and 
lagging science and technology.” This newly found influence is portrayed as “the Chinese model 
is unexpectedly assuming the responsibility of justifying the development models of emerging 
countries (emphasis added).” To further strengthen the idea that Chinese influence is “a natural 
outgrowth” of China’s rise, the author comments that “China has no intention of exporting its 
development model to other countries. However, it must be acknowledged that while the Chinese 
model paves the way for China’s success, it is also exerting an increasingly large influence on 
regional and global governance.”  
 
 
222 The term appears in this essay. Xu Guangchun, “Comprehensively Developing Marxism for 21st-Century 
China,” English Qiushi, issue 3, 2016, pp. 28-35. 
223 Wang Yiwei, “The Chinese Model: Spurring China Forward and Benefiting the World,” English Qiushi, 
vol, 7, issue 2, 2015, pp. 17-21, (specifically pp. 20-21). English translation original. This article is outside of 
the database under examination. 
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The PRC is saying that it welcomes other countries to learn from China but it is not 
actively promoting its way of development. “A number of foresighted people in the West have 
already begun rethinking their development models, and have started to place their hopes in 
China;”224 “some western commentators have noted the sense of admiration that was felt in the 
West upon witnessing how China was able to quickly read the situation, formulate the policies, 
and take action in the wake of the financial crisis.”225 The type of interaction and influence 
inferred here is the one of “the myriad of stars cluster around the moon.” In the PRC’s discursive 
context, the logic goes that China is important, not because the CCP proactively advocates such, 
but rather others recognize its contributions, goodness and ways of doing things. Beijing’s 
narratives imply that because of the merits in Chinese governance and its inherent moral 
goodness, such as the inclusive tendency rooted in the Chinese culture, the PRC is like a radiant 
sun emanating light to enlighten all, and others come willingly to learn, which upholds the 
PRC’s central position. This is the working mechanism between Chinese institutions, Chinese 
culture, and a claimed better world to come under the CCP stewardship. Such form of interaction 
in which Chinese influence flows also functions behind the disseminated idea and a Chinese 
belief that as long as China is powerful under the CCP’s leadership, the world is peaceful.226    
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 Ibid., pp. 20. English translation original.  
225 Zhan Dexiong, “History Tells Us That China Must Follow Its Own Path,” English Qiushi, vol. 6, no. 1, 
2014, p. 118. English translation original. 
226 “In fact, the more China develops, the stronger the position developing countries will be in to end 
hegemonism and power politics.” See Chen Shuguan, “Interpreting the Chinese Model,” English Qiushi vol. 7, 
no. 1, 2015, pp. 64-67. English translation original.  
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Chapter 5 
A Discussion of Strategies and Grand Strategy 
This chapter analyzes the methods that the PRC uses to attain the goal of “a revived 
Chinese nation” deferred to by others. Chapter 3 demonstrates that Chinese aspirations have been 
global and material capabilities are its main yardstick in gauging the world balance of power. 
The discussions here further elaborate the strategic importance of regions surrounding the 
country and the geopolitical re-conception of the world. In the context of China projecting the 
self as a prospective global power, strategic orientation shifts to be outward-looking. Border 
regions now take on strategic significance beyond fending off invasion of the homeland (and 
defense against invasion has dropped as the priority of national security) and preventing 
migration of so-called “terrorists” across borders. Neither are border areas mainly about 
territorial disputes and sovereignty as, from the Chinese perspective, the legacy of colonization 
and unresolved business left from history. They have strategic value, militarily and/or non-
militarily, to the country in its design of obtaining grand political objectives during its 
globetrotting age. As with the past practices of other major powers, the PRC conceptualizes the 
world by placing itself at the center. Asia-Pacific for the PRC is an ever-expanding concept that 
spatially marginalizes Western Europe and the Atlantic.   
With geopolitical and geostrategic redefinitions of the world discussed, this chapter moves 
on to analyze winning without fighting as China’s grand strategy. François Jullien’s thesis about 
Chinese efficacy that focuses on situations and how to make most of them, i.e. how to use, create 
and maintain favorable tides (shi 勢) at minimized costs in a given environment (xing 形), 
provides insightful theoretical understandings of this idea based on a broad range of literature 
across military and non-military classics. China’s strategic culture is about how to conduct a 
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protracted silent warfare of transformation which simple dichotomies of defensive versus 
offensive, passive versus proactive, cannot address. China’s strategic culture is neither defensive 
nor offensive, but rather about how political objectives can be realized. 
How the PRC makes use of a situation falls into three categories. First, the post-Cold War 
environment has been relatively peaceful and this predisposes Chinese behavior in some aspects 
to be or appear to be in accord with existing norms (using the situation). The ensuing strategy 
based on the  evaluation of a given situation is “cooperation”, one of the most prevailing words 
in the Chinese discourse, to create the impression that it is doing things which everyone is doing 
and what it does is compatible with others’ interests and thus there is no need for objection. 
Second, another dictate of strategic thinking is to redirect things back to preferred tracks without 
inviting hostility to the degree that makes impossible the attainment of political goals (creating 
the situation within the bounds of but not exactly in accord with the existing norm with the goal 
of eventually changing that norm by building the momentum for the situation created). This is 
evidenced in the strategy of managed confrontation in the case of militarization in the South 
China Sea. The third rationale is to reinforce the situational tendency once it is established in the 
first and second cases (maintaining the favorable situation). The Belt & Road Initiative that 
materializes the geostrategy of consolidating China’s west, by further expanding the PRC’s 
strategic hinterland to the Eurasian continent beyond Xinjiang and Tibet, and thereby dealing 
with the challenges from the east, is such an example. The above three propositions concern 
fulfillment of self-interest within the framework of winning without fighting.   
Grand strategy, in the case of China, is about how a state utilizes all available resources, 
including economic, military, cultural, political and diplomatic, to achieve the grand political 
goals of national security, which in the case of the PRC refers to the obtainment of international 
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status and influence supported by material capabilities. Beijing’s grand strategy so far operates 
according to “winning without fighting.” This phrase does not mean that China averts war. The 
PRC merely tries to make the war easier, if it ever judges that the situation requires such a 
solution in the future. According to Chinese strategic thought, peacetime maneuvers and war 
should be seen as a continuum, an uninterrupted evolution of events. War may be relied on if 
peacetime measures prove ineffective. War may not be relied on if peacetime measures prove 
effective. This thread of logic is reflected in Beijing’s efforts to expand Chinese influence 
through Confucius Institutes, global and regional economic initiatives, military diplomacy, 
military activities, paramilitary actions in the South China Sea, head-of-the-state visits, etc. With 
Chinese influence getting entrenched in different parts of the world, resistance from smaller 
states will get weakened and over time the influence of other powers may also recede. When the 
situation evolves to this stage, there is no need to fight. China’s post-Cold War emphasis on a 
peaceful international climate, i.e., no major war/world war, aims to enable the implementation 
of this scheme.227 Meanwhile, it is realistically preparing for war through many of its activities. 
Therefore, grand strategy in the case of the PRC needs to be understood from a broader 
timeframe.   
The obtainment of international influence and status depends on the fulfillment of various 
interests, including economic, territorial, military and maritime. The realization of these interests 
requires strategies, rather than grand strategy. Strategies function on a much narrower 
geographical scope, for instance, strategies for the South China Sea, whereas grand strategy 
functions on a more expansive geographical space because it considers how the interests in 
 
227 Chinese narratives do indicate that a relatively peaceful international environment means no major war and 
no world war. For the discursive evidence, see chapter 3 and chapter 6.  
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different places can work together to realize the grand political goals. Strategies for the 
fulfillment of a wide range of issues need to work within the bounds of the grand strategy. In 
other words, since “winning without fighting” as a grand strategy corresponds to a relatively 
peaceful international environment, strategies employed to obtain, for instance, territorial and 
economic interests, cannot create conflicts to the extent that war is required to solve disputes. 
Managed provocation in the SCS thus is a strategy, instead of a grand strategy.  
China’s grand strategy and strategies follow the subjective evaluations of xing, or 
international environment(s). They speak to the PRC’s positions about war and peace as tools of 
statecraft, both of which are conditioned in Chinese decision making and do not reflect some 
innate qualities of a polity. Winning without fighting operates within the geopolitical scope of 
Asia-Pacific, which in China’s definition is a quasi-world. Grand strategy and strategies are 
supported by both strategic reasoning and cultural rationalization, with the latter justifying 
whatever the PRC does according to the publicly unstated strategic reasoning as being always 
right, mutually beneficial and defensive. The fact that this rationalization takes place at the level 
of global expansion speaks to a high degree of “cult of defense” as defined by Andrew 
Scobell.228  
Geopolitical Re-conception of the World 
Multipolarity in China’s view is an anticipated trend and prospect for future power 
dynamics in that the world is moving in that direction. The timing of its final arrival is uncertain. 
What is certain in the Chinese narratives is that the PRC is the main driving force in the 
reconfiguration of the world balance of power. In a 2013 CMS article about the “international 
 
228 Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Long March and the Great Wall. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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strategic situation,” the author sees China and the U.S. as the main actors that will decide the 
future power structure. “Multipolarity is expected to take shape in the next 10 or 20 years as the 
world power dynamic becomes more balanced…… Changes have occurred to the relative 
strength of developed countries and developing countries. Particularly, major changes have taken 
place in the relative strength between China, the biggest developing country, and the US, the 
biggest developed country……The overall capabilities of the New Markets and developing 
countries have increased and are becoming an important pole capable of checking and balancing 
hegemonism.” It further discusses “the reconfiguration of strategic forces” by elaborating three 
major international regimes: the western alliance led by the U.S., BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa), and SCO and ASEAN.229 In these three groups of organizations, China 
has been active and attempts to play a bigger role in the latter two.  
The narrowing gaps between the developed and developing camps that underlie the 
possibilities of a multi-polar world are discussed in detail in a 2013 article from Contemporary 
International Relations (CIR 现代国际关系)230 In assessing what has changed and what has not, 
the essay dissects the relative strength from different developmental aspects. According to the 
author, about 8 to 10 years ago, the U.S., Europe and Japan accounted for 60% to 70% of the 
world economy while the percentage at the current stage has dropped below 60%. Despite the 
narrowing gap between developed and developing camps, the article argues that it will take at 
least ten or more years to see a decisive shift of balance. The author however contends that the 
gaps in terms of the quality of the economy, technology and culture are wider and may take 20 to 
 
229Qi Jianguo [戚建國], “Understanding of and Consideration on the Evolution of International Strategic 
Situation”[對國際戰略形勢演變與思考], Chinese Military Science (CMS), no. 4, issue 130, 2013, pp. 56-61. 
230 This is a journal issued by China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations affiliated with the 
Ministry of State Security of the PRC. 
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30 years to be able to compete or replace the influence from advanced economies. The above 
comparison similarly applies to the relations between China and the U.S. According to the 
article, China’s aggregate economic volume has ranked second in the world, but the rest lag far 
behind the US. It will take another 10 to 20 years for China to “become a great power which is 
internationally recognized, persuasive, and respected” (中国在今后一二十年内成为世界公认
的、信服的、尊重的大国、强国).231 Under the framework that the current and future world 
politics at its core is about the U.S. and China, Chinese narratives however do not unanimously 
agree on the length of time it will take to realize multipolarity and whether the U.S. is in decline. 
A 2017 article from CIR writes, “the fundamental characteristic of the current 
international strategic situation continues to be one superpower and multiple powers (一超多強) 
and the process of moving toward multipolarity is unbalanced. Due to a revival in the 
comprehensive national capabilities and the power to set rules and regulations, the status of the 
US as a superpower will remain in the next 20 to 30 years.”232 Individual authors’ points of view, 
changing bilateral relations, major international political and economic events, and endorsement 
of the official positions can all lead to variations in the assessments. Regardless, the prospect of a 
multi-polar world in the future hardly changes.  
In the Chinese texts, a correlated phenomenon with multi-polarity that the rise of China 
contributes to is the shifting center of global strategic gravity. In a 2010 CMS essay that 
summarizes Chinese researches about the country’s grand strategy, one author takes the Eurasian 
 
231Chu Shulong [楚树龙], “The Changes and Constant in International Politics and China’s International 
Strategy” [国际格局的变与不变及中国国际战略], Contemporary International Relations (CIR), issue 4, 
2013, pp. 3-5, (specifically p. 5). 
232 Feng Yujun [冯玉军],”Changes in International Environment and China’s Strategic Choices”[国际形势新
变化与中国的战略选择],  CIR, issue 3, 2017, pp. 9-15, (specifically p. 11). 
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continent as the geographical center of the PRC’s foreign policies. It writes that “promoting 
multi-polarity is China’s primary international strategy and a significant part of China’s 
geostrategy. The strategy of multipolarity aims to have the central force of the Eurasian continent 
play a more important role in world affairs to counter the American plot of itself being a 
hegemonic superpower. China during the Cold War was in a subservient status. Its rank in the 
geopolitics of the Eurasian continent however has been elevated markedly since the end of the 
Cold War.”233 Not only do the narratives reveal a China-centered worldview in that the country 
is the main driving force behind positive changes in international politics, they also highlight the 
strategic importance of the vast continent. The relations between the two in many other articles is 
that the PRC is the center of this new geostrategic and geopolitical arena where a multi-polar 
dynamic is forming.   
The key connecting idea here is that the center of strategic gravity has moved to the East, 
appearing in the texts by various forms of expressions. For instance, a 2012 CIR essay writes, 
“the Greater Asia-Pacific is geographically endowed. Its economic scale and unlimited prospect 
of development are decisive in replacing the Europe-Atlantic Region as the center of global 
geopolitics.”234 A 2013 CIR article brings in more actors to stress the region’s importance. “East 
Asia is a region where major powers interact most frequently and where they find their interests 
are.” The author identifies the American “pivot to Asia” and its plan to create “a Pacific 
Century,” Russia’s “looking to the East” and its “Eurasian Economic Union,” India’s “Look 
 
233 Xia Zhennan [夏征难], “A Summary of Researches in China’s Grand Strategies”[中國大戰略研究綜
述],CMS, vol. 6, issue 114, 2010, pp. 132-139, (specifically p. 139). 
234 Lin Limin [林利民], “ China and Changes in Asia-Pacific’s Geopolitics for the Next Five to Ten Years”[未
来 5 － 10 年亚太地缘政治变局与中国], CIR, issue 4, 2012, pp. 8-16, 62, (specifically p. 10). 
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East,” and the new efforts from Australia and New Zealand.235 Another separate 2013 CIR essay 
states that “Asia-Pacific is growing to be the center of the world geopolitics and China is the 
center of Asia-Pacific.”236 The underlying message in these writings is that the PRC is an 
unmistakably new center of geopolitics as the result of its rise and the ensuing adjustments of 
foreign policies of major powers. This begs the question of the geographical scope for China’s 
overseas activities and how it names this space that has the PRC situated at the center.  
The Eurasian continent, though the clearest among all, remains vague in terms of a definite 
geographical space as countries may draw different demarcations. East Asia cannot capture the 
true scope indicated by the above supplementing details. The East no doubt demands more 
clarifications. The term Asia-Pacific can be misleading and, as the official white paper in 2017 as 
well as the narratives before that year will demonstrate, the PRC defines it differently from 
conventional wisdom. Over the years, there has been no lack of essays discussing the 
geographical possibilities for the PRC’s overseas interests. Although there is hardly an agreed 
version and any specific terms require further territorial delimitations, by naming the countries 
for instance, for them to be concrete, the fundamental which most articles agree on, either 
advocating it explicitly or accepting it as an assumption, is that Chinese national interests extend 
beyond its immediate territorial boundaries into the far seas and non-contiguous lands. This 
discursive overseas expansion is not necessarily the result of Xi’s ascendance to power as the 
essays before 2013 already rationalized such action. 
 
235Wang Shen and Luo Xiao [王生罗肖], “The Transformation of International System and Changes in 
China’s Zhou Bian Diplomacy: From Stability Maintenance to Interests Protection” [国际体系转型与中国周
边外交之变: 从维稳到维权], CIR, issue 1, 2013, pp. 9-15, (specifically p. 12). 
236 Li Yonghui [李永辉], “Proactively Building Zhou Bian Strategic Supporting Belt to Form the Supporting 
Wing for China’s Rise” [积极打造周边战略依托带，托升中国崛起之翼], CIR, issue 10, 2013, pp. 35-37, 
(specifically p. 36). 
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Before a discursive analysis on the spatial possibilities for Chinese footprints, it is 
necessary to first discuss how the PRC has officially employed “Asia-Pacific”. Before official 
pronouncement of the term in the 2017 white paper, China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security 
Cooperation, essays from think tanks already attempted to define Asia Pacific. In a 2012 CIR 
article, the author argues that the definition of Asia Pacific is expanding because more and more 
extra regional countries (the U.S., Russia, India and Canada) claim to be Asia Pacific countries 
as the result of the elevated geopolitical status of the region. Other reasons include the expanding 
membership of ASEAN+N and APEC. According to the essay, the term thus does not 
exclusively refer to Asia, nor the Pacific; Asia plus Pacific Rim also fails to capture its true 
meanings. The author characterizes Asia Pacific in three ways: it is not a pure geographical term; 
it means openness; its geographical space is ever-expanding. Details regarding which region will 
be included in “the Greater Asia Pacific” and its relative strength are then discussed. According 
to the essay, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Oceania and the 
Americas will be parts of Greater Asia Pacific. “The number of the countries is about twice that 
of EU, no less than 50; the entire population is close to 4 billions, 8 to 10 times that of EU; it has 
the world’s four largest countries in terms of territorial size, including Russia, Canada, China and 
the US; it has the four most populous countries, including China, India, the US, and Indonesia; 
the US, China and Japan, the three most powerful economies, are here as well.” The essay 
continues to characterize Greater Asia Pacific with geopolitical and military importance from the 
numbers of permanent members in the U.N. Security Council, nuclear-armed states, and the most 
powerful militaries in the world. Economic weight does not lose its attention as the essay writes 
that the aggregate GDP of the 21 APEC countries account for 54% of the world GDP. Despite 
the recognition of influence from other major powers, the narratives nevertheless see the PRC 
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and the U.S. as the primary players. “Although there are numerous factors affecting the 
possibilities of conflict in the geopolitical structure of the Greater Asia Pacific, the core 
confrontational factor lies in the geostrategic relations between China and the U.S. Other 
confrontations are contingent on Sino-American relations.” The author proceeds to argue for the 
importance of the PRC in this new geopolitical configuration. “The rise of China comprises the 
main substance of the rise of Asia Pacific. The former drives the latter. On the other hand, the 
rise of Asia Pacific provides a conducive environment…for China’s rise.”237  
The official white paper also provides information as to how the PRC defines Asia Pacific. 
If there is any law of physics governing countries’ strategic priorities, geographical pull is one of 
them. In the white paper published in 2017, China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security 
Cooperation, countries that belong to the region include, from Beijing’s perspective, the US, 
Russia, Australia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. The definition of 
Asia-Pacific is more geopolitics than purely geography. The Paper summarizes the focuses of 
China’s foreign policies over the years so the ideas are accumulative. China is aware of the 
regional balance of power and makes relations with major states priorities. Under the heading of 
“China’s Relations with Other Major Asia-Pacific Countries,” it devotes sub-sections to relations 
with the US, Russia, India and Japan respectively. Other sections in the Paper are the regional 
hotspots, Beijing’s participation in multilateral institutions and non-traditional security 
cooperation. Sub-regional countries (non-major powers) are mentioned here individually or 
grouped together under the name of a multilateral platform. It is clear that Beijing’s definition of 
Asia Pacific is different from what is usually understood and covers more territories.  
 
 
237Lin Limin, 2012, pp. 9-11. 
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In the paper, multipolarity refers to Russia, U.S, Japan, India and China. The narratives do 
not state this explicitly but, judging from how the paper discusses issues by going through 
Beijing’s relations with each major power, it is clear that neighboring multiple major states does 
not deter the PRC from expansion. China’s footprints are present in each sphere of influence of 
the four other powers. Neighboring world powers premises that one’s expansion will inevitably 
overlap areas in the spheres of influence of other states. Russian influence extends to Central 
Asia and Eastern Europe; the US to the first island chain including the South China Sea to the 
further east of the Pacific, the Middle East and Latin America. Japan’s influence extends to East 
Asia and the South China Sea as well. India has to do with South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 
PRC does not use the term “spheres of influence” in the paper to describe the above areas, but 
the fact that states other than major powers are either specified individually or grouped together 
under a multilateral organization when it discusses China’s bilateral relations with an individual 
major country indicates its way of thinking functions according to this logic. Although the title of 
this document reads like a regional policy, the way China defines Asia-Pacific and the expressed 
intention for involvement in regions where the four powers and the smaller states in their spheres 
reside makes the PRC’s policies global. Accordingly, Asia-Pacific by geopolitical definition is a 
global, not a regional term that contains the Chinese perspective of the world and its center. 
The above analysis is a combination of how the policies of the PRC and other countries, 
responding to China’s rise as described in the Chinese narratives, altogether define the 
geographical scope of Asia Pacific and argue for its strategic significance. Aside from the 2017 
white paper and before 2017, Chinese military journals and the writings from government-
affiliated think tanks have spilled much ink in arguing for a spatial expansion of China’s 
strategic views. The concepts in focus here are zhou bian (周边), the areas/regions surrounding 
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the PRC, and strategic supporting belts (战略依托带). Most of the territories covered by these 
two concepts overlap with the boundaries of “Asia Pacific.” Despites minor variations, it is clear 
that geographical expansion of Chinese footprints simultaneously takes place with expanding 
national interests, and that the safeguarding of national interests, which can be differentiated by 
importance in degrees, requires the extension of Chinese influence away from the border regions. 
As a result, the PRC’s strategic views for its national security go beyond the border areas, into 
the region and the globe.  
Strategic Supporting Belts 
A 2011 CIR article that discusses Chinese overseas interests incorporates the reasons for 
the PRC’s foreign expansion and proposes mechanisms to safeguard overseas national interests 
along with a differentiation of these interests. This article sees foreign expansion as “a natural 
outgrowth of the scale of the Chinese economy and its influence.” Another reason is the 
“unreasonable domestic economic and societal structures.” Of the latter, the author argues that 
capital surplus and limited domestic demand due to unequal distribution of wealth and limited 
consumption lead to a large quantity of overseas investments including acquisitions and “a 
reliance on foreign markets.” To elaborate on such dependence, it further breaks down the 
industrial chains of production. According to the essay, despite its fame as “a world factory,” the 
PRC does not control the supplies of raw materials, product designs, and selling markets as well 
as prices for raw materials and final products. It is western countries who created and control the 
current global economic structure including the structures of energy and raw materials supplies. 
The author rationalizes China’s close relations with Libya, Sudan, Iran and other places with 
high political risks as alternatives to the reliance on the existing structure of oil and natural 
resources markets. The point here is to chart a new path that reduces Chinese dependence on the 
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international order built by the western countries. Still holding the view that China needs to be 
engaged in the markets where western countries already set rules and regulations, the essay 
further proposes several mechanisms to protect Chinese overseas interests, including 
participation in rule setting, finding “strategic partners and allies,” and enhancing military power 
projection.238  
While the article recognizes that there is a need to address the reliance resulting from the 
deficiencies of domestic economic structures-induced overseas expansion, it still supports 
expansion through reducing risks and costs, which can be done by the proposed mechanisms and 
“controlling production chains”. It is important to note that when the author discusses foreign 
reliance and (political) costs and risks, this is more about the lack of measures (as the author 
perceives) in place that allow the PRC to have production chains and markets in its control, and 
less about the outcome of the need for the country’s globetrotting, as the essay also states that 
foreign expansion is “a natural outgrowth of the scale of the Chinese economy and its influence.”  
The essay itself and as an embodiment of many other articles provides the evidence that the 
PRC’s national interests cannot be separated from its overseas expansion, which is necessary and 
“natural” as the narratives write, and to participate in rules setting and develop military power 
projection are recommended to protect its interests. To develop a country by a spatial expansion 
of activities is reflected in the narratives that also indicate expanded strategic views and 
boundaries for national security. In addition, to capture this logic, Chinese literature has disserted 
the concept of zhou bian.  
 
 
238Tang Hao [唐昊], “Strategic Thinking Regarding the Protection of China’s Overseas Interests” [关于中国
海外利益保护的战略思考], CIR, issue 6, 2011, pp. 1-8. 
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Zhou bian (周边), as popular a phrase as it is in the Chinese foreign policy writings, 
nevertheless does not have a clear definition. It can refer to border regions and also regions in the 
outer rings that do not immediately border the PRC. For some Chinese researchers, the term 
Great zhou bian (大周边) imagines three circles surrounding the PRC. The innermost is the 14 
neighboring countries immediately neighboring the PRC on land. The middle circle includes 
bordering maritime states, the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and the parts 
of Central Asia and Russia that do not share boundaries with the PRC. The outer circle is 
Europe, the Americas, Africa and the two poles. The relations between zhou bian and the globe 
in Chinese narratives are nuanced and no dichotomous differentiations can address their essence. 
“Because of the ‘central’ status of China in the world and its world economic expansion and 
global demands of natural resources and energy under the condition of globalization, we need to 
have a greater horizon regarding zhou bian. We need to analyze the relations between China’s 
zhou bian and the world from both perspectives of the whole and the parts.”239 The narratives do 
not equate zhou bian to the world but do not separate them either. They are interrelated. “Zhou 
bian and the world should be seen as a whole. This is the gist of ‘Great’ in the ‘Great zhou 
bian.’”240 Other Chinese researchers differentiated zhou bian into small zhou bian (小周边) and 
Great zhou bian (大周边). The former includes countries directly bordering the PRC such as 
Mongolia, Russia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia. The latter “goes 
beyond traditional geographical scopes and includes countries and areas who share similar 
 
239Yuan Peng [袁鹏], “Regarding the Strategic Thinking of China’s Zhou Bian Strategy in A New Era” [ 关于
新时期中国大周边战略的思考], CIR, issue 10, 2013, pp. 30-32, (specifically p. 31). Original text: 因中国在
世界版图中特殊的“中”国地位，以及全球化条件下中国经济的世界性扩展及资源能源的全球性需求，
使得我们应对周边要有更大视野，要从整体与局部的视角看待中国周边与世界的关系。 
240Ibid, p. 31. Original text: 周边与全球两个大局始终应被视为整体，这是新时期“大周边”战略“大” 
之要义所在。 
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strategic interests with China, including countries and areas of small zhou bian and regions of 
[China’s] strategic extension such as Western Asia and the Southern Pacific (emphasis 
added).”241 Therefore, translating zhou bian into “periphery” hardly captures its strategic 
connotations.  
Among the PRC’s immediate neighbors are both small and major states. While the border 
regions around the PRC fit into the definition of zhou bian, in the context of a Chinese belief that 
global geostrategic gravity has shifted to Asia where the PRC is situated at the center, these 
areas, especially the smaller states whose roles once were relegated, now gain strategic salience. 
They act like conveyer belts to extend Chinese influence further outward while transmitting back 
much needed natural resources and reinforcing China’s position. Another issue with equating 
zhou bian to periphery is that the PRC has identified the major powers along its borders as its 
primary targets in its design of national security. In the Chinese foreign policies, the importance 
of countries to the PRC in order is major powers, countries of zhou bian, and the developing 
countries. According to the Chinese narratives, major powers are the main players in 
international politics and zhou bian countries concern the PRC’s national interests including core 
interests. The developing world does not substantially affect China’s interests but it has been the 
foundation of China’s international political support since Mao’s period and has in recent years 
become the main supplier of natural resources and new markets for Chinese capital and products. 
Since major powers and zhou bian countries can be the same, in the case of Japan, Russia, India 
 
241Wu Zhicheng [吴志成], “More Strategic Planning Is Needed for China’s Zhou Bian Diplomacy”  [中国周
边外交需更加重视战略谋划], CIR, issue 1, 2015, pp. 25-27, (specifically p. 26). Original text: 而大周边则
超越传统的时空地理范围，涉及与中国有相同战略利益需求的海陆国家和地区，既包括小周边国家和
地区，也关系战略延伸地区，比如西亚和南太平洋地区 
255 
and the U.S. at the other end of the Pacific as well, these are overlapping categories. At this 
level, zhou bian diplomacy can be major power diplomacy.242 
Is zhou bian the world? The regions along the PRC borders do not exist in isolation. Nor 
do they exist against a historical background when overseas expansion was not in every aspect, 
economic, diplomacy, military, and cultural, essential to the Chinese regime. Countries from the 
inner to the outer circles altogether form transmission belts that are to serve Chinese interests. 
The border areas can be seen as a strategic extension of the PRC and the outer regions are a 
further extension. If the PRC can successfully deal with multiple major powers including the 
U.S., as it is also a zhou bian country in the Chinese narratives, by having them agree to respect 
its interests or reach agreements on controversial issues in or away from China’s 
neighborhood,243 it can clear obstacles to the pursuit of other interests.244 A successful diplomacy 
with major states also eases the way to outer expansion where small states or the interests of 
major powers reside. Economic and security cooperation with countries, regardless of relative 
strength, in the Chinese view will mitigate the possibility of conflict and increase the 
opportunities for access to markets and resources. As the foreign policy writings indicate, zhou 
bian can either refer to the border states or regions away from the Chinese borders. In these two 
cases, states may have varied strategic values, in degrees and by the natures of issues, to the PRC 
 
242 Wang Guifang [王桂芳],“National Interests and Choices of China Security Strategies” [國家利益與中國安
全戰略選擇], CMS, vol. 1, issue 19-1, 2006, pp. 76-83; Yuan Peng, 2013, p. 31. In this article, Yuan writes, 
“major powers are the key; zhou bian are the primary targets of China’s foreign policies; developing countries 
are the foundation” (大国是关键，周边是首要，发展中国家是基础……)  
243 It is common to see in the Chinese narratives that the PRC proposes peaceful coexistence of major powers 
on the Eurasian continent or in Asia Pacific along with a demand of respect to Chinese interests. In other 
words, the former is conditioned on the latter.  
244Wu Zhicheng, 2015, p. 26. In the paragraph that focuses on developing “new type of zhou bian relations” 
between the PRC and the U.S., after listing several flashpoints in the first island chain, the author concludes 
that “improved Sino-American relations undoubtedly will facilitate the implementation of China’s strategy of 
zhou bian diplomacy.” Zhou bian in this article refers to both border regions and territories far away from the 
PRC. 
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(the parts), but altogether they are designed to support Chinese maintenance of economic growth 
at a certain desired level if not the high-speed growth seen before 2007 (the whole). The strategic 
employment of the geographical landscape of the Eurasian continent to the PRC’s advantage 
makes zhou bian the world.  
The way the PRC understands its geo-position and the surrounding environments can also 
be explained by “strategic supporting belts” (战略依托带). A necessity to build supporting belts 
and the methods and means to that effect seen in the Chinese foreign policy writings are based 
on the lessons and experiences of major powers, including Germany, the U.S., the USSR, and 
Japan. In the Chinese view, the U.S. succeeded in building its own strategic belts whereas the 
other three powers failed. Washington is able to bend the north and the south of Americas to its 
influence while being shielded by the Atlantic and the Pacific. Its strategy of providing public 
goods, both in economy and in security, to its neighbors further maintains the strategic belts.      
These narratives recommend that the PRC rely on cooperation, manage conflicts, and offer 
public goods to create its own belts, instead of resorting to use of force as the USSR, Japan, and 
Germany had once done and failed. Where the PRC’s strategic belts extend echoes with the 
regions aforementioned. “Asia-Pacific is growing to be the center of the world geopolitics and 
China is the center of Asia-Pacific……China can create strategic supporting belts around more 
than 20 countries bordering China by lands and seas, and the far-neighboring countries of the 
Middle East, Oceania, and the Indian Ocean. The former can be named the first strategic 
supporting belt and the latter the second strategic supporting belt. With these two belts, China 
can stand tall in the global competition.” It is further argued that the geostrategic location of the 
US which once was an advantage has become a disadvantage because of its distance away from 
the geopolitical and economic center, i.e. Asia Pacific and China. Accordingly, from a Chinese 
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view, the PRC is in a better position to build its own supporting regions in the new historical 
conditions.245  
Strategic Culture 
With the redefined geographical arenas and the strategic reasoning behind the method (i.e., 
reduce dependency by creating one’s network) to obtain tangible and intangible means  (i.e., 
material resources and political influence) within those spaces discussed, the next question is 
what the Chinese strategic culture is which can explain its behavior on a global level. This 
question is important because it lays out a theoretical framework for the grand strategy (winning 
without fighting) and strategies discussed in the next section. Previous literature addresses this 
question mostly through the lens of defensive or offensive and through the cases of use of force, 
and in some examples in line with whether it is about homeland defense, which sees border areas 
merely as territories for the purpose of Chinese defense. This study has more complicated 
answers. 
Strategic culture, defensiveness and offensiveness do not refer to military operations in 
this study. They are to be explored in the Chinese strategic context that the evolution of events 
goes through a non-use of force stage to use of force with an emphasis on the former; the process 
 
245Li Yonghui, 2013, pp. 36-37. Original text: 亚太正在成长为世界地缘政治中心，而中国则是亚太的中
心。……中国不但能以周边20多个陆海近邻为战略依托带，还能以包括中近东、太平洋岛国等环太平
洋、印度洋远邻国家为战略依托带。前者可称之为第一依托带，后者可称之为第二依托带。以这两个
依托带为战略依托，中国就可在全球竞争中立于不败之地。Other citations include Lin Limin, 2012; Wu 
Zhicheng, 2015, p. 27. In Wu’s article, the author writes, “Zhou bian is the primary supporting force for 
China’s path toward a responsible world power. Faced with the problem of insufficient supplies of public 
goods and the common expectation of zhou bian countries, China should more proactively provide public 
goods, especially in terms of security and economy,  according to its core interests and actual capabilities, 
promote its own discursive influence in the building of regional institutions and order, so that it 
can fully demonstrate itself being ‘a responsible major power.’” (周边地区是中国走向负责任世界
大国的首要支撑与依托。面对地区公共产品的供给不足和周边国家的共同期待，中国应从自身核心利
益与实际能力出发，更加积极地提供地区公共产品尤其是安全和经济公共产品，提升在地区制度和秩
序建构中的话语力，充分展现“负责任大国”的责任担当。) 
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is a continuum. Accordingly, strategic culture cannot be sliced down to mere use of force and 
needs to consider peacetime measures as well. Clausewitz’s notion that war is the other means of 
politics indicates an ongoing process. But, this continuing process is not brought into the analysis 
of strategic culture and the understanding of strategic culture is often equated to the study of use 
of force. In addition, strategic culture here does not apply to the evolution of a single event for a 
short term, but rather a state’s trajectory on its way to great power status, which consists of a 
series of events. Therefore, strategic culture in this study is related to the grand strategy that the 
PRC employs through political, cultural, economic and military resources to achieve the goal of 
a revived Chinese nation.  
An assessment of Chinese strategic culture can start from strategic thought. Chinese 
classics about strategic thinking elaborate on both peacetime policy and military solutions. Even 
when it comes to arts of war, they do not merely apply to use of force, but also areas of non-
military operations. Despite different contexts, the fundamental principles in utilizing what one 
has and creating what is desired are the same.246 Strategic thought can further break down into 
four components: self-evaluation of environments, ensuing behavior, methods in conducting 
behavior (i.e. strategies), and rationalization of behavior. Accordingly, strategic culture reflects 
the reasoning of certain behavior to preserve one’s interests in response to perceived reality that 
is constructed subjectively through social interactions. Since the types of behavior are subject to 
one’s judgements of external and internal conditions, strategic culture contains bias that from the 
viewpoint of the self (collectively speaking, i.e., the CCP, Chinese leadership, or even across 
political, social and academic sectors) is rational and right while it may not be from others’ 
 
246 Sun Tzu’s Art of War; Ralph Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1993, kindle version. 
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perspectives. This subjectivity is reflected in the rationalization of one’s own behavior as being 
just and defensive.  
When the PRC disseminates the idea that China has been peace loving and its strategic 
culture is defensive, which is echoed in some English-language scholarship, this is about Chinese 
justification of and belief in the characteristics of its deeds, rather than what its strategic culture 
is. Similarly, when the literature finds that during a given period of time, China exhibits 
offensive and parabellum propensities, they are products of certain domestic and perceived 
international conditions and do not present what China’s strategic culture is. The Ming dynasty 
was more bellicose than Song, partly because the latter was a weak state who eventually could 
only occupy southern China proper. But, Song also initiated naval offensives against the Jurchen 
Jin when the latter was retreating north.247 When defensiveness and offensives can be found, 
albeit under different situations, strategic culture is something else. Its definition needs to be able 
to explain variations in Chinese behavior, including non-use of force, use of force and, not least 
important, how they are employed (methods or strategies) and why (rationalization). The rest of 
the analysis in this section will focus on how xing shi (situation and the potential) can provide 
answers in defining China’s strategic culture.  
Situations, Types of Behavior and Justification 
So often in Chinese classics (dealing with statecraft, diplomacy, war and down to the 
deeds of individuals), there are theories and abstract precepts and concepts which by nature are 
strategic in instructing actors how to achieve their goals. These philosophies provide frameworks 
to understand a spectrum of behavior under different conditions. One example is “the 
 
247 Peter Lorge, “Water Forces and Naval Operations,” in A Military History of China, eds. David Graff and 
Robin Higham, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012, pp. 81-96. 
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propensities of things” or shi (勢). Outcome and change will come of their own accord, as the 
result of the continuation of the process and no arbitrary intervention is needed to change the 
course of things to one’s advantage, for such action only prompts resistance from one’s enemy 
and is self-defeating. François Jullien’s theses, A Treaties on Efficacy and The Propensity of 
Things, elaborate well how such process occurs and how such process contains the above stated 
four components that altogether explain what China’s strategic culture is.248 The same relations 
of conditioning and consequence that structure the Chinese concept of efficacy, i.e., how to 
strategically do things in a way that desired results can be realized with the least amount of costs, 
can be found across the literatures that he surveys, including Taoism, legalism, Confucianism, 
and Sun Tzu’s Art of War. The following discussion is based on Jullien’s works along with my 
application of his works to world politics and China’s developmental course, and an explanation 
of why strategic culture is neither defensive nor offensive.249  
The Chinese phrase xing shi is a key term whose analysis will solve the puzzle of how a 
desired outcome will come into place. Xing (形) means a situation or “a relation of forces” in the 
surroundings. In world politics, it can be understood as a configuration of balance of power 
among/between major states/political camps. Shi (勢) can be translated into the “potential” of a 
situation or “a position of strength” in a situation. Without xing, shi will not exist and thus shi 
always reflects the tendency of xing and the “position of strength” varies according to different 
situations. In the PRC’s post-Cold War narratives, international politics is structured as being 
more peaceful as the antagonism of two superpowers has dissipated (xing) and countries around 
 
248 François Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China. New York: Zone 
Books, 1995; François Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2004. 
249 Words and phrases in the quotations marks in this section are from Jullien’s book.  
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the world prefer economic development rather than conflicts in an era of globalization 
(potentiality). From the Chinese perspective, to “obtain the potential” in this situation is to 
reorient China’s (internal and external) policy to be focused on economic growth rather than 
ideological struggle and steer the country away from being in a constant combat-ready condition 
where war is perceived to be imminent.250 The desired outcome is that economic growth will 
eventually drive other aspects of national power (military, political and cultural) and together 
with them bring about a rejuvenation of the country. In a very broad and general stroke, what the 
PRC’s narratives say is that to realize the ultimate political objective, it will do things that fit the 
general trend.  
The assumption here is that to bring about desired effects, it is more effective to behave in 
a way that fits the dynamics of the course of things, instead of acting against it and encountering 
opposition. However, one does not passively react to situations and simply coast along with the 
tide. The activeness is displayed in the constant vigilant observation of the environment and the 
corresponding behavior or initiatives to elongate the duration of or enhance “the propensity of 
things.” When the tendency of a situation is detected to be swerving away from one’s preferable 
course, one needs to bring it back on track, keep it ongoing and consolidate it.  
The measures taken to create and sustain favorable situations are not melodramatic 
performances, like war, that can be defined in time and in space and that can be easily detected. 
Drastic action that disrupts the commonly held sense of how things should run delivers a 
message that one intends to change status quo and thus invites opposition which may increase 
the cost and make the desired goal impossible. The gist here is to do things imperceptibly and 
 
250 In fact, this process already started before the end of Cold War and the CCP already cast a dim light on the 
Soviet reforms in the 1980s. The post-1991 narratives continue to follow the same discursive direction. 
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have others think that where they end up is a natural outcome without human intervention. A 
more efficacious solution is that one molds one’s behavior to suit the existing way and reshape 
the structure of a situation from within. This is deception at a higher and more skilled level. 
Although the Chinese classics emphasize “situation” and conditions, in reality it is human beings 
who make things work and manipulate the courses of things.  
In Chinese thinking, the propensity of things in a situation, aided by (imperceptible) 
human intervention that strengthens its directions, can naturally create irresistible and inevitable 
trends that lend legitimacy to the desired outcome. Chinese narratives as seen in Qiushi and 
official newspapers often reflect such logic. For instance, they frequently identify major events 
in the current political economic order, such as the 1997 financial crisis, the 2008 financial crisis, 
and the American retreat from globalization, and frame them as structural opportunities in a 
power vacuum for China to provide public goods which the world still needs. Because the 
world’s still needing public goods is the propensity of things in a situation, according to the 
Chinese reasoning, what China does is simply to give what others want and thus what it does fits 
the trend. As the logic goes, the expanded Chinese influence is a natural outcome of this 
irresistible trend. China is framing its desired result as legitimate through focusing on the 
conditions in the environment and thereby arguing that the outcome which it prefers, but may not 
always be explicitly stated, is objectively reached without subjective and self-interested human 
intervention, while it is exactly Chinese intervention that creates the environment and forms the 
impression that the trend is irresistible and inevitable. The Belt and Road Initiative is another 
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example in which economic outreach is framed to create and sustain globalization which the 
PRC says is needed for the benefit of the world.251  
Imperceptible manipulations to create and maintain conditions favorable to one’s 
development should be understood with a relaxed standard. In reality, it is next to impossible that 
others will not detect the changes in the balance of power, especially when their interests are 
violated. In this circumstance, the move to bring the course of things back onto the track that one 
favors will not go unnoticed and may invite counteraction. China’s maneuvers in the South 
China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) show that without changing the greater xing 
dramatically (as the measures fall short of war), it is incrementally creating a new status quo, a 
new situation in which others play the new game that the PRC creates. The counter measures 
such as patrols and FONOPs have failed to change Chinese island building and military 
installations.  
In Chinese philosophy, the structure of an environment also characterizes one’s deeds. 
Accordingly, behavior is not inherently passive or active, defensive or offensive. These 
adjectives are constructed and given meanings by the situation one is in. The emphasis on the 
conditions in the environment makes an interesting contrast to the claim that China has been 
peace-loving, an innate and active quality of an agent. Describing behavior as inherently 
peaceful and desired effects as inevitable and natural results of the trends provides justification 
and legitimacy to what one prefers, while in fact the agent has kept a watchful eye to subtle 
changes in the environment and accordingly makes necessary adjustments and reinforces 
favorable trends or creates favorable conditions.  
 
251 The above discussion is about the application of xing shi in the Chinese discursive construct. Whether 
Chinese descriptions of events and described effects of its policy fit the realities require further examination 
and are out of the scope of this research. 
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Situations, Non-War and War  
The ancient military classic Liu T’ao includes conversations between King Wen and T’ai 
Kung about how to subdue their enemies; one strategy that T’ai Kung offered is called “civil 
offensive” (文伐).252 There are twelve measures of civil offensives. They are “civil” because of 
their non-military nature. The purpose is to disarm the enemy without the enemy knowing that it 
is being disarmed, stripping the available resources that it can mobilize in a war, before one 
initiates the attack. The twelve measures in general are three-fold. Toward the enemy itself, do 
what the enemy likes and corrupt the enemy with licentiousness and women so as to foster its 
arrogance and lower its guard. Toward the associates of the enemy, get close to them and win 
their hearts and minds through bribes and gifts so as to divide their loyalty. Toward the self, 
accumulate one’s resources and plan strategy secretly so one’s true intention will not be known. 
Under the situation that the enemy is not prepared and never imagines that it is being plotted 
against, the attack will be easier because those who had been closest assistants and officials now 
are at the enemy’s command and because of long-term secret planning, the relative capabilities 
now are very clear in favoring the self. This is how the victory is obtained. It does not involve 
fighting in a way that future literature will celebrate commanders’ brilliancy on the battlefield or 
lament their failure.  
T’ai Kung finished the conversation by saying, “when these twelve measures are fully 
employed, they will become a military weapon. Thus when, as it is said, one ‘looks at Heaven 
above and investigates Earth below’ and the proper signs are already visible, attack him 
(emphasis added).” In Chinese political philosophy, disasters and rebellions within a state are 
signs from heaven and earth that the rulers are immoral and incompetent and whoever aspires to 
 
252 Ralph Sawyer, Loc 835 to 858. 
265 
establish a new regime is justified to overthrow the old. According to T’ai Kung’s strategy, the 
signs of heaven and earth are in fact the results of conditions created by human beings who 
intentionally try to corrupt the enemy and make the enemy’s governance lax, leading to popular 
dissatisfaction and compounding the difficulties brought by drought or flood. “Righteous war” 
fought on the claimed just grounds can be based on man-made conditions.  
Chinese strategic thought is about efficacy, utilizing the least amount of resources to 
achieve the greatest effect (minimizing costs and maximizing benefits). This also translates into 
obtaining goals without fighting a war and when a war is to be fought, ensuring victory is already 
at hand so one does not get consumed by the waste of resources. As the example of T’ai Kung’s 
strategy shows, with the bulk of work being done before war, waging a war becomes effortless. 
This continuous process makes it impossible to understand Chinese strategic culture by 
separating non-military measures and use of force. They are not events that can be examined in 
isolation from one another. Instead, they form a continuous process that “transforms the 
situation,” as Jullien describes, without dramatically altering the course of things, to bring about 
desired results. Since transformation takes time, China’s strategic culture is long-term. This 
warrants a study that focuses on peacetime evolution. 
War as a continuation of politics has different interpretations and practices in western and 
Chinese traditions. The former accentuates devoted resources and personnel whereas the latter 
tries to prevent war from upstaging the importance of political manipulations in the statecraft. 
The idea that the PLA should be able to fight and win a war, which has gained more media 
attention under Xi Jinping, can be traced back to Jiang Zemin during the post-Deng period. To 
understand what this idea means, consider one section in a 2017 CMS article about war and 
politics. In the context of stressing “the political nature of war” (战争的政治属性) as “from a 
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Marxist point of view, war is the continuation of politics”, the author quotes Xi’s words from a 
book compiling documents for military leaders to learn basic guidelines laid out in the 18th 
NCCPC (the 18th Party Congress) : “Understanding and planning war [is to be done] within the 
governing objective of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Strategic mistakes 
cannot be tolerated. If the military cannot win a war on the battlefield, it will have serious 
political consequences!” This means, in the author’s paraphrases of Xi’s statements, that failed 
wars such as the US in the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the USSR in Afghanistan, and the 
US in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 21st century diminished the major powers’ influence politically 
and economically. To win a war however is not the ultimate goal of strategic thinking. From the 
Chinese view, politics rises above military affairs. The author concludes this section with another 
quotation from Xi, “the questions of fight or not fight, when and how to fight, and fight to what 
degree are in service to politics. In the case that the military can get an upper hand but political 
conditions do not allow, action cannot be taken. On the contrary, if political conditions allow but 
there are military risks and difficulties, action will still be taken resolutely.”253 Fighting on the 
ground will stop if the political goal has already been reached, even when the future prospect of 
battlefield success looks promising. Troops will still fight for political goals even when 
battlefield success is uncertain. The true capabilities may only be known to the self. What is not 
explicitly said in the essay but may be possible, in accord with deception, is that by militarily 
engaging the enemy, it may mislead the enemy to believe that one is more capable than it 
actually is. If the enemy reasons according to the logic that since the self is the weaker side, it is 
 
253 Zhang Shude and Xia Zhinan [張樹德  夏志楠], “A Study of Xi Jinping’s Outlook on War” [习近平战争
关研究],  CMS , no. 6, issue 155, 2017, pp. 27-38.  
267 
better to concede than to fight, then the side who is willing to use force can attain bargaining 
power to extract concessions from the enemy.  
The admonition to the PLA to win a war is to have battlefield success, but that success will 
take place in the presence of political conditions that political leaders judge to be conducive to 
their political objective and with the PLA following political dictates. Politics reigns. As a result, 
whether there will be a war depends on leaders’ evaluations of political situations and less on 
whether the military is fully equipped for the job. This conclusion however is not invalidated by 
the fact that the PRC tries to make the PLA qualified for war. China may fight under the 
conditions that the PLA is not fully ready for the task.  
On the macro-level, the military strategy is the political strategy. At one level, the PRC 
may develop its operational strategy. At the level of military action obeying political dictates, 
what matters is not so much battlefield success, but whether negotiation can exploit the 
military’s willingness to fight and reap the benefits from the created impression, real or unreal, 
that it has chances to win. Winning without fighting predisposes actors to rely on non-war 
solutions (with military means still being utilized), but does not renounces war; it only tries to 
make war easier by relying on political manipulations. 
War and non-war all depend on subjective assessments of political situations. The PRC is 
saying that it prefers non-war solutions, which have so far fit its peacetime expansion---if 
economic growth and globalization have the potential to achieve political goals under a relatively 
peaceful environment, why wage war and rock the boat? But it is also willing to wage war at a 
time that it deems politically propitious, which may come when it judges that the international 
environment is no longer favorable to its national development.  
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China’s strategic culture is about how to wage a prolonged silent warfare. Whether there is 
a war does not define “silent” and even the occurrence of war does not disqualify the word as 
long as the authority judges that its deeds do not contravene the mainstream of the time and 
accordingly construct a discourse, i.e., propaganda, to shape the public’s consciousness. The 
lengthy period in which desired effects will be born out is about what situations offer and what 
players can do to evoke the potentiality in xing so that favorable forces are maintained, enhanced 
and created to predetermine the outcome. The interactions between environments and agents are 
nuanced and altogether define strategic culture. Characterizing strategic culture according to 
binary distinctions as either being defensive or offensive based on deeds neglects the 
fundamental assumption that preferred results are the “consequences” of transforming situations 
in a lengthy period by only capturing a snapshot of the entire evolution. It also neglects that 
strategic assessments of environments, the activeness of human beings, play indispensable roles 
in determining the type of action to take or not to take. Therefore, whether behavior is defensive 
or offensive is not the point in analyzing what China’s strategic culture is. China’s strategic 
culture is about how and to what extent objectives can be reached. In this sense, subjective 
evaluations of situations, types of behavior taken in response, and justification of behavior need 
to be considered altogether.  
Doing things according to xing shi heavily relies on players’ judgements of situations. In 
theory, it requires a sage-like person to comprehend correctly the interlocking relations in the 
layered situations and manipulate what will and will not happen in a way that from others’ 
perceptions remain within the bounds of the existing order. In practice, the PRC may not have all 
the situations under its control and may act in a way that provokes more countermeasures, due to 
misjudgments or beliefs that are far from the realities that others have constructed. 
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The above overview concerning the utilization of xing shi (situation and its potential) 
provides a theoretical framework for the following discussion of grand strategy, that is, winning 
without fighting, and varied strategies in the bigger environment (post-Cold War relatively 
peaceful political climate) that allows winning without fighting. Chinese narratives evaluate 
external and internal situations, recommend policy options accordingly, and rationalize the 
behavior that is taken.   
Grand Strategy and Strategies  
Without neglecting that a military solution remains a legitimate means, the issue in focus 
here is strategically conditioned Chinese preference to use non-war solutions to reach a great 
power status. In both Chinese military classics and the contemporary narratives, war and non-
war approaches come to form because of certain conditions.254 As much as China’s foreign 
policy and military narratives like to argue that the country has a cultural distaste for war and is 
inherently peaceful, its discourse also indicates that non-war measures are favored because of the 
post-Cold War international climate. In deciding what measures to take, the assessments of 
external and internal conditions may weigh more than the cultural belief which is subjective and 
serves the purpose of justification.  
It is under both conditions of a peaceful international environment and the PRC’s needs 
for economic development that the narratives propose means and methods to achieve grand 
strategic goals. In abstract, the PRC’s grand strategy of winning without fighting can be 
presented through a triangle (graph 5.0). The grand strategic objective is to achieve the status of 
“a trans-regional great power that can wield global influence.” Some authors also use “a regional 
 
254 See Ralph Sawyer. Also see the example in chapter 2 about Confucius’ suggestion to wage a war against 
the state of Ch’i. 
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great power that can wield global influence” and “from a regional great power that has global 
influence and its influence is ever increasing to a world great power.” Chinese researchers differ 
over whether the PRC is a regional or trans-regional power, but they unanimously hold that it 
will exert influence on a global level.255 This objective fits ongoing Chinese foreign footprints in 
the stated regions and countries of strategic importance from inner to outer circles surrounding 
the PRC.  
Graph 5.0 
 
Because Chinese expansion is an ongoing process and foreign activities that aim to arrest 
or create another wave of growth are based on material capabilities accumulated since the 
reforms began, C needs to reflect not only the available assets that can be invested for additional 
returns, but also the newly gained resources. The resources at C point are economic, cultural, 
 
255 See Xia Zhengnan. Other articles explicitly stating that China has global influence and/or such influence is 
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political and military. They are employed in combination with one another to generate more 
assets, or to increase CNP,256 to realize A. The process is a complicated one. For instance, 
finding foreign  territories and markets, including Chinese acquisition of land in foreign 
countries in order to build factories or other economic assets, land to be used for Chinese naval 
bases, and the acquisition of natural resources as well as to solve socio-economic issues such as 
unemployment and shortage of grains may require diplomacy and cultural influence. Material 
gains may translate into political and cultural assets which then allow the accumulation of further 
material gains. This self-feeding process is not perfect and can lead to increasing opposition from 
other countries. For the investments to bear fruit, it requires strategies. The gist of those 
strategies is to have others cooperate willingly, minimize the degree of resistance, and manage 
conflicts on issues where countries’ interests diverge. What has been unfolding in the PRC’s 
foreign policies in the last two decades or more is this protracted process of the employment of B 
to get C. 
Cooperation and Managed Confrontation  
The strategy of cooperation has dominated in the Chinese military and foreign policy 
narratives and it is the product of the evaluation of objective and subjective conditions. “On one 
level, since the countries usually have conflicts of interests, it is necessary to seek common 
grounds among differences so that the interests of our country can be safeguarded. On another 
level, competition between major powers no longer displays solely in the form of confrontation, 
 
256 In Chinese narratives, to achieve the grand strategic goal requires the enhancement of material capabilities 
and comprehensive national power (CNP). The latter is characterized as the central feature of contemporary 
competitions among major states. CNP is a Chinese term cited in the vast foreign policy writings. It uses nine 
metrics to measure states’ power, in general including economic resources, energy, human resources, military 
capabilities, technology, capital, international resources, government resources and information. Some Chinese 
researchers have characterized the current major power competition as “a world war waged through a 
competition of CNP without shedding blood.” See Xia Zhengnan, 2010, p. 133.  
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but instead through cooperation…This is because globalization limits the objective conditions 
for confrontation. Countries in the post-Cold War have made their primary objectives economic 
development and maintenance of stability. The chances of obtaining [one’s] interests are greater 
through cooperation and necessary political and economic means than through military 
conflicts…Therefore, [China] should practically strengthen constructive cooperation, strategic 
coordination, and strategic partnership with world powers……through multilateralism and 
bilateralism to reach the balance of interests [among major states] (emphasis added).” 
Accordingly, cooperation is a strategic choice based on domestic needs and international politics. 
Present along with the assessment of the security environment in the narratives is the factor that 
Chinese culture and traditions are biased toward cooperation and mutual benefits as long as the 
condition that “national security strategy can safeguard core interests” is met.257 The above 
narratives are made with the belief that it is necessary to interact with major powers if China 
wants to secure its core and primary interests.258 
The strategic prominence of zhou bian stems from the situation in which China’s reaching 
outward requires pathways through the smaller states which are in the spheres of influence of 
other major states. Surrounded by the geostrategic landscape where both major and small powers 
reside, the PRC’s foreign policy cannot but deal with both. In considering the geopolitical 
complexity of Eurasia, military and foreign policy writings that advocate for a more proactive 
approach in forming cooperation and partnership also heed the necessity of adroit diplomacy and 
maneuvers in order to play a protracted game. The grand strategy here is “winning without 
fighting.” 
 
257 Wang Guifang, 2006, p. 81. Original text: 国家利益的客观诉求，均要求国家安全战略在维护国家核心
利益的前提下，首选合作，谋求互利共赢。 
258 Wang Guifang, 2006, p. 80.  
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Consider the following narratives that appear in a 2010 CMS article. “China needs a 
brand new and holistic grand strategic thought that enables continuous economic growth, 
modernization of technology, and strengthening of the military while this grand strategy does not 
incur confrontation policies from other countries. Such grand strategy requires an orientation of 
thought in…seeking winning without fighting.” After laying out this fundamental logic, the 
author specifies what can be done in each aspect of national power. “In the political arena, 
[China] should vigorously promote the meanings to the world of the strategy of peaceful 
development and counteract the discursive hegemonism of great powers…;in the economic 
arena, [China] should protect and consolidate economic gains through globalization and seek the  
commanding height of technological development; in the cultural field, using the universal 
values of Confucianism to start dialogues and exchanges with western civilization, and cultivate 
the world influence of the Chinese culture through openness and inclusiveness;……;in terms of 
the military, [the goals are] to prevent war through effective deterrence and accelerate revolution 
in military affairs so that China can seize the initiative in a future war.”259 The work done in the 
political and cultural fields is to obtain material capabilities in the economy and military and to 
reduce the degree of resistance, if there is any, to that effect, by creating a shared belief among 
the members of the international community that the rise of the PRC brings the world peace and 
prosperity. Without forsaking the war solution, the preferred measure is to use force to deter and 
coerce others, both of which are two sides of one coin, to do one’s bidding. 
It is said in a 2013 CIR article that many cooperative measures are the precedents to the 
PRC’s building of strategic supporting belts, including China’s assistance to Asian countries in 
the 1997 financial crisis, ASEAN+N, economic and trade relations between China and countries 
 
259 See Xia Zhengnan, p. 135. 
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of zhou bian, the Six-Party Talks regarding North Korean nuclear issues, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, the Boao Forum, promotion of Sino-Russian relations etc.260 As the 
logic goes, other multilateral and bilateral mechanisms not listed in the essay and/or were 
established after 2013 such as Belt and Road are conducive to the formation of strategic belts as 
well. In a separate article about establishing land strategic belts, especially referring to western 
expansion to Central Asia and Europe, but also including Indochina, the Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia, through platforms of security and economic cooperation, the author argues that 
states nowadays have more options, aside from war, to realize their national interests; although 
they are strategic detours compared to direct use of force, these less straightforward measures 
have better chances to reach their objectives because they are in accord with “changes in the 
[international] security dynamics.”261   
Cooperation for the PRC is not for cooperation’s sake, but rather to equip oneself with 
abilities for competition. Through participation in the current international institutions, one can 
take advantage of whatever is beneficial to the self and change international regimes to one’s 
favor. Consider the following paragraph: “China should prioritize free riding and surpassing as 
its foreign strategies……Free riding is to coast along the world trend and mentality…try as much 
as possible to join international organizations and follow the international rules, try as much as 
possible to learn advanced technology, management, political maneuvers,…and international 
norms. Free riding is not passive dependence…, but aims to develop more shared common 
interests, rules and working mechanisms as well as to attain the opportunities in the current 
environment we are situated in in exchange for necessary and bearable compromises that we 
 
260Li Yonghui, 2013, p. 37. 
261Tang Yongsheng [唐永胜], “Proactively Pursue the Strategy of the Westward Movement”[积极推进西向战
略], CIR, issue 11, 2010, pp. 19-20, (specifically p. 20). 
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make. [To avoid the complications] of security dilemma, China needs to incorporate the strategy 
of surpassing in the first years of the 21st century, that is, participating in international security 
institutions whose benefits outweigh the costs for China…and to play a lead role in these 
organizations.”262 Accordingly, the PRC prefers to finalize the power transition process without 
war. 
Cooperation also needs to be understood in the strategic context of “building the zhou bian 
order.” In the Chinese narratives, whether the geo-position of the PRC is disadvantageous or  
advantageous depends on the policy designs. They caution about the possibilities of increasing 
“contradictions” as interactions grow and favor the policy of “befriending neighbors, bringing 
peace to neighbors, and enriching neighbors” through economic, cultural and security exchanges. 
“Economic growth has endurable spill-over and expansion effects. [The Chinese government] 
should guide domestic capital to invest more in zhou bian countries and convert economic 
benefits into political trust toward China. The goal is to mitigate the concerns or strategic 
agitations from zhou bian countries about China’s rise and relieve strategic pressure from the 
American rebalancing [toward Asia] and the strengthening of alliance between the US and Asia-
Pacific countries.” Engagement with neighbors, according to the narratives, aims to create 
strategic conditions favorable for the PRC to be on top of the overall geostrategic balance. 
“China can build vast and solid support for its national security and development and shape 
regional security dynamics favorable to itself by guiding more Asian countries to proactively 
seek relations with China.” This passage reveals a Chinese worldview in which it is the center of 
new geostrategic gravity and an expectation that others come for benefits with a recognition of 
the PRC being capable of providing them. In addition, the word, “guiding” (牵引), indicates an 
 
262 See Xia Zhengnan, 2010, p. 137. 
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attitude of strategic pro-activeness which appears in many foreign policy and military writings 
and, when understood in conjunction with the public narratives that managing and building 
relations with other countries is a long-term process, shows that the PRC intends to shift subtly 
the structure of world politics to the order that it prefers and during the process ease the 
mentality of others to be receptive to Chinese ways of doing things through the assumption, 
shared by many however, that cooperation and exchanges are mutually beneficial and reduce 
conflicts. The product of interaction between guiding and long-term processes is the concept 
“accumulation of strategic advantages” (积累战略优势), which also has frequent presence in the 
narratives, albeit with different forms of expression.263 The PRC is practicing these discursive 
recommendations and is building “propensities of things” to its favor through economic 
enticements and minimization of resistance.264 Once the trends get institutionalized, they become 
new norms which few will challenge as they are seen as the natural orbit of things.  
The strategic reasoning discussed above aims to serve the political objectives of self-
aggrandizement and the weakening of opposing forces. As the zhou bian countries are shored up 
to be the PRC’s strategic support, the country’s “accumulated strategic advantages will lend 
influence to regional affairs and gradually enhance the centripetal force centered on China from 
Asian countries including the allies of the US”, such as Japan and South Korea. “As long as 
China keeps the state of development and progression, and has effective deterrent capabilities, 
any zhou bian country needs to carefully and practically treat its relations with China. Even the 
American allies will find it hard to join the U.S.-initiated strategic gamble against China. Over 
 
263 The analysis in this paragraph is based on this article. Tang Yongsheng  [唐永胜], “Make A Good Use of 
Geopolitical Advantages and Proactively Shape the Order of Zhou Bian” [发挥地缘战略优势，积极塑造周
边秩序], CIR, issue 10, 2013, pp. 34-35. 
264 François Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China. New York: Zone Books, 
1995. 
277 
time, the increasing contradictions between control and anti-control will render alliance less 
useful.”265 Accordingly, cooperation is not always inclusive and mutually beneficial. It is 
strategically used in the hope that in the long run the American power will recede, and the 
Chinese influence will consolidate.  
Despite the prevailing rhetoric of cooperation, the PRC also shows its willingness to get 
involved in limited confrontations, or the strategy of managed conflict. In the case of territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, China has employed limited use of force 
to occupy disputed islands and has conducted island building. Its use of force can be described as 
gray zone action in which conventional military force may or may not be involved in the course 
of action and the measures taken fall short of triggering a formal military response from an 
opponent. For instance, militia forces can be used on the sea to intimidate the fishing boats of 
other countries and outmaneuver their protecting vessels in a way that over time one gets to 
occupy a disputed sea territory without a direct military conflict. Essays from think tanks have 
recognized a shift in foreign policy from a cooperative stance, that is, joint exploration of 
resources and shelving disputes, to Chinese assertiveness in using “hard power.”266  
A 2013 CIR article explains how the shifting rationales are in accord with changing 
international politics and China’s national capabilities.267 In order to fully capture the 
rationalization of changes in strategies, it is necessary to discuss the essay at length. The author 
characterizes China’s foreign policy in the past 20 years of “strategic opportunities” (战略机遇
期), since after the 16th NCCPC in 2002 to 2013, as primarily “diplomacy of stability 
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maintenance” (维稳外交). Such diplomacy aims to “create favorable zhou bian conditions for 
China’s peaceful rise…in a relatively favorable international climate.” The strategy is to seek 
“common grounds among differences,” “gloss over disputes,” (淡化争议) and “forge shared 
political interests through economic means” (以经促政) among other measures. These 
cooperative approaches, according to the author, will create a stable zhou bian environment 
conducive to the success of China’s reforms and modernization. The 1997 financial crisis and 9-
11, the article continues, further provided the PRC opportunities to deepen regional 
interdependence. “The American strategic focus shifted to counter-terrorism and the Middle East 
after 9-11, its attention to East Asian affairs has decreased, which greatly reduces strategic 
pressure on China and the obstacles to implementing zhou bian policies. All of a sudden, peace, 
cooperation, and development become consensus [shared by the countries in the region].”  
According to the narratives, China’s peaceful rise hinges on whether it perceives the 
environment to be peaceful (and whether it can achieve the goal through means other than war). 
The perception however can be highly subjective. From a Chinese perspective, peace is obtained 
when other major powers wield less influence in China’s zhou bian and the PRC has more say; it 
believes that it has more abilities to create prosperity for all than other powers as it states that it 
could push through zhou bian policies because of a distracted U.S. As the narratives further 
indicate, if the international environment is not peaceful, it is others’ fault and China is justified 
to take confrontational measures.  
This essay adds to a list of foreign policy and military writings which pinpoint 
troublemakers while depicting the PRC as defensively protecting its rights from incessant 
infringements. Writing during the increasing tension since 2009 and in the aftermath of the 
Scarborough shoal dispute, the author identifies the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan in the case 
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of the SCS and the ECS, and argues that they have disturbed regional peace to the degree that 
China has to take countermeasures. A list of actions regarding islands disputes is provided to 
show “major changes in China’s zhou bian diplomacy from excessive emphasis on the 
maintenance of stability to the moderate protection of rights,” including domestic 
demonstrations, economic sanctions on other countries, military exercises, domestic law and 
regulations revisions, unilateral exploration of natural resources on the Chinese side and 
regularization of maritime patrols. These measures are described to “safeguard the relations with 
zhou bian countries and stabilize the regional balance of power based upon resolutely protecting 
national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.” According to the discursive logic, policies 
in line with Chinese interests are stabilizing forces for the region whereas those who contradict 
destabilize it. These measures are further justified by the idea that ungrateful smaller states 
deserve punishment.  
The same article depicts the PRC as a “good-willed” power wishing to “mitigate maritime 
disputes with zhou bian countries through close economic ties.” The provided benefits to 
ASEAN countries include imports of non-tariff agricultural products, unconditional aid, loans 
and trade agreements. When it comes to the Philippines and Vietnam, the PRC expects to 
“economically pacify” both countries in exchange for their concessions on the SCS. The author 
then lists promised Chinese investments worth 13US$ billions and 60 US$ billions of bilateral 
trade agreements to the Philippines and indicates that China has been particularly gracious 
toward Manila since “pro-US Philippines does not have traditional friendship with China like 
Cambodia and Laos do. Nor does it have abundant oil, gas and mineral resources like Sudan and 
Zambia. It does not have significant geostrategic value to China either, like Pakistan and 
Myanmar do.” The conclusion is that these countries have not shown gratitude and instead are 
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“emboldened” by the American support to “provoke” China and encroach on its rights with “the 
intention to force China into accepting an illegal fait accompli.”  To restore stability and to 
prevent China from being busy with “putting out fire from four directions,” “it needs to forsake 
delay and blocking strategies that reflect the thought of maintaining stability and instead… 
resolutely use China’s interests as the main benchmark to measure how well the relationships 
with zhou bian countries are.” “Those who are friendly to China or at least will not be 
provocative on the sensitive issues will have priority to share the abundant dividend of China’s 
rise for the long term whereas those who are provocative on sovereignty and security issues will 
lose from Chinese punishments.” 
The narratives continue to endorse China’s hardline policies and argue that “only by 
effectively safeguarding rights can the maintenance of stability through forceful measures and 
resolute will be possible.” The article then recommends comprehensive measures, from 
economic, military, and diplomatic means to administrative presence and propaganda, to protect 
China’s maritime rights, with additional passages emphasizing military deterrence. In addition, it 
is clear that, based on the above discursive analysis, from a Chinese view whether stability exists 
depends on whether Chinese interests are fulfilled. The policy turn after 2010, from a focus on 
stability to protection of rights, is rationalized by the belief that the PRC with its increased 
relative strength, facing growing competition from other major powers in Asia in the context of 
weakened American global influence, has assets and bargaining leverage to carry out its 
objectives with a stick. The 2008 global financial crisis is marked as a watershed point, with 
which many other foreign policy articles including those in Qiushi also concur, where uni-
polarity started to give way to more equal distribution of power. In other words, according to the 
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article, the US is in decline and “non-western market economies represented by China “are on 
the rise.”  
The authors of this article do not merely provide justifications for policy shifts. They take 
one more step to argue that the PRC should change its position from being defensive, in line with 
the diplomacy of stability maintenance, to taking initiatives in proactively shaping regional 
dynamics according to its interests. This suggestion is made based on the premise that changes in 
the international system including a shifting global strategic center and the reshuffling of 
powers’ ranking due to the rise of China are ongoing and long-term. Therefore, the policy 
reorientation is likely to stay. 
The 2015 white paper was the first defense document to state the need “to strike a balance 
between rights protection and stability maintenance, and make overall planning for both.” It 
should be read in association with “safeguard national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights 
and interests.” It seems to indicate a strategy of managed confrontation with countries who also 
have stakes in disputed islands and relevant waters of the South China Sea. In other words, the 
PRC is relying on military means short of war to achieve its goal without jeopardizing a 
relatively peaceful environment that it needs for continuous development. 
Have Your Cake and Eat It?  
Both overseas investments since the 2000s under the “going global” policy (走出去) and a 
series of administrative, diplomatic and military actions along with discursive construction about 
the ownership of the SCS since 2009 aim to utilize and create a favorable balance of power for 
the fulfillment of the PRC’s interests. To maintain the momentum, the Belt and Road Initiative 
was announced in 2013. Serving both economic and military purposes, based on the accumulated 
effort of past engagement with other countries, the Initiative forecasts more infrastructure 
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projects to come along two routes. The maritime route extends from China’s east coast through 
the South China Sea, Southern Pacific, and Indian Ocean to East Africa. The land route runs 
through Central, South and West Asia to Europe. Concurrent with the disharmony with countries 
in Southeast Asia over territorial disputes is the Chinese attempt at economic enticements. The 
military balance of power in the SCS that favors the PRC and economic dependence will tie the 
hands of Southeast Asian countries on issues where they have stakes but China wants to 
dominate. Except for India, China does not have major disputes with countries in the Indian 
Ocean and those in Central Asia. Although Russia has been on good terms with the PRC in 
public, their relations may be more complicated and deserve separate research. Economic 
incentives plus diplomacy and international propaganda may suffice to influence the ruling elites 
in these countries to adopt policies compatible with Chinese interests. The Initiative carries a 
strategic rationale of consolidating the west while dealing with challenges in the east that aims to 
sustain favorable xing during the power transition. 
China’s strategic rationale is derived from how it perceives its geopolitical position. 
Situated between lands and seas, the narratives concern how to make the most of it while 
avoiding simultaneous attacks, not necessarily in the military sense, from both fronts. The policy 
is to weight maritime and land security equally (海陆兼备 or 海陆并重), instead of sacrificing 
one for the other. The 2013 defense white paper wrote that “China is a major maritime as well as 
land country.” On a constant foundation of weighing land and maritime security equally is the 
changeable direction of “strategic gravity” (战略重心) in accord with varied/variable xing shi at 
different directions. The sea front is where the current strategic gravity lies. To attend to both 
sea-born and land-born threats, the solution is to consolidate the west and use it to support the 
challenges from the east. The implementation of this idea does not equate to simultaneous 
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aggrandizement of the army and the navy. As the current policy of Belt and Road indicates, 
multifaceted approaches including economic ties and diplomacy exist alongside the naval 
buildup.  
The Mahanian idea that whoever controls the sea dominates the world is modified in the 
PRC’s military writings. This is the result of China’s geopolitical position and reflects a need to 
find a solution when the country sees the U.S., a sea power, as the primary adversary. A 2014 
CMS article opines that the real reason for sea powers’ victory over countries bordering both 
land and sea lies in the strategy of “balance of power on the land and maritime supremacy on the 
sea” (大陆均势＋海洋优势).268 According to the article, the English (British) historically had 
managed to ally with France’s neighbors (in the nine-years war from 1688 to 1697 and 
Napoleonic wars) while preserving their sea command to assail French expansion. What matters 
is the overall power equilibrium (xing) that favors the sea power, instead of the obtainment of sea 
power itself capable of winning the war. Other countries which had similar geopolitical features 
and suffered the same fate of defeat from attacks coming from both land and sea were Germany, 
Russia and the Qing dynasty. The author then prescribes the presence of three conditions that can 
prevent the formation of an unfavorable xing (a sea power allying with land powers to attack a 
state neighboring land and sea). They are domestic stability and unity, obtainment of maritime 
benefits, and international support.  
With regard to maritime interests, the author advises that China needs to develop massive 
exports based on the foundation of “resourceful economic strength, highly advanced credit 
system, vigorous business, accumulated capital and large amount of shipping.” Export by sea has 
 
268Zhang Yongchao [张勇超], “A Historical Review of How Major Land-Sea Powers Resolved Security 
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high correlation with a strong commercial shipping industry which contributes to naval 
development. According to the article’s reasoning, both naval capabilities and maritime trade 
will sustain the country and prevent it from being enervated by insufficient benefits accrued 
through land because the latter only suffices to support a certain strategic direction.  
Another suggestion to prevent the exploitation of geostrategic vulnerability is voiced in 
this paragraph that embodies the spirit of winning without fighting: “A major power that borders 
land and sea, when it comes to strategic orientation, should uphold self-defense and [the 
principle] of defensiveness as well as opposing expansion. Only by the policy of peaceful 
coexistence, and the avoidance of hegemonism and expansion through land and sea can it attain 
support from neighboring land countries and prevent their alliance with a sea power.” As 
discussed before, hegemonism and expansion in the Chinese definition only apply to war. 
China’s militarization in the South China Sea falls short of this qualification and thus from the 
PRC’s view is entirely defensive and does not contravene the principle of peaceful coexistence. 
The message of the paragraph is that as long as a non-military solution is used, China can win 
the hearts and minds of others. The example is overseas investments in Belt and Road projects. 
Despites growing criticism mostly from developed countries, the Initiative has gained solid 
ground in the developing countries. The solution is to disarm, figuratively, the enemy by 
removing political conditions for (informal) alliance, for instance, alliance between the U.S. and 
countries to the west and south of China, through economic dependence. While this essay is a 
piece of military writing, the strategic logic goes beyond military operations and belongs to 
grand strategy. 
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The final suggestion in this article is to closely observe xing shi and shift the direction of 
“strategic gravity” (战略重心) as soon as subtle changes in the situation are detected. The 
fundamental principle is to ensure security from either direction while engaging in all-out effort 
to deal with the enemy during both peacetime and wartime. In demonstrating how to obtain 
security at both fronts, the author cites the example of rapprochement with the US, when the 
latter was in a quagmire in Vietnam, to alleviate pressure from the sea so as to tackle Soviet 
hostility without distraction. As the logic goes, the contemporary engagement with countries 
from Central Asia, South Asia and Russia, with India sometimes an exception, aims to 
consolidate China’s west and ensure supplies of resources when dealing with challenges from the 
east. 
A good amount of Chinese writings devoted to the idea that the PRC can be a strong 
maritime power are more about weighting land and sea directions more equally than about a sole 
emphasis on the latter. The space dedicated to sea power discourse is to address the gap between 
the fact that China traditionally had been a land power and the prospect that its future 
development also and not exclusively depends on the sea. In other words, the positive cases that 
advocate naval power are the result of previous bias toward the land in practice. 
The idea to balance two directions or to think about the PRC’s strategic environment from 
an integrated grand strategic view, that is, how the land and the seas work together for self-
benefit, does not only appear in the military writings as the above analysis of a 2014 CMS essay 
shows, but also in foreign policy journals. One example is a 2015 CIR article with a focus on the 
“maritime silk road”, the maritime component of Belt and Road.269 The authors build their 
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arguments by connecting together infrastructure on the land and cooperation with countries 
bordering or on the sea. “The rise of a strong maritime power requires the support of land power. 
China needs to rely on the inland development to become a sea power. An integrated effort is 
needed to have the Maritime Silk Road and Land Silk Road exert synergetic influence.” It goes 
on to say that “the historical success of Portugal, Spain and Holland was ephemeral because they 
had scarce land resources whereas the US was first a land power and then moved on to become a 
naval power with an expansive territory for back up.” The authors then describe China’s geo-
position and the narratives indicate that the Chinese development is a replica of the U.S. 
The outward expansion to seas and lands aims to address the imbalanced development 
within China and to reduce Chinese dependency on the coastal economy. The authors recognize 
“domestic economic imbalance between the coast and the inland due to a more effective 
utilization of external resources by the coastal regions.” “The coastal economy reinforces 
China’s high dependence on overseas markets and foreign capital as well as sea lanes.” 
Recognizing the need to solve “the Malacca Strait Dilemma” by creating alternative routes 
through Pakistan and Myanmar for energy supplies, from the authors’ view, they “cannot replace 
maritime shipment.” “In order to ensure that China has enough substitutes for maritime shipping, 
it is necessary to broaden maritime cooperation with other countries.” The article further 
provides the example of the Indian Ocean, which was not a Chinese priority before, to 
demonstrate the need to develop maritime routes. According to the authors, the Indian Ocean has 
become an important energy and trade corridor that matters “in China’s overall development and 
security.” The logic here is to expand China’s influence far away from the coast so that its 
vulnerability can be reduced. Meanwhile, it is clear that the PRC does not intend to sacrifice one 
strategic direction for the other.   
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While this article is about the maritime silk road,  because many countries on the sea route 
border both lands and seas (aside from Indonesia and Sri Lanka which are island countries and 
from the authors’ views are more about maritime values with their seaports’ potential), the article 
also emphasizes the connectivity between sea and land routes, and how the former works to its 
best with the latter. The issue is tied back to the PRC’s attempts to develop its west and central-
southern provinces. “Through the two Corridors (the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Corridor and the China-Pakistan Corridor)……Xinjiang and Yunnan and other inland provinces 
can more effectively attract elements of production…….For instance, Yunnan can have access to 
the Indian Ocean through the corridor in the southwest and transform from an inland province to 
one that indirectly has coastal advantages.” It is particularly noted that the two corridors have 
both land and maritime functions that add developmental incentives to China’s inland regions. 
To be specific, the authors pinpoint Pakistan, Myanmar and Thailand as locations for Belt and 
Road because they border lands and seas. As chapter 6 will discuss, the PRC has been investing 
in the seaports in Pakistan and Myanmar along with land infrastructure that links to China’s 
western regions.  
Other domestic developmental issues stated in the article include over-production and 
economic upgrading. Countries on the Belt and Road are believed to provide help for the PRC in 
solving these problems. “The developed countries such as the US, Europe and Japan traditionally 
are China’s export markets. But the markets have saturated. Developing countries along the Belt 
and Road however have huge market potential and can help digest China’s production surplus 
and industrial upgrade because of the backwardness of manufacture in these countries.” 
The admission of Chinese reliance on the world is not always made explicit. In the public 
statements addressed by Chinese leaders to international audiences, for instance, speeches 
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published on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is rare to find passages that admit 
so. This is in line with official rhetoric that China has always relied on itself. The standard script 
that the country has overcome obstacles big and small and remains an economic giant even 
during the most difficult times for the international community runs through these speeches. The 
message is that even though members of international society are suffering and China also has 
received some impact, it remains not only capable of standing tall but also altruistically 
providing public goods; it is a reliable partner. However, when canvasing articles from wider 
sources, for instance, articles for policy making purposes and even essays from Qiushi, a Party 
organ for political indoctrination, Chinese authors do not shy away from acknowledging China’s 
dependence on the world.  
The way that China deals with its security concerns and developmental imbalance is to 
expand outward, by incorporating zhou bian countries into its orbit. For public consumption, the 
underpinning strategic logic discussed above is replaced by the discourse that depicts the PRC as 
a just and altruistic benign power that treats the small as its equal and brings mankind peace and 
prosperity. 
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Chapter 6 
I Come for Peace and the World Is My Playground 
 
To gain international influence and status, the PRC has relied on peacetime measures. 
Peacetime maneuvers are supported by the logic of winning without fighting and combine 
military and non-military means. Meanwhile, as Chinese official documents indicate, peacetime 
preparations are to prepare for “informationized local war” (to be exact, “informationized limited 
war”) Both non-war and war solutions are justified by the same logic that the self is on the right 
side and the other will take the blame. This logic applies to wherever Chinese activities take 
place. Active defense as a strategic guideline for the PLA has the above multifaceted and yet 
interrelated meanings. 
Although active defense is usually understood as a strategic guideline for war, Chinese 
official documents indicate that the emphasis is also on peacetime maneuvers and preparations. 
This is not to dismiss its war function, but rather to point out that without peacetime activities, 
there are no combat capabilities for war and aside from war, China also aims to achieve political 
objectives by deterrence.  
Active defense is not merely about where war most likely will occur. The prevailing 
definition of the concept from a sole “strategic direction” (from the sea) and from a war 
perspective is too narrow. A better approach will consider how the PRC understands its external 
environment from both land and sea directions and what designs it comes up with accordingly to 
cope with security challenges. The measures taken are for both peacetime deterrence and 
eventual use of force if the latter is judged to be necessary. 
Active defense can be understood by the logic of winning without fighting. Winning 
without fighting does not separate the pre-war stage and war. Instead, both phases are considered 
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together and war becomes an option when peacetime maneuvers fail to achieve desired effects. 
However, instead of seeing war as a last resort, which seems to be accepted by the current 
literature, war and non-war are conditioned. Winning without fighting does not mean that China 
dislikes or avoids war. It simply means that it focuses on pre-war preparations to make use of 
force easier. The PRC does not have real combat experience since the 1979 war with Vietnam 
and it takes time for the 2016 military reform that aims for capabilities of joint warfare (联合作
战) to have an effect. To modernize the military, it takes advantage of global interdependence 
and creates a relation of symbiosis between economic expansion and military training required 
for combat abilities. Moreover, it is stated in the Chinese narratives that what will be ideal is to 
elongate the peacetime period to benefit military development. The PLA’s capabilities in joint 
warfare remain questionable. Aside from unqualified armed forces, the official assessment of the 
international environment so far does not see an imminent war coming. Neither do domestic 
conditions that are still heavily oriented toward economic development favor a war. Accordingly, 
China intends to perfect its military capacity and use it in tandem with non-military influencers 
(culture, economy and diplomacy) to shift world power dynamics eventually to its favor, which 
will render a war unnecessary. Alternatively, it hopes to accumulate as much capacity as possible 
before it fights, which means sometime in the future the impossibility of a much-anticipated 
protracted peace period due to external or internal reasons or both. Another scenario is that war 
becomes an option when the country perceives itself to be on par, militarily, with the adversary 
and there are domestic factors favoring that route. Whichever way it may be, approaches to reach 
goals are conditioned. War as the last resort, indicated by statements like “because of others’ 
provocations, the self is forced to do something,” contains a cultural bias that justifies one’s 
behavior. It does not explain why certain measures are or are not taken.   
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In the context of the informationized local war that China expects to fight, active defense 
functions on a global level. The meaning of global here involves interactions between land 
power and sea power indicated by Chinese writings. Regarding the sea, open seas ( the Indian 
Ocean and Pacific Ocean) are training grounds and battlefields, both of which aim to realize 
offshore-waters defense. Although the campaign is to be waged within the first island chain, the 
PRC also is looking for adding strategic depth in the sea direction to obtain its political target 
within the first island chain (or within offshore waters regions). Increasing strategic depth will 
allow it, as its writings indicate, to minimize wartime homeland destruction by having the 
battlefield in the open seas. Preparation for such during peacetime also facilitates outward 
expansion. Open-seas operations such as MOOTWs, in the direction of the Indian Ocean, do not 
just serve the protection of maritime economic interests, but also lend force to the accumulation 
of combat capacity that can be used in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans for the purpose of 
offshore-waters defense. Military exercises in the Western Pacific beyond the first island chain 
no doubt serve the same goal. On the land side, China’s investments in the contiguous and non-
contiguous territories are expected to assist in dealing with the main challenge from the sea. In 
other words, even though the political target is located within the first island chain and the 
campaign will take place there, “informationized local war”, or a better translation, 
“informationized limited war” also expects battles will be fought away from offshore waters, in 
both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
The above stated preparations on the land and sea are on a global scale. Therefore, the self-
justified rationale of active defense, that what the self does is always right and for the sake of 
peace, is to be applied to wherever Chinese activities are present to create favorable xing shi to 
achieve political objectives. Similar to the historical experiences of other major powers, the PRC 
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is extending its foreign influence. However, it does not call its own behavior “expansion.” In the 
Chinese discourse, tangible and intangible influence and resources obtained through use of force 
is “expansion” whereas means short of use of force is not. That a materially superior state 
imposes terms on an inferior counterpart, instead of relying on moral appeals and reciprocity, in 
the PRC narratives, is called “hegemonism,” because again a military solution is resorted to. The 
Chinese discourse nevertheless does not have a clear-cut distinction between force and non-force 
means when it comes to the acceptability and legitimacy of Chinese behavior. Full-scale war can 
be sanctioned as being defensive and on just grounds, which are subjective interpretations. The 
same rationale applies to display of force and use of force short of war. 
This chapter first explores active defense as a multifaceted strategic guideline for the 
realization of the PRC’s grand political objectives. The theoretical tenets laid out here apply to 
the period from the second half of the 2000s or the time around the publication of the 2004 
defense white paper and Liu Huaqing’s memoir. It then moves on to historical discussion of 
active defense in practice before and after Deng’s reforms. Through comparison, it brings out 
major differences in that active defense after Deng’s reforms is tied to expansion and the 
synergetic workings of land and maritime power. The analysis then focuses on China’s strategic 
reasonings, activities and rationalization in both sea and land directions. Through the 
presentation of interrelations between offshore-waters and open-seas activities and how the land 
and the sea can work together in the Chinese view, it argues that the self-justified logic does not 
merely apply to the war scenario and the location of its occurrence, but also to the non-war 
scenario in which both military and non-military activities regardless of their distance from 
Chinese territory are used to achieve political objectives. 
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Theoretical Foundations of Active Defense 
 
Graph 6.0270      
     
 
Based on the discursive evidence from official documents and essays affiliated with the 
PLA,271 graph 6.0 presents a military approach to fulfill the PRC’s grand political goal(s), with 
arrows standing for contributing effects. The “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by the 
attainment of international status and influence can be the result of multifaceted approaches and 
it demands success in foreign policies as well. The grand political objective(s) are linked to the 
realization of issue objectives. As indicated by the Chinese narratives, their attainment requires 
military support, either through means of type (1) or type (2). For both war and non-war 
solutions, the narratives indicate that the country needs military strength to credibly coerce others 
 
270 Graph is made by the author. 
271 Defense white papers, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2019. Quoted 
texts are from English translations provided by the Chinese government. 
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to conform. Various activities short of war will foster combat capacity (especially via military 
training and MOOTWs in graph 6.0) and shape a good image that plays into the PRC’s 
advantages. This chapter thus contends that active defense is not merely a military strategy about 
war and where war will take place from a Chinese viewpoint. It also informs peacetime activities 
and how they are designed to contribute to political objectives without fighting. Analysis based 
on either of them will lose the forest for the tree.  
According to the 2015 document, in the chapter Strategic Guideline of Active Defense, 
aside from “winning local wars under conditions of informationization,” other goals of active 
defense include “war prevention, rights protection and stability maintenance, deterrence…...” 
These goals serve a larger political purpose beyond military; it is about peacetime operations that 
have accumulated effects on warfighting abilities that can either be used during wartime or 
peacetime, through deterrence and coercion, to achieve the grand political objectives. In other 
words, use of force and military means short of use of force can have, in theory, the same effect 
on the realization of political goals.  
A related question is the geographical scope of military activities. The space where the 
PLA is active has expanded according to China’s evolving interests. This is best demonstrated by 
the concepts of “offshore waters defense” and “open seas protection.” The 2015 defense white 
paper discusses them under the headline of “Building and Development of China’s Armed 
Forces” while previous white papers approach the topic in a less organized way. It wrote, “In 
line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection, the PLA 
Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of 
‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,’ and build a combined, multi-functional 
and efficient marine combat force structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic 
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deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive 
defense and comprehensive support.”272 It is unclear why the English translation uses marine. 
The Chinese version however means maritime combat force structure (海上作战力量体
系),instead of marine combat force structure. Nevertheless, the passage indicates the integrating 
efforts in place of operational abilities in the offshore-waters and in the open seas. Open-seas 
operations and training in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans are indispensable for joint warfare 
conducted in the offshore waters (or “near seas,” 近海防御 jin hai fangyu, as the Chinese 
characters should be directly rendered) and open seas, with the latter aiming to prevent key 
enemies’ forces from the two oceans entering the offshore waters theater. Meanwhile, offshore 
waters and open seas activities also work together for peacetime deterrence.    
According to the same white paper, the mission of the armed forces is to “foster a strategic 
posture favorable to China’s peaceful development.” The strategic posture (战略态势), including 
preparations for war (military trainings and MOOTWs), displays of force, military exchanges 
and formation of regional security frameworks, is to shape the situation and foster a trend within,  
or xing shi, with the aid of justifying narratives to shape international perceptions and 
accumulated combat capabilities which lend force to deterrence and coercion, favorable to the 
PRC in the sense that other countries will not oppose its overseas activities, but instead willingly 
cooperate or involuntarily acquiesce. These military activities are to fulfill economic, maritime 
and territorial interests which then will be transformed into the PRC’s international status and 
influence. For instance, military installations on the artificial islands of the SCS coupled with 
 
272 English translation original. Chinese text : 海军按照近海防御、远海护卫的战略要求，逐步实现近海防
御型向近海防御与远海护卫型结合转变，构建合成、多能、高效的海上作战力量体系，提高战略威慑
与反击、海上机动作战、海上联合作战、综合防御作战和综合保障能力。 
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required abilities for joint warfare, such as organizational coordination, personnel training, trials 
of equipment and weapons systems, intelligence gathering and naval formation in the open seas, 
whose obtainments are made possible by peacekeeping and anti-piracy missions that also aim to 
safeguard China’s overseas commercial interests, may deter regional countries from taking steps 
which Beijing sees infringing on its territorial interests. Because war is not used during the 
process, China claims that its development is peaceful and as a result it is not practicing 
hegemonism. In international politics, the literature is dominated by the dichotomy of peace and 
war, with one defined by the lack of the other. The complexity in the case of Chinese expansion 
and ways of intrusion will challenge the idea that peace is defined by the lack of war.  
The evidence that the PRC intends to finalize power transition during peacetime can be 
found in the official documents, including the 2015 white paper. To “create a security 
environment favorable to China’s peaceful development” usually comes after the assessment that 
the international climate remains generally peaceful and such peace provides opportunities for 
China to develop. Judging from the frequent appearance of the parallel between the two 
sentences in which China is both a beneficiary and a creator of peace, it is not difficult to grasp 
that active defense is a long-term strategy to realize China’s political objective, i.e. creating a 
new status quo in the world balance of power, during peacetime, a goal which otherwise would 
have to be attained by war.    
The intention to prolong the current period of peace does not contravene the fact that the 
PRC is preparing for war. It is simply to have more time to perfect its fighting potential. The 
logic of “winning without fighting” goes that it will be better to have political objectives come 
true with the presence of military capabilities but without war, but since the future is 
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unpredictable and the day may come that Chinese leaders see a necessity to use force, the longer 
the period of peace, the narrower the gap of power asymmetry.  
Active defense, although closely associated with military activities, is not exclusively 
military. To deter war, it dictates a coordination between military and non-military means. In the 
defense white papers of 2002, 2006, 2008, and 2015 within the framework of deterrence, the 
narratives indicate a realization of political objectives without war through a combination of 
military and non-military struggle. While the Chinese version uses “struggle” (斗爭), the English 
version reduces its frequency and uses “means”, “endeavors” or “work”.  The Chinese texts 
contain more hostility and a greater sense of competitiveness than English translations. The 
following examples are the English translations of the defense white papers provided by the 
PRC.  The 2002 paper wrote, “ In accordance with the needs of the national development 
strategy, the PLA, by employing military means flexibly and in close coordination with political, 
economic and diplomatic endeavors, improves China’s strategic environment, reduces factors of 
insecurity and instability, and prevents local wars and armed conflicts so as to keep the country 
from the harm of war.” The 2008 paper wrote, “This guideline lays stress on deterring crises and 
wars. It works for close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, 
economic, cultural and legal endeavors, strives to foster a favorable security environment, and 
takes the initiative to prevent and defuse crises, and deter conflicts and wars.” The 2015 paper 
stated, “to foster a strategic posture favorable to China's peaceful development……persevere in 
close coordination of political, military, economic and diplomatic work.”273 The guideline also 
singles out non-military struggle to help deter war. Therefore, when it comes to realization of 
 
273 For the 2002 white paper, see <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/II.htm>; for 2018, see 
<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-04/11/content_4778231_4.htm>; for 2015, see < 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2015-05/26/content_4586711.htm>. 
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political goals without fighting, active defense is about both military and non-military means. 
The question then is about the type of coordination among different realms that the papers refer 
to. 
Deterrence is not solely for the sake of maintaining a non-war environment. As the 
statements quoted above indicate, it is for China’s development and about galvanizing combat 
capabilities before the outbreak of war, especially the ability of joint warfare operations. The 
type of coordination between military and non-military struggle (a combination of means type 
(1) and non-military means in the Graph 6.0) thus is to foster national comprehensive power and 
translate it into political assets and military capacity to deter war. Take China’s interactions with 
zhou bian countries as an example. The state media reports diplomacy and heads-of-states 
meetings especially with developing countries in a way to highlight the PRC’s international 
popularity. Overseas infrastructure investments and trade are made high-profile events. But these 
deals are not simply to solve Chinese problems of production shortage and surplus. Some of 
them are also strategic and military as the Chinese writings elsewhere indicate. A certain level of 
economic solvency and infrastructure support military buildup. The Belt and Road Initiative is 
such an example in that it provides needed resources and markets for the PRC’s economy and 
invested infrastructure may be used during wartime. China’s dealings with the SCS are another 
example of utilizing various ways, including military facilities, public discourse and legal 
warfare, to validate its territorial claims. From a Chinese viewpoint, military presence in the SCS 
deters other major powers in the surrounding areas. These multifaceted approaches feed the 
realization of issue objectives as illustrated in the Graph. 
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In Graph 6.0, the relation between issue objectives and means type (1) is symbiosis. It is a 
two-way effect that means type (1) contributes to issues objectives and vice versa. Accumulation 
of combat capacity is made possible against the background of pursuing overseas economic 
interests; the PRC takes advantage of peacekeeping and anti-piracy missions, both of which aim 
to secure Chinese commerce and are framed as cooperative and conducive to world peace and 
economy, to do training required for joint warfare capabilities. Territorial interests are another 
example. Their realization in the South China Sea through island building creates an 
environment that serves both peacetime deterrence through military presence and wartime 
fighting by force deployment and regular military exercises, both of which are practiced and 
accustomed to the sea terrains and the presence of other countries’ navies. Therefore, issues 
objectives have contributing effects to combat abilities as well. 
The Chinese narratives (in the PLA-affiliated publications) explicitly indicate that offshore 
region(s) the PRC believes to be crucial to its national security are strategically linked to its 
global activities and economic interests which tie back to national security that is conceptualized 
to include but not limited to (maritime) territories along the national boundaries; in other words, 
the coastal maritime regions are not merely about national security, but also bear strategic 
importance for the possibilities of the PRC’s global status. These regions are one of places where 
“informationized local war”, a type of warfare that the PLA believes it will fight, is most likely 
to take place—a limited war that has global consequences from the Chinese perspective. 
The geographical space of an informationized local war extends beyond the PRC’s border 
areas. While the first island chain is identified as the most strategic region for the country’s 
security, to achieve its political objectives in the first island chain, Chinese discourse indicates 
that warfare in the outer areas is necessary in a “local war”, to deepen strategic depth by pushing 
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the war outward.  Therefore, local wars can include but do not equate to wars fought in the 
offshore waters or places along land borders between China and neighboring states. The PRC’s 
defense white papers in their English version often translate jubu zhanzheng (局部战争) as 
“local wars.” However, the Chinese jubu (局部) actually refers to “limited,” instead of locations 
within a fixed geographical range close to the PRC-controlled territories. The more appropriate 
translation of jubu zhanzheng should be “limited war.”  
“Limited wars” or the misleading translation, “local wars” needs to be understood against 
the lesser likelihood of “a massive war of invasion”274 and the lesser likelihood of “worldwide, 
all-out and large-scale wars for a relatively long period of time.”275 This is because the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the rise of China have moved the world toward multipolarity and thus 
large-scale homeland invasion and world war have become less likely.276  
Based on the above discussion, graph 6.0 functions on a global level and so does the self-
justified logic of active defense. The PRC’s discourse rationalizes both cooperative and 
confrontational activities of types (1) and (2) as being defensive, mutually beneficial or 
conducive to peace.277 Considering this and the fact of China attempting to realize its 
 
274 See the 1995 English defense white paper 
275 See the 2008 English defense white paper. The 2014 white paper uses “world war.” 
276 The white papers of 2008, 2010, and 2014 have multipolarity and local wars (or local conflicts, 局部战
争，局部冲突) in the beginning paragraphs of the same first chapter, the (National) Security Situation. 2008 
and 2014 also see a world war included in the same section. The 2014 document stated, “…the global trends 
toward multi-polarity and economic globalization are intensifying…The forces for world peace are on the rise, 
so are the factors against war. In the foreseeable future, a world war is unlikely, and the international situation 
is expected to remain generally peaceful……Small-scale wars, conflicts and crises are recurrent in some 
regions. Therefore, the world still faces both immediate and potential threats of local wars (jubu zhanzheng局
部战争).” Accordingly, the relations between world war and jubu zhanzheng are about whether war is on a 
worldwide scale. “Local wars” in the Chinese white papers means that war does not occur in the form of 
WWII in that there are multiple theaters made possible by major states’ global interests and trans-oceanic 
alliances. 
277 Post-1949 cases include the Korean War and the 1962 border war with India. When it comes to war, the 
Chinese concept of “righteous war” provides a range of reasons to defend the action, including self-defense, 
helping the weak, being forced to take action, and fending off aggression. In the border clash between China 
301 
multifarious interests in a re-conceptualized expansive geographical space where its activities 
take place, it is not difficult to conclude, and empirical evidence does show, that the PRC 
justifies its behavior as being non-expansionist and for common goods wherever military 
activities occur. In other words, the application of active defense is dynamic and not bound by 
geographical limitations as long as China is able to continue expansion. 
Active defense as a strategic guideline does not solely function as a principle for military 
operations, in terms of whether forces should take a defensive or offensive posture.  Neither does 
it solely provide guidance for the active buildup of armed forces, not in the simple sense of arms 
stockpile but rather the overall combat capabilities based on qualitative and quantitative 
measurements, to deter or to fight adversaries for identified national interests. It is both. The 
“defensive nature” or “defense” of active defense refers to the fact that the PLA is prepared to 
 
and India in 1962 that is dubbed “the Border Self-defense Counterattack War Against India,” China exonerates 
itself by the excuse that it did not aim “to use force to recover the territory illegally seized by India, but to 
create conditions for peaceful settlement of the border dispute by means of war when China had no 
alternative.” The narratives frame armed conflicts with neighbors as the result of no other choices left for 
Beijing and it is forced to go to war. In the Chinese view, the war solution that it adopted is justified because it 
would create conditions for peace. The PRC also has used the Korean War as a prototype of “righteous war.” 
“In the Korean War…… [we aided] the neighboring country [North Korea] in danger to resist foreign 
aggression [American imperialism], and to consolidate our national defense.” But the narratives that Kim Il 
Sung secured a greenlight for invading South Korea from Moscow and Beijing under the assessment that the 
US would not intervene and China already made military intervention possible on its side three weeks after the 
outbreak of war are lacking. For Mao and the CCP leadership, war in Korea served good purposes for 
communist revolution and could further consolidate the political legitimacy of the CPP, domestically and 
internationally. Domestically, by propagating the threat from the American “imperialists” and the “reactionary 
forces”, especially the KMT in Taiwan and its remnants in China, Mao was able to mobilize the Chinese 
population in his design of transforming the country from the stage of democratic revolution to that of socialist 
revolution. Internationally, Chinese victory in driving the Americans out of the peninsula would boost the 
country’s position as a regional leader of the communist revolution. Beijing was eager to restore its central 
status by exporting revolution to developing countries. The PRC framed its role as someone who had duty to 
liberate people whom the U.S. aimed to oppress and expand its influence over. For Mao, if China sat idle when 
the U.S. acted in Korea, it would put its reputation at risk. In short, the war was half-encouraged by China and 
the Chinese intervention in the Korean War was ideology driven for self-interests. This proactiveness in 
motivation is in a sharp contrast with how the PRC wants the event to be remembered, a victim who tried to 
protect the self and the other victim as well. See Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi. Science of Military 
Strategy. Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 2005, pp. 458-459 (for the quotations in this 
footnote); Jian Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War: the Making of Sino-American Confrontation, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
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deter or fight for national interests as fighting for national interests is defensive in one’s 
subjective interpretation. It is less about whether operations are defensive. In fact, on the 
operational level, both defensive posture and offensives are encouraged so long as they are 
judged to facilitate victory. 
“Active” means to actively conduct military training and MOOTWs to prepare for war and 
for a preferred non-war peacetime balance of power. The Chinese texts call such activities 
“preparation for military struggle” (PMS). The “military struggle” that prevails in the official 
documents was not explicitly defined until 2015 through an independent chapter. The term may 
simply refer to a situation in which force on various scales is used to solve disputes and does not 
include peacetime military activities. This is indicated by “preparation for military struggle” in 
that peacetime activities including military exercises and MOOTWs (military operations other 
than war) are the preparations for future use of force as they foster combat capacity.278 In the 
2015 white paper, the first paragraph of the chapter, Preparation for Military Struggle, wrote, 
“preparations for military struggle (PMS) is a basic military practice and an important guarantee 
for safeguarding peace, containing crises and winning wars. To expand and intensify PMS, 
China’s armed forces must meet the requirement of being capable of fighting and 
winning,……and do solid work and make relentless efforts in practical preparations, in order to 
enhance their overall capabilities for deterrence and warfighting (emphasis added).” It is within 
this context that the same chapter discusses MOOTWs along with military training. The last 
 
278 The idea that the armed forces can be used during peacetime and wartime already appeared in 2006 white 
paper. It identified the diversified employment of the military as a pathway to “effectively respond to crises, 
maintain peace, deter war and win war in all kinds of complicated situations (emphasis added).” The term 
however did not receive full treatment until 2013 with the entire document devoted to that. Not until 2008 did 
the white paper use the term, MOOTW, that includes “active participation in multilateral and bilateral joint 
military exercises,” to specify what peacetime diversified tasks the PLA may perform. Other MOOTW 
missions are disaster relief, counter-terrorism, maritime stability maintenance, peacekeeping, and humanitarian 
assistance. 
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paragraph states that MOOTWs are “an important approach to enhancing [China’s armed 
forces’] operational capabilities.” The Chinese version of the white paper however uses a more 
expressive term, “combat capabilities” (作战能力). Accordingly, from the Chinese view, 
through developing combat capacity from military training and MOOTWs, the PLA’s primary 
objectives of peacetime deterrence and warfighting capabilities can be achieved. 
Another way to understand “active” is from the strategic level of the preparations work. 
The underlying logic is that however security dynamics change, the PLA has to be prepared and 
will be ready to go to war when it comes. It is about actively planning and preparing for 
“informationized local war”(信息化局部战争). To that effect, this will involve constant 
assessments of geostrategic situations and corresponding adjustments of organizational 
responsibilities and force deployments. The goal is to prevent the country from passively 
reacting to changing conditions and to enable it to “seize the strategic initiative.” The 2015 white 
paper provides descriptions about active defense that conform to the above interpretations. “In 
view of China’s geostrategic environment, the security threats it faces and the strategic tasks they 
[the armed forces] shoulder, the armed forces will make overall planning for strategic 
deployment and military disposition in order to clearly divide areas of responsibility for their 
troops, and enable them to support each other and act as an organic whole.”279 The security 
environment that the quoted text mentions specifically refers to outer space, cyber space, and the 
geographical areas where China’s overseas interests are located. Accordingly, active defense 
does not merely apply to the PRC’s core interests but also general national interests including 
those overseas. 
 
 
279 For more detailed treatment of this passage, see the sub-section, open seas operations.  
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The “defensive nature” of active defense is not about how the campaign is waged or who 
initiated the attack, but rather regardless of that, actions are taken for self-believed defensive 
purposes on the political level.  “Defensive nature” is related to whether the war is fought to 
secure specific political goals, including “safeguarding national unity, territorial integrity and 
maritime rights and interests”280 which Beijing defines according to its perspective of history and 
interpretations of international law. From the PRC’s viewpoint, since these goals are entirely 
justifiable and righteous, its engagement in combat for the stated purposes is purely defensive, 
regardless of whether the campaign is offensive or defensive. According to the Chinese logic, so 
long as issues are placed under the category of national interests, its actions receive immunity 
from the accusation of aggression. China’s narratives put this “defensiveness” in the perspective 
of expanded space for military and non-military activities in line with evolving national interests. 
The 2015 white paper is an example where open-seas maritime interests are seen as national 
interests and discussed within the framework of active defense. In other words, the PRC justifies 
its deeds as legitimate and righteous wherever they take place.  
The PRC As A Land and Sea Power?281 
 
280 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, 2005, p. 459; the 2015 defense white paper. 
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During Mao’s period, the main defense focus was military preparations for a homeland 
invasion that would come from either the sea or the land, or both at the same time. From the 
PRC’s perspective, the US could launch attacks from the Korean Peninsula or southeast coastal 
areas in coordination with KMT offensives. The US also posed threats from the south as it had 
been fighting in Vietnam since 1964. Meanwhile, from the 1960s to 1970s, following a 
deterioration in bilateral relations, the Soviets had grown aggressive in the Chinese eyes. Being 
sandwiched between two superpowers and lacking a modernized army, despite the possession of 
nuclear capabilities, the strategy was to orient economic development to fit the military needs for 
a war that in Chinese leaders’ assessment mostly likely would not be limited but rather full-scale 
(全面战争) People’s War.  
The People’s War aimed to mobilize nationwide resources to fight in more than one way. 
In such a war, the PLA would lure enemies deep into the interior, annihilate them when they 
were in dispersion through force concentrations, and directly confront the enemies’ main fighting 
forces only under certain conditions. It was a combination of guerrilla and regular warfare. The 
goal was to enervate adversaries by removing their fighting potential. Facing formidable enemies 
whose military prowess far surpassed a country whose inventory and training were imported, 
Chinese leaders transformed the country to be constantly on a high alert for war. To fight the 
war, developmental priorities in industries and investments were readjusted; enterprises, 
infrastructure, science and technology, transportation and telecommunication were primarily to 
serve military needs. The result was that the country did not have a normal economy to support 
the overall wellbeing of its citizens. The “Three Line” (or Three Front 三线建设) policy in 1964 
 
Zedong’s Military Strategic Thought” [鄧小平對毛澤東軍事戰略思想的繼承與發展], Aug. 13, 2014, 
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2014/0813/c69113-25459367-3.html>. 
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further relocated people, factories and research institutions from the coastal regions to the 
hinterland. It aimed to make northwest and southwest provinces the bedrock of military industry 
that could sustain combat needs. Mao’s People’s War thus was continental-oriented, to be fought 
mainly by the army with the navy and air force relegated to an auxiliary function. 
Passing with Mao’s death was the Maoist worldview about war that had informed national 
development and defense strategy. The resulting ideational changes about the interrelations of 
war and state building were also influenced by the rapprochement with the US during the 1970s 
that mitigated Chinese concerns of taking thrusts on two fronts simultaneously and further 
reduced the fear of a Soviet invasion since Beijing’s capabilities now were augmented by 
improved relations with Washington. The PRC also utilized the newly gained freedom of action 
to war against Vietnam. Bilateral relations with Hanoi worsened in the later stage of the Vietnam 
War as Beijing abandoned its communist “brother” for a second time since the 1954 Geneva 
Conference. The closer relations between Moscow and Hanoi, in the eyes of Chinese leaders, 
lent a hand to the former’s strategy to encircle China; Vietnam’s drive for regional hegemony 
and Moscow’s antagonism toward Beijing would create another sandwich situation for the PRC. 
Washington’s weak response to Hanoi’s aspirations did not curtail such a possibility either. 
Consequently, Deng Xiaoping, the then paramount leader of the PRC, decided to go to war. The 
war that started in 1979 and extended into the mid-1980s aimed to improve and consolidate 
China’s geopolitical position. It also sent a message to the USSR that the communist brother that 
it supported was punished by its immediate neighbor whom it wanted to subdue, and the 
Vietnamese defeat was an assault to Moscow’s expansionist ambition.282 Adding to the PRC’s 
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relief were Moscow’s setbacks in the Afghanistan invasion and the sluggish Soviet economy. In 
the mid-1980s, Chinese leaders set the tune for a better relationship with the northern neighbor in 
the years to come.  
A series of upswings led Deng to believe that China’s external security had changed for 
the better. What contributed to the PRC’s confidence included reduced negativity, i.e. alleviated 
or removed threats, and the input of positivity, that is, the victory in the 1979 war with Vietnam 
as well as trade flows with the U.S. It was against this backdrop that Deng announced in the first 
half of 1980s a need to drop the mentality of expecting an imminent full-scale war and to 
concentrate resources on the Four Modernizations that would elevate economic development to 
the first place and relegate military development to the fourth in priority. This did not mean a 
slight toward the military in its role of state building, but rather a shift to a more sustainable way 
to develop coercive power by ending the subordination of the economy to military needs. 
severing the relation of economy serving military.283 The meeting of the CMC in June, 1985 set 
the tone that the country was no longer in a state of imminent war and the nature of the PLA’s 
development would be peacetime modernization. Not until 1988 did the enlarged meeting of the 
CMC reorient “the preparation basis for military struggle” (军事斗争准备的基点) from a full-
scale war of homeland invasion to a limited war (or local war). 
Another important change was the replacement of coastal defense with offshore-waters 
defense (or near seas defense). Throughout Mao’s period, the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN)’s responsibility of coastal defense was inward-looking. Despite the stated need to build 
 
283 As a norm of countries’ successful development, economic growth would at the end allow for expanded 
military budgets if initial priority was given to the economy that support the general well-being of the 
population, especially the civilian light industry. Mao’s period however contravened this pattern. Chinese 
leaders then tried to develop the economy primarily for the development of heavy industry as it paved the 
foundation for a modernized army. The result was the sacrifice of the livelihood of its citizens.  
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a strong navy, People’s War with its continental orientation relegated the navy to an auxiliary 
role of supporting the army in securing the home front. Deng Xiaoping in the mid-1980s voiced 
the need to develop the capabilities of offshore-waters defense. Measures were taken for a more 
balanced development among the services of the armed forces, although the PLA would remain a 
continental-oriented army for the following decades. In 1979, the 13 military regions were 
reduced to 11. The 1985 enlarged meeting of the CMC in June announced a one-million 
personnel reduction. In the late 1980s, military regions again were reduced to 7 along with 
reductions of three million personnel.284 Aside from downsizing the army, Deng Xiaoping made 
Admiral Liu Huaqing the Commander of the PLAN. Since the PLAN Commander usually did 
not require a rank higher than lieutenant general or vice admiral, Liu’s takeover of the position 
indicated the elevated status of the Navy in Deng’s reforms.285 Liu would also serve as the vice 
chairman of the CMC until 1997. He earned a reputation for his strategic thought about offshore-
waters defense and his efforts in naval modernization. The newly gained attention and greater 
budget allocations would serve three purposes, reverse engineering, foreign procurement and 
indigenous construction.286 The decade of the 1990s should be seen as providing the foundation 
and setting the tone for naval expansion from the 2000s to today, in both geographical space and 
armaments buildups.287 
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Deng’s reforms would make China’s economy dependent on globalization in the following 
decades. Maritime interests thus also offer impetus for naval expansion. “Local war” as the new 
type of warfare for the PLA to master has inseparable connections with naval capabilities and 
force projection. The passing of Maoist ideology that valued manpower over machines in the 
People’s War made possible the recognition of modern technology. Evolving names for local 
war reflect the elevated status of technology. In the late 1980s and 1990s, it was “local war under 
modern high technology conditions.” Entering the 21st century, the name changed to “local war 
under the conditions of informationization.” In recent years, military writings have used “local 
war under the conditions of informationization” and “informationization local war” at the same 
time. 
To fight a People’s War, resources were to be generated in the vast home territory and 
destruction in parts of the homeland was expected. These activities barely occurred outside the 
landmass. Local war takes on a different logic. It will still rely on the land power to create and 
mobilize warfighting resources. However, Chinese dependence on the world market and 
territorial contiguity with other states in the west and southwest directions make the generation 
of land resources qualitatively different. First, land power will rely on the concept of land 
extension that is made possible by transportation networks under BRI projects and infrastructure 
investments before BRI. China’s (strategic) hinterland further extends to Central Asia, South 
Asia and Indochina. Second, related to the first point, instead of indigenously strengthening itself 
on a weak foundation as was done in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the PRC is using 
global resources to develop its national economy and to strike a balance, through investments in 
the western and southwestern foreign states, between the inland and the coast.  Unlike the 
People’s War and its historical conditions, local war over the years has pushed outward the 
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defense line in the sea direction, away from the coast to minimize homeland destruction. 
Meanwhile, it is augmenting naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. While the People’s 
War carried the continental mentality, the informationized local war in the 21st century is 
premised on the idea that the PRC is both a land and sea power.  
Active defense in the context of local war differs from that in the context of the People’s 
War in terms of political goals and the methods for their realization. Because of a relatively 
peaceful post-Cold War environment, the attainment of grand political objectives through a non-
war type of power transition theoretically becomes possible. Peacetime military activities and 
economic engagement that can be transformed into military assets may make war unnecessary 
during the process of power transition. This was unthinkable during Mao’s period because of the 
country’s backwardness as well as its international isolation. Despite the stated goal of 
surpassing developed countries through technological and economic leaps within a short period 
of time, this was unrealistic and severely hampered by ideological radicalization. Achieving 
power supremacy was impossible and military preparations for a drawn-out People’s War built 
upon weak material conditions could only secure self-survival, not expansion. In addition, active 
defense in the context of informationized local war also has different geographical meanings that 
go with expansion.  
Active defense is not to be defined solely by where the primary strategic direction for the 
PRC is. It is to be defined by the following aspects taken altogether: 
1. The primary strategic direction for the PRC concerning BOTH its survival and its outward 
expansion. 
2. Where it draws resources to support its efforts in the primary strategic direction. 
3. Since it is a strategic guideline for peacetime military activities and use of force, both of 
which are pathways for the realization of grand political goals, it is imperative to take a 
strategic view about how Chinese peacetime military and non-military activities in the places 
stated in points 1 and 2 can, according to Chinese narratives, shift the world balance of power 
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and how they can be transformed into combat abilities when China decides to use force in the 
future.  
It is under the expanded geographical scope, especially taking into account the second 
point, and the consideration of both peacetime activities and use of force that active defense 
should be understood. A central logic of active defense is that Chinese deeds are innately 
defensive, non-expansionist and peaceful, purely for technical and logistical needs, and 
beneficial for others as well. In understanding this logic from the perspective of Chinese 
globetrotting, the PRC will always defend its behavior as being defensive wherever it goes, and 
this is exactly the line for its commercial and naval expansion.  
In the context of China’s strategic reasonings for both the sea and land directions and how 
it intends to transform them for its own use, the next section will show that the self-justified logic 
is not affected by distance and that Chinese rationalization reveals the power relations that the 
PRC prefers. To that effect, the analysis will include two main sections, the sea direction and the 
land direction. In each of them, strategic reasonings, activities and Chinese rationalization of its 
own behavior will be presented. Chapter 5 has discussed the Chinese strategy of consolidating 
the west (the land direction) while preparing for war in the east (the sea direction). It is based on 
this view that the rest of the analysis in this chapter unfolds.  
The Sea Direction  
3 Million Square-Kilometers of Maritime Territories 
Between 1984 and 1985, Liu Huaqing read a report produced by a research institute of the 
State Council that advocated for China having both “continental vision” and “maritime vision.” 
Liu was in the middle of contemplating China’s naval strategy as the military was undergoing a 
transition from wartime to peacetime operation. In his memoir, Liu cited a paragraph from the 
report to justify why it was necessary for China to devote resources to naval development. The 
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first sentences read as follows: “our country is the first to invent the compass and has a long 
coastline and long history of sea-faring. It is a major state with natural endowment of oceans. 
Therefore, the navy should be an independent strategic branch of the armed forces.”288 The late 
admiral was not the only one who believed that China has potential to become a maritime power 
because of its geographical location. This idea has gained currency within the PLA. The 2013 
White Paper, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, wrote that “China is a 
major maritime as well as land country.” Another example is the 2015 white paper that reads, 
“The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development 
of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great 
importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights 
and interests. It is necessary for China to develop modern maritime military force structure 
commensurate with its national security and development interests.”289 
While it is a popular notion in the military writings that China is naturally endowed with 
the potential for both sea and land power because of its location, the narratives also see its 
surroundings as obstacles to the control over the ocean. “China’s neighboring seas are 
surrounded by the island chains of the neighboring countries. Japan, North Korea, and South 
Korea surround the maritime areas from the sea mouth of the Tumen River to the southeastern 
coast. From the southeast to the South China Sea, the region is circled by the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand. Regarding maritime transportation and other 
maritime rights, [China] is a country with geographical disadvantages…….”290 Some authors 
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also argue that geographical blocks extend to the second island chain. After affirming the 
geostrategic advantages of China, that is, situated in the inner crescent of the Eurasian continent 
according to the author’s understanding of Halford Mckinder’s thesis,291 the author of a 2004 
CMS article continues, “nevertheless, the country remains half-closed since its pathways to the 
oceans are interrupted by the two island chains.”292 This geographical disadvantage is translated 
into desires to control the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu islands), Taiwan, and the South China Sea.  
According to Zhang Shiping, a researcher in the Academy of Military Science when his 
book was written, “if Japan-North Korea-South Korea and the Philippines-Malaysia are the two 
doors to the Pacific Ocean located in the north and south respectively, Taiwan and the Senkaku 
islands in the East China Sea are the latches to the doors; if Japan-Taiwan-the Philippines and 
Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia are China’s two doors to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, then the 
South China Sea is the latch to the doors. China can navigate the two oceans with ease if it has 
both doors and latches.”293 For Zhang, Taiwan holds the key position to the Pacific and the SCS 
to both oceans. Meanwhile, the CMS has carried the perspective that Taiwan and the SCS also 
concern China’s domestic development and national security. 
The Chinese publications imagine that Taiwan can provide strategic depth for the PRC. In 
a 2007 CMS essay that devotes the entire space for the strategic significance of Taiwan, the 
author links it to China’s security and outward expansion. “For China and the entire East Asia, 
Taiwan and its surrounding areas is an invaluable outpost from the military perspective……By 
 
291 Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) was a British geo-strategist who argued that a “heartland” power on a 
Eurasian continent can have potential for world dominance once it is able to defeat a potential competing 
country and utilize resources on the Eurasian landmass to muster industrial and military capabilities. When this 
situation is materialized, a land power has opportunities to defeat a sea power.  
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connecting Taiwan to the Zhoushan Archipelago in the north and the Hainan island in the south, 
China will have a strong coastal defense……, safeguarding the six provinces and cities in the 
southeast and the military strategic depth in the area.” To be geographically specific, the Chinese 
narratives imagine that “Taiwan situated in between can provide coastal defense for the Yangtze 
River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, both of which carry the hope of the Chinese nation to 
surpass the world advanced standard” and have been the most prosperous regions after the 
reforms. The Taiwan Strait is also believed to hold economic and transportation lifelines for 
China and other countries. “Three out of China’s four major trade routes are southbound” and 
Taiwan provides them a shortcut between the East China Sea and the South China Sea. 
Furthermore, “most of the air and maritime traffic from the far east of Russia, Japan, the Koreas, 
and China passes through areas around Taiwan to Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the other 
side of the Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe.” Finally, the author sees the island nation as a 
gateway to the Pacific. “China is a major country endowed with both land and sea……but the 
first island chain separated China from the ocean……The 21st century is the century in which the 
Chinese nation faces toward the ocean and the world…..Realizing the unification will change the 
situation that China’s sea area is half-closed.”294  
The CMS articles also address Taiwan solely in terms of its importance to China’s national 
security. In a 2010 essay that summarizes different researchers’ views about China’s grand 
strategy and how it should be devised, the author lists Taiwan along with the SCS and the border 
relations between the PRC and neighboring countries as geostrategic focuses in Beijing’s foreign 
policies. The specific reasons of including the Island are follows. Taiwan is believed to be the 
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“center of China’s maritime strategy in the Chinese sea area” that consists of “four offshore 
waters regions, Bohai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the SCS.” “They form an organic 
whole with close relations to one another in China’s geopolitics. The Taiwan Strait is an area of 
utmost strategic significance…… If it is in the enemy’s hands, the connection between the SCS 
and Bohai and the Yellow Sea will be cut off, which poses a major security threat to China’s 
southeast coastal region. On the economic front, the Taiwan Strait is an important sea lane for 
China as well.”295  
The Science of Military Strategy, which provides military theories and strategies for the 
People’s Liberation Army, also contends that Taiwan is “directly related with the overall 
situation of China’s survival and development” from a geostrategic perspective. Situated in the 
middle of the first-island chain, Taiwan is believed to hold “the key to the southeast coastal area 
of China and the fence to the seven provinces in the center of China.” “It is a sea transportation 
hub” which “the sea route from the West Pacific to the Middle East, Europe and Asia passes” 
through. The book issued a warning if China fails to control Taiwan. “Not only our natural 
maritime defense system would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to the outside forces, but 
also a large area of water territory and rich reserves of ocean resources will fall into the hands of 
others……our line of foreign trade and transportation……will be exposed to the surveillances 
and threats of separatist and enemy forces, and China will forever be locked to the west side of 
the first chain of islands in the West Pacific.” The authors believe that Taiwan is “where [the 
PRC] can breach the chain of the islands surrounding [it] in the West Pacific to the vast area of 
the Pacific, [and] a strategic key area and sea barrier for defense and offense.”296  
 
295 Xia Zengnan, p.138. 
296 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, pp. 442-443. 
316 
The strategic value of the SCS similarly is also about both national security/development 
and outward expansion. There are at least four stated motivations propelling Chinese 
militarization of the Sea. First, reserves of natural resources (fishery, minerals, oil and gas) for 
national development. Second, the concerns about cargoes and energy supplies being intercepted 
in the Strait of Malacca are translated into the desire to control the SCS. On a Chinese website 
that collects articles from newspapers and journals regarding the SCS issue, one essay with 
posting date marked 2011, in the context of recognizing the possibility that its oil supplies from 
the Asia Pacific, Africa and the Middle East will be halted in the Strait of Malacca, writes in the 
same paragraph, “ the SCS situated between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans has geostrategic 
advantages because all the maritime and air routes that transit through the SCS need to pass the 
Spratly islands. In discussing traditional security, from a geopolitical perspective, occupying the 
Spratly islands can directly or indirectly control most of sea lanes from the Strait of Malacca to 
Japan, from Singapore to Hong Kong, from Guangdong to Manila, and even from East Asia to 
Western Asia and from Africa to Europe.”297  
Another article from the same website with posting date marked 2011 which originally 
appeared in Ordinance Knowledge (兵器知识 ), a Chinese magazine, is more detailed about the 
military purpose of the SCS for the PRC.298 It first writes that “the Spratly islands is an important 
security belt for our national south. Effective control over the Spratly and the relevant waters can 
extend our military’s strategic depth to a thousand kilometers, which allows more room for 
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maneuvers for our air and naval forces. It will also help with defending the country from an 
enemy’s strategic bombing and provide cover for troop movements on the land.” This reasoning 
apparently is to support the other two reasons that motivate Chinese behavior in the region. 
“Effective control over the Spratly and the relevant waters can increase integrated deterrence 
capabilities, seize strategic initiative, and can directly control and influence the international 
maritime oil lifeline. It can become a sharp knife that directly threatens foreign forces and deters 
western countries that have forward presence in the surroundings of the SCS (emphasis added).”  
The last reason has to do with Taiwan. In the case of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, “the Spratly 
is [China’s] forward presence that can prevent foreign military intervention, provide 
reinforcement, implement sea blockade, provide air cover and enable unannounced inspection 
and detention.”  These two strategic motives were laid out in the context that the Spratly “is an 
important support for our Navy breaking through the first island chains to the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans.” The lines between national security and outward expansion are thin. 
China’s claims go beyond Taiwan and the SCS and it believes that the size of coastal 
regions under its jurisdiction is 3 million square-kilometers, running from the Yellow Sea, to the 
East China Sea, to the South China Sea. These maritime territories “provide resources for our 
country’s survival and development and are our safety shields.”299 Upon the discovery that China 
has an additional maritime expanse one-third the size of its land territories and the country is 
larger than conventionally understood, Zhang Shiiping’s wordings are expressively enthusiastic: 
“when taken together, land territory and sea territory, the geographical landscape of China is 
more than a rooster. It is a brightly burning torch erected in the east of the Eurasian continent. 
The land of 9,600,000 square kilometers is the raging flame. The 3,000,000 square-kilometers 
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sea territory from the Bohai, to the Yellow Sea, the maritime area to the east of Taiwan, James 
Shoal of the SCS, Hainan island and Gulf of Tonkin are the blue tray and the handle of the 
torch.”300 This sense of entitled vanity has its translation in the concept of “offshore-waters 
defense.”  
Offshore-Waters Defense 
The “offshore-waters defense” was developed based on the notion of the first island 
chain.301 Liu Huaqing’s memoir and a good amount of military writings have confirmed that the 
main strategic area for China’s defense where military campaigns will take place has extended, 
since after Deng’s reforms, from the coast to offshore waters regions including Bohai, the 
Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and part of the maritime areas to the east of 
Taiwan.302 Liu’s memoir set the goal of breaking the first island chain that naval development is 
to follow. According to him, the Navy should aim at “effectively controlling the important 
maritime routes connected to China’s sea regions within a necessary timespan.”303 Regularized 
 
300 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
301 A curious thing is the English translations provided by the PRC. The defense white papers of 2000, 2004, 
2006, and 2008 use “offshore defensive operations” for jin hai fang yu (近海防御) whereas the papers of 2015 
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302 For instance, in a CMS article dated 2004, the author wrote, “China’s maritime territories are vast. 
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea and China’s positions, the sea territories under 
the Chinese jurisdiction is 3,000,000 square kilometers, which is equivalent to 20 Shandong provinces or 30 
Jiangsu Provinces.” The author continues that “our strategy is to wage military campaigns in the near sea. [The 
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See, Xu Qi, 2004, pp. 79-80. Others include Liu Huaqing, 2004, pp. 434-438; Song Liangjiang, Wu Diming 
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[论邓小平建设强大海军思想], CMS, issue 137, no. 5, 2014, pp. 53-59, (specifically p. 54). 
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and patterned military exercises in recent years demonstrate the policy in practice. China defends 
its military activities as rightful deeds for protecting its rights and for self-defense. Furthermore, 
this act of defending is imagined to be something that creates peace and stability. In other words, 
China links the fulfillment of its interests to the public goods of the international society. The 
logic that what is good for the PRC is good for others is the gist of active defense through 
military manifestation. Overall, justifications for these activities reflect a type of power relations 
that the PRC prefers.  
Based on the data from 2016 to 2017, the Navy of the PLA has built a record of passing 
through waters and straits between Japan’s main islands and between its offshore islands that 
connect to Taiwan. Aside from the Soya and Tsugaru Straits, China probes different routes in 
Japan’s southwestern island chain, including the water between Amamioshima and, to its west, 
Yokoatejima, the Miyako strait between Okinawa and Miyako, and, further south, the Osumi 
Strait between Nakanokami and Yonaguni which is about 224 kilometers away from the 
northeast coast of Taiwan.304 Intelligence gathering vessels also sail Japan’s territorial waters 
near Kuchinoerabu and Yakushima, both of which are offshore islands near Kyushu, the 
southernmost main island of Japan. Another example is the contiguous zone north of Kitadaito, 
to the east of Okinawa.305 More information however is needed to analyze why these routes are 
taken and what roles they play in Beijing’s routine training as well as whether they will be 
 
304 Japan’s 2017 Defense White Paper, pp. 98-99, <https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2017.html >; 
Japan’s 2018 Defense White Paper, pp. 103-107, <https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2018.html>; Ankit 
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305 Japan’s Ministry of Defense, “Movement of a Chinese Navy Vessel,” Jun. 20, 2016, 
<https://www.mod.go.jp/e/press/release/2016/06/20b.html >; Ayako Mie, “Chinese spy ship enters Japan's 
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determined to be useful in any kind of military maneuvers. Nevertheless, regional geography 
reveals that waterways and airspace from the East China Sea to the Pacific may be more 
preferable than a detour through Tsushima before passing the Soya and Tsugaru Straits. This is 
corroborated by the official statement that passing waterways in Japan’s southwest offshore 
islands is part of “routine” or “regular” training and China will continue to do so.306  
In one press conference, a journalist asked for comment about an alleged Japanese news 
report that Tokyo is analyzing the intention of the PLA Navy’s passing through the Miyako 
Strait. The spokesperson from China’s Ministry of Defense expressed that Japan was “hyping up 
Chinese military’s legitimate training activities” and “this is due to the fact that Japan has not 
come to terms with reality, and has not adopted the right frame of mind.” He then diagnosed the 
symptom and came up with the cause and a prescription. “Maybe it’s because the Chinese 
military vessels have not passed the Miyako Strait frequently enough. Then, we should pass the 
strait more often in the future. When the Japanese side gets used to it, everything will be fine 
(emphasis added).”307 China does not hide its intention to have neighbors acquiescence to its 
interests. 
Moving south, there are two routes for China’s Navy and Air Force to enter the South 
China Sea. First, along the first island chain from the Miyako Strait to the area east of Taiwan, 
and the Bashi Channel, between Taiwan’s Orchid Island to its southeast and the Philippines’s 
Y’Ami island, before entering the South China Sea. Second, taking the route of the Taiwan Strait 
 
306 The PRC’s Ministry of Defense Press conference, Sept. 29, 2016; Dec. 01, 2016; Dec. 30, 2016. 
<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-09/29/content_4740052.htm>; 
<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-06/30/content_4685171.htm>; 
<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/HomePicture/2016-12/01/content_4765259.htm>. 
307 Ibid., March 30, 2017, <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2017-03/31/content_4777097.htm>. 
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after navigating through the East China Sea. The PLA has displayed a pattern of sailing through 
these two pathways and conducting military exercises within and outside of the island chain.  
The PLA’s behavior demonstrates China’s intention to familiarize itself with areas 
surrounding Taiwan by making its regular presence from four directions. The 2016-2017 data 
published by Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense shows that the PLA has navigated outside of the 
Island’s eastern Air Identification Zone (ADIZ) before entering the Bashi Channel.308 After its 
commissioning to the Navy in 2012, China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, and its 
accompanying vessels have tested the waters around Taiwan. In 2016, the carrier group for the 
first time navigated the waters east of Taiwan from the Miyako Strait for far-seas operation in the 
Western Pacific. Not until 2018 did the PLA hold the first “confrontation” exercise to test long-
range combat capabilities in the western Pacific. In 2013, 2017, 2018 and 2019, Liaoning 
accompanied by destroyers, frigates, other vessels and aircraft also sailed south and north 
through the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and/or the Western Pacific for training and/or 
drills. In the waters and airspace south of Taiwan, the Bashi Channel is a chokepoint for China to 
enter the Pacific and possibly during wartime to keep its adversaries out of the South China Sea 
and other parts within the first island chain. The PLA has frequently passed the channel for 
training and drills in either the Western Pacific or the SCS. In November 2017, in a training of 
simulating the route of attacks, bombers, fighter jets and other aircraft that provide intelligence 
and logistical support flew right on and along the outer edge of Taiwan’s ADIZ when passing the 
Channel to the Pacific.309 
 
308 Taiwan’s 2017 Defense White Paper, p. 38. 
309Ou Hsi-Fu and Huang Tsung-Ting, eds. [歐錫富、黃宗鼎]. The 2018 Assessments of China’s Political and 
Military Development [2018 中共政軍發展評估報告] Institute for National Defense and Security Research, 
Taiwan, December, 2018, pp. 86-89, 
<https://indsr.org.tw/Download/%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E6%94%BF%E8%BB%8D%E7%99%BC%E
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It has become a pattern for the PLA to simultaneously take the northern and the southern 
routes for far-sea training outside of the island chain. One example occurred in November 2017 
when H-6 bombers and other aircraft flew through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel at 
the same time to meet with destroyers and frigates for a confrontation drill in the sea area 
southeast of Taiwan.310Simultaneous maneuver to circle Taiwan from different directions also 
takes place. One example occurred in November 2016 when two formations of bombers and 
fighter jets passed through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi respectively before meeting in the 
airspace south of Miyako and continuing flying back to China via the East China Sea.311 Another 
example is in May, 2018 when China sent out two groups of H-6K bombers from Eastern 
Theater Command and Southern Theater Command respectively. One formation flew clockwise 
around the Island through the Miyako Strait and the other counter-clockwise via the Bashi 
Channel during a long-range patrol.312  
In the South China Sea, aside from military exercises, the PRC has conducted reclamation 
but denies the existence of any man-made or artificial islands.313 It recognizes the construction of 
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313 Statements by Spokesperson of Ministry of Defense in press conferences on March 30, 2017, “there is no 
‘man-made island’” and Feb. 25, 2016, “we have repeatedly expounded that there is no such a thing as 
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facilities but argues that “what we do and how we do that are within our sovereign rights.” 
“Since [the islands of SCS] is Chinese territory, China has the legitimate rights to deploy 
weaponry on its own territory in the past or at present, temporarily or permanently, and to decide 
the kind of weaponry and equipment to be deployed.” There is a good amount of awareness of 
foreign opposition and concern but they are dismissed as coming from ulterior motives. 
“[Outsiders] are fond of sensationalizing the South China Sea issue and create tensions. Their 
intention is worth thinking about.” Knowing that anxiety exists in the international community, 
the government insists that the development in the SCS is moving on the right track and such 
comment usually follows after a reiteration that the building of facilities is to exert Chinese 
sovereignty. “The situation in the South China sea is generally stable and it is making a positive 
turn (emphasis added).”314 For the PRC, its action brings stability for the region while regional 
countries may not believe so.  
The facilities serve “mainly” civilian purposes and “necessary” defense needs, as the 
official rhetoric states. This recognition of the presence of military facilities however in Beijing’s 
view “is by no means the expansion of military deployment.” The reason goes, “China has 
indisputable sovereignty over the islands and adjacent waters in South China Sea. It is fully 
justified and lawful for China to strengthen the construction of necessary defense facilities……” 
As long as Beijing associates certain issues with its sovereignty rights, it will not admit “military 
expansion” which has the connotation of aggression and acquisition of territories through 
illegitimate means. In China’s rhetoric, the construction serves the “common interests of various 
countries,” is to “provide better public services to the international community”, and “helps 
 
‘artificial island’”. <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2016-02/25/content_4644801.htm>; 
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China fulfil its international responsibilities and obligations.” 315 China tries to persuade foreign 
countries that it does not use military means to expand its influence at others’ expense and on the 
contrary, it is advancing everyone’s interests. In other words, the Chinese logic goes that what it 
does is justified and for the common good and thus the fulfillment of its interests is the 
realization of prosperity and peace for all.  
In a 2015 joint press conference with the US president Barack Obama, Chinese president 
Xi Jinping expressed that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” of the SCS.316 The 
military installations built on the reclaimed islands and reefs in the following years however have 
led many to believe that Beijing has reneged on its promise. For instance, in a talk at the 
Brookings Institution, the US General Joseph Dunford stated that “what we see today are 10,000 
foot runways, ammunition storage facilities, routine deployment of missile defense capabilities, 
aviation capabilities, and so forth. So, clearly, they have walked away from that commitment.”317 
In reality, Beijing did not break the promise. It tells others that it will not militarize the region 
but it does not say it will not construct military facilities and install weapons there. The two, 
from the Chinese perspective, are not the same thing. During the press conference, Xi already 
provided detailed reasons as to why China’s behavior in the SCS would not amount to 
militarization and these reasons were reiterated officially on different occasions before and after 
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Xi’s visit to the U.S., including the defense ministry’s regular press conference. The following is 
an excerpt of his talk: 
“China is committed to the path of peaceful development and a neighboring 
foreign policy characterized by good neighborliness......Islands in the South China 
Sea since ancient times are China’s territory. We have the right to uphold our 
own territorial sovereignty and lawful and legitimate maritime rights and 
interests. We are committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China 
Sea, managing differences and disputes through dialogue, and addressing disputes 
through negotiation, consultation, and peaceful manner…… Relevant 
construction activities that China are [sic] undertaking in the island of South—
Nansha islands do not target or impact any country, and China does not intend to 
pursue militarization (emphasis added).”318 
Xi was evoking the familiar rhetoric of sovereignty rights based on the CCP’s 
interpretations of history, which the country has tirelessly repeated for years to the extent the 
statement may sound like cliché and is easily dismissed. From a Chinese viewpoint, since the 
construction of facilities is a sovereign right, it does not target or impact any country and is 
solely for defensive purposes. Thus, militarization that denotes aggressiveness does not fit the 
context. Xi also did not forget to frame the issue by China’s commitment to a peaceful path of 
development and peaceful solution of the dispute. Since militarization is not an issue from 
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Beijing’s view (as it simply exerts its rights), the logic goes that China does not disturb the 
region but rather adheres to its peace principle, and it is others who are militarizing the SCS. 
The above discussion does not defend Beijing’s perspective, but rather argues that Chinese 
narratives, terms and phrases often carry meanings of Chinese style that are not to be interpreted 
from a western perspective. The PRC does not always hide its intention in publicly available 
sources. When carefully analyzed, these materials reveal a good amount of details about its 
political culture, worldview, and interests. Chinese narratives on the SCS are often consistent. It 
is others who fail to grasp their true meaning. The discourse has indicated that China has 
different interests which are not compatible with others. With the knowledge of foreign 
opposition, the PRC still adheres to its interests and rationalizes deeds accordingly. 
Misunderstanding and mis-interpretation therefore is more an issue for others. Through 
interactions with the world, China may be less likely to be changed than is believed. It defines 
words and phrases from its worldview and interpretations of history which in turn are expected 
to be realized through Beijing’s actions. 
Open Seas Operations  
1. Discursive Evidence 
The PLA’s open-seas operations do not merely serve the purpose of offshore waters 
defense, but also reflect the ambition of outward expansion. According to the earlier discussion, 
the first island chain concerns both the PRC’s survival and outward expansion. Naval capabilities 
in the far seas simultaneously fulfill these two purposes. “Informationized local war” (to be 
exact, informationized limited war) can occur in the border regions and away from them. As 
previously discussed, “local war” should be understood as “limited war” as the Chinese 
characters denote and thus it is not to be defined by the distance from the territory under the 
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PRC’s control.  Open-seas operations such as peacekeeping and military drills are preparations 
for war on the high seas and within the offshore-waters regions as well. Where naval activities 
take place, such as the first island chain, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, are where informtionized 
local war is likely to occur. China may intend to deny access to the first island chain from the 
directions of the two oceans while conducting campaigns within the island chain. The key 
concept here to link offshore-waters regions and open seas is the increase of strategic depth.  
Liu’s memoir, the military journal, and defense white papers carry the same idea that the 
open seas provide vast space for PLAN maneuvers which otherwise cannot be done in the first 
island chain due to geographical limitations. For Liu Huaqing, combined arms trainings (合同訓
練) that can be translated into wartime combat capabilities will take place in the open sea. He 
specified the need for open-seas operations outside the first island chain (出岛链远航).319 Open 
sea is believed to be “advantageous for force concentration (兵力的集結), mobility, projection, 
and surprise offensives of armed forces.” Not merely a training ground, the vastness of the open 
arena is itself a battlefield. “To threaten important political, economic and military targets within 
the [enemy’s] strategic depth, [we] can take the first-island chain as the starting point to 
implement multi-dimensional precision attacks from the far-sea.”320 The multi-dimensional 
attacks refer to land, seas, air, space and electromagnetic space.321 Accordingly, it is to push the 
battlefield outward beyond the first island chain to create more strategic depth for the self and 
shorten it for the enemy.  
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The notion of fighting the battle away from the main territory in a high-tech local war also 
gains resonance in the 2005 version of Science of Military Strategy. The book advocates 
“strategic counterattack on the exterior lines.” It pictures an active release of energy to 
counterattack any invasion by hostile forces of the territory that Beijing considers to be its own 
in a battlefield that is away from China’s “border regions, coastal regions and related air space”. 
The Science of Military Strategy further sees the possibility of China pushing the battlefield so 
far as to “lead the war to the enemy’s operational base, even to its source of war, and to actively 
strike all the effective strength forming the enemy’s war system.”322   
China’s defense white papers over the years also explicitly point out that it is using the 
geographical space outside the first island chain to achieve its political goal within the island 
chain. The 2000 paper states that the Navy already has “the combat capability for offshore waters 
defense” (已具备了近海防御作战能力). The 2004 paper reads, “the Navy expands space for 
operation and extends strategic depth for the purpose of offshore waters defense.  (海军扩大近
海防御作战空间和防御纵深) Preparation for the maritime battlefield is intensified and 
improved while the integrated combat capabilities are enhanced in conducting offshore 
campaigns, and the capability of nuclear counter-attacks is also enhanced.”323 The 2006 version 
again stresses strategic depth. “ Taking joint operations as the basic form…… the Navy aims at 
gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore waters defense and enhancing its capabilities 
in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks (海军逐步增大近海防御的战略纵
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深，提高海上综合作战能力和核反击能力).324 Although the primary political target is located 
within the first island chain, the utility of outer areas “including turning them into another 
battlefield to minimize damages within the first island chain, as the most prosperous regions are 
located in the Chinese coast” does not make offshore waters defense simply a war along the 
border. The Chinese strategy on the sea may be what the US analysts term “anti-access, area 
denial.” The strategic depth mentioned here bridges together operations in the offshore waters 
and the open seas. However, such linkages have not been made more straightforward until 2015.  
Defense white papers usually separate discussions about open-seas military exercises 
which usually take place in the island chain and the Pacific, and open-seas MOOTWs in the 
Indian Ocean. This creates the impression that activities in both Oceans are irrelevant to each 
other and only the former is relevant to offshore-waters defense; in other words, the potential 
battlefields do not involve the Indian Ocean and MOOTWs have no combat implications. Depart 
from previous defense papers, the 2015 version that identifies the two functions of the PLAN, 
offshore-waters defense and open-seas protection in the same paragraph, seems to indicate that 
military trainings in the two Oceans are related to offshore-waters defense, but it remains 
ambiguous. It wrote that “In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense [near-
sea defense] and open seas protection, the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from 
‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas 
protection’ and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient maritime combat force 
structure.” From the wording, the navy has two goals and it needs to develop force structure to 
realize these goals. It does not say anything that operations for open-seas protection can 
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accumulate combat capacity for wartime needs and for offshore-waters defense. Since MOOTWs 
usually take place in the Indian Ocean and they are grouped into an “open-seas protection” 
category separate from offshore-waters defense, this creates the impression that military 
activities in the Indian Ocean have nothing to do with offshore waters defense in terms of 
transferring of combat ability and that the Indian Ocean will not be another battlefield in an 
informationized limited war.    
Although there are less straightforward connections in the defense white paper, to see 
China, the first island chain and the two Oceans altogether in the strategic thinking of peacetime 
deterrence and wartime use of force has its evidence in the 2013 version of the Science of 
Military Strategy.325 The particularity about this book is that it links together the concepts and 
ideas dispersed in different documents and articles discussed so far in this chapter. Under a larger 
framework of managing and stabilizing relations with zhou bian countries (which as chapter 5 
discusses do not merely refer to countries bordering China) to create favorable conditions for the 
PRC’s security interests, the authors see Taiwan as a pivot in affecting whether Beijing’s goal of 
a revived Chinese nation can come true. They write that Taiwan “still constrains the overall 
situations of China’s domestic affairs and foreign policies (台湾问题仍然长期制约中国内政外
交大局)……If the Taiwan problem is delayed and not solved, it will become an important factor 
that constrains and consumes our strategic resources in the political, economic, diplomatic and 
military realms. It will become a long-term hindrance to the realization of a rejuvenated Chinese 
nation.”326 
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The 2013 book continues to emphasize the inter-connectivity of China’s military activities 
on the seas. “According to the strategic demands of offshore-waters defense and open-seas 
protection, [there is a need to] integrate military deployment and preparations of battlefields in 
the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and to organically connect three 
strategic regions, including sea areas close to the continent, near seas and far seas.” In disserting 
this strategic view, the authors see the continent and islands of the first island chain as its bases 
to project force outward when the PRC is fighting within the first island chain.327 This idea 
matches with Beijing’s island building and militarization of the South China Sea. 
The “strategic spaces and setups” within those spaces needed to win a future war and to 
“deter and control zhou bian” receive further treatment regarding the political target and the 
exact geographical space that will be relied on to facilitate the goals. Based on the logic of 
“expanding defense space outward” (or increasing strategic depth) and “forward deployment of 
combat forces” (靠前部署作战力量),328 the book identifies three goals: to deal with the 
opponent’s Air-Sea Battle strategy, to maintain stability and protect China’s interests in the vast 
maritime space surrounding the country, and to cope with the “large-scale warfare” when it 
comes to Taiwan. To conduct a large-scale war, the book recognizes a need to push outward 
China’s strategic frontline. In the sentences immediately following, the authors state a need to 
establish strategic supporting points overseas (海外战略支点) in the two Oceans because they 
 
兴的长远隐患。 
327 Ibid., p. 214. Original text: 按照近海防御和远海防卫的战略要求，统筹黄海、东海、南海兵力部署和
战场建设，搞好濒海大陆、近海、远海三个战略区域的有机衔接，北固南拓、重心南移、适度靠前，
基地支撑和前沿预置相结合，逐步构建依托大陆、凭借岛礁、力量前伸的大区域海上防卫体系，创造
在第一岛链内作战，并向外辐射的有利态势。加强以战略母港为重点的大中型港口和骨干机场建设，
满足航母、战略核潜艇和大型驱护舰编队驻泊补给的需要。 
328 Ibid., p. 254. Original text: 要适度靠前部署作战力量。着眼应对战略对手"空海一体战"的威胁， 着
眼在周边更大空间范围特别是海洋方向维权维稳，着眼未来彻底解决台湾问题可能进行的大规模作
战，将主要作战力量的部署由内陆地区适度向沿海沿边地区前移，将战略防卫的前沿逐步向外延伸。 
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“can support overseas military activities or serve as forward bases for overseas military power to 
exert political and military influence in the relevant regions.” The authors put this strategy in the 
perspective of having homeland strategic arrangements and overseas military assets form “a 
situation of mutual support.”329 The meanings here can be open to different interpretations. 
Military activities in the Indian Ocean may not necessarily be related to a war in the Indian 
Ocean with Taiwan being a target; it can be about protection of maritime interests. However, in a 
different section that discusses a proximate geographical space where a war can take place, 
corresponding military preparations during peacetime, and how different geographical spaces 
can be utilized, the authors do incorporate the northern Indian Ocean as China’s strategic 
frontline in a war scenario. The idea laid out here is to rely on resources generated by the 
Chinese homeland and to develop a sense of geographical space fanning out from the homeland 
to zhou bian countries. It is within a much broader space that authors consider strategic 
preparations for the accumulation of capabilities to attend to one’s interests on the land AND on 
the sea. As to the spatial demarcation, the authors write, “Henceforth, for a certain period of time 
in the future, the strategic frontline needs to be extended outward along the maritime directions 
of northeast, southeast and southwest so as to form a curve of strategic belt that covers a limited 
region of the Western Pacific and the northern Indian Ocean.”330 
 
329 Ibid., p. 254.  Original text: 要构建依托本土、辐射周边、走向两洋的海外战略支点，为海外军事行
动提供支撑，或作为部署海外军事力量的前进基地，在相关地区发挥政治军事影响力，与本土战略布
局形成内外兼顾、远近衔接、互为支撑的态势。 
330 Ibid., pp. 106-107. Original text: 特别是强敌将凭借其海洋方向的综合远战优势，从较远距离威胁我
本土，企图使他打得着我，我够不着他，平时对我保持威慑，战时快速破击我作战体系。在这种情况
下，就本土守本土、就近海守近海的难度会越来越大，甚至可能守不胜守，因而必须考虑在更大范围
内实施外向防卫作战。[……]当前，基于国土防御的战略方向划分的局限性日益凸显，要从根本上回
答未来仗在哪里打、建构一个什么样的军事力量体系、形成一个什么样的战略布局等重大问题，都有
必要在空间范围上作出更加宏观、更具前瞻性的总体筹划。[……]新型战略空间观，由本土向周边、
由陆向海、由空向天、由有形空间向无形空间外推战略前沿，扩大战略纵深，逐步形成拱卫本土、辐
射周边[……]平时支撑利益拓展，出现危机时能够有效应对，战时采取攻势防卫。今后一个时 
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For its global ambitions, that the PRC is not only turning both Oceans into its zones for 
deterrence, but also may plan to turn both Oceans into battlefields, when a war occurs in the first 
island chain, is further evidenced by two paragraphs in the 2013 book. “In the future, our 
military needs to form a highly effective and stable command and control system. It needs to 
possess the capabilities of joint warfare in different strategic directions and the sea area within 
the second island chain, and the abilities of effective command and control in the […] warfare in 
the Western Pacific and the northern Indian Ocean.” Regarding the strike capabilities, it is 
expected that with a reliance on the informationized system, the PLA can compromise enemies’ 
defense systems and destroy fixed and mobile targets. The realization of this goal has a timeline. 
“[I]n the short time, [such capability] can reach to the first and the second island chains. 
Followed by a gradual extension, for a long run parts of the Indian Ocean and the Western 
Pacific will be within the striking ranges.”331 
China’s military strategists are aware that active defense now is operating in the spaces 
which are not the traditional active zones of the country. They do not see the incompatibility, 
however. From their view, it is entirely justifiable to push outward strategic frontlines to where 
the PRC’s national interests are and still call the strategy active defense.332 This supports the 
argument that since this strategic guideline is a self-rationalizing logic, wherever the PLA is 
present, it will always defend its behavior as peaceful and righteous. 
 
期，需要重点考虑将战略前沿从东北、东南、西南三个方向的沿海沿边地区向外延展，形成涵盖西太
平洋和北印度洋有限区域的弧形战略地带。(emphasis added). 
331 Ibid., pp. 265-266. Original text: 未来我军要形成高效、稳定的指挥控制体系，具备对各战略方向和
第二岛链海区内的联合作战、西太平洋和北印度洋的海上巡一防卫作战进行有效指挥控制的能力，以
及对战略武器系统实施可靠指挥控制的能力。[……]我精确火力打击手段，应能突破敌各种防御系
统，对其陆上固定目标和海上移动目标实施有效毁伤，近期内有效覆盖第一、第二岛链，并逐步扩
展，中远期应覆盖印度洋和西太平洋部分地区。(emphasis added). 
332 Ibid., pp. 104-106. Original text: 前沿防卫与积极防御的基本精神并不相悖 
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Despite a discursive separation in the 2015 defense paper of general national interests 
(maritime interests in the far seas) from core interests (political targets within the island chain) 
through categorization of “offshore-waters defense” and “open-seas protection,” in the longer 
run, resources devoted for general interests may be translated into those to facilitate the claimed 
ownership of territories and waters in the first island chain. As of January 2020, the PRC 
dispatched 33 escort task forces for anti-piracy missions around the Gulf of Aden and Somalia. 
Chinese media often boasts that the PLAN has escorted more than 6,000 vessels, foreign and 
domestic, since 2008 when the first mission embarked.333 The standard narratives run that these 
missions stabilize the region and the world. They “manifest our country as a responsible major 
power who proactively fulfills its international duties”; they also “fully manifest the proactive 
attitude of our military to maintain international and regional peace.”334 Discursive evidence 
from Liu’s memoir and defense papers as well as CMC essays supports the notion that combat 
abilities accumulated through peacetime military activities can be transferred to wartime use. As 
with military exercises in the Pacific, anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean similarly involve 
basic training that is required for joint operation abilities in a war, such as personnel training, 
intra and inter-services coordination, different types of naval formation, logistical support and 
familiarization with open-sea navigation. Given that world politics is in a peacetime state, anti-
piracy and even peacekeeping missions in African nations provide the best real-life opportunity 
for the PLA which has not had combat experience since 1979. Aside from a naval fleet 
 
333 Li Jiayao, “Chinese naval 33rd escort taskforce escort eight Chinese fishing boats,” Chinese Military Online, 
Jan. 08, 2020, <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-01/08/content_9712435.htm> accessed Feb. 23, 2020; 
Xinhua, “Chinese naval fleet escort over 6,600 vessels in Gulf of Aden, Somalia over past 10 years,” Chinese 
Military Online, April 19, 2019, 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/19/WS5cb9a617a3104842260b73c6.html> accessed Feb. 23, 2020. 
334 China Youth Daily [中国青年报],  “China’s Peacekeeping Fleet Sail Toward Gulf of Aden for Peace” [为
了和平 中国护航军舰驶向亚丁湾] , Dec. 27, 2008,   <http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2008-
12/27/content_2487861.htm> accessed Jan. 18, 2018. 
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comprising guided missile frigates, destroyers, supply ships and amphibious landing ships, China 
also sends nuclear and conventional submarines into the Indian Ocean.335 Experience accrued in 
the Indian Ocean applies to the Pacific as well.  
A war in the Indian Ocean cannot be ruled out. Amid China’s ongoing expansion is the 
emerging evidence that it is shaping regional dynamics to its favor. Chinese proactiveness in 
fortifying SCS and constructing infrastructure that is both for civilian and military uses along the 
coasts of Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan indicates the possibility of waging a war in the 
Indian Ocean. It awaits future development to see whether these deep-water ports will turn into 
some kind of military facilities, including bases, that will work in tandem with China’s base in 
Djibouti. In deepening its strategic depth, the PRC may not only intend to push the battlefield 
outward away from the island chain to the Pacific, but also into the Indian Ocean. From China’s 
perspective, if the first island chain is its inner defense line, the two oceans are the outer defense 
line. 
Open-seas operations are further enhanced by the development of aircraft carriers and the 
first military base in Djibouti that came into being in tandem with Chinese involvement in 
peacekeeping operations. Because the PRC had publicly pledged that it would never have 
military bases overseas and developed a discourse to criticize those who have them in order to 
claim the moral high ground, to justify the Djibouti base, it has developed a set of narratives in a 
way that criticism applying to others does not apply to itself. The power relation shown through 
the alter casted roles before and after the establishment of the military base remains the type of 
moral goodness of the self versus the immorality of others. The rationalizing case of aircraft 
 
335 Sandeep Unnithan, “China positions submarine and rescue vehicle in Indian Ocean,” India Today, Oct. 15, 
2018, <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-positions-submarine-and-rescue-vehicle-in-the-indian-
ocean-1368286-2018-10-15>. 
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carriers, however, is more expressive of preferred power relations because it explicitly demands 
deference from the world.   
2. Force Projection and Justifications   
2.1. Military Base 
China constructs narratives in a way that it is nearly impossible for it to admit 
“militarization” and “military expansion”, not merely on issues regarding territorial interests 
which usually are categorized as “core interests”, but also on those of general national interests. 
The following example will show that, on maritime interests, even though China recognizes the 
existence of overseas military facilities, it has overturned its previous verdict that military bases 
serve aggressive expansion. 
In the Chinese narratives, “military expansion” gives meanings to words such as 
hegemony and power politics and phrases like military base, all of which are used to criticize 
other powers and become something that Beijing pledges it will never do. These words 
altogether form a discourse of China as a peace-loving country. The PRC’s first military base in 
Djibouti however breaks the logical links. A discursive re-construction thus is necessary, and the 
example of Djibouti showcases how the words are redefined and meanings reconfigured while 
maintaining that spreading Chinese footprints is inclusive and conducive to world peace.  
The example of a military base is important because it crystalizes many aspects in the 
Chinese narratives which provide parameters in explaining why certain policies are made. To be 
specific, Chinese writings spend much ink on the military development of foreign powers and 
other countries’ foreign policies, particularly from the viewpoints of the use of force, geo-
strategy, geopolitics, expansion of strategic interests, and national security. The narratives 
highlight areas where Beijing can learn from other powers and provide justifications for actions 
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which it begins to take but had earlier denounced and criticized foreign powers for doing. China 
sees military bases as a reflection of American hegemony, but it has its own military base in 
Djibouti now. The following analysis will trace the evolution of the Chinese views.   
Li Jijun, a Lieutenant General of the People’s Liberation Army and the then Vice President 
of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, was at the U.S. Army War College in 1997 to give a 
speech, Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China.336 Li’s purpose was 
to persuade the American audience that China since ancient times has been a peaceful country 
adopting a defensive strategy and that “the common interests that we [the US and China] share 
are greater than our differences.” His speech begins with Zheng He’s mission of crossing the 
Indian Ocean in the 15th century. “Even earlier than the period of ‘geographic discovery’ in the 
West, a great Chinese sailor named Zheng He led the largest fleet the world had known on seven 
voyages westward. These voyages, reaching as far as the eastern African coast and the entrance 
to the Red Sea, took Zheng He to more than 30 countries and regions. Unlike later Western 
explorers who conquered the land they discovered, this fleet did not subdue the newly-
discovered lands by force......Zheng He’s task, as decreed by the Emperor, simply was to convey 
friendship and good will and to promote economic and cultural exchanges between China and 
other Asian as well as African nations.” Li however missed the details that the ships were armed 
and there was a military intervention in Ceylon (today’s Sri Lanka). He further summarized the 
history of China to provide evidence of defensive strategic culture, but the history was not 
properly contextualized and his descriptions contained contradictions that reflect the essence of 
 
336 Li Jijun, “Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China,” August 29, 1997, 
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/china-li.pdf>. 
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active defense. To fully grasp how the narratives are constructed, it is necessary to quote at 
length: 
“China is a nation that has withstood the vicissitudes of over 5000 years of 
history. During those 5 millennia, more than 6000 wars, both large and small, 
have been fought. A majority of the wars have been fought for the unification of 
the nation and the harmonic coexistence of the various nationalities. There have 
also been a number of wars against foreign invaders and to stop the aggression of 
others against us. At any particular time, no matter how divided the nation might 
be and how antagonistic different peoples might feel toward each other, the final 
result would invariably be the emergence of a more comprehensively reunified 
China, with reconciliation among different nationalities.” 
According to the statistics Li provides, China was fighting war at least once a year. This 
highly war-prone tendency however is justified as self-defense and for the greater goal of 
national unification. Thus, it does not violate defensive strategic culture; however territories or 
influence expand, it is always for legitimate self-defense. As the doctrine of active defense 
reasons, the use of force to protect China’s interests is not aggression. Regardless of the accuracy 
of his numbers, it is important to analyze the logic based on Li’s statistics because it shows what 
China’s political and military leaders believe in. Leaders’ preferences may have more influence 
on policies than facts. Meanwhile, it is worth analyzing history according to the then situations 
because it reveals the gaps between realities and myths and thus the scale of the Chinese “Cult of 
Defense.”337 
 
337 Andrew Scobell, 2003. 
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That China has 5000 years of history is an exaggeration and depends on how “China” is 
defined, either as a geographical term or a modern nation-state, the length of its history varies. In 
the case of the latter, the history starts in the 20th century. Li was using the contemporary lens of 
the PRC’s political needs, that is, ruling different nationalities on the vast landmass, to see the 
past. Dynastic wars are characterized by military conquests of territories and peoples instead of 
national unification. The examples are the Yuan and the Qing dynasties “The emergence of a 
more comprehensively unified China” that incorporated different nationalities and controlled 
expansive land as the two dynasties demonstrates did not result from voluntary reconciliation but 
military conquests. The degree of “harmonious coexistence” out of voluntariness therefore is 
questionable and debatable. After the PRC’s founding, the territories of Xinjiang and Tibet were 
acquisitions from conquest followed by forced assimilations and ethnic cleansing. 
Li Jijun continued to describe the contemporary history in which China has the military 
but does not use it for aggression. “Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, no matter how the world situation changed, China’s military strategy always remained 
defensive in nature. China has not occupied a single square inch of foreign soil, nor has it 
possessed any overseas military bases. Furthermore, China has not retained any military 
presence beyond its own territory. Instead, even though parts of Chinese territory are still 
occupied by its neighbors, China has shown great restraint and patience as it calls for peaceful 
solutions……(emphasis added)”338 It is in this context of military defensiveness that Li 
expressed, “[China] will never seek hegemony, and it opposes any form of power politics and 
does not seek external expansion.” Therefore, military bases, overseas military presence, 
 
338 Li Jijun, “Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China,” August 29, 1997, 
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/china-li.pdf>. 
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hegemony, and power politics become synonyms to each other and from Beijing’s perspective 
they are defined by military expansion that denotes aggression. Li’s audience was the American 
military and he was contrasting American militarism with Chinese peacefulness.  
It is officially written into the 1995 and 2000 white papers that “China will not seek 
military expansion, will not station its troops overseas nor build military bases.” White papers in 
2002 and the following years however no longer contain the pledge of no military base. The 
phrase is not even mentioned. The reason for removal is unknown. However, it is possible that 
some debate may already have been taking place. The 2009 version of Zhang Shiping’s book, 
China as a Maritime Power, advocates the abandonment of the decades-old policy of not 
stationing troops outside the country. It is unclear whether his 1998 version already raised this 
issue. For Zhang, the main reason to station China’s armed forces on foreign soil is to respond to 
changing situations of expanding national interests. China did not do so in the past because “[it] 
was very poor and did not have abilities to shoulder international responsibilities.” Zhang 
continued that things have fundamentally changed today. “China’s economy is interdependent 
with the world economy. It has become inevitable to deploy armed forces overseas……If a 
country cannot protect its overseas interests,……how is it qualified as a major power and a great 
power?” Zhang’s goal is to persuade the domestic audience to change their mentality after a 
decades-old national policy of condemning the US and the USSR for stationing troops in foreign 
countries. He argues that “the policy of seeking hegemony requires military deployment overseas 
but the latter is not always the result of the former.” In his view, international rescues and 
peacekeeping are the responsibilities of China in keeping world peace and their fulfillment 
requires the dispatch of troops outside the country temporarily or for a longer term. The official 
rhetoric will follow the same line of motivations to characterize overseas military presence: non-
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expansionist and non-hegemonic, peacekeeping for the sake of world peace and economy. In 
other words, the PRC is saying that what it does is not just good for itself but benefits the world. 
Overseas military presence starts to take on a positive meaning when its advocates see it as 
conducive to Chinese interests. Zhang declares that “from now on, it is inevitable that [China] 
will project and employ its armed forces on a global scale.”339 
Others would continue to study the strategic value of military bases. In a 2013 CMS 
article,340 Liu Xinhua analyzes how military bases can exponentially extend national influence in 
terms of geographical distance and intensify such influence by using the case of the US. The 
bases, according to Liu, “overcome the obstacles of waters and mountains, and make it possible 
for a major power to become a global and a regional hegemon.” Liu continues to elaborate how 
the physics between bases work to make uninterrupted the projection of power. The key concept 
here is “force field (力量场).” It refers to the range within which each base can project power. In 
choosing locations, countries need to have force fields of bases from one point to another overlap 
so that power can be projected far from the home shore. To minimize the risk of joints being cut 
off, the solution is to establish “base clusters”, namely bases at different locations in a certain 
area. According to Liu, the American pattern has followed this logic. For instance, in the Asia 
Pacific, the cluster in Northeast Asia centers on Japan’s Yokosuka naval base. In Southeast Asia, 
it centered on the Philippines’ Subic Bay. And Guam is the main post for the US presence 
beyond the second island chain. Liu further provides examples of exact distances between main 
bases to different regional countries and bomber flight duration to show the efficacy of military 
 
339 Zhang Shiping, pp. 260-262. 
340 Liu Xinhua [刘新华], “Geographical Distance, Law of Distance Attenuation and Overseas Military 
Bases” [地理距离、距离衰减规律与海外军事基地], CMS, no. 3, 2013, pp. 144-152. 
342 
bases to national interests. He concludes that, in general, the US bases in the Persian Gulf, 
Europe and Asia Pacific uphold Washington’s leadership in the Eurasia continent. 
The discussion of technical and practical necessity in Liu’s article does not serve any 
purpose if it was not for the analysis from a geostrategic perspective. When studying China’s 
situations, Liu similarly incorporates technical and strategic meanings at the same time, but the 
bigger picture is on the latter. He notices the difficulties of the Chinese navy in the Gulf of Aden 
peacekeeping mission: “in the first peacekeeping mission that lasted for four months, without 
calling at any port, the Navy did not have sufficient supplies of necessities and medical 
resources.    Even though the Navy later on partially solved the problem by stopping at ports for 
supplies, due to the lack of fixed locations, the supplies are limited to basic necessities. Calling at 
the port on an ad hoc basis cannot substitute for the function of permanent bases.” Liu continues 
to write that “to overcome the negative impact of distance attenuation, states can choose to 
station bases on foreign soil.” The technical needs however are not purely technical. They come 
with geostrategic interests. “The function of overseas military bases has gradually transformed 
from a tool for hegemonic competition in the traditional sense to maintaining national strategic 
interests, reach balance of power, and maintain regional stability by creating force fields. 
Through overseas bases, states can achieve their strategic goals by exerting power far from the 
homeland.”  
There are two points to made here. First, to paraphrase Liu’s arguments, the world is better 
off because of China, a stabilizing force who now plays a major role and whose actions change 
the meanings of military base. Secondly, the idea of creating a balance of power among major 
countries echoes the official position in favor of multi-polarity. A large body of literature 
concerning the hierarchical order of the world surfaced in the 1990s. Ever since then Beijing has 
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criticized the Cold War bipolarity in which its role was marginalized and believed that the 
coexistence of several major powers including itself creates peace. The Chinese writings link the 
technical issues at the micro-level to national interests, China’s role in the world, and how world 
affairs should run at the macro-level to build a different discourse that casts a positive light on 
overseas military presence, because now China needs it. 
Beijing confirmed in 2015 that discussions to set up support facilities were ongoing with 
Djibouti.341 Nineteen years after Li Jijun’s speech, China signed a military agreement with the 
country, allowing the Chinese navy to use its port. The confirmation of construction came in 
2016 from China’s Ministry of Defense.342 Before the deal, Beijing had devoted resources to 
peacekeeping missions in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. The expansion of Chinese influence 
beyond Asia where it historically enjoyed dominance requires some explanation of Beijing’s 
intention and purpose. In answering questions about the base, the official rhetoric has stressed 
technical necessity and linked it to China’s contributions to world peace and the prosperity of 
other regions. At a press conference in November 2015, the spokesperson of the Ministry of 
Defense expressed that, during escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the Somali 
coast, “the Chinese naval escort ships have encountered a lot of difficulties such as personnel 
recuperation, and food and POL replenishment during performing escort missions. It is indeed 
necessary to have effective and near-the-site logistical support.” He then connects the solution to 
greater public goods: the facilities in Djibouti “will ensure better support for the Chinese military 
in carrying out UN peacekeeping operations, escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters off 
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the Somali coast, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. It will play a 
positive role for the Chinese military to effectively fulfill its international obligations and 
maintain international and regional peace and stability.”343 The expansion of the base in 2018 
again drew media attention. Aside from the similar rhetoric, the spokesperson of the Defense 
Ministry added, “it will also be a boost to local economic and social development there.” Last 
but not least, to downplay the negative connotation which the government has long associated 
military bases with and to highlight its altruistic contributions to the world, Beijing describes the 
location as “logistics support facilities” instead of a military base. 
The official reframing of military bases still follows the basic tone of defensive strategic 
culture. Through a carefully chosen term, logistical facilities instead of military base, motives 
that do not sound strategic and calculated, and the characterization of the mutually beneficial and 
peaceful nature of the base, China’s self-image of a harmless and benevolent actor remains even 
though its behavior has changed. The domestic discursive construct for policy suggestions that 
Zhang and Liu’s essays show retains the above elements but is more calculated and explicit in 
the intention to reshape power dynamics of the world by material capabilities that a military base 
embodies. Within the two sets of narratives is the commonality that the possession of military 
bases does not change the defensive and peaceful role of China versus the warmongers of 
western countries. Accordingly, the defensive strategic culture is sustained regardless of 
behavior. Chinese narratives of public speeches and interviews including English versions 
provide biological explanations as to why this is so: “aggression is never in the genes of the 
Chinese, and acts of colonizing or plundering others are nowhere to be found in China’s track 
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record”; “It is not in the genes of the Chinese nation to invade other countries or seek world 
hegemony”; “Harmony without uniformity and good neighborliness are in the genes and blood 
of the Chinese nation and its culture.”344 Beijing’s logic is straightforward: whatever has been 
done and regardless of policy changes, China’s motive is always selfless and it is the nature of 
the Chinese polity that makes it so. Such reasoning that relies on biological explanations is 
unfalsifiable.  
The biological reason is to be understood in a broader context. China, harmony without 
uniformity, and the Chinese nation and its culture that appear in the above quoted texts, 
according to Chapter 1, bear historical continuity in the PRC’s discourse; co-inhabitants of multi-
ethnical groups with diverse cultures on the different territories that from the PRC’s view are 
called China since ancient times altogether form a nation, instead of nations, and despite 
conflicts, international wars were not international and were simply family feuds and thus did not 
weaken the foundation of solidarity. This understanding that distorts history corresponds to the 
PRC’s needs of political legitimacy. By making Chinese the discursively foreign and 
independent political entities who once conquered or competed with regimes in China proper, the 
narratives seek for a logical consistency that endorses genetic explanation. 
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It is in the blurring of foreign and domestic in the narratives that lessons can be drawn 
regarding the foreign policy of today’s China. By making the foreign domestic, the narratives 
explain away the PRC’s invasion of Tibet and Xinjiang. Today, the Chinese government’s vision 
of creating a world community for mankind straddles between independent sovereign states and 
a world community allegedly benefiting from peaceful Chinese genes. The PRC may be less a 
modern state and close to a quasi-empire, with its territorial ambitions in the first island chain 
and with its use of a genetic-cultural discourse of defensiveness to sanction the outward 
expansion which it denies. 
2.2. Aircraft Carriers 
Because of their mobility, aircraft carriers may, with surfacing textual evidence and 
waiting for future developments including the number of carriers and the areas they operate, 
become an important indicator of China’s armed forces operating in various interrelated aspects 
of active defense, from general interests to core interests, from near seas to far seas, and from 
peacetime deterrence to wartime operations.  
The carrier history in China is again attributed to the ideas proposed by Liu Huaqing. From 
Beijing’s perspective, the carrier will send a message to the world that China is a major power to 
be reckoned with since the ship symbolizes the “comprehensive national powers” of a country. 
The fact that major countries such as the US, the USSR/Russia, the UK, France and Italy all have 
carriers also made it necessary for China to claim such capability. Aside from “promoting 
military and national awesomeness,” carriers also serve the purpose of strategic deterrence.345 In 
addition, the carriers will solve the problem that land-based military aircraft cannot travel beyond 
their combat radius. Given that warfare on the sea requires air cover, a large quantity of aircraft 
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and airfields are required to meet the demand. The carriers however can move aircraft around 
beyond areas the latter normally cannot reach. In Liu’s view, carriers are “the core of maritime 
combat force structure”（海上作战体系核心）.346 In his memoir, he indicates the importance 
of carriers in the military struggle against Taiwan, in solving disputes in the SCS and in 
safeguarding China’s maritime rights.347 Taking together Liu’s views about near-sea defense, 
future naval ability to conduct military campaigns in the second-island chain, and the core 
function of carriers in the combat forces along with corroborating evidence from other sources, 
the narratives suggest that China plans to prevent other powers from entering the first-island 
chain by engaging its enemies in the open seas, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. 
The Liaoning battle group has conducted several rounds of training that aim to develop its 
combativeness, which will make peacetime deterrence more credible. In April 2018, the PLA 
had counter-clockwise “cross region” confrontation exercises from the SCS, to unidentified 
waters in the Western Pacific and finally the East China Sea. The Chinese official media reported 
that the drills encompassed several joints during the simulated combat. Carrier-borne fighter jets 
were engaged in the interception of shore-based fighters. The battle group’s striking capabilities, 
including destroyers’ and frigates’ capabilities of launching anti-aircraft missiles, were also 
tested against air, surface, and land targets as well submarines. The Liaoning formation also 
exercised its reconnaissance and early-warning system in the simulations.348 Before the drills, 
Beijing had not admitted any combat abilities Liaoning has acquired but rather stressed “it is 
perfectly reasonable and legitimate for the Chinese navy to constantly improve its combat and 
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deterrence capability.”349 The recognition came after the drills. Responding to a journalist’s 
question about Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo’s comment on combat abilities of Liaoning, the 
spokesperson of the Defense Ministry confirmed that the trainings over the years have tested “the 
comprehensive offense and defense system of the aircraft carrier group,” and also “improve 
combat operation in the open sea.” “It is fair to say that the aircraft carrier battle group has 
initially formed system combat capability (emphasis added).”350 The response has two points for 
analysis. First, the relevance of naval presence to war-fighting capabilities in the open sea and 
second, a bigger context of the PLA’s cans and cannots in which the battle group is situated.  
A 2017 article carried by Global Times republished on China Military Online places the 
carrier in the multiple aspects that allow a general assessment of what may already be gaining 
currency.351 The expressed views are ambitious but recognize the current deficiencies China has. 
The two are not in contradiction. Instead, the author presents the maturing process as “a long 
journey” with limitations now and farther reach of the Navy in the future. After commenting on 
the expansion of areas of operations the Liaoning group is capable of, the author continued that 
the carrier still “lags behind the US main aircraft carrier fleet in terms of fighting capacity and 
experience.” Nevertheless, it “represents a necessary step as the Chinese navy advances.” In the 
author’s view, Liaoning cannot be “confined to military technological experiments”, merely used 
for “scientific research, experiment, and training” for the incoming new carriers. It should bear 
strategic meanings to test China’s geopolitical role and responses of other major powers. The 
view is strategic in terms of scale and purposes and thus it is worthy of quotation at length:  
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“Aircraft carriers are strategic tools which should be used to show China’s 
strength to the world and shape the outside world’s attitude toward China. It is 
[sic] not built for war only. Chinese aircraft carriers must set off on a long 
journey. China’s core interests are mainly offshore, but the range of aircraft 
carriers must go beyond offshore areas. The rivalry must be extended to wider 
areas so as to ease China’s offshore pressure.” 
Each sentence in this paragraph deserves emphasis in italics. It asks for the world’s respect 
to China through military awesomeness short of use of force. Meanwhile, the carriers’ war 
purpose is clear. The space in which, according to the author, the battle group(s) should operate 
to ease offshore pressure will extend to areas outside the locations where actual training cruises 
of Liaoning currently take place. To be specific, “the Chinese fleet will cruise to the Eastern 
Pacific sooner or later. When China’s aircraft carrier fleet appears in offshore areas of the US 
one day, it will trigger intense thinking about maritime rules.” South America is another region 
that, as the article states, “China needs to think about setting up navy supply points……right 
now.” The expressed ideas in this article embody active defense in terms of the goals of the 
military and the expanded geographical space to apply the doctrine. The carriers link offshore 
defense and far-seas operations. The PRC has two carriers so far and they have not yet travelled 
to the Indian Ocean. More carriers are to come and whether they will be used in the Indian 
Ocean to ease offshore pressure remains to be seen as it depends on whether the PRC is able to 
continue its naval buildup. 
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A 2015 article published on China Military Online, an official website sponsored by the 
PLA Daily, is an embodiment of how the PRC aims to achieve hegemony during peacetime.352 
The narratives contain similar logical sequences to those laid out so far in this section. First, the 
article draws linkages between offshore and open-seas activities against the background of naval 
buildup. Second, it understands the interactions between the PRC and other countries in the 
context of the first point from the perspective of power relations. 
After summarizing foreign media reports and studies about China’s progress in building 
naval vessels including guided missile frigates, surface ships, corvettes, and nuclear submarines 
capable of launching ballistic missiles, the article supplements this with more details about naval 
development and cites Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo as saying that “such a rapid momentum [of the 
equipment development] will continue for a long time. Yet, the PLAN still lags far behind those 
modernized naval giants in the world and its development speed is far from sufficient 
considering the fast expansion of maritime security interests and economic interests.” Yin Zhuo 
identifies three areas for equipment improvement, including the aircraft carrier fleet, nuclear 
submarines, and information-based combat forces (such as satellites, large airborne early 
warning aircraft, electronic reconnaissance aircraft, electromagnetic interference aircraft, and 
anti-submarine patrol aircraft).  
Against this general assessment of China’s naval forces compared to other countries, the 
article writes, “The PLAN is bound to become ocean-oriented, or else, its equipment 
performance cannot be truly tested, and the combat capability of the PLAN in the open sea 
cannot be verified.” According to the article, escort missions in the Gulf of Aden, the Atlantic, 
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and the Indian Ocean are conducive to the realization of this goal. What is more worthy of 
attention is the linkage between offshore waters defense and open-seas operations. “The offshore 
area is the core of China’s strategic interests. But to safeguard its offshore realm, China has to 
go to the open sea areas [emphasis added].” The Indian Ocean is both a training ground and 
where the battlefield is, both of which aim to realize offshore waters defense.  
While recognizing China’s deficiencies, the article reveals a determination to be on par 
with other major powers. It cites a Major General who is also a professor of the National Defense 
University on deterrence as saying, “If 3 to 5 nuclear submarines are deployed on the sea for 
patrolling all the time, no one dares to launch preemptive nuclear attacks against China.”  The 
development of submarines and other equipment will center on the carrier fleet and “the world is 
bound to adapt itself to the inevitable trend of the PLAN’s entry into the pelagic realm (emphasis 
added),” so does the author comment. Regarding Japanese and Indian concerns about China’s 
military exercises in the open seas, it cited Yin Zhou as saying, “If any still feels uncomfortable 
about this, we have to continue open-sea trainings to make them comfortable.”  
The Land Direction 
Considering the mounting domestic debts each province has been accumulating including 
coastal provinces which traditionally had surpluses, the overseas investments do not necessarily 
reflect the economic logic of finding more markets for unused capital. When China’s economy is 
slowing down and the real number for annual growth may in fact be lower than official statistics, 
so long as foreign markets are available and expandable, the country may persevere despite debts 
and reduced foreign reserves. The BRI projects that in essence are to augment China’s land 
power do not necessarily contain lower risks and costs, compared to maritime shipment, and 
whether it is more efficient timewise depends on cases. Militants in disputed Kashmir, local 
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protests and popular unrest in Southeast Asia and Central Asia can disrupt cargo delivery. The 
idea of Eurasian connectivity through rails that link Europe, the Middle East, Western and 
Central Asia to the PRC’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region does not emerge based on the premise 
of guaranteed economic profits. Land may not eventually outweigh maritime shipments for 
China’s economy. Like business investment, each deal has pros and cons and estimates of risks 
and returns are not absolute. With these uncertainties, why is the PRC willing to venture into 
business at this grand scale with injections of state funds and string these projects together with a 
coherent logic that the world can prosper together with China? Why will overseas investment 
become an officiated theme of China’s foreign policy, instead of a phenomenon of global 
economic activities? 
The answer is that the BRI is strategic in nature. If successfully developed, the PRC can 
leverage it against American sea power. It is an alternative route, with some degree of overlap 
though, to the markets and countries where the US already wields influence. As discussed in 
chapter 5, Chinese narratives suggest the incentive to reduce the dependence on the networks 
provided by western countries. The BRI can be seen as an attempt to allow China to act more 
independently while, from the continental direction, preventing (informal) alliance between 
smaller states and the US. Invested ports and facilities in the coastal regions of foreign countries 
are dual use, i.e., civilian and military. They can facilitate shipment of energy from the Middle 
East and inbound and outbound freight. Since economic and political relations can have positive 
correlations in cordiality, the prospect is to strengthen bilateral and regional ties to the PRC so 
that peacetime interaction itself can be deterrence working in tandem with military presence in 
the two Oceans and may be transformed into wartime capital as well. Compared to the east coast 
and the Pacific direction, despite historical border clashes, the prospect for major international 
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conflicts in the west is relatively low. Investment to connect inland, border and coastal 
towns/cities in the region with suppressible unrest, which means manageable risks at affordable 
costs, to buy wartime security, i.e., energy and material supplies, through friendly zhou bian 
countries may be worthwhile from the Chinese perspective, in case cargoes are to be halted in 
wartime by hostile forces including the American Navy in the Strait of Malacca.  
According to Chinese policy analysis, one of motivations behind the Belt and Road is to 
develop central and western China to alleviate strategic pressure on the east coast where 
economic development has mostly concentrated and which is the direction where the main 
security challenges lie. The idea is to make the inland China’s strategic hinterland (内陆战略腹
地), without changing the primary strategic direction which is the coastal and maritime east. It is 
a policy of mutual support between different strategic directions (不同战略方向的相互支撑). 
The underpinning logic is to consolidate the west and to rely on the resources and security 
generated by the landmass to deal with maritime threats. Three directions, Central Asia,  South 
Asia and Indochina, are believed to provide pivoting forces that enable this blueprint because of 
their prospect for development and their proximity to western and southwestern China.353 And 
they are indeed recognized regions in the Chinese writings where the PRC can exert influence 
and build security measures to benefit itself. In other words, China is making countries in these 
three directions its strategic hinterlands. Meanwhile, it does not need to shoulder responsibilities 
of defending these foreign lands and for itself, invasion from them is not likely. These strategic 
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reasonings align well with the PRC’s propagation of bringing economic opportunities to others 
and its position of non-alliance.  
The investment in the “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor” (CMEC), as the PRC calls it, 
has not been smooth sailing. The concerns about loan trap and instability and protests in Rohkine 
State have delayed port construction and the establishment of a Special Economic Zone at 
Kyaukpyu, a seaport town in Rohkine. As with other Chinese investments in developing 
countries, progress nevertheless is made and the PRC has been persistent in reviving previously 
announced projects suspended or cancelled by the host country due to domestic opposition or 
changes in the country’s leadership. For instance, construction of oil and gas pipelines linking 
Kyaukpyu to Kunming, capital of China’s southwestern Yunnan province, despite local 
opposition, was completed in 2015 and operation started in 2017. Beijing also expects to build a 
Kyaukpyu-Kunming high-speed railway whose prospect has been revived by the Aung San Suu 
Kyi government after the 2014 cancellation under Thein Sein. The CMEC exemplifies the 
Chinese design to link overseas infrastructure to its domestic networks of transportation.354 Other 
examples include Chinese investments in other Southeast Asian countries, Central Asia and the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). 
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Kunming again serves as a transportation hub connecting domestic railways to Vietnam, 
Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore, through upgrading the existing rails or new 
constructions.355 The Chinese blueprint is not unprecedented, however. British, Japanese, and 
especially extensive French colonial railroads are historical examples, although not every single 
plan bore fruit, to connect the continent and Southeast Asia. Unlike in Central Asia, railroads in 
Indochina will run standard gauge that is used in China.356  
The CPEC connects Kashgar in PRC-controlled Xinjiang through the Khrunjerab Pass, 
the northern end of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir Gilgit-Baltistan, to the southern seaports of 
Gwadar and Karachi, two exits to the Arabian Sea. The projects include railways, highways and 
oil and gas pipelines. They facilitate Chinese export of goods to the Middle East and Africa and 
secure the PRC an alternative route of energy transportation aside from the Malacca Strait.357 In 
Central Asia, energy pipelines run from Turkmenistan to Khorgos, a border city of Xinjiang, 
with connecting points in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Khorgos also serves as a dry port that 
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transfers cargoes from Chinese standard gauge railways to the Soviet broad-gauge system in the 
region before reaching Europe. China already runs train services from its inland and coastal 
cities through the Eurasian continent and has developed routes to Iran and Turkey.358  
Along the southern rim of the Eurasian continent are several deep-water ports, one military 
base in Djibouti, military installations in the South China Sea, and ongoing construction at 
Cambodia’s Ream naval base. The American naval base in Singapore at the mouth of the Strait 
of Malacca does not deter China from competing for regional influence. In the South China Sea, 
China has fortified Subi Reef, Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross, three artificial islands that form a 
triangle shape in the middle of SCS. These islands have airstrips, hangars, radar, mobile surface-
to-air and anti-ship cruise missile systems, fighters and bombers. Woody Island, located to the 
northwest of the triangle, also has the same list of assets and will become a “national key 
strategic service and logistical base” following a directive from the central government in April 
2018. Most Southeast Asian countries are within China’s combat radii.359 Beijing would take 
additional steps to strengthen its territorial claims. According to the announcement on April 18, 
2020 made by China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs, under the approval of the State Council, the 
Sansha city of the Hainan island will establish the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands 
administrations. The Paracel administration will be stationed on the Woody Island and in charge 
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of affairs related to the Zhongsha islets as well. The Spratly administration will be stationed on 
the Fiery Cross Reef (or Kagitingan Reef).360  
Cambodia is another possible place for China’s military outposts before sailing the Strait 
of Malacca to the Indian Ocean. At the Ream naval base, China reportedly will have a 30-year 
renewable lease. Possible development includes pier construction and the stationing of military 
personnel. Satellite imagery shows that ground in the forest-covered land was cleared for 
construction. To accommodate Chinese needs, the two U.S.-funded facilities there were asked to 
relocate. China also has a 99-year lease at Dara Sakor, where it is constructing a new airport, 40 
miles northwest of Ream. From the evolving changes in landscape revealed by satellite images, 
the two-mile runway can accommodate long-range bombers and military transports. The runway 
turns design will allow fighters’ takeoff and landing. It also has an airport apron with space for 
about a dozen aircraft.361 It awaits future development, but Burma’s Kyaukpyu, Sri Lanka’s 
Hambantota, and Pakistan’s Gwadar with their deep-water features have potential for military 
utilities. 
BRI is designed to develop China’s central and western regions. Yunnan and Xinjiang 
with their networks of transportation linking to other provinces of the PRC and to Indochina and 
the western Eurasian continent are the two main hubs in the border territories that direct inbound 
and outbound goods. Through the Initiative, more access to open seas is created by connecting 
China’s inland regions to coastal areas of foreign countries that are not blocked as its east coast 
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is by the island chains. The sea ports and invested coastal regions are both inward looking as 
they transport resources back to China and consolidate its west wing, and outward looking as the 
military logistical support that they provide enhances force projection.  
A 2017 CMS article by four co-authors explicitly disserts the military purpose of BRI from 
the view of, as its title reads, “the building of strategic projection system.”362 It states that the 
PRC’s “strategic frontline” (战略前沿) has been pushed outward, from homeland to far seas. 
The change is in accord with geographical expansion of China’s national interests. As the 
strategic frontline extends outward, so does strategic depth. Based on this ideational foundation, 
the essay argues that force projection needs to reach to wherever Chinese interests are, and the 
developed projection system will support both war and non-war purposes in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans.  
According to the essay, to build uninterrupted projection chains to far seas requires 
“airports, sea ports, railway hubs and overseas bases as the supporting points.” Highways, 
railroads, aviation and commercial vessels will possess both civilian and military use. The 
transportation networks as the basis for force projection that the authors describe are the 
continuous ones linking domestic to overseas infrastructure. “In the past, development of 
transportation was mostly within China. Force projection was also about mobilization among 
different war zones. As the strategic frontline pushes outward, to ensure that military power goes 
global, the strategic projection system needs to develop outward as well.” To do so, the article 
sees how overseas projects can “lead the development of facilities, equipment, technology and 
personnel needed for developing a force projection system.” It further argues that island building 
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in the SCS and MOOTW operations have provided opportunities and created shi for building the 
system. In addition, the high-speed rails that the PRC is eager to export in the BRI projects, so 
far with more luck in Mainland Southeast Asia, so that they can connect seamlessly to domestic 
railways are identified as a key pillar in building the system because of their speed. Suggested 
overseas military facilities come in various forms, ranging from permanent and temporary land 
bases to mobile offshore bases (MOB) on the high seas.  
It is the PRC’s policy to “include national defense transportation construction in the 
national economic and social development plan.”363 In other words, transportation infrastructure, 
vehicles, delivery platforms, and loading and unloading equipment developed for civilian use 
and overall economic growth are also for military use.364 The State Council, the highest organ of 
civilian administration, and the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest organ of the 
PLA, are the superior institutions of local governments and relevant agencies of the PLA 
respectively, both of which will participate in the designs and technical standards of projects 
with dual use. Local governments have responsibilities to report to military institutions regarding 
the progress of construction projects to ensure that military needs are met.365 Big and medium 
transportation enterprises are the main pillars in developing strategic force projection. 
Companies engaging in overseas investments are required to provide logistical supplies and 
inbound and outbound goods for overseas military operations.366 Military-civilian fusion (军民
 
363 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Transportation(中华人民共和国国防交
通法), effective 2017, Article 15. This idea however has been in place for years. For instance, in the 
Regulations on National Defense Mobilization of Civil Transport Resources (effective Jan. 1, 2004), to ensure 
a smooth mobilization of “civilian vehicles and relevant equipment” during wartime, Article 7 puts 
governments on the county level and above in charge of preparations work, including production of dual-use 
vehicles and equipment, and places them “into the national economic and social development plan.” 
364 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Transportation, Article 22. 
365 Ibid., Articles 4, 15, 21, 26, 27, 29. 
366 Ibid., Articles 35, 36, 38. 
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融合) realized in this form as a way to prepare for military struggle applies to both domestic and 
overseas force projection, and a certain degree of technological standardization or compatibility 
between domestic and overseas infrastructure is something which the PRC is working on. From 
this perspective, BRI projects have undeniable military purposes. This long-term preparation 
conducted during peacetime by riding the wave of global economic engagement and without 
separating civilian from military goals is an integral part of active defense. Force projection, 
according to the previously mentioned 2017 CMS article, is for both “non-war employment”(非
战争运用) and rapid mobilization and deployment for large-scale joint warfare. (大规模联合作
战快速布署). 
China has tried to create shi that will incrementally tip the inter-regional balance of power 
in its favor through investments on the land, quasi-military bases in the South China Sea, and 
military exercises and presence in the maritime directions. It is the workings of multiple forces, 
neither economy, politics nor military alone, whereby it hopes to shift international power 
relations without a major war. Meanwhile, China is preparing for war. It intends to become a 
major state with capabilities of traditional land power and maritime power. The PRC’s 
aspirations to become a maritime power hinge on whether it has free movement in and out of the 
first island chain. Removal of (potential) adversaries here, through force or not, provides a safety 
belt for the homeland and furthers outward expansion with little security concern in the rear. The 
first island chain in the next decades remains the most likely place where a major conflict will 
take place. The infrastructure that BRI lays out, from a grand strategic perspective, serves 
multiple purposes. In the short term, it is for domestic regional development, overall economic 
growth, and domestic material supplies. In the long run, the PRC is using global resources to 
prepare for war.    
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The 2019 defense paper wrote that China will “never seek hegemony, expansion and 
spheres of influence” (坚持永不称霸、永不扩张、永不谋求势力范围). In the Chinese view, 
the three terms are associated with war and the use of force and since it is not relying on war, its 
overseas activities do not fall into these three categories and thus are peaceful. Meanwhile, it also 
justifies its own use of force as being defensive and not expansionist. Since positive and negative 
cases of use of force are irrelevant to the definition of hegemony and expansion, the expression 
serves as justification, but it goes beyond rhetorical and reflects Chinese leaders’ beliefs, the 
conviction that both means are justified as they manifest China’s high morality of bringing other 
parties into an inclusive and peaceful world that Beijing designs. This swearing expression 
permeates official statements, domestic newspapers, articles from think tanks, and essays on the 
websites which are not as known as official media outlets. The 2019 defense white paper is one 
of the latest examples. As with the widespread notion that China has a 5000-year civilization, the 
expression is a believed myth that China is inherently good, rather than a proven fact. The PRC 
carries this belief to wherever its activities are, and the belief now functions on a global level. 
When ideas are not pure instruments for justification and mix with beliefs, they provide the 
impetus for certain policies, i.e., Chinese expansion, to continue. 
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 Chapter 7 
Discursive Comparison: the U.S., Japan, and China 
 
This chapter puts China’s quest for great power status in a comparative light. Since the 
jury about its future is still out, the analysis presents and compares historical processes in which 
lesser powers made their way to become regional and/or global hegemons. It specifically looks 
into the discursive constructs in the cases of the US, Japan and China during their respective 
power transition periods. One of the goals is to analyze and compare how rising powers use 
narratives for expansion that serves strategic and political interests. Another goal is to compare 
the degree and scale of idealism and morality found in these narratives across different countries. 
This comparison also indicates differences in how ingrained the belief in the self’s high morality 
is. It will further identify factors that make differences. 
One issue is about the definitions of idealism and morality. In line with the rest of this 
research, both are synonyms to the claimed inclusiveness based on the coexistence with multi-
ethnic groups and various socio-economic and political institutions. Meanwhile, both terms also 
take on a cultural meaning in that the narratives of inclusiveness are constructed systematically 
(including the roles of the self and others, the understanding of the world and how the world 
should run), and such practice has been a tradition and become a given country’s political 
culture. Definitions as such are derived from the Chinese experience detailed in chapters 1, 2 and 
4. Therefore, a country’s claim that it will bring the world peace and material benefits through 
whatever means does not suffice as the evidence of idealism and morality defined in this 
research. Three criteria are to be met: 1) the definition of inclusiveness as explained above, 2) 
whether the inclusive discourse is systematically built, 3) whether discursive consistency exists 
to sanction foreign policies, and 4) whether the practice of the points 2 and 3 is a tradition and 
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has become an institutionalized political culture. When the case passes these four thresholds, it 
can join the club of the “cult of defense.”367  
The findings in this chapter show that neither Japan nor the US shows the degree and scale 
of high idealism and high morality that is seen in the case of the PRC. Japan somehow met the 
first requirement, but not the other two. Despite its inclusive claim under the scheme of Greater 
East-Asia Co-Prosperity, unlike China, Japan’s domestic demographic was more homogeneous 
and more cohesive. It did not tolerate diverse institutions abroad either. The US failed in each 
requirement. Washington’s foreign policies follow the logic of differentiations, not 
inclusiveness. Nevertheless, the racial logic was not a necessary condition for overseas 
expansion and in some cases even worked against expansion. This indicates that there were other 
factors shaping Washington’s narratives and, unlike China, the American discourse for foreign 
policy had not been consistent. 
To avoid possible bias, this chapter utilizes another measurement, transparency in one’s 
strategic calculations, for robust check. When a state has a greater degree of transparency and 
lesser degree in consistently upholding a similar set of idealistic narratives, it confirms the 
finding that this country does not belong to the category of ultra-defensiveness. When a state has 
a lesser degree of transparency and a greater degree in playing morality politics, it belongs to that 
category.   
Although the focus here is to identify the major patterns in various types of imperialism 
through the descriptive analysis of discursive rationalization, this chapter also briefly explores 
the causal factors that explain differences. One fundamental reason is the historical presence of 
equally/comparably powerful political entities of different peoples and how the countries have 
 
367 Andrew Scobell, 2003. 
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historically institutionalized, through political ideology, their interactions with other peoples. 
The other reason is about the polity; autocracy tends to produce more consistent discourse than 
democracy. Thus, the prevalence of inclusive rhetoric in the Chinese discourse is not only 
preserved by authoritarianism but also is a type of authoritarian inclusion in which the so-called 
altruism is to bring others into the inclusive world as Beijing designs and the meanings and 
practices of altruism is not open for discussion but depends on China’s definitions.  
This chapter will first discuss the factors that explain differences in producing varied 
patterns of imperialism, after a brief overview of a general history of three countries. It then 
moves on to specify the criteria for comparison, including the timeframes, measurements and 
issue areas. With this chapter mainly about the descriptive analysis of the respective discourses, 
what then follows is the summarization of the histories of the US and Japan. This aims to show 
the critical junctures when they became or failed to become regional hegemon and when they 
turned into global powers. The final section will focus on the ideas supporting their (proposed) 
new orders. Because the Chinese narratives have received detailed analysis in the previous 
chapters, the study here focuses on the American and Japanese cases before comparing the three 
countries in their differences and similarities. Along the line of imperialism are three aspects for 
comparison: differentiation versus inclusiveness, domestic-foreign linkage of governance, and 
falsifiable versus unfalsifiable logics. A table of findings is presented as below.  
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Table 7.0    
 
The Fundamental Factors That Make Differences 
The previous chapters show that Beijing’s different worldviews, corresponding preferred 
world orders, and the overseas activities in the past years are underlined by realpolitik. 
Paralleling this is the construction of the increasingly sophisticated narratives of morality. The 
rhetoric of equality and mutual benefits is not simply designed to meet the needs of the post-Cold 
War environment in which the hypocrisy of stating that sovereign states are equal has become 
the norm, but also reflects China’s conviction that it has the abilities to realize the idealistic goals 
and its easy dismissal of the contradictions between what happens on the ground and the 
idealistic narratives. Beijing’s high idealism and the claimed moral high ground define China’s 
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ultra-defensiveness in a degree unseen in the cases of the US and Japan. This ultra-defensiveness 
is characterized by the inclusive narratives. 
Japan similarly had an inclusive discourse but paled in degree. Despite the lofty rhetoric to 
care for all with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds in the Greater East Asia, the 
institutionalized political culture of building inclusive discourse that underlines the defensiveness 
is lacking because historically Japan does not have persistent practices in this regard. The 
Chinese regimes however have been doing similar things since dynastic periods. They claimed to 
provide public goods for both Chinese and non-Chinese peoples so long as the latter adopted the 
Chinese way. As chapter 2 shows, the Ming’s emperor wished to pacify the Mongols through 
extending his heaven-mandated benevolence, either by bestowing gifts or granting titles. When 
the nomads went against Ming’s wishes, Emperor Yongle justified his punitive expeditions by 
the reason that the Mongols had betrayed his grace. After the founding of the PRC, Beijing has 
continuously relied on the discourse that contains the same message that regardless of the 
differences, China is able to address the needs of many. During Mao’s period, the narratives 
were that regardless of institutional differences, Beijing worked and was on the same side with 
less developed countries. Entering the 1990s and the 21st century, the discourse of inclusiveness 
applies to both domestic “multiethnic cohesion” and overseas activities that, according to 
China’s claims, respect and treat different peoples and their institutions equally. No other 
country rivals China in having the ambition and the audacity to claim to be able to address issues 
for all in a non-discriminating way. The US was not inclusive and did not claim to be before the 
twentieth century. For most of the twentieth century, it remained racist at home. Its democratic 
institutions however kept it relatively honest in not stating the opposite. Unlike the PRC which 
derives its legitimacy from the fabricated historical continuity of civilizational greatness, 
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multiethnic unity, and territorial unity, Washington has its legitimacy rooted in the rowdy crowd. 
The US cannot compete with China in terms of the tenacity to produce and believe in the 
uninterrupted history of the world in a harmony under the Chinese leadership that in Beijing’s 
narratives effortlessly comes into being.  
China exceeds Japan in degree regarding the discursive substance of inclusion and the 
extent of belief in its own narratives. The substance of the Chinese narratives, however, has no 
similarities with the American discourse. What explains these differences? To identify causal 
relations, the comparison here will not meet each requirement laid out in the scientific 
procedures. The fundamental reason is that each country is different, even though they may share 
some similarities. When it comes to the major patterns in the variants of imperialism, it 
inevitably will be the aggregate results of differences, instead of similarities, that explain one’s 
type of imperialism. 
Despite some cultural similarities between China and Japan, the extent and the scale of this 
ingrained belief in one’s moral authority have differences amounting to a gulf. Because perfect 
homogeneity in the cross-case study is not possible, heterogeneous factors can be minimized for 
maximum homogeneity. Since this study argues that Beijing’s belief in its moral authority is a 
phenomenon of institutionalized political culture, the pool of cases should be limited to countries 
that share some cultural similarities. The other two barometers are that states have a history of 
overseas expansion and authoritarian government. Accordingly, Japan stands out as an ideal case 
compared to other Asian countries. Through a comparison of similar cases between Japan and 
China,368 the factor of a tradition of political ideology/narratives that the authority is altruistic 
 
368 For most similar cases study, see Jason Seawright & John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case 
Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 
2, 2008, pp. 294-308. 
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and inclusive is identified to have explanatory power. The reason conditioning this traditional 
practice is that historically the Chinese polity has interacted with powerful entities of different 
ethnicities on the East Asian continent. To consolidate its own legitimacy, it over time develops 
an ideology that aims at both internal and external audiences in a way to persuade others that it 
does not differentiate. Such a condition has been relatively absent in the Japanese islands. 
The PRC and the US are different cases in nature. On the standards that gauge the 
relationships between Japan and China, from culture to the polity, Washington did not share any 
similarities with Beijing. Although the US once coexisted with the American natives and 
European influence, native tribes and states were not comparably powerful and Europeans after 
all were Caucasians even though they could be powerful actors. Washington did not need to 
develop an inclusive discourse to sanction its presence in a competition with powerful players of 
different peoples as China did. This also explains why it was racism-based exclusion that became 
a dominant pattern in the American narratives. While racial logic could be related to annexation 
of territories and extension of one’s influence, it was not a necessary condition and in some cases 
racism worked against expansion. In addition, unlike China, being a democracy Washington did 
not maintain a coherent political ideology to condone its overseas influence, let alone a 
consistent view of inclusion.  
The persistent, systematic and institutionalized efforts to generate and maintain the 
discourse of inclusion is a major characteristic of Chinese politics. The discursive comparison in 
this chapter thus tests the presence and the scale of inclusiveness in the cases of the US and 
Japan. In addition, this chapter will measure the degree of idealism and a conviction in the self-
claimed morality by the rhetorical tolerance and inclusiveness toward those identified as 
belonging to different “races” or ethnicities. To strengthen the findings, the degree of strategic 
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transparency will be analyzed. A lesser degree of transparency and a greater degree of denial of 
realistic practices confirms the tendency to believe the self is selfless and thus moral.  
Criteria for Discursive Comparison  
Comparison requires a specification of benchmarks for measurements. Since this research 
is about the PRC, cases for comparison should follow closely the conditions under which China 
is working its way to great power status. China’s experience will be reference points for 
comparison. To deconstruct the title of this dissertation for a moment, the first part is about 
“rationalizing.” As the first four chapters show, Chinese justification is not merely a rhetorical 
cover, it is systematic and institutionalized and thus carries a good amount of conviction within. 
The question then is, do other major powers display a similar degree and on a similar scale? The 
second part is about “Chinese hegemony.” The related question is, is there any existing theory 
about the making of a (potential) hegemon and how do the cases of other major powers fare 
according to this theory? Standards for the timeframes and examples are to be explained along 
with the following three specifications of these two major guides. It is important to note that the 
discursive comparison among three countries should be evaluated by taking together the three 
specifications below as they are also interrelated.   
First, as of today, the PRC is not even a power that dominates the region. It has been 
dealing with multiple major states in its neighborhood and the US. Accordingly, this chapter is 
interested in states’ foreign policy discourse in an environment where the self needs to compete 
with multiple powers. Second, the second part of the title of this research is “Chinese 
hegemony.” The existing literature already theorizes the trajectory of the making of a hegemon 
in terms of the geographical areas where one needs to dominate first. To open a dialogue with the 
current literature, selected cases including China will be tested against John Mearsheimer’s 
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theory that a major state needs to consolidate its power in the region before it can wield global 
influence. In other words, to become a regional hegemon is a prerequisite for global influence. 
Unsurprisingly, the case of the US fits the theory as Mearsheimer develops this idea based on the 
American experience. The Japanese example also confirms the theory as Mearsheimer mentions. 
This chapter, however, demonstrates that the case of China does not fit the theory. Because of its 
geopolitical location and corresponding geostrategy, Beijing’s policies show that the PRC is 
working on the regional and global scales simultaneously to become a hegemon. In combination 
with the first condition, the discursive analysis will focus on the period when a state strives to 
dominate its region. In comparing cases, it is necessary to trace the origins of modern-state 
building, because the boundaries of national territories have direct impact on national capabilities 
and identification of security threats as well as the scopes of defense perimeters. If it was not for 
the territories acquired after independence which compose most of the national boundaries that it 
has today, US hegemony in the region might not be the case. If the PRC had not invaded East 
Turkestan and Tibet after its founding, the outlook of China’s foreign policy and domestic 
dynamics would be very different. Therefore, the timeline for the summaries of territorial 
expansion begins after the establishment of a modern-state government. In the case of the US, it 
will include western expansion. The Chinese case includes the invasion of Central Asian 
Xinjiang and Tibet. Japan however shows a different situation. Annexation of territories that 
constitute today’s homeland was on a much smaller scale. Japan’s focus was largely on overseas 
territories, and these lands combined are much larger than Japanese homeland. Inevitably, the 
summaries of some countries such as the US will cover a longer timeframe.  
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Third, what are the territories that major states intend to obtain or to exert influence over? 
This question is raised according to the second point. Mearsheimer’s theory is about one’s own 
sphere of influence and thus the obtainment of or influence over territories in a certain 
geographical area/region becomes the main direction for analysis. In this sense, the selected 
territories/geographical areas need to be seen as strategically important by a major power and 
constantly receive that power’s attention. The case of the US will focus on the Western 
Hemisphere. Regarding China, it will be the South China Sea. Since the Chinese trajectory and 
strategic intention do not match the order of becoming a regional power first, the narratives for 
its activities in other regions need to be examined as well. In line with the standard that certain 
strategic issues have constantly received the attention of a major power, the military base in 
Djibouti is another example for comparison. Since the Djibouti case is illustrated in chapter 6, it 
will not be repeated here.  
As to the exact content of the discourse for comparison, since this research argues that 
China’s ultra-defensiveness is shown through inclusiveness-based morality politics with a 
conviction in the motives of the self being selfless and moral, and the abilities of the self to 
realize rosy blueprints in the future, the American and Japanese narratives will be tested against 
the Chinese style of systematic idealism. This research does not merely argue that Beijing plays a 
politics of high idealism, but also that such culture is institutionalized as its practices date to 
dynastic eras and continue to today. It also argues that such culture is reflected in systematically 
built discourse that links domestic and international governance; as chapter 4 and many places 
scattered in other chapters show, the narrative of inclusiveness is based on a respect for diversity 
(multiethnic unity at home, respect for different political and socio-economic institutions abroad) 
and is embodied in Chinese socialist institutions and Chinese culture that is partially influenced 
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by sinicized Marxism. As to where this benevolence and inclusiveness come from, Beijing offers 
a biological explanation of the Chinese genes. The PRC’s claimed high altruism and morality 
politics needs to be understood by considering the above characteristics together. It is the 
combination of these traits that explains China’s cultural subjectivism. Neither the US nor Japan 
demonstrates defensiveness and claims to have the moral high ground at this level and at this 
scale.  
There are two criteria to measure the quality of high idealism and high morality as “self-
privileging”:369 1) a greater gap between fragmented/complicated realities and the degree of 
willingness and conviction to systematically deny such or the degree of showing no issues with 
covering up what happens on the ground, and 2) a lesser degree of transparency in one’s strategic 
intentions for self-interests despite the utilization of lofty rhetoric. The first criterion is to be 
evaluated by the presence of systematic and institutionalized effort to construct idealistic 
narratives of morality. Since it is not possible to do psychoanalysis, whether a persistent and 
systematic effort exists to keep certain political culture alive and functioning can be a good 
alternative to measure the extent of belief, or how entrenched such belief is. The second criterion 
acknowledges that major states tend to use beautified rhetoric to justify their deeds and, based 
upon this constant, this chapter gauges the degree of strategic transparency. These two yardsticks 
need to be considered together. The second standard can function as a robust check to confirm 
the extent of ultra-defensiveness proved by the first standard when the degree of the strategic 
transparency is low.  
 
 
369 This is not to measure the real high idealism and the real high morality. This is to measure the degree of 
“full of oneself,” which is not the same as being actively hypocritical, in one’s belief that the self possesses the 
quality of high idealism and high morality.  
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The first four chapters in this research have demonstrated that inclusion-based morality 
politics and ultra-idealism are institutionalized political culture and systematically constructed, 
which supplies evidence for China’s persistent belief in its own morality. On the basis of 
factoring in the diversity of peoples and governing institutions across different countries in one’s 
narratives, Washington’s outward expansion was built on racism-related exclusion. This differs 
from the PRC’s claimed inclusiveness. As the logic goes, the US did not have an 
institutionalized culture of pretending to have undifferentiated compassion, let alone generating 
relevant discourse systematically. Tokyo utilized inclusive rhetoric, but this was more obvious 
during the inter-war period and WWII. It does not have a history of building and employing 
narratives to stress one’s own morality versus the immorality of other ethnic groups in the 
territories that it now governs. China, however, has such history and traditions. Accordingly, the 
discursive comparison will focus on inclusiveness versus differentiation.  
Regarding strategic transparency, the Chinese narratives about the South China Sea and 
the American narratives, such as the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary, about the 
Western Hemisphere will be compared. The matter here is not about whether a certain doctrine 
or speech is effective as a deterrent, but rather about transparency in one’s strategic assessments. 
In fact, it is exactly the minimal effectiveness of the Monroe Doctrine that highlights the 
transparency in making public the American strategic intentions and the conditions it laid out as 
the temporary guidance for certain foreign policies. Compared to the Roosevelt Corollary, the 
Monroe Doctrine is a least likely case, to provide evidence of strategic transparency. If this least 
likely case also shows the expected result, it provides an even stronger piece of evidence. When 
Monroe made that announcement, the US was still surrounded by the colonies of many European 
powers in today’s US homeland and in the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, 
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Monroe made it clear that the non-intervention and non-colonization principles which sought 
coexistence with European powers that were still stronger than the US would change once 
conditions shifted to negatively affect Washington’s interests. Despite being a weaker state, 
Washington was explicit that it would play realpolitik as any other major state did, which 
indicated that it had its eyes on the Western Hemisphere. China, on the contrary, denies in public 
its strategic ambitions, and fills the narratives with lofty words for public consumption to dazzle 
people’s minds. As Lucian Pye put it, “one of the risks of being a student of Chinese politics is 
that prolonged immersion in the language of Chinese politics may dim one’s wits to the point 
that it becomes impossible to recognize fuzzy thinking.”370 China’s politics is full of and is 
words, rhetoric and reading between the lines. There are more convictions than practical 
substance. The denial of any strategic calculations and a conviction that such denial is entirely 
sincere adds another layer to China’s ultra-defensiveness.  
From Regional Hegemon to Global Power 
Using the United States as a reference point, John Mearsheimer argues that a major 
power’s global status is not possible before achieving a status of regional hegemon with the 
abilities of excluding others from exerting influence in the region. After regional dominance is 
obtained, the regional status can be further ensured by preventing another rising power from 
gaining dominance in another region of the world. A power is free to operate and meddle in other 
regions when it faces no serious threats in its own backyard. Therefore, a world of bipolarity 
with two powers achieving dominance in two different regions is more dangerous than a world 
of multipolarity with one securing hegemony in one area and two or more than two powers 
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competing in a region for supremacy. In the case of the former, two great powers are free to 
intervene in each other’s backyard. In the case of the latter, states will be busy with checking 
each other’s strength in the region where they reside and thus have no spare capabilities to grow 
their influence in other regions. Accordingly, for Mearsheimer, a power is less likely to gain 
global dominance when it still needs to deal with other powers residing in its own region. 
Meanwhile, Mearsheimer’s argument is not that a global hegemony is achievable. To 
subordinate distant countries is costly given that projection of power is limited over long 
distances. He concludes that the ultimate goal a state can attain thus is regional hegemony.371  
Mearsheimer’s theory is also about the dynamics of power transition. Power transition, 
while focusing on the relations between relative strength and the timing of war, does not specify 
the dynamics of competition on the geopolitical and geostrategic levels. Mearsheimer’s 
arguments about how a state can consolidate its power in the region by considering inter-state 
interactions on both the regional and global levels provide the dynamics of competition that 
substantiates power transition theory. Accordingly, the summaries of the trajectories of overseas 
expansion of the US and Japan and their discursive constructs will be in accordance with the 
time frame in which each one aspired to become regional hegemon before obtaining global 
influence. This study finds that the cases of the US and Japan conform to the theory. China’s 
course of overseas expansion, however, does not follow theoretical expectation.  
The US  
During the eighty years from the Monroe Doctrine (1823) to the Roosevelt Corollary 
(1904), European powers were either retreating from the Americas or growing overstretched and 
exhausted from imperialist competition. By the time the Monroe Doctrine that asked non-
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intervention from Europe in the Western Hemisphere and promised no American involvement in 
Europe was announced, it would take another 23 years to complete western expansion on the 
continent, with Texas and California annexed after the war with Mexico from 1846 to 1848. The 
further expansion into Latin America during the 1840s and 1850s, such as acquiring rights to 
build a canal and establishing a naval presence, was aided by British withdrawal. For London, 
continental politics demanded full attention and as relations with Russia deteriorated, both sides 
ended up fighting the Crimean War (1854-1856).372 Washington’s external environment would 
again improve as Europe turned its attention to East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East with the 
wave of revived imperial colonialism in the 1880s.  
The US already had an eye on Hawaii after the completion of continental expansion and 
had wished to build a trans-isthmus canal protected by the US Navy in Central America. The 
Spanish-American War in 1898 made the long coveted territorial acquisitions come true and 
allowed Washington to control strategic locations. Engulfed by domestic crisis, the aged imperial 
monarchy was no competent rival. The US took Spain’s Cuba in the Western Hemisphere as a 
protectorate, Puerto Rico, the Philippines as colony, and Guam. The Pacific possessions formed 
a strategic line serving American interests in the Pacific. Five years later, the Roosevelt 
Corollary would make it clear that Latin America was an American sphere of influence and the 
US had duties to police the region. 
The US under Teddy Roosevelt would grow interested in participating in international 
affairs beyond the Western Hemisphere. Regardless, it did not enjoy privileges in other parts of 
the world while it was tightening its grip on Latin America. This was the case when the scramble 
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for Africa was nearly complete at the end of 19th century and China, after losing the 1894 war 
with Japan, became the pie from which European powers and the US alike wanted to have a 
share. As a latecomer in the club of global powers, its best bet was to ensure its own access to the 
market in China and what it already had in the Pacific and tried to ensure that others’ gains did 
not come at its expense. During the inter-war years, the US participated in international politics, 
but remained one among equals. In addition, a retreat to isolationism, meaning the hesitancy to 
interfere in European politics and to take positive actions to prevent Japanese expansion in East 
Asia, also characterizes its foreign policy. Not until 1941 did the US along with Britain and the 
Netherlands impose economic sanctions on Japan to cut off its oil supplies. The emergence of the 
US as a superpower did not come until after two world wars. The UK was enervated, and Europe 
and Japan were devastated. 
Japan 
From the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868) to the early 1940s, the opportunities for 
Japan to obtain regional dominance came and went. The incumbent power in the region and the 
western powers that came to the region were either troubled by domestic crises or imperial 
disintegration or engulfed in the continental wars. In this regard, Japan shared similarities with 
the American case. However, unlike the US who was one among equals with consolidated 
regional influence, Japan was not able to drive out extra-regional powers, although it gained 
from western inaction. Tokyo was one among equals but arguably the weakest one in the club. 
The western colonizers still guarded their interests in the Pacific. Following growing concerns in 
the 1930s and Japan’s occupation of southern Indochina in the summer of 1941, the west 
imposed economic sanctions on Japan, especially oil supplies, and the US had updated its war 
plan for the Pacific theater. Washington and Tokyo already saw the possibility of war before it 
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arrived.373 The regional order would remain dynamic until Japanese defeat. Tokyo’s defeat not 
only led to the loss of all colonies and protectorates but also disarmament of the nation. Its 
regional dominance was ephemeral.  
The 1894 war against the Manchu Qing empire would mark the beginning of Japan’s 
overseas expansion. With Japan emerging as a victor, the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki gave 
Tokyo Taiwan where its interests dated to the 1874 failed expedition and severed tributary 
relations between Korea and the Qing after two decades of meddling in Korean politics and 
competition with the Qing for influence on the peninsula. Due to its declining imperial power 
and the recent defeat, the continental power was permanently removed from the list of 
competitors that Japan needed to outmaneuver for regional dominance.  
Japan’s primary enemy now would be Russia. The two countries went to war in 1904. 
Caught by a revolution back home and a defeat in the Tsushima Strait, Russia was ready to 
settle. Tokyo might not have been able to fight long either because of heavy casualties and high 
military spending. Playing the British card374 and reaping the benefits from Russia’s domestic 
turmoil, along with battlefield successes, Japan got what it wanted, including freedom of action 
in Korea and Russia’s privileges in the Liaodong Peninsula. The erstwhile enemy could even 
become a temporary ally. In 1910, Tokyo and Moscow signed a secret deal to divide Manchuria 
between their spheres of influence. As the geostrategic logic dictated, Russia had the north and 
Japan had the south. 
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Japan’s gains in Shandong during WWI however would be reversed by the Washington 
Conference (1921-1922). The Conference further limited the firepower of capital ships and set 
the ratio of tonnage among powers. The treaty of alliance between Japan and Britain was 
replaced by a Four Power Pact in which the US, France, Japan, and Britain promised to respect 
each other’s rights and to consult each other in times of crisis. These agreements reined in 
Japan’s expansion and restored power equilibrium in East Asia. 
In 1931, the Kwantung Army defied Tokyo’s order and invaded Manchuria on the pretext 
of a railway bombing incident engineered by army officers. The next year, Manchukuo, a puppet 
state of Imperial Japan, was established. Suffering from the Great Depression, the west did not 
take counteraction, aside from condemnation. During the 1930s, Tokyo reneged on the promise 
of armament reductions and sought for territorial control. After Manchukuo, the Imperial Army 
continued to advance on the continent and expanded in Southeast Asia. On the eve of the Pearl 
Harbor attack, Japan already controlled a good amount of territories in Asia and faced no threats 
from extra-regional powers as Europe itself was at war. The attack however drew strong 
American reaction and starting from the second half of 1942 after losing the battle of Midway, 
Japan’s newly gained but fragile status as regional hegemon would soon be gone. The Asia 
Pacific has not yet seen the total withdrawal of the west.  
China in Comparison 
The American experience provides the foundation for Mearsheimer’s theory. The case of  
Japan further conforms to the theoretical predictions that without obtaining a status of regional  
hegemon, one cannot have global influence. The example of the PRC differs according to the  
development seen so far. As chapters 5 and 6 discussed, from both China’s experience and  
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strategic logic, it seems that the PRC is working on the regional and global levels 
simultaneously. From a Chinese viewpoint—consider its geopolitical location and the strategic 
logic that Chinese narratives come up with, that is, inner and outer strategic belts in the context 
of a quasi-world “Asia-Pacific”—it is difficult to draw a clear line between regions and the 
globe. Unlike the past experience of Japan and the US, China may be more able to throw its 
weight around in some remote and less developed states than in its immediate neighbors since 
they are either major powers or states that have strong governments. While attempting to fulfill 
its agenda in the South China Sea where it will meet formidable enemies such as the US and 
Japan and probably others, China also is working on the outer rim of “Asia-Pacific” of its 
definition, including Western Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Africa, for its goal in the first 
island chain. It is casting the fishing net wide to obtain as many as possible.  
Ideational Bases of New Orders 
China, Japan, and the US are no exception to the law that major powers’ expanding 
strategic and commercial interests require some justifications to uphold. In the American 
construct of relations with others, there were clear distinctions between the self and the other. 
The differences were racial. Racism had underlined westward movement, domestic slavery, and 
overseas expansion. In the case of Japan, Asians were similar as opposed to the white West—as 
the objects of western colonialism who shared the aspiration for independence—and yet they 
were racially different and treated as such in the context of a Japan-led Greater East Asia. 
Neither aspect can be ignored, for dropping either of them fails to capture the contradiction in 
Japan’s new order. China shows the other end of the spectrum. It puts on the pretension of 
inclusiveness with a belief in it, seeing differences in culture, ethnicity, religion, and race as no 
barriers for the world to become a family. The logic that others are part of the self while their 
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differences are respected is seen in the discursive construction of the Chinese state and its 
foreign policies as well. In dealing with heterogeneity, the US admitted differences among 
peoples in the narratives but carried them too far in identifying differences with racial 
(in)capabilities and from there it further derived what different races deserved. But Washington 
did what it said. It honestly stated its contempt for peoples of color and treated them accordingly. 
China however creates the impression of equal co-existence with mutual respect while its 
behavior proves the contrary. Neither case is better. They both serve imperialist goals.  
The US 
The logic of American racism applies to both domestic governance and foreign policies. 
However, American racism did not necessarily lead to continental and overseas expansion. 
People with racist views could oppose that as well. Regardless, they all shared the same logic 
that the races of color alike were inferior and were innately incapable of self-government. 
Domestically, this logic was in the system of slavery before the Civil War and then, following 
the Reconstruction Era, segregation and restricted voting rights and civil liberties. Since the 
blacks were considered a degraded race, many did not have rights for political participation.375 
Many whites believed that the superiority of the US democratic institutions could only be upheld 
by the whites. Similar racial logic underlined Washington’s foreign relations in both the 
territories the US annexed and the countries in which the US intervened. The post-1898 
territorial arrangements, including Hawaii which later became a state because of the very large 
scale of white immigration there, present the result of compromises between white supremacy 
and imperialist ambitions. The population would not gain citizenship and these territories would 
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not be elevated to statehood because they would contaminate the American polity and the 
peoples of color could not be Americanized easily. The US however would extend its protection 
over these territories since they were understood to be racially incapable of self-government and 
defending themselves from foreign threats. These territories instead became colonies and 
protectorates in the imperialist chapter of American history. A similar racial logic underlined the 
intervention in Latin America. The non-white races’ capacity for self-government was doubtful 
and they needed American help to stabilize their countries. In US foreign relations, racism did 
not lead to expansion but rather rationalized the imperialist schemes that served the purpose of 
strategic and commercial interests.  
In the case of continental expansion, racism facilitated territorial annexation. On the issue 
of Texas, Northern Whigs, as much as they held an antislavery position, did not support the idea 
of treating blacks as equals. The anxiety that slaves would inundate the North if they were set 
free prompted Northern Whigs to support Texas annexation in 1845. Instead of migrating to the 
North, blacks would disperse into the west and enter Mexico and Latin America where colored 
skins would make them equal among Latinos. Northern Whigs’ desire to preserve institutions 
and the way of life in the North and the southern scheme to have Texas as a slave state to 
increase political representation in national politics eventually led to expansion. But the 
expansion had limits. For the Southerners, the acquisition of territories beneath the Rio Grande 
would destroy the white institutions. For Northern Whigs, it would continue the slavery system 
that they were opposed to.376 Racism was one of reasons for continental expansion in the sense 
that it provided temporary relief from the slavery issue and slavery-related sectional power 
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struggle. The slave logic would continue to function regarding overseas expansion. However, the 
case of Cuba shows that the logic did not affect whether territorial acquisitions took place or not. 
Against the background of diminishing seats in Congress, the Southerners would continue 
to link slavery to the purchase of Cuba. The strategy of abolitionists was to turn the table against 
slaveholders by arousing racial fears. Whig President Fillmore in his 1852 message to Congress 
expressed that incorporation of Cuba into the Union would bring “the Confederacy a population 
of a different national stock, speaking a different language, and not likely to harmonize with the 
other members.” He considered incorporation of Cuba “a hazardous measure.”377 In response to 
Southerners’ $30million bill in 1859 for the island’s purchase, John Bell, a Tennessee Whig, 
stated that “when you shall have extended your dominion over the state of Mexico and Central 
America, you will have added twelve million of a population for the most part perfectly 
imbecile.”378 At the same time, Spain made absolutely clear that it had no interest in selling Cuba 
to the United States.  
The slavery incentive disappeared after the Civil War but racism by other definitions 
remained one of the governing tenets in U.S. foreign relations. The territorial annexation 
following the 1898 Spanish-American War primarily served Washington’s commercial and 
strategic interests, with the latter evidenced in military bases in the Philippines and Cuba. The 
political status of the new territories as colonies and protectorates however would be subject to 
racial discrimination. The racial logic would justify the political relations between the US and 
these territories. Anti-imperialists loathed the idea of incorporating these people into the US for 
fear that they would contaminate American institutions. Imperialists wanted the territories for 
 
377 Ibid., p. 51. 
378 Ibid., p. 57. 
384 
strategic purposes while they too looked down upon races of color. Nevertheless, politicians, 
both for and against territorial expansion, agreed that peoples of color were unfit for self-
governance. The result was the denial of their statehood (as states in the US federal system) and 
the postponement of their independence.  
The dominant rationale of the time for the imperialists was that peoples of color were 
incapable of governing themselves and thus it required the intervention of the US to ensure a 
functioning government and a stable society so that American commercial and strategic interests 
could be protected. In responding to the Cuban revolution following the 1898 war, President 
McKinley favored the solution of turning Cuba into a US protectorate so that a stable 
government under Washington’s supervision could duly pay its international obligations and 
ensure the protection of American interests.379 In deciding who would be eligible to vote, 
Secretary of War Elihu Root was happy to learn that “whites so greatly outnumber the blacks” 
and the population that drove the country into chaos would not have a say.380 On the Philippines, 
McKinley appointed the Schurman Commission to conduct first-hand research. A part of the 
Commission report reads as follows: “the Philippine people were not capable of independent 
self-government, and that independence, for which some of them said they were fighting, 
was…an idea at present impossible, not only because of their unfitness for it, but because of their 
inability to preserve it among the nations even if it were granted (emphasis added).” The report 
concluded that “the Philippine Islands, even the most patriotic declare…need the tutelage and 
protection of the United States.”381  
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Anti-imperialist politicians at the same time continued the old rhetoric that the 
incorporation of peoples of color would endanger the American institutions and civilization. 
Their version of racism was about American exceptionalism in terms of white supremacy. 
Senator Tillman gave his reason for opposing the Philippines deal. “It is to the injection into the 
body politic of the United States of that vitiated blood, that debased and ignorant people, that we 
object.” But he did not oppose the American protection, as he expressed that “we give them 
whatever necessary protection they may need to keep other nations from gobbling them up, and 
thereby relieve ourselves of any obligations.”382 In Congressional debates about Puerto Rico, 
several representatives rejected making Puerto Ricans American citizens because of their racial 
incapability in self-governance. Some cited failed republican government in mixed-blood 
countries as evidence; some used geography and climate as the reasons—“the tropics seem to 
heat the blood while enervating the people who inhabit them.”383 For Carl Schurz, Senator Henry 
Teller, Senator John McLaurin and others, the Philippines, and, for some, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
could not be admitted to statehood because people there were half-civilized and had nothing in 
common with the Americans in terms of language, religion, and culture. For anti-imperialists, the 
mere thought that races of color would direct state affairs via elected offices was unbearable and 
the independence of newly gained territories such as the Philippines would be preferred to keep 
the US white.384  
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While racial language ran afoul of the political narratives, those acting on the reason that 
American institutions should remain in the governing hands of the whites were anti-expansionist. 
Territorial acquisition, justified by the reason that because of others’ racial inabilities the US had 
to act, primarily served economic and strategic interests. For instance, on Cuba, the Platt 
Amendment specified that the U.S. had rights to intervene for the protection of life, property and 
individual liberty. To enforce the Monroe Doctrine and prevent European meddling in the 
Caribbean, it also prohibited Cuba entering loan contracts with foreign powers. For the 
amendment to have enforcement power, Washington would also secure two naval bases at Bahia 
Honda and Guantanamo Bay.385  
After the 1898 war and the securing of land to build the Panama Canal by supporting 
Panama’s secession from Colombia in 1903, Washington found that its interests could be 
safeguarded by means other than territorial acquisitions. American expansion through 
intervention was formally formulated in Roosevelt’s message to Congress in 1904, which was 
later dubbed the Roosevelt Corollary. The birth of the new doctrine again came in the shadow of 
possible European meddling over the Venezuela debt crisis. Roosevelt’s message carried the 
racial logic of civilization versus barbarism. He stated: 
“If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and 
decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it 
need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an 
impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, 
may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized 
nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the 
 
385 Lars Schoultz. 1998, pp. 148-149. 
387 
Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant 
cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police 
power (emphasis added).”386 
The message to Latin America and Europe is direct: if the southern neighbors were 
incapable of governing themselves and fulfilling their responsibilities in a way that jeopardized 
US security, the US would intervene. The northern giant exonerated itself from any accusation 
by stressing the reluctance to use force. Meanwhile, Roosevelt lamented that there was no 
international law and no tribunal to bring to justice the wrongdoers who violated the rights of 
another nation. He did not agree on total disarmament of the nations. “Until some method is 
devised by which there shall be a degree of international control over offending nations, it would 
be a wicked thing for the most civilized powers…to disarm.” Because the civilized countries had 
“the most sense of international obligations” and “the keenest and most generous appreciation of 
the difference between right and wrong,” they should keep “a sufficient armament” “under any 
circumstances” to “serve the purpose of international police.” The power of force would keep the 
world distant from “an immediate recrudescence of barbarism.” “International police”, 
“civilized,” and “obligations” appeared in this context of general foreign policy and in the text 
specifically about Latin America. This textual arrangement found its testing ground in Latin 
America.387 
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Cuba in the hands of President Tomas Estrada Palma was in a state of rebellion in 1906. 
After Palma and his Cabinet resigned, the country was in anarchy. Roosevelt ordered Secretary 
of War William Howard Taft to restore order. Taft went to Cuba with nine U.S. warships. Upon 
learning that Cuba had about $13.6 million in the Treasury (and thus the US funds were not 
needed), Taft established a provisional government by the authority of the US President. Now, 
Charles Magoon and the US Army were in charge of Cuba. In commenting on the reason for 
Cuban unrest, Magoon said, “Like all other people of Spanish origin they are hot blooded, high 
strung, nervous, excitable…They are suspicious of everyone.” Regarding the future prospects of 
Cuba, Magoon stated that “we cannot change these racial characteristics by administering their 
Government for two years or twenty years, nor would they be changed by a military 
occupation.”388  
Japan 
Ostensibly a Japanese blueprint to help Asian nations expel colonialism and become 
independent, the slogan of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity, promulgated in 1940, first aroused 
nationalist excitement in the Western-controlled colonies and then brutally crushed their false 
sense of hope and misplaced trust. In a nutshell, the ideal espoused by the concept was an 
international hierarchy based on racism of a Japanese version when it came to political and 
economic order. No country would truly gain independence since Japanese would compose the 
ruling class of the territories and local economies were to be structured according to Japanese 
needs. In figuring out how human resources could be useful for the empire, peoples of Asia were 
categorized along the lines of racial deficiencies and capabilities. Pan-Asianism was the cloth for 
Japanese colonialism, and equality and brotherhood were veneers of racism-informed inequality.  
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Japan saw its relations with others in racial terms. In an article written by Colonel Ishiwara 
Kanji and Miyazaki Masayoshi, both argued for a new construct of regional order in East Asia 
that would reject the racial inequality in the Western-built order. “We Orientals know that such 
Western ideas as freedom, equality, democracy, etc. are based on the concept of racial and class 
differences. For example, the free societies of the British and French white peoples are built on 
the foundation of the slavery of billions of colored people…It is like the democracy among the 
nobility of ancient Rome which was conjoined with use of slaves of many difference races.” A 
new order realized in an East Asia Federation with Japan at the center would manifest a different 
culture, “a culture of the rule of righteousness” that would respect the choices of East Asians.389 
The slogan “Expel Western imperialism” from the Pacific that gained currency in the 1930s thus 
was directly related to the injustice of racial inequality that Tokyo intended to address. 
According to General Principles of National Defense Policy from Army General Staff 
Headquarters, Japan’s national policy was to become a protector and a leader by possessing “the 
power to expunge the pressure of the white races in East Asia.”390  
Tokyo’s political appeal was the liberation of Asian nations from colonialism and to build 
“Asia for the Asiatics”. Within the community, there were cooperation, co-existence of states, 
mutual dependence, and respect for distinctive cultures and traditions. The equality prevailing in 
the narratives was subject to racial differences, however. Relations among Asians after all were 
not equal. In the Japanese logic, equity could be achieved only when the peoples of different 
nationalities performed roles in accord with their racial capabilities. This delegated the 
leadership role to the Yamato race and relegated others to supporting Japan’s political, 
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economic, and social needs. Ishiwara Kanji, the officer responsible for the 1931 Mukden 
Incident, wrote in 1930 that, “The four races of Japan, China, Korea and Manchuria will share a 
common prosperity through a division of responsibilities: Japanese, political leadership and large 
industry; Chinese, labor and small industry; Koreans, rice; and Manchus, animal husbandry.”391 
With the two colonies, Taiwan and Korea, and the war being waged in China, Professor 
Kamikawa Hikomatsu, specialized in diplomatic history and a graduate from Tokyo Imperial 
University, compared the Monroe Doctrine and its Japanese counterpart in a 1939 article. 
Kamikawa was defending Japan’s regional policy and asked for understanding and sympathy 
from the Americans. He saw resemblances on both sides in that the principles of non-
colonization and non-intervention are the policy toward the home region with reference to each 
side’s relations with extra-regional powers; Europe would withdraw from the Americas and 
leave the region to US, and the West from East Asia and leave it to Japan. Kamikawa further 
argued that Japan was not interested in European affairs as it left the League of Nations, just like 
American isolation from the Old World. He concluded that the policies of the two countries met 
their developmental requirements at the initial stages.392  
The professor denied that Japanese imperialism was ongoing. He turned the accusation 
against the American continental expansion and intervention policy in Latin America. In 
defending Japan’s footprints, he described them as “a joint movement of the East Asiatic 
peoples” who shared “racial, cultural and economic solidarity” and whose differentiated 
economic structures, with Japan’s economy industrial and the rest agrarian, are “mutually 
harmonious and accommodating.”393 According to Kamikawa, Japan’s Monroe Doctrine was 
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necessary for “defense and preservation of East Asia”. Any western transgression will be 
“construed as disturbing the peace and order” of the region and Japan would oppose that. 
In reality, Japanese expansion was buttressed by racial inequality. The Global Policy with 
Yamato Race as Nucleus, a report circulated within the government and written by about forty 
researchers during the heyday of the Pacific War, contains specific demographic and economic 
policies and supporting racist ideas. According to the report, Japan is superior to other Asian 
countries because the Yamato race is pure whereas others have mixed blood. The cultural, 
spiritual, and material superiority derived from racial purity grants Japan the privilege of a 
leadership position. Because only the Yamato race can strengthen the region as a community, the 
continuation of a pure Japanese race in the leadership position is the cornerstone to regional 
development. To that effect, the suggested policy toward other Asian nations is the migration of 
Japanese population to designated countries (including Korea, Taiwan, Manchukuo, China, 
Indochina, Burma, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the East Indies, and Philippines). There 
would be no intermarriage with local peoples and the Japanese migrants would be in charge of 
institutions in the occupied areas. Regarding the roles of other races, the resilience of the 
Koreans and Formosans (the Taiwanese people) would sustain the protraction of war by 
conducting hard labor,  based on their record of strong resistance to Japanese rule and strategic 
locations; Southeast Asians are generally lazy and do not have business sense; the Han Chinese 
were good at business but were flunkies.394  
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China in Comparison  
Unlike the American narratives which saw clear differences between white Americans and 
other races, rhetorical inclusiveness characterizes Chinese and Japanese worldviews. The 
polemical language for public consumption incorporates others as part of the self or sees the 
other and the self as an organic whole in which different national units work together for the 
same goal. Both Japanese and Chinese narratives identify certain countr(ies) as enemies against 
which the rest of the world will unify. For Japan, in appealing to Asian countries, the object for 
resistance is western colonialism. For China, it is American hegemony which developing 
countries led by the PRC will target. Both China and Japan are framed to be selfless leader-
aspirants capable of raising up the suppressed states who share commonalities with them. The 
PRC sees itself belonging to the club of developing countries and because of its past of foreign 
“humiliation,” its narratives claim that it understands what others had been through and thus will 
not treat them unequally. Japan saw itself sharing racial kinship with other Asians and also 
understood how it felt to be a target of western aggression as the rest of Asian countries did. 
Both countries share strikingly similar lines. They attempt to win political allegiance by 
appealing to sentiment, denouncing others’ evil doings and providing hope of a future shared 
community in which the have-nots can all become the haves. While rhetorical inclusion is used 
to facilitate expansion for China and Japan, racist narratives did not necessarily lead to expansion 
in the US case. As previously demonstrated, the US differentiated peoples on racial grounds and 
domestic groups used variants of racial logic to obtain their political goals within and without the 
country.  
Chinese and Japanese pretensions of inclusiveness belie the differentiations that matter in 
the new order to be established. Other Asian races would serve the Yamato race and contribute 
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their resources for the Japanese economy while remaining politically inferior. Although Chinese 
narratives condemn racism, the behavior demonstrates otherwise. An example is a controversial 
televised show on CCTV, a nationwide broadcasted official media outlet, during 2018 Lunar 
New Year that featured a Chinese woman wearing blackface in an event about her daughter’s 
inter-racial marriage and an African man with monkey suit. The show aimed to highlight Sino-
African cooperation and friendship, but the actors’ lines and the racial connotations of their 
costumes reveal a racial hierarchy.  
The scene was set in Kenya. The blackface Chinese woman who played the role of an 
African mother with oversized body and female features was accompanied by an African man 
with monkey suit who handed over a basket of fruit to a Chinese man who played the role of her 
future son-in-law. When asked how the couple got to know each other, they answered with 
gradually raised voices at the tail of the statement, “it is the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway that 
connects us together.” A young Chinese woman who turned out to be the real bride of the 
Chinese man then showed up and revealed that the inter-racial marriage was a fake deal and the 
African daughter used it to escape the arranged marriage that her mom had planned. The mother 
now realized that her daughter did not want to get married at an early age because she wanted to 
go to China to study. The daughter acted by a black woman expressed the desire to “be the same 
as the Chinese people---roll up sleeves and be industrious, win the praise from the intellectuals 
and elite of the world.” Responding to her daughter’s concern and wish, the mother said, “how 
can I say no [to your plan to go to China]? When I was young, it was China’s assisting-Africa 
medical team who saved me. Now the Chinese young generation come to Africa to build 
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railways for us……I love Chinese people. I love China.”395 Racially objectifying others to fulfill 
one’s desire to be deferred to does not live up to the narratives of non-differentiation. 
In fact, China’s relations with Africa have been nothing short of racism. Since Mao’s 
period, many educated Chinese citizens have embraced the view of international hierarchy 
rooted in racial capabilities. The logic goes that the Chinese race is as superior as the white 
whereas the black is the inferior one, down at the bottom of hierarchy. It is deplorable for a 
Chinese woman to have a relationship with a black man. Such a relationship invokes the 
inferiority complex that some Chinese men have toward the idea that a black man is more 
muscular than a Chinese man. Discussions on the internet and some local news reports consider 
the presence of the black as the source of socio-economic problems as the black population has 
no sense of law and order, is a less developed race and less intelligent. Cyber messages justify 
such a view not as racial discrimination, but rather a biological fact. Those who have work 
experience in Africa in recent years due to Beijing’s overseas investments also translate the 
differentiated treatments they received, partly as a result of dishonesty in China’s business 
practices, into information that feeds racism at home. This fuels domestic views that hard power 
is necessarily to be used on Africans so that they will bend to the Chinese, just like they show 
more respect to the whites now because of past colonization.396 
Chinese and Japanese inclusiveness are identical in rhetoric but differ in geographical 
scope. The Japanese version was limited within the bloc of Greater East Asia. As Kamikawa’s 
article demonstrates, the West including the US should retreat and leave East Asia to Japan. This 
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was in accord with the political appeal of expelling colonialism. The Chinese version however is 
more universal. Consider the following three examples, one Japanese and two Chinese. In 
response to western criticism about Japan’s regional aspirations, Arita Hachiro, a professional 
diplomat and a foreign minister in the Hirota, Konoe, Hiranuma, and Yonai Cabinets wrote an 
article in 1941, when the war was raging, to defend the country’s policy: 
“Considerable misunderstanding seems to have arisen abroad regarding Japan’s project 
for the creation of a sphere of common prosperity in East Asia. It is generally charged 
that Japan has suddenly seized upon this plan as a means of establishing her exclusive 
control over East Asia and that within this sphere Japan alone shall enjoy all benefits 
by virtue of monopoly. The idea of spheres of common prosperity, however, is not a 
Japanese invention. Nor is it an expedient by which Japan aspired to monopolize this 
part of the world to the exclusion of all others……The present form which this 
historical process is assuming in East Asia is something devoid of national selfishness, 
aiming as it does at the universal welfare of East Asia and ultimately at bringing the 
movement into accord with the spirit of universal brotherhood… (emphasis added).”397  
Arita continued to explain the Greater East Asia Sphere as a bloc that was not exclusive in nature 
but rather conducive for human beings’ progress: 
“One of the common misunderstandings regarding the establishment of such blocs is  
that they are exclusive in nature. But it is utterly impossible to build a number of  
smaller worlds within the world……the establishment of blocs is the stage or method  
through which war is to be done away with and peace maintained, thereby assuring the  
advancement of world civilization and culture in general. Freed from economic  
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pressure by other nations, the blocs will be able to develop economically, and, as 
they progress, they will naturally come into closer economic and cultural 
relationships with other blocs, thus making possible universal advancement in the 
economic and cultural fields……the blocs system as proposed by Japan for East 
Asia certainly promises greater security, because it proposes not competition, but 
co-prosperity and co-existence……It is a step forward for world peace by 
abolishing those grave economic disparities which have so often been the source 
of conflict.398  
In defending its overseas activities, China similarly stresses inclusion, cooperation, and co-
existence. It also draws a connection between its policies and progression for mankind. The 
difference is that “Greater East Asia” is a bloc with limited geographical scope compared to 
China’s globalized view of “Asia-Pacific.” Consider the narratives from two different speeches 
given by Chinese officials. The first one is about the concept of “Asia-Pacific Security” which 
the PRC has propagated internationally. Based on the analysis in chapter 5, “Asia-Pacific” is 
defined as a region but the discursive content makes the term a quasi-world. This article contains 
the basic parameters laid out in chapter 5 that are used to decide the geographical scope of the 
term. The second speech addresses a general world audience and is representative of a large pool 
of public speeches on an international level.  
In a 2016 international seminar in Beijing about security arrangements in Asia-Pacific, the 
PRC’s vice foreign minister Liu Zhenmin first described the changing balance of power in the 
region and then argued for a place in the region with no intention of excluding anyone. The 
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speech was given in the context that mankind has historically searched for “common security” 
and peace and China’s proposal is conducive to this goal: 
“China and other developing countries are growing stronger and playing an 
even more constructive role in regional and international affairs. We need 
reasonable development space, an appropriate say in the world, and a new 
regional security structure that is reflective of the reality of the region, consistent 
with the interests and needs of various parties and acceptable to all.” 
“Both important members of the Asia Pacific, China and the US shoulder 
great responsibilities for peace and prosperity in the region. The two countries are 
building a new model of major-country relations featuring no conflict or 
confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. This is in line with the 
common expectation and aspirations of the countries in the region as well as the 
fundamental interests of themselves. The two sides need to develop a correct 
understanding of each other’s strategic intention. China does not want to be the 
predominant power in the Asia Pacific, or build spheres of influence and military 
alliance. It has no intention to replace the US or exclude the US from the 
region.”399 
A conciliatory and accommodating tone is also seen in the speech targeting the world 
audience. In a 2017 China Development Forum hosted by Beijing, foreign minister Wang Yi laid 
out several principles in itemized manner (marked in bold) followed by explanations which by 
their nature remain abstract slogans: 
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“pursue peace and cooperation. The type of partnership which China proposes  
does not target an imagined enemy or any third party. It advocates a win-win  
approach instead of a zero-sum game approach to state-to-state relations, and  
stresses the importance of seeking common interests……treat each other as  
equals. Countries may differ in size, strength and wealth, but all are equal  
members of the international community. China advocates a partnership which 
follows the principle of equality of nations, respects all countries’ sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity, and respects each other’s core interests and 
major concerns…… benefits for all. In the world today, the winner-takes-all 
approach and seeking self interests to the neglect of others is both obsolete and 
counterproductive. Those who want absolute security will only find themselves 
less secure. Those who only care about their own development will eventually run 
out of steam and lose space of progress. The partnership that China strives for 
aims to make the pie of common interests bigger through cooperation, so that 
more fruits of success and common development and prosperity can be shared.”400 
The intention to change the status quo usually does not get treatment in the Chinese 
narratives. This differs from the American practice. Consider the two examples, the Monroe 
Doctrine and Chinese foreign policy statements. After the defeat of Napoleonic France, 
European politics would continue to be the prime factor influencing how Washington oriented its 
foreign policies. Russia would take the lead in gathering forces across different European 
countries to check continental revolutions ignited by the Napoleonic wars. It also made the 
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restoration of the Spanish monarchy an allied commitment. If efforts could be attempted to 
unravel the results of the Napoleonic wars, the fate of Latin America might be reversed to 
become colonies again. In addition, Russia’s colonies in Alaska and a small part of northern 
California for about three decades also made the Americans uneasy. Tsar Alexander’s imperial 
edicts in 1821 regarding maritime resources caused American concerns about freedom of the 
seas and colonial activities in the Pacific Northwest. Meanwhile, within the US, leading political 
leaders were debating what the American position should be regarding Greek independence from 
the Ottoman empire. Against this background of the Russia-invoked specter of European 
colonization in the neighborhood and the emerging aspiration for the US to be involved in 
international affairs, the Monroe Doctrine was born in 1823.401  
Washington saw itself as a rising power whose interests the colonizers of the Old World 
would have to come to recognize while the country remained vulnerable. Within the US, debates 
were not just about Greek independence but also relations with Latin America. Should it 
encourage independent states there to adopt republicanism or leave them to be monarchies?402 
Meanwhile, America’s perception of itself as a rising power was also confirmed by the British 
proposal of a joint statement to deter European intervention in Latin America. Appropriating the 
British idea, the US president James Monroe unilaterally made the statement when he addressed 
the Congress.403 Monroe’s message reflected the then de facto balance of power in the Americas, 
with the US as a newly emerged stakeholder demanding Europe to recognize Washington’s 
interests in the New World. The president stated: 
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 “[T]he occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in 
which the rights and the interests of the United States are involved, that the 
American continents, by free and independent conditions which they have 
assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future 
colonization by any European power.”404 
“With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we 
have not interfered and shall not interfere. But, with the Governments who have 
declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, 
on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view 
any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling, in any other 
manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the 
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war 
between those new Governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time 
of their recognition, and to this we had adhered, and shall continue to adhere, 
provided no change shall occur, which, in the judgement of the competent 
authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change, on the part of 
the United States, indispensable to their security (emphasis added).”405 
The message recognized Europe’s lingering interests in places which had not yet wrangled 
themselves out of the colonial yoke, and Europe for the moment could keep them. On the other 
hand, it emphasized no meddling from the Old World in the newly independent states, for “any 
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere” would be seen “as 
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dangerous to our peace and safety.”406 In return, Washington promised no interference from its 
side in European politics. Monroe’s speech was bounded by power reality. As one of the new 
independent states, the US could not compare to established powers in Europe. The result was a 
proposition of two spheres of influence in which major actors from each sphere kept a healthy 
distance from each other so that their individual schemes would go unhampered. The US 
recognized that a European sphere still extended to parts of the Americas. With a recognition of 
power realities, the idea of creating a new order different from colonialism, conveyed by the 
word “their system”, had taken root, albeit geographically limited at the moment.  
Monroe made it explicit that the then US position was a product of the time and would not 
be constrained from changes once circumstances shifted. Washington was neutral in the 
independence wars of the Latin American countries and would remain so, provided conditions 
did not alter to endanger the security of the United States. Monroe did not shut off the option that 
the US might in the future intervene in the affairs between Latin America and Europe, leaving 
the matter to the judgement of future governments. Meanwhile, the speech reveals an optimism 
that Europe in the long run would not win the game. “If we look to the comparative strength and 
resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be 
obvious that she can never subdue them.”407 The non-intervention and non-colonization 
principles laid out in the speech were thus subject to conditions and specific to the relations 
between independent parts of Americas and Europe.  
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As a lesser power working its way to become a great power, the US laid out conditions for 
its behavior and the justifying logic for the principle could be falsified once circumstances 
shifted. Even though it remained a weaker state compared to European powers, the US made its 
strategic calculations clear. The Monroe Doctrine provided a clear picture of the American 
perception of the world balance of power and indicated that once the US interests were not 
served, non-intervention in Latin America might not be the guiding principle anymore. As 
Washington consolidated its gains in the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt then directly stated that 
intervention embodied the fulfillment of American duties to make its southern neighbors 
civilized and to keep Europe away. There was a greater degree of match between words and 
behavior. Despite the fact that compared to European power, the US remained a weaker state 
when the Doctrine was announced, it already made its strategic calculations and intentions clear. 
The Doctrine, therefore, provides a stronger piece of evidence to Washington’s strategic 
transparency compared to the Corollary. 
China however does not express the intention and conditions for its desired changes in 
status quo. For instance, official narratives for public consumption do not justify military bases 
by admitting changes in strategic circumstances. Instead, as chapter 6 demonstrates, the PRC 
uses “logistics support facility” to create discursive ambiguity to avoid the accusation of 
violating its own principle. Official explanations also adhere to purely technical and practical 
needs. Compared to the US, strategic reactions to world politics are not readily detected in 
official Chinese narratives; they do not indicate that military bases form an attempt to address 
China’s perceived imbalance of power. In addition, the PRC did not actually spell out the 
conditions for the non-military base principle during the years when it propagated its defensive 
strategic culture by using the possession of zero military bases as an example. Having a base in 
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Djibouti was not publicly admitted until it became a done deal and infrastructure construction 
was underway. The PRC justifies the move as keeping the region safe for its own and others’ 
economic activities. It uses an altruistic motive to appeal to the international audience. Relying 
on the innately good qualities of the self to explain policy decisions sends a message that 
whatever it does, it is always good. In the case of the US, principles are falsifiable whereas the 
Chinese principles are not because they do not contain specific conditions and their functioning 
depends on the inherent goodness of a government that claims to always behave right. 
Contrary to the American strategic clarity, China denies its strategic intention. From 
Monroe Doctrine to Roosevelt Corollary, Washington did not pretend generosity in tolerating 
European interference. The Western Hemisphere was not big enough to have more than one 
major resident power. However, for China, “the Pacific Ocean is broad enough to accommodate 
the development of both China and the United States.”408 The background of this statement is 
island building and militarization of the South China Sea. From a Chinese perspective, its words 
and behavior are not in contradiction. The 2016 talk by Dai Bingguo at an event co-hosted by the 
US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and China’s Renmin University provides an 
example of how the narratives reconcile the gaps between words and deeds. 
Dai once was a state councilor and deputy minister of foreign affairs. He had already 
retired from government service when he gave the talk about the South China Sea in Washington 
D.C. However, his speech was publicized on the website of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. What Dai said is representative of a large pool of speeches by Chinese leaders and 
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officials and publicly available essays in terms of how China frames the SCS issue. Dai 
expressed a need for “the US heavy-handed intervention in the South China Sea issue” to “be 
scaled back” because “there is deep concern about the US continued reinforcement of its military 
alliances in the Asia-Pacific and forward deployment of its military assets.” Opposed to the 
American image of a troublemaker is the conciliatory role of China, which is “committed to 
peaceful resolution.” Dai further shaped the role of China as non-strategic, non-competitive and 
simply an innocuous actor who tries to provide the best for its people. Consider this paragraph:  
“It would be nothing but baseless speculation to assert that China wants to make 
the South China Sea an Asian Caribbean Sea and impose the Monroe Doctrine to 
exclude the US from Asia or that China is trying to compete with the US for 
dominance in the South China Sea, Asia and even the world. Unlike traditional 
western powers, China, an oriental civilization that goes back five thousand years, 
has distinctive culture, values, political thinking and view of the world. For China, 
the South China Sea issue is all about territorial sovereignty, security, 
development and maritime rights and interests. It is all about preventing further 
tragic losses of territory. China's thinking is as simple as that. And there is no 
other agenda behind it. We have no intention or capability to engage in “strategic 
rivalry” with anyone. We have no ambition to rule Asia, still less the Earth. Even 
in the context of the issue in question, we have never claimed we own the entire 
South China Sea. We only have one ambition, which is to manage our own affairs 
well and ensure a decent life and dignity for the nearly 1.4 billion Chinese people. 
China's right to rise peacefully and deliver a better life for its people should not 
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and will not be taken away by anyone.”409 
According to Dai, China’s motives are simple, non-strategic and non-exclusive; it does not 
aim to dispel American influence. This Chinese uniqueness is discursively tied to traditional 
culture which in practice is claimed to be inherently inclusive. Dai tried to prove Chinese 
inclusiveness by saying that China “never claimed we own the entire SCS.” However, the 
historical nine dash lines that it uses for position defense basically is the SCS itself. The former 
diplomat’s statement to deny Chinese ambition is as effective as the attempt to gloss over the fact 
that the PRC has a military base by naming it a “logistical support facility.” Nevertheless, 
Chinese leaders and officials hold a firm belief in their idealistic motives.  
Another example is a 2016 Qiushi article penned by a professor from Beijing University. 
The author rebutted foreign commentary that China’s proposal of “the concept of Asian security” 
amounts to “an Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine.”410 One of the reasons this professor cites 
to explain the differences between the American policy in the Western Hemisphere and China’s 
policy toward Asia is along the line of Beijing’s inclusion versus Washington’s pursuit of “self-
interests and hegemonic practices” in the Americas. The article characterizes the Doctrine as 
“unfair and outdated,” and as the evidence for the US seeking “a dominant status in the 
Americas.” It continues that, “on the contrary, the concept of Asian security fits the trends of the 
time in terms of peace, development, cooperation and win-win [situation].” To highlight Chinese 
inclusiveness, the author lists several examples of its cooperativeness since the 1990s with Asian 
countries on traditional and non-traditional security issues including the South China Sea. 
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According to the author, “in the security field, the American alliance system can hardly cover the 
entire Asia and lacks inclusiveness.” China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Investment Bank 
and Silk Road Fund are parts of efforts to “reform international order and system,” and “such 
reform is not to build a brand new order but rather to innovate and to improve [the current 
order].” In other words, unlike Washington’s strategic calculations for self-interest, China’s 
concept of Asian security does not mean exclusion and it takes others’ interests to heart. In 
conclusion, by taking a moral high ground, the author lays out principles for major and smaller 
states to follow in their foreign policies: “relevant major states should abandon the pursuit of 
absolute security, respect smaller countries’ security needs and should not practice hegemonism 
and bully lesser states. Smaller countries should exert self-restraint and should not intentionally 
infringe on and provoke major states’ legitimate security interests.” In the context of Beijing 
raising this point, it is using an indirect way to say that regional lesser states should not provoke 
China because it has every right to do what it deems necessary and since the PRC never practices 
power politics, what it does is right and good for others. Such logic well accepted in China’s 
political culture may raise eyebrows for those educated with different sets of behavioral values. 
China and the US share one similarity in that the ideational basis used to run domestic 
affairs applies to foreign policy as well. In the case of the U.S., it was racist logics. Variants of 
racism that spin around the idea that peoples of color are born to be inferior facilitated 
continental expansion and contributed to the compromised results of turning overseas territories 
into protectorates, instead of federal states. This domestic-foreign linkage is evident in the 
Chinese discourse of inclusiveness. The logic goes that, due to the inclusive Chinese culture, a 
multi-ethnic Chinese nation has been a unified whole since ancient times and the PRC will carry 
this idea of unity with diversity to international governance. This continuity from the past to the 
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present and from domestic to foreign however results from cosmetic changes made to the 
history. One example is Chinese textbooks.  
In the formative years of the Chinese Communist Party, it was the party’s policy to support 
the independence of ethnic territories.411 After it became the ruling party in 1949, the CCP’s 
position shifted and reverted to the imperialist view. The PRC invaded Xinjiang at the end of 
1949 and Tibet in 1950. After territorial annexation, it did not immediately build narratives that 
incorporate non-Han peoples to the Chinese self. The 1954 constitution already embraced the 
idea that China is a multi-ethnic state, but the high school textbooks remained Han-centric. In 
describing the historical relations between the Chinese dynasties and non-Chinese political 
entities, non-Hans often carry negative representation as “enemies”, “pillaging” and “destroying” 
the Chinese homeland, whereas Hans were “patriots”, “defending the motherland”. Basically, 
“China” and “Chinese” during Mao’s era, in comparison to textbooks from the 1980s onwards, 
still closely referred to the territory where the Han lived.412  
Changes would come after Mao’s death. The receding ideological zeal requires other 
means to hold the country together. The growing ethnonationalism during the 1980s and 1990s 
also provided motives to stress inclusiveness. Inter-ethnic wars and conflicts in the continental 
history now are downplayed as “a quarrel between brothers, and a scuffle in the family.” 
“Invasion” by non-Hans is replaced by “expedition”, in a 2003 textbook for instance. Words 
such as “slaughters”, “plunders”, and “cruel” ceased to be the labels of the non-Hans, with some 
exceptions. In contrast to previous practice, non-Han peoples such as Mongols now receive 
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positive appraisals for their contributions to China’s development. “China” and “the Chinese” in 
the new narratives extend to the territories and the peoples, Han and non-Han alike, that the PRC 
rules. The underlying rationale is that the past will be understood according to the current 
political needs of the Communist Party.413  
While it is problematic to form discourse by othering non-Hans, it is similarly erroneous to 
remove the Other by seeing them as part of the Chinese self. The new discourse rewrites the non-
harmonious past and creates a false consciousness of binding community “since antiquity.” 
Neither does it adequately address the inter-ethnic conflicts in the territories now under the PRC 
control. This process of forming national identity is a political one. A multiethnic Chinese 
identity is not based on the reality that peoples are willing to live together under the same 
institutions. It is the result of the Communist Party’s attempts to create the reality to fit its 
governing needs.  
Chinese repression of the non-Chinese population has its latest example in Xinjiang. Each 
year, from 2011 to 2016, saw the number of new buildings below 4. In 2017, it spiked to 15 and 
dropped to 10 in 2018. These buildings are security facilities equipped with barbed wire, cameras 
and check points. There are an estimated one million Muslim Uyghurs imprisoned in these 
facilities. Chinese authorities also send Kazaks for “re-education” in this large-scale round-up. 
Reportedly, the prisoners are forced labor and work in the factories that supply manufactured 
goods worldwide including clothing and shoes. According to witnesses’ testimonies, these 
people experience physical and psychological torture. They are taught Chinese songs that praise 
the CCP and Xi Jinping. Outside the concentration camps, Muslims are forced to eat pork and 
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drink liquor. Attending religious activities and reading the Quran are forbidden.414 Chinese 
authorities deny ethnic cleansing and insist that these facilities are “vocational training centers.” 
To show that it is on the right side, the Chinese government argues that while  23 countries 
representing a population of 600 million question China’s Xinjiang policy in the UN, more than 
30 countries with 3 billion people support China.415 It further defends the policy on the ground of 
correcting thought to prevent the spread of “terrorism, separatism, and extremism.”  
Under the “Pairing up” policy, the government sent 1 million civilians, with most of them  
Han Chinese, to live in the Uyghur households and other Muslims’ homes to monitor their daily  
life and educate them with scheduled Chinese choreography, red songs and Xi’s “New China”  
vision. These strange people suddenly become “relatives” to the Muslim families. The purpose 
throughout the stay is to observe whether Muslims are “extremists” and whether they show a 
decent amount of loyalty to the Chinese leader and government. Observing the fast during 
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Ramadan and Islamic long dress are signs of “extremism.” Family members will be questioned 
about the whereabouts of their relatives and whether they know Arabic or Turkish. To test 
whether the Muslim population’s Chineseness is genuine, these “relatives” will provide 
cigarettes or beer to see if anyone takes it. Another strategy is to buy fresh ground meat to make 
dumplings to probe if anyone asks what kind of meat it is. Muslim households in the list of visits 
include those whose extended family members have been sent to the concentration camps.416 The 
Chinese government readily admits that 1.1 million “civil servants” are involved in this 
“assistance program” to improve ethnic unity. Domestic reports are infused with familial 
closeness and mutual help when describing the interaction between Chinese “relatives” and their 
Muslim strangers.417  
When it comes to the relationships between the PRC and other countries, and the  
relationships between the CCP and its own people, Beijing’s narratives are constructed in a way  
that is devoid of strategic calculations and suppresses mention of power relations. They do not 
describe the Chinese government in a way that would create the impression that it is constantly  
practicing and aware of realpolitik. Instead, they portray an unrealistically idealistic picture in  
which the CCP and the Chinese nation are innately peaceful. “The logic that rising powers  
always seek to dominate does not apply to China, as such action is not in China’s ‘genes.’ In a  
bid to prevent history from repeating itself, China’s rise has followed a distinctly Chinese path of  
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Party Staff and Workers Pair Up with Peoples of Different Ethnicities in Xinjiang” [新疆百万干部职工与
各族群众结对认亲], China Daily, Nov. 07, 2018 <gongyi.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1107/c151132-
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peaceful development.”418 This ultra-idealism makes non-Chinese Chinese by discursively 
creating a façade of domestic inclusiveness. It is also used to influence and persuade the  
international audience not to resist its foreign policies as they mean no harm, by providing  
a cover for outward expansion that is strategic in correspondence to the PRC’s assessments of  
the world balance of power. 
Deeds of concealed realism nevertheless do not preclude the concurrence of a belief that 
the self-behavior is altruistically inclusive and morally right. The Chinese texts that are full of 
idealistic principles of inclusion and are made to contain no assessments of situational conditions 
required for strategic calculations that go beyond rhetorical cover. It reflects a conviction in the 
self occupying the moral high ground. This differs from the American idealism that similarly 
relies on statements like “make the world a peaceful place and correct the wrongs that are done,” 
but is based on racist differentiations. This statement also applies to Japan’s case and since Japan 
used similar inclusive and altruistic narratives as China does, Japanese idealism was closer to the 
Chinese version. However, to gauge the extent of one’s ultra-defensiveness, a discursive 
comparison needs to be understood in a larger context of a country’s history. China’s politics of 
authoritarian inclusion is an institutionalized culture with its seeds planted in pre-modern times, 
and its practices have been relatively constant since then. Japan’s domestic conditions and its 
short-lived bid for hegemony provided no persistent imperatives to form a discourse that reflects 
the Chinese degree. Tokyo’s imperialism from the perspective of discursive rationalization was 
diminutive compared to the scale of Beijing’s model.  
 
 
418 Xu Weixin, “The Newest Developments in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” English Qiushi, vol.7, 
no. 3, 2015, pp. 46. English translation original. 
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The American case is a different variant. It was criticized for its blatant use of force and 
intervention through various excuses. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether Washington 
produced a consistent and systematically constructed discourse with its roots allegedly planted in 
an uninterrupted American civilization. It is also questionable whether the same set of narratives 
has been applied throughout its past, as the US is a democracy and thus its justifications have not 
been consistent. What turned out to be relatively constant was racism, but racial logic did not 
always have positive correlations with expansion and in some cases it went against expansion. 
The difficulty of finding a pattern in Washington’s discursive justification, except for a general 
statement that it used rhetoric for cover-ups, has to do with its democratic polity. The PRC, on 
the contrary, not only has a single ruling party but also a long-term tradition of appropriating 
inclusive ideology, which conditions the entrenchment of its belief in the moral authoritativeness 
of the self; “we are selflessly inclusive in the past, at the present and will be in the future.”  
 
 
 
  
413 
EPILOGUE 
To leave the rebirth cycle, the Heart Sutra and the Diamond Sutra teach Buddhist 
disciples to discharge any masks (不著相) they may take on to execute any agendas 
arising from greed, hatred, delusion and ignorance, for the Buddhahood each sentient 
being originally possess does not have any of these attachments. Buddha’s 
compassion does not stem from these emotions that give rise to karma which sentient 
beings carry over to their next life. A Buddhist disciple is constantly reminded that 
the purpose of one’s life is to practice the ultimate peace of mind. 
 
In a conversation between two monks and Master Huineng, the Sixth Successor of 
Chan (or the Sixth Patriarch of Zen), about the flying banner in the wind. One monk 
said that the banner is moving and the other argued that it is the wind that makes it 
move. Master Huineng then replied, “the banner does not move. Neither does the 
wind. It is your mind which gets agitated.”  
 
Before the passing away of Master Shen Yan, he left four verses. “Aging in the 
middle of hustle and bustle but carry no sense of burden. Crying and laughing are 
transient for their nature are attachments. ‘I’ do not exist in the first place and 
therefore there is nothing that cannot be left behind” (無事忙中老，空裡有哭笑，
本來沒有我，一切皆可拋). 
 
Shakyamuni Buddha incarnated in the form of a human being to preach for forty-nine 
years, but the Buddha told the disciples that whoever says I preach, it is a defamation 
of Buddha for it does not wear any mask for any purpose. It is as it is (如是); nothing 
comes and nothing has gone.  
 
The Buddha transforms into human beings with different identities to show people 
ways out of suffering as sentient beings carry different karmas and thus they need 
different guidance. The Buddha does not have any attachments before and after this is 
done. 
 
For those whose minds are agitated and their motives are sweet words coated, with 
themselves taking genuine unsettled minds and motives, they wear multiple masks. 
As they proselytize to recruit followers, they have taken the opposite side to 
Buddhahood.  
 
 
However the narratives are constructed and whether they are more inclusive or not, from 
Mao’s period until today, they are all about the PRC itself. They reflect China’s perceptions of 
how other major powers treat it, its responses to foreign criticism, and how it will reshape an 
international order to address its perceived injustice and inequality in the current world politics 
that is not conducive to the fulfillment of its interests. Other actors, including those who have 
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role congruence with the PRC and those who are (potential) enemies, play auxiliary roles to 
contrast with and to highlight Chinese uniqueness that, according to Beijing, bears the 
characteristic of genetical goodness. Such benevolence is further claimed to have a realization in 
China’s socialist institutions and sinicized Marxism-influenced Chinese culture. Chinese 
narratives cannot be taken as a mere reflection of a sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Each 
addition of discursive thread to the growing sophistication of connections among different 
logical nodes also shores up the ruling group’s confidence. The created discourse can work both 
ways to project a desired persuasive effect, to the target audiences and to those who authorize 
and design the narratives. The pursuit of self-interest is disguised with idealism. However, from 
the PRC’s perspective, it believes itself to be the true upholder of the moral high ground. The 
wider the gap is between China’s beliefs and what others understand, the more likelihood there 
will be for future conflicts with other countries. The root cause of conflicts as such is not 
misunderstanding, but rather structural. Views and perspectives can be systematically formed. 
Clashes of worldviews can give rise to conflicts.  
The Chinese narratives at different stages exhibit a similar pattern. They constantly supply 
domestic audiences with the idea that the country will be great. During the 1990s and entering 
the 21st century, this future national greatness also hinges on Chinese influence and activities 
abroad. To facilitate its outward expansion, Beijing disseminates similar ideas to both domestic 
and international audiences that China is on the right path and will be a better contributor to the 
world compared to what the institutions in other major states have brought to domestic and 
international development. The prospects for future gains define Chinese nationalism. This type 
of nationalism is built upon material strength and its accompanying cultural and political 
influence. When nationalism is not merely about building a modern state, but also depends on 
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outward expansion, the lines between state and empire, between nationalism and imperialism are 
blurred. This is evidenced by China’s annexation of Central Asian territories at the end of 1940s 
and the early 1950s and its current global activities that are justified through the rhetoric of 
bringing prosperity to all human beings. The blurred differentiation is further evidenced by the 
PRC creating a belief that the territories in the first island chain are indispensable to its access to 
foreign markets and to the territories that will be used for economic and military purposes. 
The second pyramid discussed in chapter 3 that describes the Chinese belief system posits 
China’s institutions at the top of the triangle to form reciprocal relations with the future of the 
world and the future of the PRC’s domestic development. Although this triangle emerges in the 
context of Beijing’s advocacy for a multi-polar world, judging by the PRC’s past practices of 
proposing a preferred order according to its evaluations of the then world dynamics, 
multipolarity may be more a strategic expediency than a formula China will adopt permanently. 
The pyramid thus needs to be seen on a global scale, instead of a limited geographical scope 
where China claims itself to be a pole. With that said, deception and a genuine belief in one’s 
words can coexist. It is the latter that supports Beijing’s expansion.  
The second triangle along with the narratives in the defense white papers confirm that the 
country prefers to achieve its political goals during peacetime. The relations between domestic 
development and the future of the world are mediated by material strength. Accordingly, a lack 
of a major war is conducive to China’s overseas activities which in turn contribute to material 
accumulation. Beijing further justifies that its domestic solvency will contribute to the world. 
These mutually reinforcing linkages in the Chinese belief system also appear in the military 
writings. Through a re-conceptualization of the world’s geopolitics, China’s geostrategy that 
perceives itself at the center covers an expansive geography of Eurasia and the Indian and the 
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Pacific Oceans in a way that marginalizes the Atlantic and Western Europe. It is within this 
scope that military and non-military activities take place in attempts to realize the 
expected/claimed reciprocal connections between domestic development and the future of the 
world, and to realize the second pyramid as well.  
The PRC characterizes its outward expansion as non-expansive and non-hegemonic 
because it does not rely on the use of force and war as previous powers did. The narratives trace 
this quality to the genetical goodness of the Chinese polity and the Chinese nation. This 
biological explanation conceals strategic calculations. The preference of realizing political goals 
during peacetime results from China’s assessments of the post-Cold War climate. This means 
that the PRC’s foreign policies are tailored according to conditions and it does not avoid war. 
When it perceives that situations allow it to advance its interests, the country may also actively 
pursue a war solution. In addition, the globetrotting during peacetime, as indicated by its military 
and non-military narratives, also aims to prepare for war once non-use-of-force measures fail. It 
is trying to make a possible future war easier. Narratives for the public attention rarely dissert 
these strategic motives. Meanwhile, the hiding of strategic calculations does not mean a Chinese 
disbelief in their constructed idealism. Writings for non-public consumption still incorporate 
idealistic reasonings for self-rationalization. It is an institutionalized culture of self-justification 
in display. Chinese idealism, which is predicated on the inherent good nature of the self and 
functions on a global scale to serve strategic purposes, bears the characteristics of unfalsifiable 
ultra-defensiveness. 
The prospects for gains have driven Chinese behavior and increasing discursive 
assertiveness. This tendency can be strengthened when the country perceives itself to not be on a 
strong footing. Tales are woven to convince the self and others that a catastrophe is merely a 
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mistake, a China problem is someone else’s problem, a normal deed can be exaggerated as 
heroic, and the outcomes of events are framed to be successful under the CCP’s leadership. As 
the PRC shows determination to increase its global influence, these types of narratives also gain 
salience in its foreign policies. The attempt to reshape global consciousness has its latest 
example in the crisis of the Wuhan coronavirus. The PRC may be consciously aware of its own 
manipulation but its belief that such act serves a greater purpose will provide justification. As 
Beijing selects partial facts and fabricates information to explain the evolution of the event, it 
also becomes a believer in its own created account.  
************ 
 
The coronavirus crisis provides a vivid example of Beijing’s conviction in its authoritarian 
inclusiveness. That its moral authority cannot be questioned has a full display through strategies 
of denial and distraction to protect the throne. The intense wave of international propaganda to 
reshape the cognition of the public, with some conducted more diplomatically while many are 
dubbed as what the pundits call “wolf-warriors diplomacy,” aggressive in words and actions with 
a lack of civility, indicates something at the belief level which supports this fervor. This belief is 
close to the statement that “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” under the leadership of 
the CCP is to be realized at the expense of whatever comes into its way; the Chinese polity is to 
be protected so as to maximize the effects of inclusion shown through the unhampered spread of 
Chinese influence which is an integral part of a realized revived Chinese nation. The 
implementation of this imperialist nationalism has collaborators overseas.  
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The World Health Organization (WHO) presents a curious case for a more systematic 
analysis in the future. Some preliminary evidence points out positive correlations between 
Beijing’s influence in the past 13 years and an institution-wide approval, on the bureaucratic 
level, of the PRC’s handling of the epidemic that later on became a world pandemic. WHO does 
not hide the fact that it uses data and information provided by the Chinese government. The 
curiosity lies in the officials’ conviction about Beijing’s success and unrestrained praises of 
China. With limited reliable information and knowledge of this virus, WHO chooses to believe 
in what it is told. What are the sources of this built-in bias and how institutionalized it is within 
the organization require a more in-depth examination with field research including interviews 
with (formal) WHO staff to obtain knowledge of the culture of that institution. The rest of this 
epilogue presents Beijing’s narratives to cope with internal and external pressures, its military 
activities in the first island chain during the crisis, a contest of will between the PRC and 
regional countries including the US through military presence, and a discursive co-optation 
between WHO and China. In using an event that originally was domestic and later on produced 
political, economic, social and military consequences, in some cases severe, on the international 
level, this epilogue demonstrates the degree of Beijing’s ingrained belief in how an “inclusive” 
world should/can be realized, that is, do not question the authority of the CCP and recognize the 
positivity that it brings, and the comprehensive scale of its behavior informed by such conviction 
in the morality of the self.  
Li Wenliang, a Chinese ophthalmologist at Wuhan Central Hospital of Hubei Province, 
sent a text message in December 2019 to fellow doctors warning of a SARS-like virus and urged 
them to wear protective gear. Four days later, the Public Security Bureau had him sign an 
419 
admonition letter which accused him of “making false statements,” “severely violating social 
order” and “violating the law.”419 
On the last day of December 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission issued a 
news release stating that “investigation so far has not found any cases of human 
transmission……Pneumonia usually appears in the winter and spring. It can spread or become 
epidemic (or pandemic). The symptoms include fever, body sores, breathing difficulties in some 
cases…… this disease can be prevented and can be controlled.”420 
On January 5, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a disease outbreak 
statement to explain the situation in China and to provide suggestions. It stated, “As of 3 January 
2020, a total of 44 patients with pneumonia of unknown etiology have been reported to WHO by 
the national authorities in China.” It continues to use the information provided by the Chinese 
authorities for further details about the symptoms of these patients and their business affiliations 
with Wuhan markets. It concludes the beginning section in this way: “Based on the preliminary 
information from the Chinese investigation team, no evidence of significant human-to-human 
transmission and no health care worker infections have been reported.” In the section titled WHO 
risk assessment, following the statement that “There is limited information to determine the 
overall risk of this reported cluster of pneumonia of unknown etiology,” it continues to describe 
the symptoms as being “ common to several respiratory diseases” and states that “pneumonia is 
common in the winter season” before recognizing a need for prudent handling of the 44 cases. It 
is based on the information provided by the Chinese authorities that WHO “advises against the 
 
419 BBC, “Li Wenliang: Coronavirus death of Wuhan doctor sparks anger,” Feb. 7, 2020, 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51409801>   accessed March 17, 2020. 
420 Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, “The Report From Wuhan Municipal Health Commission 
Concerning the Situation of the Coronavirus” [武汉市卫健委关于当前我市肺炎疫情的情况通报], Dec. 31, 
2019, <http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/front/web/showDetail/2019123108989> accessed March 17, 2020. 
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application of any travel or trade restrictions on China based on the current information available 
on this event.”421 
On January 10, 2020, Li started to develop the symptoms of Wuhan coronavirus (COVID-
19 or novel coronavirus). Not until twenty days later was he diagnosed with the disease. The 
confirmation of his case came in the middle of the Lunar New Year that is celebrated by several 
East Asian countries including Vietnam. He eventually passed away in the beginning days of 
February.422  
At the end of January, the territories under the PRC’s control had all reported confirmed 
cases. Several countries had either repatriated their citizens or planned to do so. Governments 
worldwide also implemented various travel bans and restrictions to contain the spread of the 
disease from China to other countries. Not until January 30 did WHO declare coronavirus as a 
global health emergency or public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC), and it 
had been against such a decision before.423 This was after the trip made by Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus, the Director-General of WHO, to meet with Chinese president Xi Jinping. 
Tedros explained, in a report to the Executive Board of WHO on February 3, that the 
declaration was based on the evidence of human-to-human transmission outside China and the 
 
421 WHO, “Pneumonia of unknown cause – China,” Jan. 05, 2020, <https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-
2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/> accessed March 18, 2020. 
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concern about the capabilities of countries with “a weak health system.”424 In the same report, 
the Director-General also stated that he was “impressed” in his meeting with Xi “at his [Xi’s] 
detailed knowledge of the outbreak, and for his personal leadership, but also at his commitment” 
to protect the Chinese people and to prevent the spread of the disease to other countries. He 
continued to praise China, saying that “if it weren’t for China’s efforts, the number of cases 
outside China would have been very much higher.”425 He further provided reasons for why travel 
restrictions are not appropriate. “[T]here is no reason for measures that unnecessarily interfere 
with international travel and trade. We call on all countries to implement decisions that are 
evidence-based and consistent.”426 In other words, the travel bans implemented by airlines and 
countries are not, from the WHO perspective, supported by evidence. Meanwhile, WHO’s 
recommendations were based on incomplete data and with limited knowledge of the sources and 
the nature of coronavirus. Tedros in the report also praised Chinese endeavors in stopping the 
spread of the disease. China’s Xinhua on the same day also reported Tedros’ statements and 
understood his words as a “denunciation” of the measures that other countries were taking 
against China, as the headline shows.427  
In a news release from the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the meeting 
between WHO’s Director-General and Xi, the report listed Xi’s remarks and Tedros’ comments 
in a way that shows the consensus from both sides about the endeavors that China had been 
putting into stopping the spread of the disease. Xi mentioned that China’s dealing with the 
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epidemic was “in a timely, open, transparent and responsible manner, responded to concerns of 
all sides actively, and enhanced cooperation with the international community” after explaining 
what the central government had done domestically. The report then provided a list of the 
Director-General’s praises of China, in a way compatible with and overlapping with what Tedros 
would later state in the February 3 report to the Executive Board of WHO. Take a few examples 
of what the report said that Tedros stated in the meeting: 
“……it is admirable that the Chinese government has shown its solid 
political resolve and taken timely and effective measures in dealing with the 
epidemic.” 
“President Xi's personal guidance and deployment show his great 
leadership capability.” 
“China has released information in an open and transparent manner, 
identified the pathogen in a record-short time and shared the genetic sequence of 
the novel coronavirus in a timely manner with the WHO and other countries.” 
“China’s measures are not only protecting its people, but also protecting the 
people in the whole world.” 
“Hailing the high speed and massive scale of China’s moves are rarely seen 
in the world…… it showed China’s efficiency and the advantages of China’s 
system.” 
          “The experience of China is worth learning for other countries.”428 
 
 
428 PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Xi Jinping meets with visiting World Health Organization (WHO) 
Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus,” Jan. 29, 2020, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1737014.shtml> accessed March 18, 2020. 
423 
In the 146th session of the Executive Board of WHO on February 6, under the auspices, 
announced by the chairperson, of the Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee for the 
WHO Health Emergencies Program, Thai representative Dr. Suwit Wibulpolprasert gave a 
sarcastic statement about WHO’s dealings with coronavirus:429 
“Chair, WHO advice against travel restrictions on novel coronavirus in China has 
been violated. This is in contrast to H1N1 2009 pandemic emerged from other 
part of the world and spread out much faster and killed more. We are definitely 
double or even triple standard. Chair, if implement travel restrictions and have to 
quarantine, we have to quarantine the DG [Director-General] who just came back 
from China, and cancel this EB [Executive Board]. Many people here including 
those from the countries that implement travel restrictions shake hands and even 
hug Dr. Tedros. They are all vulnerable except me. Dr. Tedros decline to hug or 
shake hands with me in the last 3 or 4 days. Particularly you, Chair, who sits next 
to him all the time, would be the most vulnerable. Chair, we need to bring back 
global confidence, solidarity and stop the panic immediately. To achieve that, I 
would like to propose to the DG through you, Chair. To immediately convene a 
global meeting of WHO staff and experts in China, especially in Wuhan. We can 
all appreciate the most charming Yellow Crane Tower, built almost 2000 years 
ago, with very few tourists. If convenes in Beijing, it would be the best time to 
visit the Great Wall and the Forbidden City, without too many tourists and at low 
costs. Chair, with my wife’s permission, I am happy to pay half of my annual 
 
429 For the video, see WHO, the 146th session of the Executive Board, the session of public health 
emergencies; preparedness and response, <https://www.who.int/about/governance/executive-board/executive-
board-146th-session> accessed March 19, 2020. 
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pension to support this meeting and join in with my own expense. Thank you, 
Chair.” 
The Thai representative’s humor made others laugh as he proceeded. Once he finished his 
remarks, he was applauded from the floor and thanked twice by the chairperson. 
Amid the mounting death toll and cases of infection in the PRC, a video included in a 
news report posted by New Tang Dynasty Television shows that a man in Wuhan, perhaps a 
patient’s family member, shouted at the doctors, saying that “I do not want to talk with you about 
this. How come there is no oxygen? People are dying. The television channels reported that 
everything is fine.” Another woman then continued to say, “they say they have been helping 
everyday, but actually they have not. They say new rooms are opened, but in fact there is no such 
thing. I saw someone died in front of the door yesterday. It is real.”430 
To cope with the crisis, China announced that it would build new “hospitals” in late 
January. Within two weeks, two “hospitals,” Mount Fire God (Houshenshan) and Mount 
Thunder God (Leishenshan), were completed and started to receive patients in early February. 
The interior designs and the lives of patients are unknown. News reports show that the hospital 
looks more like a warehouse, with individual beds only partially separated. It remains an open-
air setting where treatment of patients and control of the disease can be called into question. 
Some news reported two beds in one room with locks outside the door.431 Chinese official media, 
however, presented a different picture: patients wearing masks were square dancing to inject 
 
430 See New Tang Dynasty, “ People of Wuhan Risk Their Life in Disclosing the Situation of Coronavirus in 
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positivity amid the crisis.432  
Due to the lack of medical treatment and support in the middle of the collapsing medical 
system, a woman from Wuhan in a video vented her frustration at the helpless situation that her 
sick family members were faced with, “……money cannot get you medicine. Money cannot get 
you a bed in the hospital……corrupt regime, evil society, no one has freedom of speech……A 
yard-full of people have crowded the hospital. There are no beds. There is no medicine. The 
news from CCTV are all fake, all of them!”433 
Tedros’s applause of China did not come without being questioned. During a press 
conference on February 12, a reporter from Euro News asked WHO whether “effusive praise” 
given to Beijing was due to a Chinese request to save face.434 Tedros replied that many WHO 
colleagues, including himself, Mike Ryan, Sylvie Briand and Maria van Kerkhove all agree that 
what China was doing should be recognized. In his two-page answer, Tedros used “truth” 13 
times to emphasize that it is the truth that China has been doing praiseworthy things and the 
Chinese president was showing leadership. “We have met the President, we have seen the level 
of knowledge he has on the outbreak. We saw first-hand that he is leading the outbreak directly 
and you know we always ask for political commitment, political leadership. That’s what we have 
seen so don’t you appreciate that kind of leadership that’s really committed? Again the truth.” In 
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a video showing the press conference between Tedros and Xi when they met, which CGTN 
(China Global Television Network), a Chinese state-owned English language news channel, 
uploaded to YouTube, a line from Xi Jinping goes, “This time, I have been personally directing 
and deploying (resources)” regarding the work of the prevention and control of the disease.435 
The Director-General also brought in member states to strengthen his view that what the 
PRC was doing was witnessed and agreed by many. “….[A]lmost all member states were 
praising China for what it did and they had a reason. The reason others were saying, many 
countries were saying was, China took action massively at the epicenter, at the source of the 
outbreak - the shutdown of Wuhan City - and that helped in preventing cases from being 
exported to other provinces in China and the rest of the world.” He also added that “China is 
doing many good things that are slowing the virus and the facts speak for themselves and this has 
to be recognized. The whole world is seeing this……So let the truth speak for itself and the 
world can judge.”  
Tedros denied that China demanded to be praised and insisted that what the WHO 
delegation said and saw were the truth. “China doesn’t need to ask to be praised and I don’t 
expect any country asks to be praised. It was not, it is not. That’s the truth, the whole truth and 
with my colleagues we speak the same language because we have seen these concrete things that 
should be appreciated.” Despite sweeping statements, it is unclear what the WHO delegation saw 
and how the information and situation were presented to them.  
The demise of the stricken ophthalmologist Dr. Li Wenliang set off a public outcry to 
demand freedom of speech and to condemn the government for hiding the spread of the disease. 
 
435 CGTN, “President Xi Jinping: We will definitely overcome this disease,” YouTube, Jan. 28, 2020, 
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Perhaps in an attempt to assuage the public fury, and in keeping with the CCP’s long-term 
practice of making propaganda out of people’s misery, the National Health Commission (NHC) 
issued an official decision on March 5 to grant 506 individuals and 113 medical teams and 
hospitals the titles of “Progressive Individual” (先进个人) and “Progressive Group” (先进集体) 
respectively in the work of preventing and controlling the spread of the novel coronavirus. The 
list of individuals would come to include deceased Li Wenliang. The decision frames the issue in 
a politicized way:  
Since the occurrence of the new coronavirus, the staff and workers of the 
nationwide health system have resolutely implemented the spirit of General 
Secretary Xi Jinping’s important directives and the policy of the Party. Carrying 
the lofty mission of safeguarding people’s life, security and health, they have 
displayed fearless spirit. Treacherous situations only motivate them more to step 
out and work in the frontline to compete with time and the devil of the disease to 
save patients’ lives……[They] have created medical miracles……Some of them 
abandon everything, overcome family difficulties and disregard the self’s 
unwellness to race to Hubei……Some of them resolutely stand in the frontline to 
save patients’ lives days and nights regardless of danger…… Right now, the 
prevention and control of the disease enters a crucial stage, health departments of 
different bureaucratic levels and health workers should……resolutely obey the 
Party’s centralized command and take those who are granted with titles as role 
models.”436  
 
436  National Health Commission, “Regarding the Decision to Honor Advanced Individuals and Advanced 
Groups for Their Work in Preventing the Spread of Novel Coronavirus” [关于表彰全国卫生健康系统新
冠肺炎疫情防控工作先进集体和先进个人的决定], March 5, 2020, ＜
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The narratives of the decision are about the Chinese Communist Party, instead of those 
devoted individuals and groups. In other words, the narratives indicate that it is under the 
leadership of the CCP that the Chinese people show bravery and an impressive sense of 
responsibility and altruism that makes the containment of the disease possible. This is 
reminiscent of the CCP-constructed national discourse about the history of the PRC in that the 
CCP historically has led the Chinese people to overcome difficulties, great and small, and the 
country remains strong under its leadership. 
On March 19, the National Supervisory Commission issued a Q&A document regarding 
the process and results of the investigation into Li Wenliang’s case. It concludes that it was 
“inappropriate” for Wuhan’s local police authority to admonish Li and the local authority did not 
follow “the proper law enforcement procedure.” The investigation team decided that the 
admonition letter will be revoked and the local police authority will take responsibility.437 Two 
police officers were then disciplined.438 The concluding sentences of the document state that “Li 
Wenliang was a communist party member and was not a so-called ‘anti-current political 
establishment’ individual” and “those who labeled Dr. Li Wenliang as a ‘hero’ against the 
current political establishment and an ‘awakener’ are hostile forces aiming to attack the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Chinese government.”  
Contrary to the past official narratives that Li stood against the government, his role has 
now shifted to become one of the CCP’s kind. In so doing, the Party aims to mitigate public 
 
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/renshi/s7771/202003/28cc60d7e33b4dc7bd77af485fab1a58.shtml＞ accessed 
March 18, 2020. 
437 Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection & National Supervisory Commission, “ Q & A with the 
National Supervisory Commission” [国家监委调查组负责人答记者问],March 19, 2020 
<www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiao/202003/t20200319_213887.html>. 
438  Xin Jing Bao Wang [新京报网], “Regarding Those in the Wuhan Police Force Who Were Responsible 
for Dr. Li Wenliang’s Incident” [武汉警方对李文亮医生被训诫一案相关责任人作出处理],March 19, 
2020, <http://www.bjnews.com.cn/feature/2020/03/19/706380.html>. 
429 
anger and to undermine the source legitimacy when its own people or foreign communities use 
Li’s example to question Chinese institutions. Meanwhile, like many Chinese political figures 
who were repudiated and then rehabilitated such as Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping’s father, Xi 
Zhongxun, or acclaimed first and then condemned (such as Lin Biao) according to changing 
political circumstances, Li’s incident adds one more case to such a pool of instances. The tale of 
Li in the official narratives is the devotion of the people to their country under the successful 
leadership of the CCP, which disciplined those who failed to do their duty as civil servants. What 
Li did or did not do and what that means from his own perspective matter less. 
The disease can cause severe blows to China’s economy and the world’s economy, but 
whether and how it will undermine the legitimacy of the CCP is unclear at this stage. Despite the 
public discussion about Xi’s unstable administration, which in theory can be made more insecure 
by the public health crisis, according to the PRC’s history and the political culture of the Chinese 
Communist Party, it is also likely that Xi and his followers will use this opportunity to enhance 
their power by placing their own people in some key positions so that opposition forces (either 
from factions within the Party itself or from the society) find it hard to challenge the current 
disease narratives in a way that would threaten Xi’s power.  
The former holders of the positions of the Party Secretary of Hubei Province and the Party 
Secretary of Wuhan City were replaced by Xi’s men with backgrounds in law and politics. The 
vice team leader of Wuhan in the work leadership group to cope with the coronavirus that has 
been newly established by the central government also comes from the same background. 
Among the three new personnel, two of them had worked as Xi’s subordinates before.439 A 
 
439 BBC, “The Head of Hubei Was Replaced by the Party” [肺炎疫情：應勇空降「救火」 中共湖北換帥], 
Feb. 13, 2020, 
 <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-51485021>accessed March 21, 2020 
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closer look into the work leadership group reveals a composition of leaders specializing in 
propaganda and foreign policy as well as the maintenance of domestic stability.440 The 
effectiveness of this task force in containing the spread of the disease while minimizing the 
harms inflicted or that will be inflicted on the people is highly questionable.  
As the chart shows below, the new round of personnel changes is associated with the 
decline in the reported number of the newly infected cases on a daily basis. The government has 
so far issued seven different versions for the guidance for diagnosis and treatment. The way to 
calculate infected cases (not including the deceased cases) has also changed according to the 
addition or deletion of certain categories. On paper, the definitions of “suspected patients” and 
“confirmed patients” get more refined. The fifth version of the guidance that included “clinically 
diagnosed cases” judged through the C-T scan with the “confirmed cases” judged through the 
RT-PCR test was implemented on February 12,441 and thus there was a record high of the 
reported infected patients amounting to 14,840. The numbers in parentheses are clinically 
diagnosed cases. From February 16 to 18, no statistics are provided regarding the number of 
clinically diagnosed cases. However, within less than one week, coinciding with the arrival of 
the new officials, the decision was made, according to the changes made in the sixth version of 
the guidance, i.e., the removal of the category of “clinically diagnosed cases” for Hubei 
 
440  Xinhua, “Li Keqiang Hosts the Work Leadership Group That Deals With Novel Coronavirus” [李克强主
持召开中央应对新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情工作领导小组会], Feb. 04, 2020, 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-02/04/c_1125531482.htm>. 
441Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, “ The Situation of Novel Coronavirus in Hubei on February 12, 
2020” [2020 年 2月 12日湖北省新冠肺炎疫情情况], Feb. 13, 2020,＜ 
http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/front/web/showDetail/2020021309543＞ accessed March 21, 2020. 
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Province,442 to exclude the “clinically diagnosed cases” from the confirmed cases.443 Therefore, 
starting from February 19, the reported new cases on a daily basis had a drastic drop. The odd 
number on February 19 in which the cases of Wuhan were even more than the entire province, 
according to the official explanation, was due to the confusion caused by the transition from the 
fifth version to the sixth version of the guidance. Cases were then added back by the Chinese 
authorities and the number changed to 775 for the entire province.444 Statistics on February 20 
were also adjusted, according to the official explanation, after the addition of the 220 cases in 
prison.445 Despite some fluctuations, the trend was going downward and dropped to a single digit 
and then zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
442“The Interpretations of the Sixth Version for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Novel Coronavirus”《新型冠
状病毒肺炎诊疗方案（试行第六版）》解读, Feb. 19, 2020, 
 <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-02/19/content_5480958.htm>  accessed March 21, 2020; National Health 
Commission, “ The Sixth Version for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Novel Coronavirus” [新型冠状病毒肺
炎诊疗方案（试行第六版）], 
<http://www.nhc.gov.cn/yzygj/s7653p/202002/8334a8326dd94d329df351d7da8aefc2/files/b218cfeb1bc54639
af227f922bf6b817.pdf> accessed March 21, 2020. 
443 Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, “Explanations Regarding the Feb. 19 Corrections of the Number of 
Cases of Novel Coronavirus in Hubei” [湖北省关于订正 2月 19 日新冠肺炎确诊病例的情况说明], 
Feb. 22, 2020, <http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/front/web/showDetail/2020022209721> accessed March 21, 2020. 
444 Ibid. 
445 Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, Feb. 21, 2020, 
<http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/front/web/showDetail/2020022109719> accessed March 21, 2020. 
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Reported Infected Cases Chart: 
Location
s 
 
dates 
Hubei  
Province 
(newly 
confirme
d cases) 
Wuhan 
(newly 
confirme
d cases) 
Location
s 
 
dates 
Hubei 
Province 
(newly 
confirme
d cases) 
Wuhan 
(newly 
confirme
d cases) 
Importe
d cases 
(nation 
wide) 
Current 
local 
confirmed 
cases 
(nationwide
) 
Feb. 01 1921 894 Feb. 26 409 383 --------- 43258 
Feb. 02 2103 1033 Feb. 27 318 313 --------- 39919 
Feb. 03 2345 1242 Feb. 28 423 420 --------- 37414 
Feb. 04 3156 1967 Feb. 29 570 565 --------- 35329 
Feb. 05 2987 1766 Mar. 01 196 193 --------- 32652 
Feb. 06 2447 1501 Mar. 02 114 111 --------- 30004 
Feb. 07 2841 1985 Mar. 03 115 114 --------- 27433 
Feb. 08 2147 1379 Mar. 04 134 131 2 (20) 25352 
Feb. 09 2618 1921 Mar. 05 126 126 16 (36) 23784 
Feb. 10 2097 1552 Mar. 06 74 74 24 (60) 22177 
Feb. 11 1638 1104 Mar. 07 41 41 3 (63) 20533 
Feb. 12 14840 
(13332) 
13436 Mar. 08 36 36 4 (67) 19016 
Feb. 13 4823 
(3095) 
3910 Mar. 09 17 17 2 (69) 17721 
Feb. 14 2420 
(1138) 
1923  
(922) 
Mar. 10  13 13 10 (79) 16145 
Feb. 15 1843 
(888) 
1548 Mar. 11 8 8 6 (85) 14831 
Feb. 16 1933 1690 Mar. 12 5 5 3 (88) 13526 
Feb. 17 1807 1600 Mar. 13 4 4 7 (95) 12094 
Feb. 18 1693 1660 Mar. 14 4 4 16 (111) 10734 
Feb. 19 349 (775) 615 Mar. 15 4 4 12 (123) 9898 
Feb. 20 411 (631) 319 Mar. 16 1 1 20 (143) 8976 
Feb. 21 366 314 Mar. 17 1 1 12 (155) 8056 
Feb. 22 630 541 Mar. 18 0 0 34 (189) 7263 
Feb. 23 398 348 Mar. 19 0 0 39 (228) 6569 
Feb. 24 499 464 Mar. 20 0 0 41 (269) 6013 
Feb. 25 401 370 Mar. 21 0 0 45 (314) 5549 
Note: data compiled by the author. Sources: Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, 
<http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/front/web/list3rd/yes/802> accessed March 21, 2020; Nation Health 
Commission of the PRC, <http://www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/yqtb/list_gzbd.shtml> accessed March 22, 2020. 
 
  Because of a lack of transparency, it is not possible to verify whether these official 
statistics closely reflect the realities. First, there is an issue about testing. How widely the tests 
are available to three types of patients--critical patients, patients with mild symptoms, and those 
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who carry the virus but do not show symptoms--is unknown. If tests are not distributed 
sufficiently wide or are not made available, it is highly possible that patients with mild symptoms 
and those who do not show symptoms are not included in the data. Only when the data about the 
number of people tested and their distribution is presented can we know how well a country is 
coping with the crisis. For the countries where the disease did not originate and that had time for 
preparedness, the data also tells how well these countries are preparing for the possible crisis. 
Data is relatively transparent in many democracies. It is also not difficult to find out from news 
reports whether, how many and when the testing is available in these countries. In non-
democracies, this information is not readily available. Second, if a country is ill-prepared, which 
also includes a failure to prevent the spread at the very beginning, and its bureaucracies do not 
function at the time of crisis, faced with a sudden surge of the disease’s  attack, it has a higher 
chance of experiencing a collapse in its medical system, including a lack of medical supplies for 
patients and for nurses and doctors as well. When the medical system is collapsing, the data is 
not reliable because people do not get tested and even when they get tested, they may not get 
treatment. The results of the test can also be fabricated to meet the official expectation, which is 
more likely to happen in a non-democracy.  
As the PRC provides the world the number of zero cases for four consecutive days as this 
epilogue is written, there are also news reports indicating a need to be doubtful of the data. Tan 
Zhigang, a resident of Wuhan, expressed his distrust of official statistics. “It is just like the 
Wenzhou train collision. In answering journalists’ questions about how many people die, the 
official of the railway department said regardless of whether you believe the number that I 
provide, I believe and as long as they [higher officials] believe, it counts.” Mr. Ding provided a 
more detailed description of his mother Hu Aizhen’s situation. According to him, when his 
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mother showed symptoms at the end of January, the hospital denied her a bed on the ground that 
there was no bed to provide. Many hospitals that he visited all refused to give his mother a test to 
see if it was positive. What his mother got instead was oxygen. He brought his mother to the 
hospital to get oxygen for more than 10 hours on a daily basis and this continued for 10 more 
days before his mother passed away.446  
On March 10, Zhang Yi, a Wuhan resident, took his mother to Wuhan Asia Heart Hospital 
for the treatment of heart-related foot problems. In his own video recording, he mentioned the 
need to do blood testing to see whether his mother contracted the virus before getting 
hospitalized. Zhang also stated that there were patients who just got confirmed positive without 
showing any symptoms and would be transferred to a different hospital. He concluded that there 
is a need to test all Wuhan residents because they could be potential virus carriers.447 A voice 
recording from a Wuhan doctor followed up the development of the events after Zhang brought 
his mother to the hospital. The doctor said that the blood testing is according to the new policy 
stipulated in the seventh version of the guidance for diagnosis and treatment. This new method is 
faster in getting the result, more accurate, and cheaper compared to RT-PCR. However, the 
blood testing stopped one day after Zhang’s visit to the hospital. He assessed that the other two 
hospitals probably would not be able to provide the test either since Asia Heart and the Renmin 
Hospital of Wuhan University had already stopped the test.448  
 
446 Radio Free Asia, “ Questions Are Raised About China’s Statistics As Hubei Is Reported to Have Zero 
Cases for Two Consecutive Days” [湖北连续两日无新增病例 中国疫情数据再受质疑], March 20, 2020 
 <https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/huanjing/ql2-03202020064837.html> March 21, 2020. 
447 The Epoch Times, “ Video: Patients With No Symptoms Wander Around in the Hospital” [视频：无症状
确诊“中共病毒”病患在医院游荡], March 11, 
2020,<https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/20/3/10/n11929948.htm> accessed March 26, 2020.  
448 See the video uploaded by New Tang Dynasty Television, “Wuhan Doctor’s Disclosure: the Dreadful Truth 
of the Release of the Patients in Shelter Hospitals” [武漢醫生爆內幕：方艙大規模「清零」可怕實情], 
March 15, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CKxK2wPJ9Ew> accessed March 26, 2020. 
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This Wuhan doctor also commented on the lifting of quarantine order on the patients in the 
shelter hospitals (方舱医院), which were makeshift facilities built in response to the outbreak. 
He expressed his concerns about how “the expert team showed frenzy in signing the papers to lift 
the order”. According to him, the expert team would sign the paper even though it was clear that 
patients had not recovered, and they did not even ask about patients’ symptoms. As long as the 
CT test showed some progress toward recovery, the paper would be signed, and patients would 
go home. He expressed that if he did not sign during his shift, the next doctor would sign. The 
doctor concluded: “many things were not about medical professionalism”; they are about “the 
diagnosis and the cure of political science. It is too scary that people in the shelter hospitals were 
discharged in this way.”449 When this epilogue is written, China had stopped testing people and 
discharged patients between early and mid-March. Lack of testing and a premature lifting of the 
quarantine order would lead to inaccurate numbers on reported newly confirmed cases and the 
current confirmed cases.   
The replacement of officials in Hubei and Wuhan and the declining reported cases are 
highly associated. Unless there are reliable sources of statistics that can pass through several 
screens of scrutiny including non-state media reports, people’s reactions and the views of 
medical personnel among others, numbers provided by Chinese authorities should be seen with 
skepticism. Since March 4, the statistics have focused on imported cases, meaning that the 
patients contracted the disease outside the country, while official data shows that nationwide 
local confirmed cases are dwindling day by day. For the imported cases, the numbers in 
parentheses are accumulative.  The political message of these statistics to both domestic and 
international audiences is clear; since the new officials assumed office, China has been fighting 
 
449 Ibid. 
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the disease more effectively and the imported cases are the result of the situation being out of 
control in other countries.  
The narratives in the English texts depict China as a fully responsible actor in that not only 
is the control of the disease a nationwide effort with the population and the CCP fully in 
coordination, but it is also science-oriented with measures properly designed. “[U]nder the 
personal leadership and direction of President Xi Jinping, the Chinese government and people 
have fought a people’s war against COVID-19. We have acted according to the principle of 
shoring up confidence, strengthening unity, ensuring science-based control and taking targeted 
measures. We have all along been open and transparent, and put people’s health and safety front 
and center.”450 Beijing claims that its offers of help to the international society and the 
willingness to cooperate with other countries are out of its sympathetic feelings based on its 
experience in coping with the disease. “China’s readiness to help is inspired by humanitarianism; 
it has no ideological agenda, and is still less driven by selfish geopolitical interests.”451 It 
continues to reason that the international “assistance” which it provides and the endeavors it put 
forth to create an environment of solidarity follow the goal of “building a community with a 
shared future for mankind.” The narratives indicate a confidence that China’s dealings have won 
international support. “More and more countries have come to appreciate and agree with China’s 
position. It has become a common voice and consensus in the international community to reject 
any attempt at labeling the virus, politicizing the response, and stigmatizing any specific 
 
450 “Wang Yi: China Provides Experience for Global Response and Boosts Confidence in Defeating the 
Virus”, MOFA, April 28, 2020, 
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/t1774292.shtml> accessed May 2, 2020. 
451 “Wang Yi: China's International Anti-epidemic Cooperation Never Seeks Selfish Geopolitical Interests,” 
MOFA, April 28, 2020, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/t1774283.shtml> 
accessed May 2, 2020. 
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country.”452 Specifically, Beijing was deflating foreign criticism of its own denial that the virus 
originated in China, one of its diplomats’ accusation that the virus was brought by the American 
military to the PRC, and the international demands for an explanation and a thorough 
investigation of the source. Instead of tackling the problems at the roots, that is, with a reflective 
process to examine how the disease originated and the mishandling in the first place, the 
narratives turn lofty in stating that it is more important to make concerted efforts worldwide to 
deal with the virus as the common enemy of mankind than to politicize the issue. Many countries 
would agree that the priority is to control the spread, but in the context of the CCP raising this 
point, the implication may be that there is no need to trace the source and China will not be 
“stigmatized” to take the blame.  
An article from the People’s Daily reported that Xi’s March 10 “visit” to Wuhan amid the 
declining reported cases was “inspiring” and “projected confidence and strength for China and 
the world in their efforts to fight the disease.” It is a “demonstration of China’s strength and 
China’s spirit.” The article went that Xi during his visit particularly expressed gratitude to the 
people of Wuhan. “Wuhan is a city of heroes. The people of Wuhan are a heroic people.” Before 
it brought in the comment that the leadership of the CCP and the people of China have worked 
together to overcome the difficulties, the article indicates that Xi’s visit “demonstrated the 
practice of the idea of the shared community for mankind” because it “mustered the strength and 
lifted the spirit for the people of China and projected powerful energy to the world in its coping 
with the disease.”453 
 
452 Wang Yi, “Following Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy To Build a Community with a Shared Future for 
Mankind Through International Cooperation Against COVID-19,” MOFA, April 19, 2020,  
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/t1771257.shtml> accessed May 2, 2020. 
453 People’s Daily, “Projecting Confidence and Strength for China and the World for Their Fight Against the 
Virus” [为中国和世界抗击疫情注入信心与力量], March 12, 2020, 
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Another People’s Daily article praised China’s attitudes and measures taken to cope with 
the coronavirus in a way that shows the country as “a responsible major power.” According to 
this article, Beijing’s dealings with the disease “traded time for the countries around the world in 
their dealings with the virus,” which the spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs has so far 
stressed in the press conference twice,454  and “[it] has made major contributions and won the 
international applause.”455 Xinhua also came up with a list of praises from foreign intellectuals, 
scholars and officials to prove that the PRC was doing well. It commented, “the international 
society has high regard [to China] and sees that the Chinese government and the Chinese people 
have effectively fought with the disease. It is inspiring. [The international society] believes that 
China can accelerate the pace of restoring production and restoring the normal life, and further 
provide positive influence to China’s and the world’s economy.”456  
In the context of the officially reported dwindling of infected cases, at the March 20 press 
briefing of WHO, Tedros expressed that “Wuhan reported no cases for the first time since the 
 
<http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2020-03/12/nw.D110000renmrb_20200312_1-03.htm> accessed 
March 22, 2020. 
454 In the March 20 press briefing, the spokesperson said, “From February 16 to 24, the China-WHO Joint 
Mission with two American experts on board conducted their nine-day field trip in China and highly appraised 
China's prevention and control measures. They specifically pointed out that China has played a vital role in 
protecting the international community, as China's measures have bought valuable time and provided valuable 
experience for all (emphasis added).” See MOFA, 
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1758992.shtml> accessed 
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outbreak started. Wuhan provided hope for the rest of the world that even the most serious 
situation can be turned around.”457 
As countries worldwide have received severe impact from the virus, the PRC has gone for 
a global offensive to change the narrative from itself being the origin place of the disease and 
handling the domestic crisis opaquely to present itself as having a transparent, efficient, and 
people-caring government that also helps other countries fight the disease by doing such things 
as “donating” testing kits. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs records a long list of Chinese 
diplomats’ actions in changing the world’s perceptions of the country, including signed articles 
in the newspapers of other countries and interactions with foreign officials through telephone 
conversations, face-to-face talks and interviews.458 
The current pandemic may severely damage China’s economy, but it certainly has not 
affected its will to shape domestic and international perceptions. Meanwhile, the PRC has 
intensified military activities in the first island chain. On February 9, for an open-sea training, it 
sent out J-11 fighter jets, H-6 bombers, and KJ-500 early warning aircraft to pass through the 
Bashi Channel to the Western Pacific before returning through the Miyako Strait. Taiwan’s 
Ministry of National Defense (MND) published a photo showing a Taiwanese F-16 armed with 
missiles shadowing a Chinese H-6 bomber coded 20015 within a close range. Next day, China 
again sent out H-6 bombers and escort planes through the Taiwan Strait before passing the Bashi 
Channel to the Western Pacific. Taiwanese MND again published a photo that identifies a H-6 
bomber coded 20018. The escort planes briefly crossed the middle line of the Strait and retreated 
 
457 WHO March 20 Press Conference, <https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-audio-emergencies-coronavirus-press-conference-full-
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to the west of the Strait after several warnings from Taiwan’s F-16s.459 When asked about 
Chinese harassment, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan expressed that “I think what everyone 
cares most is the spread of the disease. The world has been paying attention to the outbreak in 
China. There are also a lot of things they [China] need to deal with. It is meaningless and 
unnecessary to have these military moves at this time……At this time, I want to tell China that 
the important thing is to have the epidemic under control so as to ease the pressure that the 
region and the world are faced with.”460 On February 12, the US sent out one MC-130J 
Commando II tanker and two B-52 bombers to fly through the Taiwan Strait and along the east 
coast of Taiwan respectively. Taiwan’s defense experts commented that it was usual for 
Washington to take such action.461  
On February 28, the PRC sent out H-6 bombers again for training and approached 
Taiwan’s southwestern Air Defense Identification Zone. The fourth harassment came on March 
16 when, as has rarely happened before, a KJ-500 early warning aircraft and J-11 fighters were 
sent for a night training in the airspace southwest of Taiwan. Taiwan scrambled F-16s and IDF 
fighters to intercept Chinese planes that approached its ADIZ.462 Two days later, China’s one 
destroyer, two frigates and one supply ship passed through the Miyako Strait. On March 23, 
Japan’s Air Force intercepted China’s EP-3 early warning plane in the East China Sea. Two days 
 
459 Taiwan’s MND, news release, Feb. 9 and Feb. 10, 
<https://www.mnd.gov.tw/PublishTabs.aspx?parentId=65&NodeId=657&title=%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%
E6%B6%88%E6%81%AF&SelectStyle=%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E%E7%A8%BF&Page=2> accessed 
March 26, 2020; Taipei Times, “Taiwan Shadow Chinese Aircraft,” Feb. 10, 
<https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/02/10/2003730700>; Taipei Times, “MAC Protests 
Provocative Flights,” Feb. 11, 2020, 
<https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2020/02/11/2003730751>. 
460 See The Liberty Times, February 10, <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3063099> 
accessed March 26, 2020. 
461 CNA staff, “US military flies bomber to south of Taiwan,” Taipei Times, Feb. 14, 2020, 
<https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/02/14/2003730967> accessed March 26, 2020. 
462 The Liberty Times, March 17, <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3102230> accessed 
March 26, 2020. 
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later, it again intercepted a Chinese Y-9 intelligence aircraft which was passing through the 
Tsushima Strait. One of the PRC’s frigates on March 26 was spotted cruising through the 
Tsushima and entering the Sea of Japan.463 
According to Aircraft Spots’ twitter, the US, on March 24, flew a Navy EP-3E 
reconnaissance aircraft through the Bashi Channel and headed north to the airspace southwest of 
Taiwan’s southern city of Kaohsiung. From the map, it seems that the plane hovered and flew 
back and forth in parallel with Taiwan’s southwestern ADIZ. On March 25, the US Pacific Fleet 
transited a guided-missile destroyer through the Taiwan Strait. The Fleet tweeted with photos: 
“US Navy sailors stand watch aboard USS McCampbell as the forward-deployed US 7th Fleet 
guided missile destroyer transit the Taiwan Strait on Wednesday.” The caption of the photos on 
its Facebook wrote, “McCampbell is underway conducting operations in the Indo-Pacific region 
while assigned to Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 15, the Navy’s largest forward-deployed 
DESRON and the U.S. 7th Fleet’s principal surface force.” One photo shows an MH-60 Sea 
Hawk helicopter taking off from the deck. On March 26, Aircraft Spots tweeted that the US Air 
Force flew two B-52H bombers to the East China Sea and close to Taiwan from its Anderson 
Base at Guam, with support from two KC-135R tankers. 
China saw itself as a target audience of the American military activities and on March 
26/27 issued several comments to pin the US in the role of villain. The PRC’s Ministry of 
National Defense published both Chinese and English versions of the recent events and Chinese 
reactions, with the English version coming from China Daily’s report.464 The English article saw 
 
463 Japan’s Joint Staff Press Releases, March 19, March 23,  March 25 and March 26, 
<https://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2020.htm>. 
464 It seems that the news report from China Daily confused the date and instead of February 17, it wrote 
February 27. 
442 
the encounter on February 17 and a US warship transit through the Taiwan Strait as 
“provocative,” because it “undermined Chinese sovereignty, poisoned bilateral relations and 
disrupted regional peace and security.” It described that a US EP-3 surveillance aircraft operated 
only 400 meters away from a Chinese ship to spy on the Chinese activities for four hours and 
“ignored numerous warnings from the Chinese.” It quoted the spokesperson of the PRC’s MND 
as saying, the American maneuvers were “extremely inappropriate, unprofessional and 
unsafe……They constitute a serious violation of international laws on freedom of navigation and 
are the root cause of problems between China and the US on maritime security. Yet the US not 
only ignores their wrongdoings but has also launched complaints and baseless accusations. We 
resolutely oppose these actions.” The spokesperson also commented on the American military 
exercises in the South China Sea earlier in March as “barge recklessly into the region, threaten 
national security of nearby countries and disrupt regional peace and stability.” Regarding USS 
McCampbell’s transit, the spokesperson said, “it sent the wrong message to Taiwan 
secessionists……We will absolutely not allow any foreign forces to play the Taiwan card, and 
will not tolerate any attempts of secession.”465 
Regional countries would continue to show their will through military presence. The 
second half of March and April were eventful in that actions and reactions from various parties 
confirm that neither side will back down during a crisis. Chinese vessels rammed into 
Vietnamese fishing boats, the Japanese destroyer Shimakaze, and a Taiwanese patrol boat.466 The 
 
465 The PRC’s MND news release, “China blasts ‘provocative actions’ by US,” March 27, 2020, 
<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2020-03/27/content_4862661.htm>  accessed March 27, 2020. 
466 “ Chinese Ships Rammed into Taiwanese, Japanese and Vietnamese ships” [中國「直直撞」！連撞台
灣、日本 週四再撞沉越南漁船],The Liberty Times, April 04, 2020, 
<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/3122781>; Burke Matt & Ichihashi Aya, “Japanese 
destroyer is damaged in collision with Chinese fishing vessel in East China Sea,” Stars and Stripes, March 31, 
2020, <https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japanese-destroyer-is-damaged-in-collision-with-chinese-
fishing-vessel-in-east-china-sea-1.624290>. 
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PLA naval warships would also hold military drills in the South China Sea and continue to cruise 
through the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel before returning to their bases. On April 23, 
Taiwan’s MOD published a photo of Liaoning that was recently taken during a surveillance 
mission.467 The aircraft carrier and 5 other warships also cruised through the Miyako Strait in 
late April.468 Washington made its presence felt as well. Aside from sending warships to pass 
through the Taiwan Strait, it seems that the US exponentially increased the patrols of its 
intelligence gathering aircraft in the area of the Bashi Channel and the triangular area between 
the airspace off of Taiwan’s southwest and that off of China’s southeast.469 Meanwhile, Japan 
announced the increase of troops deployed to Miyako island from 350 personnel to 700. The new 
arrangements came with new surface-to-air missile batteries and new land-based anti-ship 
missile batteries. Of the latter, part of the forces will be stationed on Ishigaki island.470  
Instead of a purely global health issue, the pandemic is more likely to set in motion a series 
of events in international politics between the PRC and other countries for the coming one to two 
decades. China’s politicization of the disease by turning the event into a propaganda tool and by 
distracting domestic attention through a show of military moves is the latest case that exemplifies 
the exercise of role construction and the framing of the issues to justify its overseas objectives. 
The narratives are constructed in a way highlighting that Beijing is on the right side and has an 
 
467 Tsai Ching-yu, “ Ministry of Defense Published A Photo of Liaoning to Show Its Recent Presence” [證實
遼寧號近海現蹤 國防部首度公布自行拍攝照片], United Daily, March 23, 2020, 
<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4513939>. 
468 Japan’s Joint Staff Press Release,” April 28, 2020, 
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altruistic heart for the people around the world in the time of a pandemic crisis. It also provides 
evidence to the idea discussed in this research about China’s increasing assertiveness in 
discursive construction to support outward expansion and its activeness in overseas activities, 
even though its domestic foundation is weakening.  
China’s economic growth has been on a gradual decline from 2007 onward. Trade war 
with the US and the pandemic cast further shadows on its economic prospects. As this 
dissertation shows, a slowing growth rate has not affected China’s overseas expansion. Neither 
does it affect the sense of cultural superiority as demonstrated in chapter 4. On the contrary, it 
has positive correlation with its growing determination to expand outward. Such determination is 
reflected in the refined discursive construct of how a strong and prosperous China can reshape 
the world order and bring the world peace and prosperity because of the inherent peaceful nature 
of its governing institutions and Chinese culture. Paralleling declining economic growth are 
proactive overseas infrastructure investments and military activities in both the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans. In the public speeches, they are rationalized with inclusive rhetoric of benefiting 
countries around the world. The rhetoric of inclusiveness that denies strategic calculations does 
not honestly reflect the Chinese perceptions of world politics which, as chapter 3 demonstrates, 
have been constantly informed by material strength and realpolitik since the founding of the 
PRC. The post-Cold War role construction of the self and others in which the altercasting 
process that produces role congruence plays a major part and the othering process which creates 
enemies becomes less salient are the strategic product of Chinese considerations of how to 
achieve maximum material gains, both economically and militarily, in a relatively peaceful 
international climate, which Beijing correlates with the trend of multipolarity, without causing 
major backlash that will hamper its design of reshaping the world order.  
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In repeatedly emphasizing a continuous need of a peaceful international environment for 
globalization and for other countries’ development, China hopes to create an environment in 
which it will be able to expand by minimizing foreign resistance. The other benefit is that it can 
claim that the forthcoming arrival of a more just international order is because of China’s 
peaceful development that does not involve the use of force. In this regard, Chinese imperialism 
bears the characteristics of peacetime expansion in that it hopes to achieve its political goal of 
obtaining international status and influence without using force.  Nevertheless, the focus on the 
pre-war stage does not mean a relinquishment of or an aversion, cultural or otherwise, to war as a 
solution. It is a matter of situational assessments.  As chapter 5 argues, Chinese strategic culture 
is neither defensive nor offensive, but rather about what the goals are and how they can be 
achieved. Since the post-Cold War climate is peaceful, there is no need to rock the boat because 
it will be too costly. The textual analysis in this research shows that the signs of increasing 
chances for the use of force can be detected by reading how the roles are readjusted in the 
Chinese narratives. The 2017 foreign policy paper about “Asia-Pacific” and the 2019 defense 
white paper indicate that China has perceived the world in a way that there are more hostile 
forces against its interests. The narratives justify Chinese positions by pointing fingers at others. 
What this reveals, consistent with the PRC’s historiography of the major and small wars that it 
has fought, is that China does not avoid war, but instead takes actions according to its own 
judgements of situations, and whatever actions it takes, it will self-rationalize them (including the 
use of force) through role construction informed by the othering and altercasting processes. 
China’s behavior during the pandemic of Wuhan pneumonia conforms to the pattern of 
how the CCP will reassert itself domestically and internationally. Using its people’s misery and 
shifting their roles to reshape the world’s perceptions when domestic situations are worsening is 
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reflective of the findings in this research that the PRC has grown discursively assertive along 
with its active overseas expansion as a means to address domestic problems. The intensified 
military activities in the first island chain in the middle of the crisis are to distract domestic 
attention, and to shift China’s problem to become someone else’s problem, again through a role 
construction of I and the Other. The current pandemic conforms to the theory laid out in chapter 
2 that material strength does not necessarily have positive correlations with the mentality of 
superiority. It is the aspiration for future gains that goes hand in hand with discursive 
assertiveness. 
As Beijing devotes resources to military development, which does not necessarily require 
a booming economy, it has fewer restraints in utilizing military means to coerce and intimidate 
others, and even to use force, now that it has more affordable tools that can be used for assertion 
in its foreign policy and is narrowing the gaps for what is required for war. This trend will persist 
if the PRC continues to allocate resources for the Navy, compared to other services of the armed 
forces, after the pandemic. It is unclear at this stage how the crisis will affect globalization and 
the global economy. It is also unclear at this stage how it, together with the trade war with the 
US, will affect foreign investments in China and global production chains. That countries trade 
and do business with the PRC may not be drastically changed. However, it is possible that the 
PRC may be even more aggressive in pursuing overseas interests to satisfy a domestic economy 
which is further weakened by the disease. It is the prospect for future gains that drives 
assertiveness. As the change of the leadership in Wuhan shows, a weakening domestic 
foundation at the same time may prompt the ruling elite to shore up their power and to behave 
with less conciliation in an authoritarian country. The case of China exemplifies the coexistence 
of the sense of insecurity and agitated ambitions.  
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Journey to the West, one of the Chinese classics, is the tale of a Buddhist monk, Xuanzang 
(Tang Sanzang), embarking on a years-long pilgrimage to India to obtain the original sacred 
Buddhist scriptures written in Sanskrit. He is accompanied by three disciples. One of them is Sun 
Wukong, or the Monkey King. Wukong was witty and had mastered the 72 types of 
transformation. He could travel 10,800 li within one second. With his supernatural capabilities, 
he grew arrogant and infuriated the gods. To make Wukong behave, the Jade Emperor who 
oversaw the Celestial Court provided him a low-ranking position and had other gods watch over 
him. Wukong then escaped the Court for he did not find freedom of movement there in a way 
that he could boss things around. In his old mountain where he was revered as a king by fellow 
monkeys, there were no behavioral restrictions and no suppression on his egoism. He called 
himself, “Great Sage Equal to Heaven.” After knowing that he was not invited to the Celestial 
banquet, out of revenge, Wukong ate the peaches that were to be offered to gods during the 
banquet. Eating the peaches made him immortal and his supernatural capabilities were 
strengthened as well. Riding the wave of newly gained confidence, he turned the Celestial Court 
upside down and created chaos. By now, the Jade Emperor asked the Buddha for help. The 
Buddha had the Monkey King in its palm. Wukong was confident that he could escape by 
urinating to mark places where he had been. However he tried, he could not escape from the 
Buddha’s palm. The Buddha eventually placed Wukong under the mountain for 500 years before 
he was ordered to accompany Xuanzang on a trip to India. Wukong’s responsibilities were to 
protect Xuanzang from the harms caused by demons. This did not mean that he had freedom to 
do whatever he liked. The Buddha of Mercy put a gold head band on him. Whenever his ego 
arose and started behaving unruly, Xuanzang could discipline him by chanting a Buddhist 
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mantra, om mani padme hum. The gold band tightened as the chanting continued and would 
cause him a severe headache.  
However cunning and capable Wukong perceived himself, he was diminutive in front of 
the Buddha. However intelligent and resourceful he was in using his magic to fool others and 
rebel against the Celestial Court, he was powerless upon hearing a few words of mantra. Wu of 
Wukong means enlightened or awakened. Kong means no attachments and no wearing masks. If 
the Monkey King had realized the meanings of his name, he would not have acted so 
presumptuously and created troubles for others as well as causing himself to suffer from the 500 
years of immobility plus intolerable headaches, while being ignorant of the knowledge that his 
unsettled mind was the source of all the disturbances.  
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Reference Notes 
 
Because of the nature of sources cited, aside from bibliography, this section is needed to 
describe the primary sources and how they were obtained. For the documents and articles 
explained here, they will not be included in the bibliography. The NCCPC (Party’s Congress) 
reports can be found on the CPC news website 
(http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64162/64168/index.html). China’s Ministry of Defense 
publishes defense white papers, both in Chinese and English versions. It also includes the 2017 
foreign policy white paper (China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation [中国的亚太
安全合作政策]). The news releases and press conferences from China’s MOD also provides 
information used in this research (http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/index.htm and 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/node_48462.htm). Japanese and Taiwanese MODs are also sources 
for regional military activities. This research also benefits from the Wilson Center Digital 
Archive for its collections of primary documents during Mao’s era. Two collections, Foundations 
of Chinese Foreign Policy and Bandung Conference, are particularly useful.  
Aside from official documents, the Qiushi Journal is systematically examined to explore 
the Chinese worldview. The journal’s website publishes Chinese issues since 2004, and English 
issues from 2009 to 2013. English Qiushi from 2014 to 2018 come in hard copies. Red Flag 
Manuscript can also be found on its website (http://www.qstheory.cn/hqwglist/mulu.htm). 
Contemporary International Relations and International Studies are foreign policy journals from 
think thanks, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations and China Institute of 
International Studies respectively. The former is affiliated with the Ministry of State Security and 
the latter with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The journal of Chinese Military Science is a 
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publication of the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Science. Foreign policy and 
military journals are used to analyze the PRC’s policy rationales.  
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